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Abstract 
 
The Slaveholding Crisis: The Fear of Insurrection, the Wilmot Proviso, and the Southern 
Turn Against American Exceptionalism 
by 
Carl Lawrence Paulus 
 
On December 20, 1860, South Carolinians voted to abandon the Union and sparked the 
deadliest war in American history. Led by a proslavery movement that viewed Abraham 
Lincoln’s place at the helm of the federal government as a real and present danger to the 
security of the South's system of slavery, southerners—both slaveholders and 
nonslaveholders—willingly risked civil war by seceding from the United States. Rather 
than staying within the fold of the Union and awaiting the new president’s conduct 
regarding slavery in the territories and in the slave states, secessionists took bold action to 
change their destiny. By acting on their expectations of what the new president would do 
instead of waiting for his actual policy initiatives, they wagered on the possibility of a 
different future. This dissertation contends that the southern fear of slave insurrection, 
which was influenced by the Haitian Revolution, and the belief that northern antislavery 
forces would use violent uprising to end southern slavery shaped the planter ethos over 
the arc of the antebellum period, affecting national politics. Furthermore, this project 
explains why secessionists viewed Abraham Lincoln's support of the Wilmot Proviso as a 
valid reason for disunion.
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Introduction 
The Role of Anticipation in the Actions of Slaveholders 
 
For the generality of men are naturally apt to be swayed by fear rather than by reverence. 
-Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 
 
The perfect condition of slavery...is nothing else, but the state of war continued, between a lawful 
conqueror and a captive. 
-John Locke, The Second Treatise of Civil Government, Of Slavery 
 
Anticipation has guided human behavior throughout history. Future expectations often 
dictate present choices, and in a democratic society, citizens choose their leaders based 
on what they presume those leaders will do once in office. Protest movements choose 
their directions from projected results, and citizens’ reactions to government policies are 
inseparable from their expectations about those policies’ ramifications. This relationship 
is woven into the very fabric of the United States by the Constitution's preamble: "We the 
People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, 
insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general 
Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and 
establish this Constitution for the United States of America." Americans ratified their 
new Constitution in 1788 not simply to secure the new government for their own 
generation, but to ensure that the Union would serve as a future safeguard for freedom, 
prosperity, and safety for their descendants.  
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 On December 20, 1860, South Carolinians voted to abandon that Union for the 
same reasons their state had joined it. Led by a proslavery movement that viewed 
Abraham Lincoln’s place at the helm of the federal government as a real and present 
danger to the security of the South's system of slavery, southerners—both slaveholders 
and nonslaveholders—willingly risked civil war by seceding from the United States. 
Rather than staying within the fold of the Union and waiting to see how the new president 
would conduct himself in regards to slavery in the territories and in the South, these 
southerners took bold action to change their destiny. By acting on their anticipations, they 
wagered on the possibility of a different future, believing the time for separation had 
arrived. As this dissertation contends, the fear of slave insurrection, which was influenced 
by the Haitian Revolution, and the belief that northern antislavery forces would work to 
end slavery at all cost—including inciting slave violence—shaped planter concerns for 
the future over the arc of the antebellum period, affecting the very course of national 
politics. In addition to these fears, Abraham Lincoln's support for the Wilmot Proviso, 
which prohibited the expansion of slavery in the West, became seen as a sufficient and 
valid reason for disunion and the creation of the Confederacy. 
 From 1840 to 1850, six different men served as president of the United States. All 
six held a different worldview and acted as individuals, in many cases unencumbered by 
their party's own platforms. They all invariably put the nation on the path to Civil War by 
implementing policies that they individually hoped and believed would move the nation 
forward. American history has often been altered by the unexpected—for example, the 
deaths of two presidents in three presidential election cycles. This dissertation focuses on 
those in power in the South and their expectations of what would happen if political 
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leaders in the North became too influenced—or corrupted—by "fanatical" abolitionists. 
As the North became more antislavery, both in perception and reality, fears of the 
implications of this position helped create a broad consensus among ordinary white 
southerners that led them to risk their lives on the battlefield in the name of defending 
their homes and way of life. 
 Despite outward appearances, slaveholders in America understood the dangers of 
holding another human being in bondage. They believed an insurrection by the enslaved 
could occur at any moment and often contemplated the results. Planters especially 
worried that southern society would fall into, as they termed it, "servile insurrection." The white fear of blacks played an important role in the history of the South. From the use of former slaves by Britain in the American War of Independence to white flight that plagued cities across the United States in the twentieth century, white paranoia about black Americans has been a common thread woven into the fabric of American history. This paranoia likewise played a pivotal role in the politics of slavery from 1800 to 1860. Throughout the antebellum period southerners continually pointed to the Haitian Revolution as an example of what was likely to occur in the United States if white Americans living in free states ever turned against slavery.  As the French colony of San Domingue erupted with revolution and racial warfare, which American planters blamed on ruthless "fanatics" who wanted to end slavery at all costs, southerners developed a proslavery interpretation of the Constitution that stated slavery must be protected under all conditions. Nationally, the proslavery movement controlled discussions of the antislavery movement. 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Deeming everyone who opposed slavery a "fanatic," proslavery spokesmen pointed to antislavery advocates as promoters of slave insurrection and the violent destruction of the South. 
  For the most part, white southerners believed their own rhetoric. The Haitian Revolution in 1791 showed—despite the constant harping of American planters about the docility of their own slaves—that a black population, yearning to be free, had the capability of violently revolting en masse against their bondage. Slavery became the American Janus, and every major slave insurrection scare in the South became connected to Haiti, regardless of how long ago it had happened—even while slaveholders told the world that their system of slavery had little in common with the slavery of San Domingue. Proslavery writers often stated that the result of 
emancipation in the South would be disastrous, not just to the economic well being of the 
planter class, but also to the physical safety of all whites living in the South. Slaveholders 
believed the end of slavery would spark racial violence. In a demented form of empathy, 
they expected that freed blacks would seek revenge in the same way they would if the 
roles had been reversed. While slaveholders told themselves that those they personally 
held in bondage would never rise up, planters also had a near constant fear of an 
American Toussaint leading a rebellion against the master class. In such an extreme 
crisis, southerners in the first decades of the nineteenth century believed that the federal 
5   
government, if controlled by the proslavery movement, could act as a safety net by 
sending the military to protect the white population.1 
  In reaction to the Haitian Revolution, southern politicians demanded that the federal government protect slavery by not creating any policy that they believed would lend credence to successful slave uprisings in the Caribbean, and thus inspiring them in the United States. For example, fearing that officially recognizing the only nation to be created from a slave rebellion would undermine southern slavery, leaders of the proslavery movement, in the name of national security, blocked the official recognition of Haiti for nearly seventy years, from the 1790s to 1860. During the days of the early republic, most slaveholders believed that as long as the federal government did not interfere with slavery, or slavery's natural expansion, the South's peculiar institution would remain safely intact. A laissez‐faire attitude domestically combined with a proslavery foreign policy was all they needed.  
  This connection between slavery and the federal government, however, began to change with emancipation in the West Indies by England. Historians Edward Rugemer and Matthew Guterl have shown that southern slaveholders were well aware of their Caribbean counterparts and often related and contrasted the experiences in southern slaveholding to that of the West Indies. The end of slavery in the West Indies by Great Britain showed American slaveholders that slavery 
                                                        
1 Drew Gilpin Faust, A Sacred Circle: The Dilemma of the Intellectual in the Old South, 1840-1860 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977): 112-131. 
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could be eliminated by majoritarian votes in a national assembly in the same way that the Haitian Revolution proved the possibility of a successful slave insurrection in what was once considered one of the most stable slave societies in the world.2  
  The initial, natural reaction to emancipation in the West Indies by slaveholders was to compare the national government of the United States to its British counterpart.  While some radicals in the proslavery movement prophesied otherwise, American slaveholders in the 1830s—as did most of their fellow citizens—believed that the unique system of government created by the Constitution protected slavery in a way that the British Parliament did not. The Union, argued southerners who supported the Constitution, had been created to "insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence." Unlike the British 
central government, the American federal government had the duty to protect slavery 
from foes that wanted to violently overthrow it. During the American discussion of 
British emancipation, southern Unionists—like most Americans—argued that the 
Constitution was exceptional. American federalism was unique, especially in comparison 
to British parliamentarianism and colonialism. Most southerners in the 1830s believed 
that abolitionists in the United States could never gain enough control to affect slavery in 
the South. They anticipated that the “fanatics” of the antislavery movement would never 
trump the risk of slave insurrection and would never gain mainstream acceptance in the 
North.                                                          
2 Edward Bartlett Rugemer, The Problem of Emancipation: The Caribbean Roots of the American Civil 
War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2008); Matthew Pratt Guterl, American 
Mediterranean: Southern Slaveholders in the Age of Emancipation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2008).  
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 Not all southerners agreed, however. Some, most notably South Carolina 
proslavery radical Robert Turnbull in 1833, predicted a future where an antislavery 
northern majority would slowly gain power. The South, he warned, traveled on the same 
road that Jamaica and other British Caribbean colonies did. An Abolitionist Power had 
been at work for years, Turnbull told his readers. He maintained that a massive trans-
Atlantic conspiracy against slavery was being formed. The antislavery movement hoped 
to turn the South into the Caribbean. Under the power of this new majority, the 
Constitution would not protect slaveholders. During the three decades before the Civil 
War, a large portion of southern society came to adopt Turnbull's worldview, including 
some of the most powerful leaders in the South. 
 Following Turnbull's lead in the 1830s, many proslavery radicals critiqued the 
notion of American exceptionalism by challenging the idea that the Constitution was any 
different from the English Parliament. Ardent supporters of slavery began to claim that 
the federal government had the duty to actively protect domestic slavery. Under the guise 
of national security and pointing to the shadow of the Haitian Revolution that loomed 
over the South, they supported legislation that censored the free speech of abolitionists, 
advocated strengthening the military in order to protect against slave insurrections, and 
promoted the expansion of slaveholding territory in the West—all of which fell under the 
prerogative of the national government. Due to the crucial support of compliant northern 
politicians who did not oppose slavery, southerners succeeded in creating a stronger 
federal government that could protect American slavery and attack the Abolitionist 
Power they came to fear. White southerners, over time, cemented this connection 
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between American exceptionalism and the government's active protection of slavery. 
 The proslavery movement soon realized, however, that a small group of 
congressmen could reshape American politics almost instantly and that their northern 
allies, who for decades had supported the measures to protect slavery, could be lost very 
quickly. In August 1846 during a debate over funding for the Mexican War, Pennsylvania Congressman David Wilmot sparked a debate in Congress, as well as across the nation, that challenged the proslavery movement’s control of the federal government. Influenced by the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, the congressman proposed that slavery be prohibited in all territory added to the United States from the war.  When northerners in the House of Representatives passed what became known as the Wilmot Proviso (though it failed in the Senate), proslavery southerners began to believe that Turnbull's prediction had been right. Southern politicians united in opposition. As Congress debated restricting slavery in the West, sectional fissures trumped party division in the United States Congress.  Southerners, regardless of party or region, strongly condemned the proviso as an attack not only on the future extension of slavery on the continent but on the South itself and the continuation of slavery where it already existed. The Wilmot Proviso became a watershed in American history. Even though it never became law, the persistence of the North to try to pass such a measure slowly eroded the southern belief that slavery could be secured from insurrections like those experienced in the Caribbean by staying in the Union. 
  The Wilmot Proviso created the opportunity for ardent proslavery forces to 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gain a foothold in the mindset of the South. Turnbull's disciples pointed to it as evidence for their prediction of the future. Tapping into the fear that antislavery forces in the North aimed for the violent destruction of their society, slaveholding leaders of the South, most vocally John C. Calhoun, organized an opposition to the proviso that called for the legalization of slavery throughout all of the United States territories, not just below the line of latitude struck during the sectional bargaining of the Missouri Compromise in 1820. The extremist claim that abolitionists longed for the bloodshed of all white southerners offered radical proslavery proponents a way to rally white non‐slaveholders and slaveholders alike in opposition to the Abolitionist Power.  They used the fear of insurrection to galvanize the South in a way that had not happened before. 
  Why the Wilmot Proviso caused such a stir in the South has received little attention in the historiography of American politics. Though this piece of legislation is widely understood as consequential, historians have not studied its history comprehensively. This scant historical investigation may originate from historians trying to offer quick and uncomplicated answers as they work to get to their major discussion—the election of 1848, the Compromise of 1850, and other events that led to the secession crisis during the decade before the Civil War. The Wilmot Proviso is often treated as just a speed bump as scholars make their way towards the tumultuous politics of the 1850s: a minor event surrounded by the major ones instead of a pivotal moment that ignited the conflagration of outspoken sectional division. Nearly every history of antebellum politics and the sectional conflict either 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ends in 1846 or begins at 1848 or later, bypassing the crucial two years in which Wilmot greatly affected American politics. The southern reaction to the Haitian Revolution, British abolitionism, or the colonization of free blacks directly influenced how slaveholders responded to restrictions of slavery in the West and eventually to their interpretation of the ultimate meaning of Abraham Lincoln’s election.  
  The most substantial account of the proviso was written in 1967.  Democratic 
Politics and Sectionalism: The Wilmot Proviso Controversy by Chaplain W. Morrison focused on northern Democrats and the rift between the Van Burenites and the followers of President Polk. Most monographs discuss Wilmot as signaling the strength of the antislavery movement in the North without a thorough appraisal of why the South united around its opposition to restricting slavery in a place many thought it would not be profitable. Furthermore, historical accounts do not thoroughly consider why a southern unity that failed to emerge in opposition to Andrew Jackson during the Nullification Crisis came into being in the 1840s as slaveholders rallied against the prohibition of slavery in the western territories.3 
Most historians discussing the southern response to the Wilmot Proviso contend that it stemmed chiefly from the feeling that they were losing equal rights within the Union—that white southerners fought for abstract ideas of liberty and equality—instead of fear that Wilmot could cause a Haitian‐like slave uprising. 
                                                        
3 Chaplain W. Morrison, Democratic Politics and Sectionalism: The Wilmot Proviso Controversy (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967). 
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Other scholars state that the Wilmot Proviso simply insulted the honor of slaveholders because southerners felt politicians in the North were morally condemning them. While it is clear that some southern politicians feared losing equality in the abstract sense, believed Wilmot insulted their honor, or even threatened the South's economic standing, those answers offer only a perfunctory understanding of the situation. Historians have not taken seriously the stated claims over the fear of slave insurrection and the southern belief that the security of the white population of the slave states absolutely depended on the ability to send excess slaves to new territory. Despite nearly fifty years of events that showed a common thread building from the Haitian Revolution to the 1840s, historians have slighted this southern preoccupation.4 
Among the more examinations of the southern reaction to the Wilmot Proviso, William W. Freehling's The Road to Disunion briefly offers a study of the thought behind the southern reaction to Wilmot’s proposed restriction of slavery.  He focuses on the Wilmot Proviso by exploring the actions taken by some politicians in Kentucky.  He writes that many southerners in the Upper South, most notably 
                                                        
 
4 James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1988), Don E. Fehrenbacher, Sectional Crisis and Southern Constitutionalism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1995), Michael A. Morrison, Slavery and the American West: The Eclipse of 
Manifest Destiny (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), Michael F. Holt, The Fate of 
Their Country: Politicians, Slavery Extension, and the Coming of the Civil War (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 2004), Sean Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 2005), Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of 
America, 1815-1848 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), Elizabeth Varon, Disunion! The Coming 
of the American Civil War, 1789-1859 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008). 
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abolitionist Cassius Clay, tried to implement plans that would rid their states of the enslaved.  Calling it the “slave drain,” Freehling contends that many slaveholders from the border South hoped to send their slaves to land in the West and Deep South as a way of “whitening” their population.  He thinks slaveholders in the Black Belt of Mississippi and Alabama argued against Wilmot’s prohibition of the extension of slavery because they feared that one day South Carolinians, Georgians, Mississippians, Louisianans and other slave‐owners would try to rid themselves of their peculiar institution by sending their excess slaves out to the West.5 
This interpretation aptly points to the fear underlying southerners’ reactions to the Proviso yet almost completely ignores the key role that the Haitian Revolution played in their denunciations of Wilmot’s plan. The proslavery movement believed in the power of demographics. Southerners thought that a stable system of slavery could only support a certain population density of the enslaved. The island nature of slavery on the Caribbean colony had prevented French planters from easily removing excess slaves from their population. As the numbers of those in slavery grew, southern intellectuals insisted, the security of San Domingue lessened until finally the small master class could no longer control the large black population. American slaveholders believed the same thing would happen in the United States if the slave states became surrounded by free soil. Without the possibility of expanding slavery, the South, in effect, was like an island, enclosed by a barrier that                                                         
5 William W. Freehling, The Road to Disunion: Secessionists as Bay, 1776-1854 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1990). Freehling does rightly argue that both proslavery and antislavery forces believed 
that Wilmot would eventually end slavery, however, there is little analysis about how southerners thought 
that slavery's end would result in massive violence and bloodshed. 
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created an ever more dense slave population. With Haiti on their minds, slaveholders feared the physical destruction of their society.  They therefore expressed exasperation over "fanatical" abolitionists gaining control of the mechanisms of the national government that powerful southerners had helped to strengthen and in anticipation that it could defend the interests of the white South.  
In 1847 many slaveholders warned that the passage of the Wilmot Proviso would directly lead to disunion. Despite offering assurances that slavery would remain legal in areas where it already existed, the election of the first pro‐Wilmot Proviso president—Abraham Lincoln—caused the South to anticipate a future that left their society in ruin. For many living in the South, the threat of passing Wilmot’s restriction could only be responded to with disunion and the risk of war. White southerners anticipated an increase in slave insurrections at the precise moment that antislavery leaders—who they believed would not assist slaveholders in putting down an uprising of the enslaved—gained control of the federal government and the military. These expectations, which had developed over the span of sixty years, gave birth to the Confederacy. 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Chapter One 
The Haitian Revolution and Slaveholding Anxiety 
 
To adopt any policy by which slavery would be hemmed in, within its present limits, does appear to me, 
when we look at the growing disparity of numbers between the races, the perpetual stimulus to 
dissatisfaction which will be held out to the negro, and his enlarging capacity and increasing facilities for 
mischief, to be providing for a renewal upon our own soil of the scenes of St. Domingo, and the destruction 
of the race or the relation, amid national and social convulsion. 
 
-John Holcombe's Secessionist Speech, Virginia, March 20, 18611 
 
The color of turquoise surrounded him as he watched a speck far across the blue 
Caribbean waters turn slowly into a coast.  Louis Moreau Gottschalk's piano had played 
for happy audiences across Cuba—from Matanzas to Santiago—where slaveholders 
showered him with flowers along with their applause.  Now, on June 6, 1857, he stood 
alone on the top deck of a ship heading for St. Kitts. As night fell, the mountains, "whose 
angular peaks seemed as if they wished to pierce the clouds," arose before him.  The 
palm trees, alone on the deserted shoreline, appeared to him sad in their isolation as the 
horizon blurred from an approaching storm.  As Haiti's coast came into view Gottschalk 
thought of his grandmother.  Two words came to his mind as he sailed past the island: 
"Santo Domingo."2 
  Nearly four decades after French planters saw a slave insurrection turn the                                                         
1 William W. Freehling and Craig M. Simpson, eds., Showdown in Virginia: The 1861 Convention and the 
Fate of the Union, eds. (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2010): 65. 
 
2 Louis Moreau Gottschalk, Notes of A Pianist: The Chronicles of a New Orleans Music Legend ed. Jeanne 
Behrend (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006): 10. 
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plantations of the "Pearl of the Antilles" into rubble, Gottschalk was born in New Orleans 
to a family who, like many others of their station, had fled the fires of the Haitian 
Revolution and sailed to America. The first virtuoso pianist of the United States, Louis 
Moreau Gottschalk decided to keep a diary of his travels as he performed concerts 
throughout the West Indies in 1857.  While in Cuba, Spanish plantation owners assured 
him that the blacks enslaved on the island felt happy to live on their plantations.  Fellow 
travelers—no doubt less accustomed to slavery—told him with some astonishment, "they 
had not heard a single blow of the whip."3   
 Gottschalk responded quite differently. In his "notes" the American diarist 
mocked the naïve travelers. A man from Louisiana knew what nonslaveholders did not. 
He wrote, "Happy tourists! Suppose that, instead of looking upon those joyous faces that 
smile in the presence of their master, you had the curiosity to take off their clothes [and] 
examine their shoulders. You would have learned more...by the sight of certain scars 
badly healed, than all your observations, founded upon your suppositions, had taught 
you."4 Haiti served as a permanent reminder to many southerners that the enslaved often 
yearned to be free.  Discontented in their bondage, slaves at any moment could strike out 
against the society that held them in chains. 
 Though hardly a proslavery advocate—he sided with the Union during the Civil 
War and believed the violence seen during Haitian Revolution by the enslaved to be 
legitimate—Gottschalk’s sail past the only black-controlled country of the Western 
Hemisphere made him recall stories from his childhood, passed along by his                                                         
3 Ibid, 9. 
4 Ibid. See Laurent Dubois, Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution (Cambridge, 
Ma: Harvard University Press, 2004) for a detailed account of the Haitian Revolution.   
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grandmother. He never tired of the tales about his great-grandfather fighting insurgents at 
Gros Morne or his grandmother "half naked and dying of hunger" who saved herself by 
"wandering many days in the woods" before being found by the captain of an English 
ship and escaping to Jamaica. Thousands of refugees who fled Saint-Domingue, he 
insisted, could tell similar narratives. They had seen the violence. "It is," he explained, 
the "history of all the colonists of Santo Domingo toward the close of last century."  The 
tale of the Haitian Revolution was passed from generation to generation not just by 
blacks and abolitionists who remembered and celebrated the victory of the enslaved over 
the white slaveholders, but also by white planters who fled the destruction to start anew 
in the United States.5   
 American slaveholders always held a strong connection with the planters of the 
West Indies.  Southern plantation owners often read news accounts from the Caribbean 
and identified with the planter class in both the French and British colonies.  The Haitian 
Revolution remained in the memories of many southerners throughout the antebellum 
period because American slaveholders recognized these foreign planters as their brethren. 
Slaveholding transcended differences in nationality or language.  As the South’s own 
black population grew and its slave society expanded, the events of that small French 
colony in the Caribbean frightened American slaveholders and reminded them to be 
vigilant in the defense of their region's peculiar institution.6  
 Saint Domingue—or as Americans often referred to it, Santo Domingo—had been                                                         
5 Gottschalk, Notes of a Pianist, 10-12. 
6 Edward Bartlett Rugemer, The Problem of Emancipation: The Caribbean Roots of the American Civil 
War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2008): 33-41; Matthew Pratt Guterl, American 
Mediterranean: Southern Slaveholders in the Age of Emancipation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2008): 1-78. 
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ripe for a revolution.  The white slaveholders of France's largest colony saw an explosion 
of the black population on its side of the Island of Hispaniola. Dubbed the "Pearl of the 
Antilles" because of its productivity in supplying sugar to the rest of the world, the island 
welcomed a steady import of new slaves as planters sought larger profits from their 
Caribbean estates. In the years prior to the Haitian Revolution, the numbers of blacks 
enslaved on the massive plantations reached over ten times that of the white population 
tasked with maintaining the tranquility of the enslaved population. This contrasted 
sharply with the United States, where only South Carolina and Virginia's enslaved 
populations came close to being the majority of the total population at the turn of the 
century.7 
 Regardless of the differences between slavery in the United States and Saint 
Domingue, news of a large slave insurrection and reports of savage deaths of white 
planters in the West Indies caused dread in white America. Though some mainstream 
antislavery advocates pointed to the violent rebellion as an example of the evils or 
dangers of slavery and others claimed the bloodletting of whites by blacks as justifiable 
in the face of enslavement, most shied away from endorsing the ferocious method of self-
emancipation deployed by the enslaved Haitians. The extreme violence especially 
dismayed many Quakers who served as the vanguard of the antislavery movement in the 
United States. Some American opponents of slavery worried that the brutality of racial 
warfare in the West Indies would turn people away from their movement in the United                                                         
7 Tim Matthewson, A Proslavery Foreign Policy: Haitian-American Relations during the Early Republic 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003): 3-4; Robert K. Lacerte, "The Evolution of Land and Labor in the Haitian 
Revolution, 1791-1820," The Americas 34 (April 1978): 449; Susan B. Carter, "Black population, by state 
and slave/free status: 1790–1860" Historical Statistics of the United States: Millennial Edition (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
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States.  Others worried that their sympathetic stance towards the Amis des Noirs, the 
French abolitionist society the planter class blamed for sparking the rebellion, would lead 
other Americans to disengage with the antislavery movement in the United States. This 
idea would only grow more popular with the publishing of Historical Survey of the 
Colony of St. Domingo by Bryan Edwards, which explicitly blamed the antislavery 
movement for the Haitian Revolution and would gain popularity in the United States at 
the turn of the nineteenth century.8 
 Despite employing similar language to that used by Americans in their revolution 
against England, the enslaved blacks of the Caribbean participating in their own uprising 
received little support from the fledgling republic of the New World. In Philadelphia—
the capital of the young United States—President George Washington, stunned with the 
news, referred to the slave rebellion as "Lamentable!" and wondered, "Where it will stop, 
is difficult to say."  Furthermore, as the rebellion became more violent and the French 
Directory issued a proclamation of emancipation in Saint Domingue, Jeffersonian 
Republicans distanced themselves from both the radical ideology of the French 
Revolution they once embraced and the universal language they formerly espoused in the 
1770s.  One northern Republican fumed that the "leveling principles" of the French 
would ruin "the finest colony on earth."  A South Carolinian wrote that allowing French 
                                                        
8 Rugemer, The Problem of Emancipation, 43-44; Winthrop D. Jordan, White Over Black: American 
Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812  (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1968): 378-380; 
Theodore Dwight, An Oration, Spoken Before “The Connecticut Society, for the Promotion of Freedom 
and the Relief of Persons Unlawfully Held in Bondage.” (Hartford, 1794): 10-12; M. Garran Coulon, An 
inquiry into the causes of the insurrection of the negroes in the island of St. Domingo (London: J. Johnson, 
1792) Christopher Leslie Brown, Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2006): 391-450.  For an example of the enslaved claiming a part of the 
French Revolution see also Laurent Dubois, A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave Emancipation in 
the French Caribbean 1787-1804 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004). 
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ideas to penetrate the South would be "fatal." While having differences over domestic 
policy, the leadership of both the Federalists and the Republicans shared a similar 
reaction of the black revolution in the French West Indies.  Black unrest in Saint 
Domingue needed to be at least quarantined, if not entirely prevented, for the sake of 
national security.9 
 Despite initial trade between northern merchants and the black military forces in 
the colony, the official stance of the United States towards the revolution concentrated on 
undermining the revolt and restoring white control of Saint Domingue. Sympathetic to 
French slaveholders, President Washington supported their attempts to regain control of 
their West Indian enslaved labor that fought to be free. His administration advanced the 
French $726,000—drawn against the United States' debt from the American 
Revolution—in the form of weapons and ammunition taken from the arsenal at West 
Point while American merchants supplied food for the white forces.  This aid from the 
United States ended once the planter class of the island became overrun and the black 
insurgents gained control over much of the island of Hispaniola.10   
                                                        
9 George Washington to Jean Baptiste Ternant, September 24, 1791 in The Writings of George Washington, 
ed. John C. Fitzpatrick (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1931-1944): 31: 375; Simon P. 
Newman, "American Political Culture and the French and Haitian Revolutions: Nathaniel Cutting and the 
Jeffersonian Republicans," in The Impact of the Haitian Revolution in the Atlantic World ed. David P. 
Geggus (University of South Carolina Press, 2001): 72-85, quote on 79; Alfred N. Hunt, Haiti's Influence 
on Antebellum America: Slumbering Volcano in the Caribbean (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 
1988), 111.  Political divisions, instead of sectional divisions, in American foreign policy in regards to 
trading with the Toussaint Louverture's de facto government of Saint Domingue would appear with the 
presidency of John Adams.  See Matthewson, A Proslavery Foreign Policy, 66-71 and Gordon S. Brown, 
Toussaint's Clause: The Founding Fathers and the Haitian Revolution (Jackson, MS: University Press of 
Mississippi, 2005): 139-143. 
10 Donald R. Hickey, "America's Response to the Slave Revolt in Haiti, 1791-1806," Journal of the Early 
Republic 2 (Winter 1982): 364-365; George Washington to John Vaughan, December 27, 1791 in The 
Writings of George Washington, 31: 453; Matthewson, A Proslavery Foreign Policy, 24-26. 
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 American slave states also received direct pleas for reinforcements from West 
Indian slaveholders. French planters asked Governor Charles Pinckney of South Carolina 
to send some of the state's militia to help quell the rebellion, warning that the destruction 
of French slavery threatened all of their slaveholding neighbors.  Pinckney declined.  He 
did, however, agree that the Caribbean insurrection imperiled his state and forwarded the 
Saint Domingue request for help to President Washington. Along with the French letter 
Pinckney noted his fear that if the slave revolt went unchecked the "flame which will 
extend to all neighboring islands, may prove not a very pleasing or agreeable example to 
the Southern states." The risk of doing nothing, he urged the president, could be 
disastrous to American slavery.11 
 White southerners thus took every precaution against the possibility of the Haitian 
Revolution coming to America. South Carolina's legislature, at Governor Pinckney's 
request, strengthened the state's militia. The governor believed the militia needed to be 
able to "act with promptness and effect" in the case of a slave rebellion at home. Though 
the government of South Carolina did not martial troops to support their French 
counterparts, it did help the Caribbean slave owners by sending money to support the 
crumbling master class of the French West Indies.  Whites would fight the insurrection 
for two years until finally their power collapsed. The black population took control of the 
colony in 1793.  With the fall of white power in Saint Domingue, many in control of 
American foreign policy believed slavery could never be established again. The United 
States found itself neighbors with what would eventually be the only black-led nation in                                                         
11 George C. Rogers, Evolution of a Federalist: William Loughton Smith of Charleston, 1758-1812 
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1962):  246-250, Pinckney quote found on 249. 
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the Western Hemisphere to be formed from an insurrection of the enslaved. The 
vulnerability of slavery had been exposed.12  
 Besides securing military and political responses from fellow slaveholders 
overseas, the Haitian Revolution also caused many southern slaveholders to lash out 
against French abolitionists, who they believed presented a very dangerous threat to the 
South.  Planters proclaimed antislavery advocates "Madmen, Robbers of their Neighbor's 
Property, and enemies to the Peace of Society" and worked to sequester their own slave 
population from people and information considered dangerous to their slave society.  In 
Virginia proslavery forces attacked an antislavery meeting, claiming that abolitionists 
wanted to stir the slave population to commit acts of rebellion. Shaking the American 
slave states to their core, the Haitian Revolution produced a set of severe southern 
responses because it served as a real-life example of a slave system gone wrong. 
Proslavery forces connected white discontent with slavery in the South with the violence 
and instability seen in the Caribbean. Any talk of abolitionism came to be viewed as too 
dangerous and unacceptable by many slaveholders.13 
 If they expressed a high degree of anxiety in the early days of the Haitian                                                         
12 Governor Charles Pinckney to the South Carolina House and Senate, December 4, 1791, Governors' 
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Forgotten Founder: The Life and Times of Charles Pinckney (Columbia: University of South Carolina 
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Diplomatic History 3 (Summer, 1979): 324-325. 
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rebellion, the fears of white southerners became even greater with the news that the 
French had lost control over the colony of Saint Domingue altogether. The Charleston 
City Gazette and Daily Advertiser reported that stories from the Caribbean filled 
Americans "with horror" as descriptions of "burning estates, and putting all prisoners to 
death, fill up the measure of every day's calamity." In a letter, Secretary of State Thomas 
Jefferson shared his concerns about the Haitian Revolution with James Monroe.  He 
envisioned a day when Americans would suffer the same fate as Saint Domingue 
planters. Jefferson wrote, "I become daily more and more convinced that all the West 
India islands will remain in the hands of the people of color, and a total expulsion of the 
whites sooner or later take place.  It is high time we should foresee the bloody scenes 
which our children certainly, and possibly ourselves (south of the Patowmac [sic]) have 
to wade through, and try avert them."14 
  As the situation in Saint Domingue became more violent and the French lost 
control of the colony, refugees—like Louis Moreau Gottschalk's family—poured into 
cities across the United States.  In many instances, American slaveholders eagerly helped 
their counterparts from the West Indies.  Secretary of State Jefferson wrote, "The 
situation of the St. Domingo fugitives (aristocrats as they are) calls aloud for pity and 
charity.  Never was so deep a tragedy presented to the feelings of man I deny the power 
of the general government to apply money to such a purpose but I deny it with a bleeding 
heart.  It belongs to the state governments. Pray urge ours to be liberal."  Other federal 
officials also received pleas for help or requests for letters of introduction from French                                                         
14 July 20, 1793 Charleston City Gazette and Daily Advertiser; Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 14 
July, 1793, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson ed. John Catanzarti (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1995): 26: 501-503; Matthewson, A Proslavery Foreign Policy, 59-60.  
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planters arriving in American ports. Most American leaders responded positively to the 
requests for help.15 
 French refugees from Saint Domingue petitioned President Washington, in both 
French and English, for assistance. The president, obliged to write back to some of the 
requests, offered his sympathies along with some advice. Washington responded to one 
pair of refugees by sending them twenty dollars. In his letter he explained that though he 
could not give more individual aid, he believed that in "almost every city and large town 
in the United States" committees had been created to further help them. He also asked the 
Secretary of the Treasury to send two thousand dollars to the "Committee at Baltimore, 
appointed to superintend" the French planters that had arrived in that city.16 
 Throughout the 1790s, roughly 90 percent of the white population in Saint 
Domingue fled the French colony and nearly one-quarter of them came to North America 
in search of a safe haven. Cities across the entire eastern seaboard received an influx of 
French-speaking refugees. Many immigrants retained their cultural identity as Frenchmen 
while both adapting to their new residences and culturally impacting their new 
communities. In New York and Philadelphia, white refugees added to the culture of those 
cities by teaching piano and dance. Others, having lost much of their wealth, served as                                                         
15 Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 14 July, 1793, in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 26: 501-503. See 
also Joret de Longchamps to Thomas Jefferson, September 23, 1793, in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 
27: 146; Edward Rutledge to Thomas Jefferson, November 9, 1793, in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 27: 
336. 
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housekeepers in order to maintain a living.  French doctors also participated in the debate 
over yellow fever during the period of an outbreak, which northerners had blamed the 
refugees for causing. Jean Devèze, a former military surgeon who became the chief 
physician at one of Philadelphia's major hospitals, emerged as a hero during the yellow 
fever epidemic when he introduced tropical remedies to fight the disease and recognized 
that yellow fever could not be passed on communicably.17   
 More than just white Frenchmen came to the United States.  Slaves and the gens 
de couleur, the French name given to free blacks, also came to northern cities such as 
Philadelphia, where their arrival added to a black population that expanded dramatically 
from 1790 to 1800.  Despite being more impoverished and receiving little help from the 
private and public organizations formed to aid the West Indian refugees, black 
immigrants found a receptive African American community. While American free blacks 
welcomed former slaves who had gained their freedom upon arrival in Pennsylvania into 
their communities, whites worried that they had brought the insurrectionary spirit with 
them.18   
 In some cases, white northerners became shocked as black women from Saint 
Domingue continued to be employed as the paid companions of white men—a customary 
practice in the former French colony. One Philadelphian wrote that the city during this 
period "gave the appearance of a great hotel" as it "thronged with French people of all 
shades from the colonies." He described "mestizo ladies, with the palest complexions, jet                                                         
17 John E. Baur, "International Repercussions of the Haitian Revolution," The Americas vol. 26 (April 
1970): 395-398; The Letters of Benjamin Rush vol 2 ed. L. H. Butterfield (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1951): 738. 
18 Susan Branson and Leslie Patrick, "Étrangers dans un Pays Étrange: Saint-Dominguan Refugees of Color 
in Philadelphia," in The Impact of the Haitian Revolution in the Atlantic World, 193-208. 
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black hair, and eyes of the gazelle" along with "black negresses, in flowing white dresses, 
and turbans" walking "with white or creole...forming a contrast to the native Americans" 
and older European immigrants.19 
 In the South, Norfolk and Baltimore became major landing spots for those 
arriving from Saint Domingue in the 1790s.  Both places offered relief, but most refugees 
perceived Baltimore as the city of greater opportunity due to its size, resources, and larger 
market for employment.  As new immigrants plied their wares in Maryland's largest city, 
the economy grew.  Just as in the North, many Saint-Dominguan immigrants—the 
majority white or of mixed race—contributed to their new home's culture by becoming 
teachers, lawyers, and business owners, or by using their expertise in such subjects as 
irrigation to support themselves during the region's dry seasons.  In Louisiana, another 
destination favored by some refugees because of its French influence, former Saint-
Dominguans contributed to the theatre and opera of New Orleans, becoming an important 
contributor the culture of the Crescent City.20 
 West Indian immigrants who fled the Haitian Revolution helped improve indigo 
production in South Carolina by introducing new chemical agents while others developed 
vineyards in order to produce some of the earliest winemaking in the slave states. 
Charleston too experienced a growth in theatre and opera performance with the increase  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of the Francophone influence in the city. Immigrants from the former French colony 
assimilated very quickly in the Palmetto State's population. South Carolina notices of 
marriages designated some brides as "formerly of Saint Domingo." While contributing 
culturally to the South, many refugees kept their French identity even as they married 
into the planter class of the United States. Like the Gottschalk family, many immigrants 
who came to the South retained the memory of the Haitian Revolution as they started 
their new lives in the slaveholding states of America.21 
 With the influx of new French refugees in their towns, slaveholders in the United 
States found themselves in a precarious position. Though sympathy for the French 
planters ran high among American planters, attempts at assisting white refugees often 
came into conflict with the reason why southerners had wanted to help the French 
planters in the first place—to protect slavery.  Therefore, one of the slave states’ first 
responses to the French colony’s overthrow was to restrict the importation of Caribbean 
slaves and freedmen to the South. They thus hoped to reduce the possible influence of the 
Haitian Revolution over their own slave population by implementing harsher slave codes. 
Georgia, for example, required all “free negroes, mulattoes, or mustizoes” who came to 
the state register themselves, and their locations, at the local county clerk’s office. The 
law further absolved the state from any recompense of “the value of slaves legally 
executed” to the slave owner. Later, Congress bolstered state restrictions on importations 
of the enslaved from the West Indies. The prospect of importing a black revolution made  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slaveholders wary of any new people—free or enslaved—who joined the black 
population of their rattled slave society. Apprehensiveness from large plantation owners 
about the possibility of insurrectionary ideas coming to the United States via Caribbean 
slave ships superseded the desire of minor slaveholders for access to cheaper enslaved 
labor.22 
 Fearful of the possibility that the revolutionary spirit still stirred amid French 
colonialists or slaves now living amidst them, slaveholders in Virginia supported the 
strengthening of their militia and called on them to serve as a standing army, an assurance 
against any possible uprising. The concern Virginians had about insurrections trumped 
the traditional American skepticism about a permanent, active military force being 
established. Though slave resistance had been a threat long before the Haitian 
Revolution, including during the American Revolution nearly two decades prior, many 
slaveholders reported that the arrival of French refugees brought an increase in reported 
disturbances amongst the slave populace.  In 1793 the people of the South warily 
watched for anything out of the ordinary.23 
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 The specter of Haiti's successful revolution appeared in everyday life to some 
American slaveholders. John Randolph awoke to find his wife complaining of noise 
coming from the street outside their house in Richmond. After groggily going to the 
window, he found a group of black men gathered outside and "ordered them to disperse."  
At first, Randolph noted, "they seemed regardless of my words" but soon after left.  After 
he returned to bed Randolph again heard two black men talking outside his window.  
Curious to know what had caused the commotion outside, he crept quietly to the window 
and heard one say to the other, "the blacks were to kill the white people soon in this 
place." After asking what time the rebellion would take place, the black companion (and 
Randolph) heard the answer—October 15th, just a few months away.24  
 Randolph continued to listen anxiously.  Incredulous about the potential 
insurrectionist's claim, the other asked, as a third joined the pair, why the rebels would 
wait so long.  In reply to this skepticism the first slave made a bet, "pointing his finger 
down the street" while he explained that after the insurrection two different houses 
currently owned by Randolph's neighbors would be his.  The "chief speaker" ended their 
conversation by reminding his compatriots to remember "how the blacks has [sic] killed 
the whites in the French Island and took it a little while ago." Randolph took seriously 
enough the conversation outside his window to share what he had heard with local  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authorities in a deposition documented by the Virginia state government. In the months 
following Randolph's deposition, numerous accounts of other instances of slave 
resistance, from New York to Georgia, engendered anxiety throughout the slaveholding 
states. The slaveholding South especially stood on guard. During this time a warning 
from Lieutenant Governor of Virginia James Wood reached the South Carolina 
governor's office.  A letter had been found discussing a possible insurrection to be 
launched around the same date—October 15th—mentioned by the black men outside of 
Randolph's window. A grand conspiracy, white southern leaders feared, seemed to be 
afoot.25   
 Written under the pseudonym of the "Secret Keeper, Richmond," the letter read, 
"The great Secret that has been so long in the being with our Colour has come nearly to a 
hed [sic] though some in our Town has told of it, but in which the Manner it is not 
believed."  Addressed to the "Secret Keeper, Norfolk" and allegedly carried by a black 
preacher named Gawin who "passed through Richmond on his way to Norfolk," the letter 
stated that insurrectionists had obtained "about five hundred Guns and plenty of Led, but 
not much Powder." The most frightening aspect for the South Carolina governor came 
next, however: "Since I wrote you last I got a letter from our friend in Charleston, he tells 
me he has listed near six thousand men and there is a gentleman that says he will give us 
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as much power as want and when we begin he will help us all he can" as well as "stirring 
up" as many as he could. 26 According to the evidence at hand, Haiti did not seem so far 
away. 
 Shortly after receiving his warning from Virginia Governor Moultrie, two black 
people presented him with letters—supposedly written by someone who knew about the 
conspiracy—which appeared to corroborate the initial findings. One letter told him to 
"guard against certain strangers" and "don't let your attention be directed to frenchmen 
alone." Finally, it advised the governor to "give the most particular orders to your own 
patroles [sic] in every part of the State, keep up the military duty till the 10th of January 
at least." Moultrie took the letters seriously and ordered the state militia to be on full 
alert. South Carolina prepared to quell an insurrection in the making, though no rebellion 
launched by the enslaved of the Palmetto State actually came to pass.27  
 Furthermore, by the end of 1793 authorities formed a committee in South 
Carolina to expel all black emigrants from Saint Domingue along with any other free 
blacks who came to the state throughout the year. Governor Moultrie issued a 
proclamation that gave black emigrants from Saint Domingue ten days to leave the state 
because "there are so many characters amongst them, which remain dangerous to the  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welfare of the state." White South Carolinians also looked on with suspicion as rumors 
circulated about French revolutionaries trying to spread their beliefs by teaming with 
slaves in order to foment insurrection.28  
 The "Secret Keeper" letter, along with Randolph's disposition a few months 
before, also created a stir among Virginians about blacks launching an American version 
of the Haitian Revolution. Thomas Newton, the militia leader of Norfolk who first 
discovered the letters about the possible uprising in South Carolina, believed that blacks 
from Saint Domingue hoped to enter the United States and aid slaves in a war against 
American slaveholders.  He wrote, "I suppose there may be two hundred or more 
Negroes brought from Cape Francois...they I have no doubt would be ready to operate 
against us."  He pleaded with the lieutenant governor to strengthen the defenses of 
Norfolk because he believed "in case of insurrection or invasion we should be badly 
situated."  He pleaded that "a few more men" and a "small fort [in Norfolk] would keep 
all in order." American slave owners, he insisted, needed to remain vigilant against both 
local and outside forces that might threaten southern slavery.29 
 Other Virginian slaveholders considered the possibility that blacks held in slavery 
in the United States might indentify with black revolutionaries in the West Indies. When 
Thomas Jefferson pondered the condition of slaves in the United States, he envisioned a 
distinctive people without a nation. He understood the relationship between whites and 
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blacks to be similar to two nations constantly at war. Acting on his concern that Saint 
Domingue's racial warfare might cross the Caribbean, Jefferson worked actively to 
preempt that possibility. During the Secret Keeper scare, the secretary of state 
communicated to South Carolina officials that he too had a reliable source informing him 
of "two Frenchmen, from St. Domingo" who were "setting out from this place for 
Charleston, with a design to excite an insurrection among the Negroes." The secretary of 
state and future president viewed slaves in America as well as revolutionaries in Haiti as 
potential threats to the nation.30 
 Anxiety about the Haitian Revolution continued to spread throughout the latter 
half of the 1790s. Southern cities reported allegations of arson and other smaller forms of 
resistance as products of West Indian influences. In 1795 North Carolina followed South 
Carolina's example and barred the importation of any slaves from the West Indies.  Two 
years later, Maryland also repealed a law that allowed French slaveholders to bring their 
slaves with them when they entered the state, joining nearly all of the other slave states in 
placing new regulations on French immigrants coming to the United States from Saint 
Domingue, regardless of race. Though slaveholders in the South believed that they shared 
a common bond with the planters of the West Indies, they also hoped to separate 
slaveholding in the United States from slavery in the Caribbean.31   
 In 1799 one South Carolinian congressman, Robert Goodloe Harper, insisted that                                                         
30 Thomas Jefferson to William Moultrie December 23, 1793 in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 27: 614; 
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Jefferson connected white freedom with the French Revolution and black freedom to the Haitian 
Revolution and therefore he supported the French efforts to quash the insurrection in Saint Domingue. See 
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the French had plans to attack the South and cause a Haitian-style uprising.  Though a 
Federalist who most likely had a bias against France, Harper wrote a warning to his 
constituents about a slave rebellion being fomented by those connected to the troubled 
French colony in the Caribbean.  He claimed the French Governor of Saint Domingue 
had prepared "an army of blacks" to land in the South with "a large supply of officers 
arms and ammunition" in a desperate attempt to reunite the blacks and whites of his 
colony. One frightening aspect for his readers was the assertion that "missionaries 
previously sent" already lived among the southern population. Just like the Secret 
Keepers only years earlier, he claimed he had uncovered the plot by gaining information 
from one of the conspirators. Rather than happening upon a letter, "black officers who 
were to be employed in the expedition" supplied the intelligence about the upcoming 
insurgency. Harper exhorted slaveholders to be observant on their plantations. Some of 
those who opposed slavery, he claimed, hoped to create another Haitian Revolution in the 
Palmetto State.32 
 Albert Gallatin, a ranking Jeffersonian Republican who later served as the 
Secretary of the Treasury for three Democratic-Republican presidents, shared his 
thoughts about Saint Domingue in Congress. The Swiss-born congressman from 
Pennsylvania worried about what kind of neighbor an independent Saint Domingue 
would be for the United States. The black population, he insisted, "who received their 
first education under the lash of the whip, and who have been initiated to liberty only by                                                         
32 Robert Goodloe Harper to his constituents, March 20, 1799 Papers of James A Bayard, 1796-1815 ed. 
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that series of rapine pillage, and massacre" that "laid waste and deluged that island in 
blood," could not "apply themselves to the peaceable cultivation of the country."  Instead, 
he argued, blacks in control of a former colony in the Caribbean would "try to continue to 
live, as heretofore, by plunder and depredations." Believing that Haitians would want to 
spread their insurrectionary ideology, he asked his colleagues to recall the fears of the 
South and pleaded for the nation to be unified in its alarm about a possible invasion—
either overtly or in secret—coming from the West Indies.33   
 At the turn of the nineteenth century, Americans, particularly in the South, 
remained on edge about the Haitian Revolution and its connection to the ideas of the 
French Revolution. Any white Frenchmen, it seemed, could be an infiltrator looking to 
foment slave rebellion and spread their revolutionary ideals of liberté, égalité, fraternité.  
Southern whites feared that any black person, free or enslaved, Caribbean or American, 
could follow the example of the enslaved of Saint Domingue and become a Toussaint 
Louverture, leading a slave rebellion against white planters in an attempt to claim their 
freedom. These trepidations churned beneath the surface until the summer of 1800, when 
American slaveholders believed they had finally come face to face with a Haiti of their 
own in Virginia's capital city. 
  Literate and skilled in metalworking as he worked for his master Thomas Prosser, 
Gabriel's enslaved experience made him different from most slaves in the American 
South.  Roughly 5 percent of enslaved blacks could read. Furthermore, standing at six 
feet, three inches tall, Prosser towered over most of those he met, inspiring other blacks                                                         
33 Annals of Congress, 5th Cong., 3rd sess., 27-52. For more debate about the independence of Saint-
Domingue and discussion in Congress about the value of having the small colony become independent, see 
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in his community to see him as a natural leader. Though whites too saw a commanding 
quality in Gabriel and viewed him as resourceful, independent, and intelligent—attributes 
useful to a leader of an insurrection—they worried very little about his potential as an 
insurrectionist, viewing him as a loyal blacksmith born in America, content in the few 
extra freedoms he received from his skills.34 
 In October 1799, however, the former overseer Absalom Johnson caught three 
slaves attempting to steal a pig from the plantation that he had just recently begun to rent.  
Johnson saw a slave from his newly leased property, Jupiter, running away with one of 
his hogs. Two accomplices, Gabriel and his brother Solomon, accompanied him. When 
Johnson challenged the three black men attempting to stop them, he got more than he 
bargained. Gabriel fought the former overseer, at one point biting off a significant part of 
his ear. Recognizing that he had lost this brief but violent battle, Johnson walked away 
and instead retaliated with the strongest weapon white Virginians had against blacks—the 
law.  Though the guilty verdict Gabriel received came with the severe punishment of 
hanging, the court granted Prosser the clemency of the clergy who asked that his sentence 
be commuted. Rather than swinging on the gallows for his crime, the rebellious slave 
received thirty-nine lashes and a branding of the letter "T" on his thumb. Blacksmith 
Prosser had survived his first strike against southern slavery that kept him and his 
relatives in bondage.35  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 Those intent on rebelling against the status quo and overturning an entire cultural 
system do not do so overnight. This was especially true in a society wary of slave plots.  
Rather, insurrections and insurrectionists are created over time. Though Gabriel actively 
resisted slavery when he attempted to steal from a farm and fight a slaveholder, those 
actions served as a beginning. A year later, the two accomplices who had once helped 
him pilfer a pig would enlist in his army in a concerted attack against slaveholding 
Richmond.  By the end of 1800, the would-be insurrectionists Gabriel and Jupiter would 
be executed; Solomon would only escape the gallows by providing incriminating 
testimony against other black rebels.  White Virginians would be left with an uneasy 
feeling that they had only narrowly escaped their own version of Haiti.36 
 Talk about overturning the established power structure filled the air during the 
spring of 1800.  White citizens debated who would win the presidential election, John 
Adams or Thomas Jefferson. Later, some would even refer to the possible transformation 
as "the Revolution of 1800."  As this political event occupied the thoughts of white men, 
Gabriel walked the city of Richmond, Virginia, with a different revolution in mind. With 
whites dividing over the upcoming election, 1800 seemed an opportune time for a 
successful slave uprising. First, Gabriel plotted about how he might free himself and his 
neighbors.  Then, in the blacksmith shop at his master’s Brookfield plantation, he 
revealed the plan to Solomon and another slave to overthrow Virginia's slavery system.37 
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 Gabriel explained the blueprint of the uprising to his collaborators. After months 
of crafting the blades of wheat scythes into swords with his and his allies' skilled hands, 
Gabriel would gather his army of Richmond slaves in his blacksmith shop or the 
surrounding woods. As Solomon Prosser later testified, the conspirators anticipated 
giving weapons to hundreds of men on horseback. After first killing Thomas Prosser, 
Gabriel's owner, and Absalom Johnson, the man who had caused Gabriel's back to be 
savaged by the whip and finger branded, the group of insurgents would march on the 
capital. There enslaved allies, emboldened by the capture of one of Virginia’s oldest 
cities, would join them.38 
 Once inside the city the large group would split into three. One would seize 
weapons supplied in the capitol building, and then take James Monroe hostage as he slept 
in the Governor's Mansion. Another would set fire to the warehouse district as a 
diversion, while the final group would fortify a main entrance to the city and set up 
defensive positions. Significantly, Gabriel did not perceive a stark racial divide in 
Virginia as many whites did. He only intended to strike against slaveholders, not whites 
in general. Like insurrectionists in the French West Indies, he believed his call for 
citizenship would spur poor whites, also excluded from the political power, to join his 
rebellion. Those not directly complicit in advancing slavery in the United States would be 
spared his wrath. The slave leader planned to carry a banner inscribed with the words 
"death or Liberty," a phrase whites believed served as an inversion of Patrick Henry's 
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famous comment, but may easily have come to Gabriel's mind because of that phrase's 
common usage during the Haitian Revolution. "Liberte Ou La Mort" had been a slogan 
during the fighting and eventually headlined that nation's declaration of independence 
written only a few years after the Virginian's planned rebellion.39  
 A summer rainstorm on August 30, 1800, prevented Gabriel from putting his plan 
into action.  Flooding caused by heavy rains prevented many of the recruits from other 
plantations around Richmond from joining him at the assigned meeting place. As the 
small rivers rose from the deluge, the wooden bridges that connected Brookfield to the 
rest of the city became impassable.  Some whites in Richmond noticed that, unlike most 
Saturday nights when slaves from the rural areas came into town, some of the enslaved 
within the urban areas seemed to be trying to go away from the city. However, they paid 
little attention and declined to explore the reason behind these activities. The storm, 
however, prevented travel around the capital of Virginia; only those insurgents nearest to 
Gabriel showed up ready to fight. Gabriel decided to reschedule his plot and postpone the 
rebellion. He sent word that the insurrection would start the ensuing night.40 
 The delay caused some of Gabriel's crew to have second thoughts about their 
intended uprising. Having made the trip through the downpour only to see fewer men 
than expected caused one of the would-be rebels to doubt the slave leader. Pharaoh, a 
skilled slave from a neighboring plantation, changed his mind about participating in the 
insurrection. Unlike Gabriel and many of the other members of the insurrectionary 
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conspiracy, Pharaoh had a long and close relationship with his white owner's family, 
Mosby Sheppard. He also may have believed that telling his master about Gabriel's plans 
might win freedom for himself and his family without partaking in violence. After all, he 
remembered, four years earlier Mosby Sheppard had allowed a slave to purchase his own 
freedom for a discounted price. Maybe the slaveholder would do it again.41   
 Pharaoh faced a tough decision—he could try to obtain freedom for himself and 
thousands of other blacks in Virginia by fighting alongside Gabriel, or he could try to 
obtain freedom for just himself and possibly his family by betraying the plot to 
slaveholders and becoming a traitor.  He chose the latter, first telling a black enslaved 
leader of his plantation trusted by the Sheppard family and eventually unveiling his secret 
to Mosby Sheppard himself. He named Gabriel Prosser as the slave in charge of the 
upcoming rebellion.  That night two other slaves originally associated with the scheme 
against Richmond also informed their owners of the conspiracy and divulged details of 
the insurrection plot.42   
 The next day Governor James Monroe learned of the conspiracy and immediately 
took measures to secure the city. He also tried to keep the information away from the 
public in order to prevent a panic. The governor moved the weapons away from the 
capital and into the penitentiary, a building more easily defended in case of a battle. Next 
he mobilized a number of regiments in the state militia. Finally, he launched a search 
party for the insurrectionists, which captured collaborators working with Gabriel. Within 
ten days roughly thirty conspirators—though not Gabriel—had been found and arrested  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by Virginia authorities.  On September 9, Monroe ordered the slave trials to begin. Upon 
the jury’s verdict the hangman received twenty people to be executed for insurrection. 
Major threats to slavery would not be tolerated.43 
 At the end of September, Virginia authorities captured Gabriel in Norfolk and 
brought the blacksmith back in iron chains to Richmond, where he received a death 
sentence for his crimes against the state. Large crowds gathered to watch the prospective 
black rebel executed, a sharp warning against challenging slaveholding supremacy.  
Unlike his compatriots, who were nearly all hanged with a fellow rebel dying by their 
side, Gabriel was hanged from the gallows alone. Richmond's slave owners survived 
unscathed the first large and organized slave conspiracy of the new nation, but they were 
shaken.  Similarities to Gabriel Prosser's planned insurrection and the Haitian Revolution 
certainly did not go unnoticed by slaveholding Americans.44   
 The slave insurrection on Saint Domingue may very well have inspired Gabriel 
and his fellow insurrectionists to secure liberty through violence. Stories about the 
Haitian Revolution had run rampant throughout the 1790s, and some of Virginia's slaves 
undoubtingly came into contact with that information. One way Gabriel could have 
intentionally modeled himself after Toussaint was in the creation of an "army" of black 
rebels.  Throughout their testimony, the black conspirators referred to their leader as 
"General Gabriel" and talked about serving under his "command." Gabriel as general had 
"appointed" another as "second in command." Other leaders under Gabriel served as 
"captains," while those without much knowledge of the plan acted as "foot soldiers" who  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had "enlisted" in Gabriel's Army.45 
 Newspapers throughout the United States reported Gabriel's insurrection and 
often used the military language embraced by the black insurrectionists. One Philadelphia 
newspaper remarked that the instigator of the rebellion, a "villain assuming to himself the 
appellation of General," tried to lead the uprising in Richmond. One Virginian newspaper 
mocked "General Gabriel" who "manifested the utmost composure; and with the true 
spirit of heroism seems willing to resign his high office and even his life rather than 
gratify the officious enquiries of the Governor, which may endanger the necks of his dark 
satellites."  Though many whites derided his claim to be a military leader, Gabriel’s 
identification of his group using martial terms forced whites in the United States to 
recognize the authority he had wielded as a leader of a black corps of insurrectionary 
warriors.  In North Carolina, one southerner insisted that Gabriel planned to take the 
name Bonaparte after he killed " all the white males and elderly women" found in 
Richmond. These stories undoubtedly reminded readers of the tales from Saint Domingue 
that they had read less than a decade before.46 
 Gabriel definitely viewed his planned insurrection as a battle in a war. While 
being inspired by Toussaint, he also allegedly compared himself to George Washington 
as he stood defiantly at trial.  He saw his actions as being no different than the Father of                                                         
45 Calendar of State Papers of Virginia, 146-147, 164-165; James Sidbury, "Saint Domingue in Virginia: 
Ideology, Local Meanings, and Resistance to Slavery, 1790-1800," Journal of Southern History 63 (August 
1997): 531-552. 
46 New London, Ct Bee September 12, 1800; Philadelphia Gazette September 18, 1800; The Columbian 
Mirror and Alexandria Gazette October 4, 1800; Charles Harris to Robert Harris September 18, 1800 in 
"The Harris Letters" in The James Sprunt Historical Publications ed. H.M. Wagstaff (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1916): 83-84, Documenting the American South. University Library, 
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
 
 
42   
the Country, who strove to obtain the liberty of his countrymen in the course of the 
American Revolution. During his confession Gabriel's bother Solomon discussed how the 
insurrection planned to make war on the whites of Virginia. He stated that Gabriel had 
come into contact with a French veteran from the Battle of Yorktown who had 
volunteered to train the insurrectionists in the arts of war. The prospect a black rebel 
leader finding his own version of Lafayette frightened many in the South. The claim of 
whites helping blacks revolt against slavery would be repeated during other insurrection 
scares in the United States throughout the antebellum period.47  
 Slave resistance, whether at home or abroad, affected American politics 
throughout the antebellum period. The aftermath of conspiracies often resulted in 
attempts by politicians to assess blame on their political opponents and also caused 
southerners to place themselves within the larger framework of insurrections within the 
Atlantic world. The reaction to the Richmond slave conspiracy was no different. White 
Americans, from both slave states and free states, joined Gabriel in connecting his 
insurrection plot to the Haitian Revolution. Federalists, in Virginia as well as throughout 
New England, chastised their Republican opponents for supporting the ideals of the 
French Revolution and focused on the two Frenchmen supposedly involved in Gabriel's  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Rebellion. Just as the rhetoric spurred the uprising of blacks in Saint Domingue, so too, 
some Federalists warned, would it inspire blacks to rise against their masters in the 
South.48 
   One Federalist newspaper editor sneered at Jefferson's connection to France and 
argued his election to the presidency would make it "probable that the unhappy negroes 
may again be deluded by his French alien friends to make a general uprising." This 
appeal to white southerners to worry about insurrections remained obvious. To 
northerners, however, the Federalist explained how they too needed to worry about slave 
uprisings. He wrote that due to "the white people in the lower and middle parts of the 
southern states [being] very few in number in comparison to the blacks," the South would 
rely on militia troops from New England "being dragged over 1000 miles from home to 
expose their lives to the cut-throat negroes" in order to quell a rebellion. The North and 
South, he argued, had intimately been linked in defending against slave resistance and 
maintaining the security of a republic for whites only.49 
 While Federalists pointed to the French Revolution, some Democratic-
Republicans directed their attacks to an event much closer to home—Haiti. Federalists 
complained about attacks from a Jeffersonian newspaper accusing President Adams of 
supporting Toussaint and the Haitian Revolution. The Aurora wrote that Federalists 
secretly collaborated "with the British to establish an independent empire of the Blacks in 
St. Domingo" and that Gabriel's attack against the slave system stemmed from a  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conspiracy between Toussaint and slaves of Virginia and South Carolina with the support 
from the Federalist administration in Washington.50 
 After the election of 1800 and with victory attained, Jeffersonians across the 
country debated ways to strengthen the security of the slave system following Gabriel's 
Rebellion. Virginians understood that Gabriel had struck a weak point in the defenses of 
their slave society. One newspaper correspondent reported that the slaves "could scarcely 
had [sic] failed of success" as the whites in and around Richmond had been caught by 
surprise and without weapons. Changes needed to be made, they believed.51    
 In the aftermath of the failed slave insurrection, Governor Monroe urged the 
Virginia legislature to take steps towards strengthening the state's safeguards against 
slave resistance. Newspapers urged a variety of remedies, from strengthening the size of 
the militia to ending private manumissions. One citizen from Richmond, St. George 
Tucker, took the opportunity offered by Gabriel's Rebellion to examine slavery as a 
whole.  He suggested a plan to slowly end slavery in Virginia and proposed that the state 
enact a policy of colonization.  He wrote that living in a nation that valued the ideas of 
republicanism gave those enslaved an insatiable desire for freedom that would only 
produce more uprisings. Tucker argued, therefore, that introducing rigorous new 
restrictions on blacks would only make the "thousands of slaves vindictive and 
impatient." This, along with the growth of the black population, made the entire system 
of slavery unsustainable.  Since he believed that racial desegregation could never exist  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without constant hostility between the black and white races, Tucker contended that the 
only solution was gradual emancipation and the exportation of those freed to a colony to 
the "western side of the Mississippi."52 
 At the federal level, Thomas Jefferson examined the idea of colonization of 
blacks outside of the American continent upon a request by the Virginia Assembly. In a 
letter responding to them, the president admitted that Haiti, "where the blacks are 
established into a sovereignty de facto," offered "the most promising" place to send 
American freed blacks because those "exiled for acts deemed criminal by us" might be 
considered "meritorious" to them.  However, in the very next sentence he also rejected 
the idea because the black American exiles sent to the Caribbean might convince the 
rebels from the former French colony to attack the South in "concert with their brethren 
remaining here." Jefferson faced the conundrum of finding a place to diffuse slavery from 
the United States without giving blacks further opportunity to enact their revenge he 
presumed they all wanted.53 
 Jefferson's personal attitude about the Haitian Revolution pervaded his 
administration. In 1802 postmaster general Gideon Granger, from Connecticut, expressed 
concerns about employing blacks to carry the mail.  He wrote, referencing the slave states 
with large black populations, "After the scenes which St. Domingo has exhibited to the 
world, we cannot be too cautious in attempting to prevent similar evils in the four 
Southern States, where there are, particularly in the eastern and old settled parts of them,  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so great a proportion of blacks as to hazard the tranquility and happiness of the free 
citizens." To many whites Gabriel Prosser exemplified skilled blacks, both free and 
enslaved, that could undermine slavery in the United States just as they had in the West 
Indies.54     
 After pointing to different slave conspiracies being uncovered, including 
Gabriel's, the postmaster general insisted that allowing blacks to carry the mail increased 
"their knowledge of natural rights, of men and things, or that affords them an opportunity 
of associating, acquiring, and communicating sentiments, and of establishing a chain or 
line of intelligence, must increase your hazard, because it increases their means of 
effecting their object.” He further maintained that black post riders had the ability to 
communicate with other slaves and gain information on white defenses while at the same 
time "becoming teachers to their brethren." Treating all blacks as potential 
insurrectionists, the only solution he could conceive, would be to "prevent the evil than to 
cure it." He recommended ending the practice of black mail carriers as the most prescient 
solution, a preemptive strike against an anticipated rebellion that might occur in the 
future.55  
 During his time in office President Jefferson tried to distance the United States 
from the Haitian Revolution while also profiting from France's struggles to maintain 
control of their colony.  At the beginning of his term, and in light of Gabriel's rebellion, 
Jefferson initially supported Napoleon Bonaparte’s attempt to subdue Toussaint's power  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in the Caribbean and return Saint Domingue to French control.  However, he soon 
changed course upon receiving intelligence from England that Bonaparte intended to 
expand his empire onto the American continent. Watching as Bonaparte sent a group of 
troops to Saint Domingue to regain France’s power in the Caribbean, Jefferson 
reconsidered his position, fearing that a large-scale war between French forces and the 
black army of Toussaint could spread to the United States.  One scenario Jefferson 
described to Secretary of State James Madison depicted the French sending the "most 
warlike" black revolutionaries, who would never submit to re-enslavement from Saint-
Domingue, to Louisiana. The South seemed too vulnerable. When Bonaparte's general 
arrived in America, the president decided against supporting the recapture of Saint 
Domingue. This included a refusal to change John Adams’ policy of allowing American 
merchants to trade with Toussaint's forces. After nearly two years of brutal fighting 
between a ravaged French military force and black freedom fighters, the United States 
had a new neighbor officially: Haiti, the product of the only slave rebellion that had 
successfully created an independent state.56   
 France paid a steep price for trying to re-enslave their former colony in the West 
Indies.  With the destruction of his expeditionary force—from both the black army’s 
resistance and an epidemic of yellow fever—Napoleon Bonaparte saw his dream of an 
American empire collapse. While French troops died on the island of Hispaniola, Spain 
issued a blockade of the United States from the port of New Orleans that spurred 
President Jefferson to send James Monroe as part of a mission to France with the order to  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offer the French leader ten million dollars to purchase the city of New Orleans and the 
Floridas.  Fed up with the Americas and militarily weakened by Haiti's stout resistance, 
Bonaparte abandoned Louisiana and ordered Talleyrand, the French foreign minister, to 
offer the entire Louisiana territory to the United States.  For the price of just three cents 
an acre, amounting to a total of fifteen million dollars, James Monroe and Robert 
Livingston, the American minister to France, returned home with a treaty that doubled 
the size of their country—and vastly increased the amount of slave territory.57 
 Though the Haitian Revolution helped strengthen the United States by allowing 
the new nation to gain Louisiana, an independent black republic so close to American 
shores also created political issues for Jefferson and his predecessors. The debate over 
whether or not to formally recognize the Republic of Haiti came almost immediately 
following Haiti's de facto independence. Once in office, Thomas Jefferson swiftly 
acquiesced to southern slaveholders in Congress demanding a trade embargo and 
nonrecognition of the only other independent republic in the New World. The United 
States would not officially accept Haiti as a neighbor until after the beginning of the Civil 
War, yet over the following decades the black republic in the West Indies would 
frequently re-enter the political debate of the United States.58 
 Beginning in the colonial period the importation of Africans to America made 
some slaveholders wary about the increase of a black population they considered  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potentially dangerous. The Haitian Revolution reinforced this belief, and the fear of slave 
insurrection influenced American foreign policy throughout the early nineteenth century. 
Some southerners saw the end of the slave trade as a way to weaken black power in the 
South. When slaveholders looked to the events of French Saint Domingue they often saw 
a demographic nightmare that raised suspicions lasting in the South all the way to the 
Civil War, of a black population that had grown too large for whites to control. Some 
advocates of restricting the further importation of slaves to the United States argued that 
the slave population needed to be curbed in order to maintain a secure slave society 
unlike Saint-Domingue. In 1800, years before Congress could act to federally ban the 
importation of Africans to the United States, one Virginian who favored curtailing the 
slave trade wrote, "the safety of [the southern states] depend on a great accession of the 
white population." A larger white population would be needed in order to prevent the 
American version of the Haitian Revolution.59   
  This idea was not rare. Many in Virginia viewed the potential of a large enslaved 
population wreaking havoc against the southern system of slavery. For example another 
Virginian, William Leckie, who ran a dry goods business that connected him to both 
England and the Caribbean, stated his concerns clearly, writing, "The other [problem] is 
the encreasing [sic] quantity of blacks, who in Virginia...amount to 350,000, who are all 
native, many of whom can read and write, will perhaps prove the bane of all the Southern 
States, and by this struggle for freedom and involve nearly one half the Union in Civil 
Wars."  He believed that as long as the enslaved population grew, the white South would 
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always be at risk of having to fight a war against those they held in bondage. 60 
 States in the Lower South rarely considered the suspension of the slave trade due 
to moral qualms, but instead many sought to prohibit trade into their states in order to 
protect their security. The calamity of the Haitian Revolution impacted the American 
planter class and their devotion to the importation of more black people to the South by 
challenging the notion that further inflation of the black population of the country 
through the importation of African or Caribbean slaves had little consequence in regards 
to the security of the American slave system. A potential power struggle between the 
white and black populations seemed suddenly more real for many southerners who 
pondered slaveholders’ fate in Haiti. If former slaves could successfully fight against 
Napoleon, they worried, what could they do in America?61 
 In 1807 Congress passed legislation ending the international slave trade to the 
United States in the beginning of 1808, as the Constitution permitted. During the debate 
about enforcing the prohibition, one Pennsylvania congressman asked the House of 
Representatives "to look at St. Domingo" as a reason to end the slave trade. The Haitian 
Revolution showed, he contended, that blacks held in slavery could "learn the rights of 
man" and learn to become "proficient in the art of war" in claiming them.  He further 
believed that Europeans, who already had "armed Indians against us," could also "arm the 
negroes."  He insisted in keeping the black population "as numerous as is consistent with 
safety" and thought it to "be extreme impolicy [sic] to import more" without undermining  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national security. Northern arguments for ending the slave trade to keep the country safe 
also helped to isolate the proslavery faction from the Deep South who wished to keep the 
trade open.  On March 2, 1807, believing it to be "in the best interests of our country" 
President Jefferson signed the prohibition of the African slave trade into law with very 
little objection from the South.62  
 Banning the importation of slaves, however, did not stifle fears that West Indian 
blacks wanted to secretly invade the United States South and spark an uprising for the 
long term. A panic caused by a slave conspiracy connected to Haiti appeared again in the 
American vernacular on May 25, 1822, in Charleston, South Carolina.63 Just as in 
Gabriel's Rebellion, a black informant told a slaveholder about plans by blacks in the city 
to rise up against the slaveholding class en masse. Peter, a slave, told his owner's wife  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and son that at the market, another slave, an artisan named William Paul, had informed 
him of a plan "to shake off our bondage" and said that if he agreed to join he would 
"show you the man, who has the list of names, who will take yours down."  Upon being 
made aware of the rumor, South Carolina leaders placed the city on alert and created an 
investigative committee to seek out the possible insurrectionists and stop the rebellion 
before it began.64 
 After the conclusion of the probe to uncover the depth of the conspiracy, South 
Carolinian authorities indicted Denmark Vesey, a black carpenter and preacher who had 
paid for his freedom by winning a lottery, as the mastermind of the alleged plot.  Much 
like Gabriel's Rebellion, the plot, according to trial records, revolved around skilled black 
laborers, both free and enslaved, in Charleston. A large portion of those convicted in the 
slave revolt had a skill related to the shipping industry of the city. In the aftermath, 
numerous blacks received the sentence of either death or banishment from the United 
States.  The state sent some of the exiles to be sold into slavery in the Caribbean.65 
 Haiti became a chief element of the discussion during the trials of the Charleston 
conspiracy. Denmark Vesey had been born in the Caribbean and spent time in Saint 
Domingue during the Haitian Revolution. One of the charged insurrectionists, Rolla, 
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testified that Vesey told his followers they would receive assistance from Haiti and 
Africa. Vesey told his followers that Haitians would "come over and cut up the white 
people if we only made the motion here first." Others also included references to gaining 
help from the Caribbean in their testimonies.  According to the official account of the 
conspiracy, after freeing themselves and sparking the uprising in the city, the insurgent 
slaves planned to "get money from the Banks, and the goods from the stores" and "hoist 
sail for Saint Domingo," where Vesey "expected some armed vessels" to offer protection 
to them as they escaped the United States. One slave's final words before being hanged 
claimed that Vesey had "the habit of reading to me all the Passages in the newspapers 
that related to St. Domingo" along with reading passages from antislavery members of 
Congress who, he told other blacks in Charleston, were "the black man's friend."66   
 Michael Johnson has shown that the testimonies of the enslaved often came after 
severe emotional and physical trauma that he—rightfully—contends make these 
confessions unreliable.  However, even if the indicted slaves did just tell the slaveholding 
captors what they wanted to hear, the testimonies show how real the perception of danger 
from Haiti had become in the minds of the master class.  President Jean Pierre Boyer of 
Haiti had indeed invited free blacks in the United States to join his nation as he attempted 
to recruit a skilled labor force to his country. He advertised free land for black 
immigrants in newspapers throughout the country, including Charleston. Vesey 
presumably believed that he could buy his way into exile in Haiti despite the fact that 
allowing rebellious slaves to enter his republic might undermine Boyer's already  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maligned reputation in the community of nations.  The rebel leader even sent letters to the 
Haitian president asking him to prepare for his arrival. Whether the conspiracy had 
actually been planned and readied to launch or simply devised by slaveholders as a way 
to reestablish their control over South Carolina politics, the connection to Haiti served as 
a successful bogeyman that not only strengthened the political standing of slaveholders 
both at home and in the nation's capital.67 
 In the wake of the Vesey conspiracy, concerns over the possibility of slave 
insurrections rose once again in the South. The trial records and confessions of some of 
the enslaved charged in the plot became public knowledge throughout the region as 
newspapers published some of the testimony. Other southerners from neighboring states 
worried that some of rebels who had planned to raze Charleston had escaped authorities 
and fled to their state.  For instance, as part of its reporting on the South Carolina 
insurrection scare, the Alexandria Herald in Virginia wrote that "sixteen negroes of 
colour, supposed to have been engaged" in the Vesey affair, had been caught near the 
northern border of South Carolina, but assured its readers that "the necessary steps to 
secure the citizens from any accident that might occur" had been taken to "suppress every 
similar attempt."68 Though the newspaper does not give an account of what happened 
next regarding the sixteen alleged escapees, the article shows how rampant the fear of a 
possible Haiti-like rebellion coming to the United States South had become. 
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 Slaveholders in South Carolina took advantage of the crisis in order to use the 
machinery of government to strengthen their control over the state’s slave society. 
Established in 1823, the South Carolina Association vowed to police the slave system in 
Charleston and soon bred offshoots in other parts of the Palmetto State. Created by and 
filled with many of the most prominent men of South Carolina, the South Carolina 
Association worked with legal authorities to monitor the black population they feared 
might become unsettled and resistant towards the power of the slaveholding class.  One 
member explained that the organization was created in order to restore security by 
enforcing regulations of the black population that had become too lenient, and which 
therefore threatened the safety of all whites, regardless of their status as a slaveholder.69   
 South Carolina slaveholders also used the insurrection to increase their control 
over free blacks who came to their state on foreign ships. Promoted by the South Carolina 
Association, the Negro Seaman Act required black sailors who arrived on foreign ships at 
the port of Charleston to be detained and held in jail until their ship left the city.  Other 
southern states followed South Carolina's lead and passed similar laws.  Challenged in 
court by the British as unconstitutional, the defense of the statute by the South Carolina 
Attorney General Benjamin Hunt showed the anxiety those free blacks, especially those 
connected to the British West Indies, engendered in American slaveholders.  Hunt 
claimed that without the law, South Carolina would see the "moral pestilence which a 
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free intercourse with foreign negroes will produce" and that the slaveholding lawmakers 
had written the law based on  "the right of self preservation."70   
 While many South Carolinians blamed antislavery rhetoric during the debate over 
admitting Missouri as a free or slave state for the Denmark Vesey scare, others saw it as 
an opportunity to show that the slaveholders needed the North as an ally in order to 
preserve slavery against an uprising by those held in bondage in the South.  Reverend 
Richard Furman, trying to quell any backlash against evangelicalism that stemmed from 
much of Vesey's plot developing in the African Methodist Church, released a pamphlet 
explaining how northerners and southerners had to work together to maintain the security 
of the South against insurrections. He told his southern readers that blacks needed to be 
reminded "however numerous they are in some parts of these Southern States, they, yet, 
are not, even including all descriptions, bond and free, in the United States, but little 
more than one sixth part of the whole number of inhabitants." American slaves should 
know that South Carolina was not Haiti.71  
 Furman attacked abolitionist Christianity while simultaneously insisting that the 
North would protect the South from the violence of a slave uprising.  He stated, "In some 
parts of our Union there are Citizens, who favor the idea of general emancipation; yet, 
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were they to see slaves in our Country, in arms, wading through blood and carnage to 
effect their purpose, they would do what both their duty and interest would require." 
Northerners would not have the stomach to watch blacks slaughter whites in the South. 
Just as antislavery northerners used national security to buoy their arguments against the 
slave trade, proslavery southerners used the fear of slave insurrection, with Haiti as the 
main example, to engage in the discussion of slavery and push northern politicians 
towards a proslavery national policy during the 1820s and 1830s.72 
 Near the end of 1825, Mexico, and then Columbia, asked the United States to 
attend a conference of many recently independent nations of South America to be held in 
Panama. President John Quincy Adams readily accepted the invitation and asked 
Congress to approve sending a delegation to what became known as the Pan American 
Conference.  Southerners wasted no time in attacking the very notion of the conference, 
crying out against acknowledging Haiti’s independence and wanting to prevent the 
United States from participating in any confederation with their non-white neighbors in 
the Western Hemisphere.73 
As the Senate discussed the issue of providing a mission to the Pan American 
Conference, official recognition of the Republic of Haiti brought the most vitriolic 
language to the debate.  Claiming they feared the insurrection of their slaves, most 
southern politicians insisted that any formal acceptance of Haiti would lead to the 
                                                        
72 Furman, Views of the Baptists, Relative to the Coloured Population in the United States, 5. 
73 Ludwell Lee Montague, Haiti And The United States, 1714-1938  (Durham: Duke University Press, 
1940): 52-53; Ralph Sanders, “Congressional Reaction in the United States to the Panama Congress of 
1826,” The Americas 11 (Oct. 1954): 141-143; Charles Wilson Hackett, "The Development of John Quincy 
Adams's Policy with Respect to an American Confederation and the Panama Congress, 1822-1825," 
American Historical Review 8 (November 1928): 496-526. 
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repetition of its revolution in America. Granting the republic and its majority black 
population recognition as an equal on the world stage, they worried, condoned Haiti’s 
destructive uprising of enslaved and freed blacks against slaveholders, threatening white 
hegemony inside the United States as well as abroad.  Many on the proslavery side of 
Congress worked passionately to prevent a formal relationship between Haiti and the 
United States of America. Playing upon fears of insurrection, they were able to gain 
strong public support in both the North and South.74  
The fear of insurrection prompted proslavery senators to reject any formal 
relationship between the Republic of Haiti and the United States because they believed 
that any kind of equality officially granted by the federal government to blacks on the 
world stage undermined white authority over the enslaved. One of the most vocal 
congressmen discussing Haiti during the debate regarding the Panama conference in 
1826, Senator Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri, railed against any formal recognition of 
the Caribbean republic.  He said, “Our policy towards Haiti, the old San Domingo, has 
been fixed, Mr. President, for three and thirty years. We trade with her, but no diplomatic 
relations have been established between us. And Why? Because the peace of eleven 
States in this Union will not permit the fruits of a successful negro insurrection to be 
exhibited among them.” The white North and South needed to be united against Haiti in 
order to protect southern slavery and the security of the United States.75  
Southern anxiety about Haiti was real.  The senator did not simply worry about 
                                                        
74 Montague, Haiti and the United States, 52-53. 
75 Register of Debates in Congress, 19 Cong. 1 sess., 330. 
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symbolic equality being granted to the black republic undermining slavery. He also 
believed agents from Haiti would actively attack American slavery once the nation had 
the ability to send foreign consuls on diplomatic trips to the United States. He argued that 
the South “will not permit black Consuls and Ambassadors to establish themselves in our 
cities, and to parade through our country, and give their fellow blacks in the United States 
proof in hand of the honors which await them, for a like successful effort on their part.” 
The Missourian considered all blacks, whether American or foreign, free or enslaved, to 
be allies against the South’s enslaved system of labor despite differences in language or 
national heritage.76  
 Benton also thought enslaved Americans’ witnessing a black foreign minister 
from Haiti could lead to the destruction of the South and the death of white slaveholders. 
He bellowed that slaveholders would “not permit the fact to be seen, and told, that for the 
murder of their masters and mistresses, they are to find friends among the white People of 
these United States.” The Haitian president had already responded to Senator Benton’s 
latter concern that the sight of Haitian consuls would spark slave revolts. Jean Pierre 
Boyer offered to forbid Haitian agents from traveling south of the Potomac and promised 
to send a minister whose skin color would "not offend the prejudices of the country."  
Benton, however, remained unconvinced the South could ever take such a deadly risk.77   
  Senator Robert Y. Hayne of South Carolina echoed Benton's concerns. Hayne 
wanted the American mission to Panama to “plead the cause of the South” and work to 
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slow the revolutionary spirit of South America he perceived as a threat to southern, white 
hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.  He hoped that the American mission might 
convince the South American countries to reject Haiti as an equal member of the 
countries in the Western Hemisphere.  He summed up the proslavery stance on Haiti 
more succinctly than his colleague from Missouri: “Our policy, with regard to Hayti, is 
plain.  We never can acknowledge independence....the peace and safety of a large portion 
of our Union forbid us even to discuss. Let our government direct all our ministers in 
South America and Mexico to protest against the independence of Hayti.” The proslavery 
forces in the federal government would do everything they could to stop a country of 
blacks from gaining recognition on equal footing with the United States. In the end, the 
proslavery forces of Congress succeeded in undermining the president’s delegation to 
Panama. No American delegation made it to Panama in time to participate in the 
conference in any meaningful way.78 
 Realistically, the nation of Haiti had little capability or inclination to attack 
slavery in the United States. The likelihood of an army of black revolutionaries crossing 
the Caribbean for the sake of American slaves and executing a successful uprising 
appears remote at best and absurd at worst. As a symbol, however, the black republic 
struck a discomfiting chord with the slaveholding class of the South that made them 
extremely wary of real insurrections occurring on the plantations or in their cities.  Free  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and independent former slaves showed American slaveholders—and the rest of the 
world—that those held in the chains of enslavement had the capability to successfully 
attack the power of the master class and cause even the richest of plantation societies to 
collapse in a heap of ashes. It suggested that if given the opportunity, the right 
environment, and inspiration from successful slave revolts overseas, the enslaved of the 
South could do the same. 
 Indeed, their memory of Caribbean counterparts influenced Gabriel in Virginia 
and Denmark Vesey in South Carolina to organize well-planned slave insurrections.  
These, along with many smaller instances of rebellion throughout the South, bore a close 
enough resemblance to the uprisings Americans learned about in the West Indies to give 
whites in slave states a feeling of uneasiness about their security and uncertainty over the 
future of slavery in the United States. The anxiety white southerners felt about the blacks 
they held in slavery gave the proslavery element of the South a tool, which they used to 
strengthen their power at home while also claiming that the security of the nation rested 
on the protection of the southern institution by free states in conjunction with the slave 
states. The demands on the North for proslavery support, however, did not just come 
from politicians trying serve their own interests in expanding slavery. It also allowed 
slaveholders to point to an outside influence in order to explain why some of the slaves 
they said were loyal and happy in southern slavery plotted ways to attack the 
slaveholding class. 
 Many slaveholders believed that the North—along with the emerging lands of the 
West—offered a safeguard that had been lacking in the West Indies.  The 
overwhelmingly white population in the North offered a buttress to southern security in 
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the event that an actual American Toussaint rose to free the blacks of the South. Unlike 
French or English slaveholders in the Caribbean, American planters had the strength of 
the United States military at its disposal, which did not reside a thousand miles away or 
across the ocean.  During the latter half of the 1820s slaveholders started to see a change 
in the antislavery movement. Soon, they believed, the South would witness a dangerous 
world filled with abolitionists who constantly worked to undermine southern slavery just 
as English and French slaveholders had experienced. The support of northerners 
remained a vital component of the South's security against the men and women upon 
whose labor their society relied at the same time that a northern antislavery movement 
grew in its determination to see the enslaved freed. 
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Chapter Two 
"Fanaticism" and Southern Fears of Insurrection 
 
Slavery is considered a festering sore by the fanatics of the North.  They believe that they are responsible 
before God and the world, for the sin of African slavery, and although it is within our borders, they must 
use all their means in their power to destroy it in the States. 
 
-Jeremiah Morton's Secessionist Speech, Virginia, February 28, 18611 
 
 
 On January 16, 1830, subscribers to the Southern Recorder in the capital of 
Georgia continued their weekly practice of reading news stories from across the nation.  
One column talked about dinner parties between strangers on steamboats.  Another 
described an estate sale and advertised hogs, cattle corn, kitchen furniture, and enslaved 
people, attempting to entice potential buyers.  At the bottom of the page the editors 
mentioned a new book.  "Webster's Dictionary," the headline read.  The newspaper 
explained "the officers of Yale College, who have examined this work, are said to have 
recommended it to the students as being superior to any dictionary of our language." 
Written and verified by Connecticut Yankees, and published in London, the short though 
positive review by a leading southern newspaper encouraged its purchase. Webster’s 
book seemed to do what he had intended: tie the nation together.2 
 Webster’s dictionary was more than just a new book; he thought of it as a project 
in nation building. The rise and fall of empires often came to the forefront of American 
thought throughout the late-eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Noah Webster                                                         
1 Showdown in Virginia: The 1861 Convention and the Fate of the Union, eds. William W. Freehling and 
Craig M. Simpson (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2010): 3. 
 
2 Milledgeville Southern Recorder, January 16, 1830. 
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believed the United States could avoid the pitfalls of empires if the states remained 
harmonious under a strong federal government and united as a nation. He hoped to build 
connections between the dispersed people of the United States by nationalizing the 
English language throughout the country. In talking about his famous spelling book he 
wrote, "A national language is a band of national union." A dictionary, his dictionary, he 
hoped would make the United States a stronger and more unified nation and help 
Americans understand what they said to each other.3    
 For some time newspapers across the country had reported the progress of 
Webster's dictionary. After twenty years of studying different languages, Webster 
completed his magnum opus in 1828. Some newspapers poked fun at Webster for some 
of the words he included in his masterpiece. More than one newspaper wrote, "Noah 
Webster introduces into his Dictionary as legitimate, the word lengthy. We should like to 
know whether his reason for so doing are breadthy and strengthy." Despite the criticism 
of certain words, Webster's book received extensive accolades.  In an examination of 
Webster's finished project, the Connecticut Herald called his work "the most extensive 
and elaborate work which, in our country, has even been executed by the persevering 
industry of one man." The reviewer praised the dictionary as a useful tool that would help 
Americans communicate in a more understandable way. With Webster's new tome 
Americans could speak with each other more clearly.4   
                                                        
3 Noah Webster, "Dissertations on the English Language: with Notes, Historical and Critical," in Evan 
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 As the discourse over slavery began to rise in volume during the 1830s, Webster's 
dictionary would prove useful in defining the language of the debate. Of all the words 
used by southerners to describe abolitionists, one word stood out among the rhetoric: 
"fanaticism n. Excessive enthusiasm; wild and extravagant notions of religion; religious 
frenzy." Though Webster meant the definition to be related specifically to religious 
fervor, southerners broadened the word's usage. Abolitionists, many slaveholders warned 
the rest of the nation, were people so blinded by their faith in black freedom that they 
risked total destruction of whites to achieve it. Their singular focus made them deranged.5 
 When Georgians picked up the Southern Recorder and read about Webster's new 
dictionary, they also saw a column describing new laws against abolitionism that had 
been recently enacted. The new laws had one purpose, to prevent any black person living 
in Georgia from reading a pamphlet that had been sent from the North. Some 
slaveholders feared what could happen if the incendiary pamphlet—written by one of 
those antislavery "fanatics" to spark black protest—reached the wrong hands. The 
abolitionist message needed to be censored.6 
 The first effort to do so involved the mail. Between 1821 and 1831 the size and 
scope of the American postal system had doubled. In 1830 nearly thirty million letters 
and newspapers went through the United States postal service that had almost doubled 
the size of Great Britain’s and had five times as many post offices as France. The mail 
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5 Noah Webster, The American Dictionary of the English Language (New York: Johnson Reprint Corp., 
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6 Milledgeville Southern Recorder, January 16, 1830. 
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delivery system of America allowed anyone willing to pay an easy means to transmit 
their beliefs across the nation with pointed accuracy. David Walker—a free black man 
who attended church with Denmark Vesey—understood the postal system’s value in 
spreading ideas to the enslaved of the South. Restrictions might be placed on ships that 
arrived in southern ports, but Walker vowed to circulate the pamphlet at his own expense. 
He used the post office, along with sailors heading down the coast, like artillery to launch 
attacks against American slavery from a safe distance in Boston where he had settled 
after leaving the South.  Some slaveholders worried that Walker, a dealer in used 
clothing, might be a black Thomas Paine encouraging his compatriots to continue to 
fight. By the end of 1830, southern authorities found Walker's message appearing 
throughout their region. They vowed to stop it.7 
 In mid-December 1829 Thomas Lewis, a free black man living in Richmond, 
opened a parcel that came with a clear return address: 42 Brattle Street, Boston, 
Massachusetts. Along with thirty copies of a pamphlet entitled An Appeal to the Coloured 
Citizens of the World was a letter signed "Yours Very Affectionately, David Walker."  
The Massachusetts abolitionist asked Lewis to sell each copy "among the Coloured 
people" of Richmond.  Each "book" cost twelve cents; however, the author insisted, "if 
there are any who, cannot pay for Book give them Books for nothing." For this 
abolitionist, his message superseded his want of profit.8       
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  Walker did not stop with just trying to infiltrate Virginia. Walker's Appeal soon 
appeared in Georgia. The only thing needed to penetrate southern defenses of slavery was 
an address and postage. By the end of December an unsolicited package arrived at the 
doorstep of Henry Cunningham, the preacher of the African Baptist Church in Savannah. 
Upon examining the pamphlets, the minister alerted Georgian authorities, most likely 
fearful that doing anything else could make him, and his parish, the target of a 
slaveholding power leery of insurrection. What the Georgia leaders read frightened 
them.9 
 David Walker did not hope to influence those in slavery to organize for just a 
local slavery rebellion—like Gabriel or Vesey.  The black abolitionist wanted—
demanded—something bigger.  In his pamphlet, composed of four individual articles, he 
addressed "the coloured citizens of the world." From Africa to Haiti, and Virginia to 
Brazil, the abolitionist called for the massive uprising of blacks, free or enslaved, against 
whites in the American South.  Walker held disdain for any black person who did not 
aspire for a better life, whether free and discriminated against in the North or enslaved in 
the South. Like Thomas Jefferson, whom he lambasted for giving credence to the belief 
in the inferiority of Africans, Walker saw two nations divided by race residing in 
America and filled with antipathy towards each other. For the blacks of the United States 
to be free, they needed to claim freedom themselves instead of relying on the sympathy 
                                                        
9 Document IV: Walker's Appeal Arrives in Georgia, published in Hinks, David Walker's Appeal; Hasan 
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of whites.10 
 David Walker understood that whites would read his words.  An Appeal read as a 
jeremiad against white America—North and South—and challenged its Christianity.  
Like the Haitians, the rebels of Demerara, and even Denmark Vesey, David Walker 
linked Christianity and God as the progenitor of natural rights to all of humanity as a way 
to boost the morale of possible insurrectionists.  However, he took it one step further. 
Walker argued that God heard the cries of the enslaved of the South.  Whites would feel 
the wrath of an angry of the Lord for not allowing the enslaved to read the Bible.  For 
Walker, the enslaved in America fit into the history of other oppressed Christians by 
"heathen nations." Walker pleaded with blacks to "fear not the number and education of 
our enemies, against whom we shall have to contend for our lawful right; guaranteed to 
us by our Maker; for why should we be afraid, when God is, and will continue...to be on 
our side." In a battle between enslaved blacks and white Americans, the Almighty would 
be on the side of the meek and poor.11 
 Walker wanted what Gabriel had wanted—war. He prophesied, "the Lord our 
God, as true as he sits on his throne in heaven, and as true as our Savior died to redeem 
the world, will give you a Hannibal," the most famous African general in ancient history 
who had climbed the Alps against all odds in order to attack Rome. Black unity would be 
needed for this new general to vanquish the white slaveholder, and Walker implored                                                         
10 Hinks, ed., David Walker's Appeal, xxvi-xxix, 17-18; Peter S. Onuf, " 'To Declare Them a Free and 
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blacks everywhere to quash divisions among them.  He pointed to the history of discord 
between Haiti's enslaved and free blacks, telling his black readers to "read the history 
particularly of Hayti, and see how they were butchered by the whites, and do take 
warning." Walker continued, "the person whom God shall give you, give him your 
support and let him go his length, and behold in him the salvation of your God.  God will 
indeed, deliver you through him from your deplorable and wretched condition." A 
modern-day Moses would arrive, the black abolitionist promised, and lead his people to 
freedom.12 
 A final point that Walker made in his Appeal differentiated between the southern 
slaveholder and the British Empire. He wrote, "The English are the best friends the 
coloured people have upon earth.  Though they have oppressed us a little and have 
colonies now in the West Indies, which oppress us sorely....they (the English) have done 
one hundred times more for the melioration of our condition, than all other nations of the 
earth put together."  Walker most likely separated the Caribbean slaveholders from the 
British mainland in order to portray the connection between the American and British 
antislavery movement and to show southern slaveholders who read his pamphlet that 
blacks had the sympathies of one of the strongest nations in the world.13  
 Upon discovery of the pamphlet in their states, southern leaders responded 
quickly to prevent further circulation.  Both the governor of Virginia, William Giles, and 
mayor of Savannah, Georgia, William T. Williams, turned to the person they believed 
would be the best ally to slaveholders in stopping the spread of An Appeal to the                                                         
12 Hinks, ed., David Walker's Appeal, 22. 
13 Ibid., 43; Edward Bartlett Rugemer, The Problem of Emancipation: The Caribbean Roots of the 
American Civil War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 2008): 96-108. 
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Coloured Citizens of the World—Harrison Gray Otis, the mayor of Boston. Both southern 
politicians asked that the mayor prevent the pamphlet from leaving Massachusetts.  They 
also demanded that punishment be handed out to its black antislavery author even though 
he lived outside of their jurisdiction. Giles and Williams believed an example must be 
made out of David Walker.14 
 Governor Giles and Mayor Williams could not have hoped for a more acquiescent 
mayor in Boston to try and silence David Walker.  Harrison Gray Otis had served as a 
politician for a long time, first as a congressman elected in 1797, then as a senator from 
Massachusetts for a term in the 1810s, and, finally, the Federalist stalwart became mayor 
of Boston in 1829. As a congressman, Harrison Otis had supported the extension of 
slavery in the Southwest Territory and allied himself with southerners who condemned 
antislavery petitions sent to the first congresses at the turn of the nineteenth century.  As a 
senator, Otis had opposed admitting Missouri as a slave state, but not because of any 
moral qualms over slavery; instead, he claimed he voted with the North because of 
political reasons. The New England Federalist had a distaste for the political power 
espoused by Virginians. As the antislavery movement of Massachusetts became more 
radicalized during the 1830s, however, Boston's mayor urged attacks on slavery to be 
toned down.  Surely, the two southerners believed, Walker's pamphlet had crossed a 
line.15   
 Two months later, the letters that both Mayor Williams and Governor Giles                                                         
14 Samuel Eliot Morison, The Life and Letters of Harrison Gray Otis: Federalist, 1765-1848 vol. II 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1913): 257; Eaton, "A Dangerous Pamphlet In the Old South," 
Clement Eaton, "A Dangerous Pamphlet in the Old South," The Journal of Southern History 2 (August, 
1936): 327. 
15 Morison, The Life and Letter of Harrison Gray Otis, 219-230, 274. 
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received from Otis must have disappointed them.  The Richmond Enquirer published 
Otis's response.  In his letter to Governor Giles, the mayor wrote that southerners "cannot 
hold in more absolute detestation, the sentiments of [Walker] than do the people of" 
Boston and New England.  He continued that the Appeal's "sanguinary fanaticism" 
tended to "disgust all persons of common humanity."  He even asserted, falsely, that the 
free black population of the city regretted that the pamphlet—now referred to as 
"seditious" by many northern as well as southern newspapers—had been published in 
Boston.16 
 The letter Otis wrote to Mayor Williams was also filled with regret.  Otis told the 
Savannah mayor that after receiving a copy of the pamphlet from one of the Board of 
Alderman, he "perused it carefully, in order to ascertain whether the writer had made 
himself amenable to our laws." Unfortunately for slaveholders who wanted to see Walker 
published and the circulation of his Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World 
stopped, Harrison Otis stated that "notwithstanding the extremely bad and inflammatory 
tendency of the publication," the abolitionist had not committed any crime. Despite 
having support from anti-abolition forces in Boston, nothing could be done to make 
Walker stop what he planed to do. Otis explained that he could do no more than chastise 
Boston's "fanatical" dealer of old clothes.17 
 When the Boston mayor ordered an investigation into what Walker was doing, he 
was told that Walker "openly avows the sentiments of the book and authorship" and that 
                                                        
16   Harrison B. Otis to William B. Giles February 16, 1830 printed in Richmond Enquirer February 18. 
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he "declares his intention....to circulate his pamphlets through the mail" if he could not 
find any other way for his writing to reach a southern readership. The only legal action 
that the city leader could take, Otis wrote Williams and Giles, was "to publish a general 
caution to Captains and others, against exposing themselves to the consequences of 
transporting incendiary writing into your and other Southern States." He would not act 
directly to censor against Walker's individual right to free speech.18 
 White Bostonians applauded their mayor for distancing their city from Walker's 
Appeal.  One newspaper praised Otis because he "exculpated the citizens of Boston from 
any suspicion of participating in the incendiary attempt."  The Boston Courier took 
things even further.  It stated that, "curiosity induced us, a few days since, to seek out the 
vender of these 'seditious pamphlets,' and to purchase an article that had created so much 
excitement among our southern neighbors." The Courier continued, however, "The thing 
is inflammatory enough, in all conscience; but he who believes it to have been written by 
David Walker, the dealer in old clothes in Brattle street, must have more abundant faith 
than falls to our humble share."   
 The evidence against Walker's authorship was simple, they contended. "There are 
too many allusions to names and incidents in ancient and classical history scattered 
through the pamphlet....It has the appearances of being the work of an educated and well-
read writer, endeavoring to conceal his real character." The newspaper concluded that An 
Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World had not even been printed in Boston, and 
instead they blamed New York.  Walker, they insisted, just claimed authorship in order to 
"pocket a pretty handsome sum by the sale."  The newspaper editor wanted southerners to  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know that some Bostonians had similar skepticism of Walker's pamphlet. Northern 
sympathy was different than northern action. Slaveholders, it seemed, would have to take 
much of their action against Walker's pamphlet on their own, just as they had done while 
they waited for a response from New England. 19 
 An Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World came to the South at a time when 
many slaveholders felt anxious about slave insurrections.  During the previous summer, 
reports of slave uprisings had caused alarm among the white populace in both Virginia 
and Georgia.  In July 1829 a Virginia militia commander informed the governor of an 
investigation of a possible insurrection and told him that "should this alarm be well 
founded, we are in a helpless situation for a want of arms."  Some slaveholders felt 
unprepared for another uprising. Walker's pamphlet would exacerbate this sense of 
unpreparedness.20 
 Georgians too believed their slave system was already susceptible to a revolt. 
James Stuart, an Englishman traveling across the United States in 1830, reported that a 
suspicious fire in Augusta, Georgia, was widely believed to have been started by 
"incendiaries among the people of colour" the summer before. "One slave a female," he 
wrote," was convicted, executed, dissected, and exposed, but she died denying the crime. 
Another, now with child, is sentenced to be executed in June, but she still denies her 
guilt.  I fear these unhappy creatures are convicted on what we should consider very 
insufficient evidence." The fire destroyed much of Augusta's supply of weapons for its 
                                                        
19 Haverhill, Ma. Gazette, March 6, 1830; Boston Courier, March 22, 1830; Greenville Mountaineer,   
April 30, 1830. 
20 H. W. Flournoy, ed., Calendar of Virginia State Papers and Other Manuscripts from January 1, 1808, to 
December 31, 1835 vol. 10 (Richmond, 1892): 567-569. 
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militia. In response, the governor asked the United States Secretary of War for more 
weaponry from the federal arsenal, thus assuming the nation's assistance in defending 
against insurrection.  Risk needed to be averted. The repression instituted by distressed 
southern slaveholders that Stuart witnessed in light of the discovery of Walker's pamphlet 
would eventually shock the sensibilities of the Englishman.21  
 The slaveholding authorities of Georgia did not wait to hear back from Harrison 
Gray Otis before acting against An Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World in their 
own state.  Upon the initial discovery of the pamphlet, the Georgia legislature enacted 
harsh laws deemed essential to the safety of the white population.  By the middle of 
January 1830, Georgia lawmakers had emulated South Carolina after the Vesey scare and 
banned free black sailors from leaving port and mingling with the population. The law 
also imprisoned any black sailor for communicating with "any person of color residing in 
this State."  The law, however, did not intend to create a white and non-white divide. The 
law explicitly stated that "this act shall not be construed to extend to any free American 
Indian, free Moors, Lascars, or other colored subjects of the countries beyond the Cape of 
Good Hope." Georgia lawmakers saw only Atlantic World blacks—the group to whom 
Walker addressed his pamphlet—as a threat.  They also revived a law passed in 1817 that 
prohibited the importation of slaves to their state, except for "certain conditions."  These 
restrictions were only the beginning.22   
 The Georgia state legislature took Walker's pamphlet head on.  Legislators 
                                                        
21 James Stuart, Three Years in North America vol. II (Edinburgh: Robert Cadell and Whittaker and Co, 
1831): 123; Clement Eaton, "A Dangerous Pamphlet in the Old South," 323-334; Crocket, "The Incendiary 
Pamphlet," 309.   
22 Milledgeville Southern Recorder, January 16, 1830. 
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enacted a law that punished with death anyone who circulated or assisted in circulation 
"any printed or written pamphlet, paper or circular, for the purposes of exciting to 
insurrection, conspiracy or resistance among the slaves, negroes, or free persons of 
color." Furthermore, the lawmakers prohibited blacks—both free and enslaved—from 
being taught how to read, sanctioning a fine of up to 500 dollars for whites or "whipping 
at the discretion of the court" for blacks who taught "any other slave, negro or free person 
of color, to read or write either written or printed characters."  Only in the total 
suppression of Walker's Appeal could white Georgians feel secure. A pamphlet from 
Boston seemed as threatening as a slave conspiracy and had caused a clamping down in 
Georgia society similar to the way Vesey's assumed plot had in South Carolina.23   
 The repression enacted by the Georgia government shocked James Stuart. In 
Three Years in North America the Englishman explicitly mentioned Georgia's newly 
enacted statutes.  He wrote, "The laws on the subject of slavery in the State of Georgia 
are as tyrannical as in any of the states."  Earlier in his journal the Englishman had noted 
the stark difference between free states and slave states in the America.  He wrote: "The 
regulations in the different states as to the liberty of the press are as different as those 
respecting slavery.  This liberty can hardly be said to exist in Louisiana, or Georgia, 
while in most of the northern states it is enjoyed, almost, I may say, without control."  For 
an outsider, the sectional differences between the North and South seemed stark.24  
 Some northerners, however, viewed the laws differently than did the Englishman. 
On the same day that the Southern Recorder documented the new restrictions on life in                                                         
23 Ibid. 
24 Stuart, Three Years in North America, I, 230, II, 129-130. 
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Georgia, the Columbia Centinel from Massachusetts wrote, "This act appears at first 
blush violent and sanguinary."  However, the newspaper argued, "it appears necessary to 
the immediate safety of whites.  We have seen the pamphlet, which is doubtless here 
alluded to and do not hesitate to pronounce it one of the most wicked and inflammatory 
productions that ever issued from the press."  The Centinel decried the violence Walker 
called for and justified the harsh regulations as protecting the safety of the white 
population.25 
 
 No doubt harkening back to Bryan Edwards’s writings about the cause of slave 
insurrections during the Haitian Revolution, the pamphlet seemed so dangerous to some 
Georgian leaders that the mayor of Savannah asked the governor to contact John Forsyth, 
one of Georgia's senators, in order to enquire about a way for the federal government to 
suppress Walker's free speech.  Mayor Williams asked Governor Gilmer to send the 
senator a copy of the pamphlet with instructions on how to best serve the state in their 
time of need.  However, Gilmer opposed any action against Walker coming out of 
Washington because it could empower the federal government to attack slavery and 
corrode state rights under the Constitution.  In his response to the mayor, the Georgia 
governor explained that the threat of congressional engagement with slavery presented a 
greater danger to slavery than any single incendiary pamphlet.  The federal government 
would remain a key ally against slave insurrection and could be called upon to supply 
weapons lost when an uprising burned a militia armory, but it could not be counted on to 
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silence David Walker.26  
 Neither Georgia’s new laws nor any intimidation from proslavery forces 
constrained Walker from distributing more copies of his pamphlet. Even after passing 
harsher regulations, state authorities found two missionaries to the Cherokees in 
possession of Walker's Appeal. Furthermore, a printer in the state capital, Elijah Burritt, 
made the mistake of being curious about the pamphlet that had caused such uproar in the 
legislature.  He asked Walker to send him one printing of the pamphlet so that he could 
read what caused the fuss.  Walker sent him twenty-five.  When his business partner 
found a letter from David Walker and the copies of the pamphlet, the printer had to flee 
for his life, eventually leaving the South and settling in Connecticut because he could not 
clear his name in the state of Georgia.27  
 By March 1830 South Carolina newspapers had started discussing Walker's An 
Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World.  In its analysis of the letter that Harrison 
Gray Otis had sent to Virginia and Georgia, the Charleston City Gazette and Commercial 
Daily Advertiser talked about the "fanatic insolence" of Walker's Appeal.  The paper's 
editors also reported that attempts had been made to distribute the pamphlet in their own 
city and asked, "Will these wretches never be quiet? Have they no apprehensions that 
they may be destroyed in the very flames they are laboring to enkindle."  Northerners, it 
seemed at least to some South Carolinians, had become too blinded by their hate of 
slavery to understand the trouble caused by abolitionist fanatics allowed to continue their 
                                                        
26 Crockett, "The Incendiary Pamphlet," 312-313. 
27 Ibid., 313-316. 
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attacks on the southern labor system.28 
 On March 27, three weeks after the City Gazette and Commercial Daily had 
analyzed Walker's pamphlet, the Appeal appeared in the state with the densest slave 
population.  Charleston police arrested a white sailor from Boston, Edward Smith, for 
carrying the pamphlet into South Carolina and disseminating it to blacks in the city.  In 
his deposition, Smith claimed ignorance of what the writing said.  He only knew that he 
had been tasked to deliver to "any negroes he had a mind to, or that he met" and "did not 
know that he was doing wrong or violating the law."  South Carolina authorities acted 
quickly to punish the northern sailor.29   
 The Attorney General of South Carolina swiftly investigated Edward Smith and 
accused the sailor of libel as well as  "maliciously contriving and intending to disturb the 
peace and security of this State and to move a sedition among the Slaves of the people of 
this state with force and arms at Charleston in the District of Charleston."  The indictment 
from the grand jury used to prosecute the Boston sailor read like a laundry list from a 
slaveholder's nightmare.  As evidence against Smith, the court took different passages 
from Walker's Appeal specifically mentioning his call to remember the Haitian 
Revolution and his attacks on white Christianity.  In just six days Edward Smith was tried 
and found guilty.  He, however, escaped execution.  The court ordered him to pay a  
$1,000 fine and spend a year in prison.  South Carolina slaveholders in charge of the state 
wanted to show others that northern interference in their institution of slavery would not 
be tolerated, but they did not want to spark further outrage from white allies in the North  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by overreacting.30     
 A few months later the City Gazette and Commercial Daily Advertiser would claim 
that Walker's pamphlet had "recoiled upon those with whom it originated" in a report of a 
riot between "the brownies and a few of the philanthropists, in which the latter have been 
seriously battered and bruised."  The newspaper concluded by telling northerners, "They 
will discover in time, that mischief, like chickens, 'comes home to roost.' " The message 
was clear: the North needed to continue its devotion to protecting slavery from those who 
attacked it or face the consequences that stemmed from its destruction.  Between March 
and October 1830, however, Walker's pamphlet would appear throughout much of the 
South.31 
 In August, Walker's pamphlet finally showed up in North Carolina.  Jacob 
Cowan, an enslaved man who had been given permission to run a tavern, acted as the 
main agent for distributing An Appeal to the Coloured Persons of the World across the 
state in which David Walker had been born. Cowan received as many as two hundred 
copies, arriving through the port of Wilmington,  to distribute to the local black 
population who came to his establishment to drink. Upon the discovery of the pamphlets, 
the Wilmington Magistrate of Police James F. McKee reassured Governor John Owen 
that "every means which the existing laws of our State" provided had been "promptly 
used to prevent dissemination." McKee warned the governor that a "systematic" attempt 
"to sow sedition among the slaves at the South" had obviously been launched "by some 
reckless personas at the North" and asked that North Carolina follow the lead of its sister  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slave states in implementing stronger laws against the black population. Owen agreed.  
He called a secret meeting of the legislature where lawmakers passed restrictions against 
teaching slaves how to read and designated punishment for disbursing any kind of writing 
that might lead to a slave conspiracy, a move that drew criticism from some religious 
members of the white population in North Carolina.32 
 The appearance of Walker's pamphlet also caused uproar in Louisiana.  State 
authorities arrested Milo Mower, a French immigrant and the editor of the antislavery 
newspaper The Liberalist. As a way to justify his imprisonment, the abolitionist was 
accused of breaking a new law against distributing any writing that might disturb the 
black population or "excite insubordination among the slaves therein." Walker's Appeal 
gave proslavery forces a way to get rid of an advocate of antislavery in the Deep South. 
Authorities charged him with distributing a "seditious circular to the free people of color 
at New Orleans." After his arrest Mower did not appear in the public forum again. Fellow 
abolitionist editors in the North speculated that he had been deported to Europe. Much of 
the antislavery movement in the Deep South had been shut down. Slaveholders would 
control the narrative of the media in the slave states.33 
 Despite Louisiana's long history of affording free blacks a place in their society, 
lawmakers passed new restrictions on that population of roughly seventeen thousand. The 
state legislature forbade the entrance of any new free black immigrants to the state and 
                                                        
32 Document VIII: Walker's Appeal Alarms North Carolina, 1830 in Hinks, David Walker's Appeal, 104-
106; James Mckee to The Police of Mobile, November 3, 1831 Alabama Department of History and 
Archives; Eaton, "A Dangerous Pamphlet in the Old South, 331-334. 
33 The New York Morning Herald September 10, 1830; Boston Courier September 16, 1830; Caryn Cossé 
Bell, Revolution, Romanticism, and the Afro-Creole Protest Tradition in Louisiana, 1718-1868 (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2004): 91-95. 
  81 
threatened to deport recent black arrivals.  The legislature also passed its own version of 
the Negro Seaman's Act, prohibiting black sailors from staying in the port of New 
Orleans for more than thirty days. In reaction to the new laws, some free blacks 
considered leaving for the West Indies as others pleaded with them to stay and "hope for 
better times."34   
 Laws passed in the South to regulate or bar free blacks from moving into slave 
states raised the ire of some northerners. Like southerners who viewed free blacks as a 
threat, many in the North did not want to live near a black population. These northerners 
feared that banning free blacks in southern states would force them to move to the North. 
Though many free states had long ago proscribed slavery, much of the northern white 
population shared an anti-black sentiment that transcended sectional lines. Some of the 
animus towards slavery in the North stemmed from the desire to have nothing to do with 
blacks.  
 Southern newspapers mocked northerners, whom they blamed for their need to 
pass harsher laws.  For instance, the Milledgeville Southern Recorder, reporting on an 
article from the New York Journal of Commerce that worried about the burden of free 
blacks moving northward, wrote, "The Free person of color are a burden in the Northern 
States! They are not willing to receive more of this kind of population! What a 
confession! especially the Southern State for possessing a greater number than they do."  
The South, the newspaper claimed, needed to pass laws like those passed in Louisiana in  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order to maintain its safety.  They mocked northerners: "The humane in the North, and 
the truly philanthropist will have in their power to convince, that their repeated 
professions of virtue, disinterested humanity for the poor degraded Africans are not 
empty declarations."  The article ended with a declaration that southerners realized that 
having a large black population was a problem and asked why northerners would not 
spend their money to buy slaves and send them to Africa. If abolitionists wanted to free 
the slaves, some southerners argued, they should be willing to accept the consequences of 
their fanatical ways.  The black population of the nation, for both some northerners and 
southerners, created a problem that had no easy solution, as the white population in 
neither section of the country wanted to welcome freed slaves into the places where they 
lived.35   
 Lawmakers in Virginia, like their neighbors to the south, had also tried to pass 
new regulations of their black population but had been denied. Governor Giles had called 
a secret session of the legislature in order to enact harsh restrictions on blacks living in 
their state, including a prohibition on teaching the enslaved how to read.  However, while 
the proposed law passed the House of Delegates, it failed in the Senate when the bill's 
opponents thought them to be too harsh. Unlike much of the Deep South, the Old 
Dominion did not see a rash of new laws upon the discovery of Walker's An Appeal to the 
Coloured Citizens of the World.36 
 During the early part of 1830, newspapers in Virginia mocked the secrecy of the 
governor and criticized his fear of the black population. The Richmond Whig was quoted                                                         
35 Milledgeville Southern Recorder, June 12, 1830. 
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in newspapers in both slave and free states as saying "one would really suppose that 
Governor Giles imagined he was sleeping over a mine of gunpowder and that he dreamt 
of nothing but conspiracies and servile war." Many in the South wondered: What could 
one abolitionist do?  One man in Boston could not undermine southern security.  The 
scare caused by David Walker and his pamphlet seemed, to these skeptics, overblown 
and politically motivated to help the governor gain higher approval.37 
 In the summer of 1831, seventy miles away from Richmond in remote 
Southampton Country, Virginia, Nat Turner—an enslaved evangelical preacher—
launched a violent attack against those who kept him and his brethren in bondage.  After 
Turner's insurrection, what had been known to very few as a backwater region near the 
Dismal Swamp became nationally infamous as the stage of one of America's bloodiest 
attacks against slaveholders before the Civil War. By the end of 1831, Virginians would 
have experienced a shock to their slave system that made many whites living there to 
reconsider their stance against the abolition of slavery and removing blacks from their 
state. 
 Turner's formulation of an insurrection started in 1825 when the preacher claimed 
to have seen a vision from God.  Like Moses' experience with the burning bush, Turner 
told his captors following the rebellion that "the Spirit that spoke to the prophets" had 
shown itself to the enslaved preacher who "for two years prayed continually" until he 
"had the same revelation, which fully confirmed me in the impression that I was ordained 
for some great purpose." For over five years Turner said he saw visions from heaven.  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Finally, on August 13, 1831, he saw his last one.  The sun seemed to change colors in the 
sky.  The time to strike seemed certain.38 
 Though it is unclear if Nat Turner had come into contact with An Appeal to the 
Coloured Citizens of the World, David Walker's prophecy seemed to come to realization. 
Turner recruited lieutenants and other foot soldiers. Strengthened by the belief that God 
would protect him as an instrument of the Lord and fully aware of what happened to 
Denmark Vesey just a decade before, the group of insurrectionists prepared for battle. 
Like Gabriel Prosser, Turner's followers called him "General Nat." They "armed and 
equipped" themselves "and gathered sufficient force, neither age nor sex was to be 
spared." Their goal revolved around one thing, vengeance.39 
  Judgment Day, as the Turner historian Stephen B. Oates has called it, started on 
the second-to-last Sunday of August 1831.  Like Gabriel, Nat Turner's plan started with 
the death of his own master's family, Joseph Travis.  In the middle of the night, the band 
of the enslaved insurrectionists walked up to the Travis cabin carrying axes.  Turner 
broke into the locked house through the roof, unlocking the door for his compatriots.  
Sneaking into the house quietly in order to not awaken the neighborhood, Nat Turner 
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observed that he "must spill first blood." The time to strike out against the master class 
finally came to hand.40    
 Armed with a small hatchet, the rebel leader struck the man who held him in 
bondage, but the blow only glanced off Travis's head, awaking him.  As he screamed for 
his wife while springing from his bed, he met his fate. One of Turner's compatriots "laid 
him dead, with a blow of his axe." Sally Travis, along with two others met the same end, 
hacked to pieces with an axe.  After leaving the cabin and walking "some distance," the 
insurrectionists remembered that the Travises also had "a baby in a cradle" and returned 
to kill the child. The deed had been done. The Travis family had been wiped out and the 
battle had been started. A new general had taken command to attack slavery from the 
inside.41 
 After killing the Travises, the group found muskets in a barn to aid their attack.   
It was there that Turner was transformed from a preacher to a general.  In his account of 
the uprising, he said "I formed them in a line as soldiers, and after carrying them through 
all the manoeuvres [sic] I was master of, marched them off to Mr. Salathul Francis'."  
Throughout the night Turner and his new army went door to door—first to the Francis 
house, then Mrs. Reese's, then Mrs. Turner’s, then Mrs. Whitehead, and finally Mr. 
Bryant's. The rebels split up into groups to be more effective at their task. Most of those 
who died were killed with axe blows to the head, some struck to the ground with a blunt 
sword, beveled by the rebels, before coming to a bloody, violent end.  In at least one case,  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Will, a slave who joined Turner and who he called "the executioner," nearly decapitated 
one of the women he had dragged from a house. The black insurgents aimed at total 
destruction. No white person could be innocent. Unlike Gabriel, those who tolerated 
slavery would not be spared from Turner's vengeance.42 
 As the company of insurrectionists marched forward, they came across a cabin 
that had been vacated. The Porter family had escaped, the alarm to others sounded. 
Turner's group prepared for combat as they saw a group of eighteen white men preparing 
their counterattack.  "Immediately on discovering the whites," Turner recalled, "I ordered 
my men to halt and form." The slave general readied his men for battle. They soon 
skirmished, but after realizing that more white men had joined the scene as 
reinforcements and seeing that some of his men had been wounded, Turner's battalion 
retreated, leaving none of their men on the field. They followed the preacher-turned-
general as he sought to go to Jerusalem, one of the larger towns of Southampton 
County.43   
 However, Turner's militia had been dispersed, and he tried "in vain to collect a 
sufficient force to proceed."  He determined to instead head back to their old 
neighborhood, where his dispersed soldiers would rejoin him, find new recruits, and 
launch another attack.  After failing to rally his troops and finding "no more victims to 
gratify our thirst for blood" during the retreat, Turner was forced to hide in a cave located 
in a woods near the Travis homestead.  By Thursday the rebellion had been quelled.  
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Three thousand white soldiers came to Southampton from throughout Virginia to assist 
the county's slaveholders. Virginia defenses had been bolstered by the United States 
Army and Navy. The South's allies had arrived. For six weeks the white population of the 
small Virginian community doggedly searched for the black preacher/general before 
capturing the rebel leader, bringing him to trial, and executing him.44 
 Newspapers reported the incident with an almost hysterical tone of astonishment 
at the events that had transpired in Southampton.  One exclaimed, "What an abandoned 
set of banditti these cut-throats are!  Their steps are everywhere marked with the blood of 
women and children:  An astonishing fatality seems to have attended these helpless 
classes.  Neither infancy nor female sex is spared in their blood-thirsty wrath!" Others 
seemed to have trouble accepting what had happened in Southampton. The Richmond 
Compiler wrote, "The intelligence was so awful and unexpected, that it was received with 
much hesitation and doubt by all whom it was communicated, until the afternoon" when a 
colonel from Suffolk "left no room for conjecture or uncertainty." The governor received 
a letter that argued Turner had launched his attack too early and asked the governor to 
prepare for a "concerted" attack in eight days. Virginia seemed to be in chaos. Whites 
needed to be on guard and prepare to defend their homes.45 
 Reports throughout the state varied on how large Turner's group of slave rebels 
had been.  Some newspapers stated that there were "150 to 400, acting in detached 
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45 Richmond Compiler August 27, 1831. reprinted in Tragle, The Southampton Slave Revolt, 47; N. E. 
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parties," others reported that there were only "40 to 100 deluded wretches." Turner 
himself placed his following at between sixty and eighty.  Most newspapers tried to calm 
the public by reporting that white military leaders were prepared to act and that after a 
few days of white terror, "tranquility [had] been restored." The Norfolk American Beacon 
told its readership that they purposely had been withholding some of the stories they 
received because they wanted to authenticate their sources as a measure to "counteract 
the many exaggerated statements with which gossip rumor, with her hundred tongues, has 
hourly abused the public confidence." Authorities and the media hoped to keep the 
Virginia populace coolheaded as they tracked the insurrectionist leader.46 
 A reign of violence by whites against blacks, however, followed Turner's 
uprising.  Angry whites tracked down slaves they believed to be part of the insurrection 
and summarily attacked them.  On August 29, the Richmond Constitutional Whig 
reported, "The people are naturally wound up to a high pitch of rage." Five days later the 
newspaper wrote, "It is with pain we speak of another feature of the Southampton 
Rebellion; for we have been most unwilling to have our sympathies for the sufferers 
diminished or affected by their misconduct. We allude to the slaughter of many blacks." 
Up to forty blacks had been either shot or decapitated in the wave of white fury following 
the revolt.47   
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 "Fanaticism" became one of the charges against the leader of the slave rebellion.  
Newspapers from Richmond printed the same story explaining to their readers what 
happened in Southampton: "A fanatic preacher by the name of Nat Turner (Gen. Nat 
Turner!)  who had been taught to read and write and permitted to go about preaching in 
the country, was at the bottom of this infernal brigandage."  In a letter published in the 
Richmond Enquirer, a resident from Southampton County decried Nat Turner's 
connection to the Baptist church.  Instead, he argued, "those fanatical scoundrels" only 
"pretended to be divinely inspired."  The editor of The Constitutional Whig argued that 
the insurrectionists had only been motivated by "fanatical revenge."  Infused with the 
spirit of fanaticism, Virginia experienced another Gabriel—a slave with a little more 
freedom than most, who became a general in a war against slaveholding.  This time, 
however, white blood had actually been spilled.48  
 The slave uprising in Southampton caused widespread fear throughout the South.  
One South Carolinian, George Reid, wrote in a letter to his brother that the Turner 
rebellion had caused rumors to fly around South Carolina.  He said that the rebellion had 
caused South Carolinians to be "wide awake" in their observance of their slaves and that 
planters were becoming wary of any signs of further disturbances. North Carolinians 
along with Virginians made numerous requests of their governor for militia officers to be 
sent to protect panicked white citizens as fear swept through some of the slave states.49 
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 Turner's rebellion shook the foundations of the southern slave system and allowed 
the antislavery sentiment to grow in the Old Dominion. Some Virginians saw the white 
population losing the skills needed to have a vibrant economy. They feared that the 
"machanick trades and arts are falling fast into the hands of the black population," which 
drove away white skilled labor and caused the state to become too dependent on its slaves 
to survive. This concern did not just rise in Virginia; in 1831 Tennessee passed a law that 
made it obligatory for any freed slave to be removed from the state.  North Carolina 
placed restrictions on the free black community. Slave states, at least of the Upper South, 
wanted to diminish the size of their black population. Without a market for skilled white 
labor to keep the free white population in the state stable, slaveholders also lost possible 
soldiers for the local militias that protected the free population from the enslaved. Nat 
Turner had made many in the South experience the dangers of slavery as they never had 
before. Language and water had separated them from Haiti; Gabriel and Vesey had been 
stopped—but those who died in Southampton had been neighbors, friends, and family.50 
 Laws that had been passed by other slave states after the arrival of Walker's 
Appeal now received reconsideration in the Virginia. The legislature enacted a law that 
punished "any person" who distributed "any book, pamphlet or other writing, advising, or 
inciting persons of colour...to make insurrection, or to rebel" with "death, without the 
benefit of clergy." It was the same punishment that Gabriel Prosser received three                                                         
LXII (January 1985): 30-33; Governor John Floyd Diary, November 21, 28, 1831 in Tragle, Southampton 
Revolt, 262  
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NJ: Prentice Hall, 1971): 96-97; William Lloyd Imes, "The Legal Status of Free Negroes and Slaves in 
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decades prior for preparing an actual insurrection. Lawmakers also placed regulations on 
the movement of both free and enslaved blacks, the ability of the enslaved to sell goods, 
regardless of how they obtained them, and prohibited all nonwhites from selling or 
disbursing alcohol within a mile of "any muster, preaching, or other public assembly."  
The fear felt by slaveholders in the Deep South that came from An Appeal to the 
Coloured Citizens of the World had come to the Upper South with Turner's Rebellion.51    
 Many southerners felt besieged by those opposed to slavery and worried about an 
invasion of fanatical abolitionists who wanted to spark enslaved unrest. Turner's 
insurrection exasperated those fears in Virginia.  Following Bryan Edwards's thesis about 
the cause of the Haitian Revolution, many Virginians blamed the North for instigating the 
insurrection. A militia leader, Benjamin Cabell, wrote to the governor of Virginia, “The 
Southampton insurrection was only a branch of a plan, long since laid.” He requested 
arms to protect his village where “the slave population in town and its vicinity bears a 
great proportion, if it does not equal that of the whites.” He connected David Walker to 
Nat Turner and blamed “the damnable spirit of fanaticism engendered by Northern 
publications and, perhaps disseminated by missionaries.”52  
 Governor John Floyd, as well as slaveholders from other states, sought out ways 
to punish northern abolitionists. In South Carolina, the "Vigilance Association of 
Columbia" offered a reward of $1,500 for the capture and conviction of "any white 
person who may be detected in distributing or circulating within the State the newspaper  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called 'the Liberator'" or any other publication that had a "seditious tendency." Floyd 
worried that the abolitionists were planning further insurrections in the state and wrote in 
his diary that if the "fanatics" continued to be unchecked by northern governments, 
Virginia would "not be tied up by the confederacy from doing ourselves justice." 
Following Turner's attack against the white population of Virginia, southerners again 
looked to their white, northern counterparts and demanded that they stem the tide of the 
antislavery movement.53 
 In the fall of 1831 a letter from Boston arrived at the post office of Jerusalem, 
Virginia, that was quickly forwarded to the governor and only exacerbated the frayed 
nerves of the state's leadership when the governor presented it to the legislature.  
Speaking with the rage of David Walker, bolstered by the independence of Haiti in the 
Caribbean, and encouraged by Turner's rampage against the white population, the 
author—a man named Nero and allegedly a free black once held in slavery in Virginia—
claimed that all of Turner's lieutenants had not been caught and that more white blood 
would be spilled in the South.  He wrote that "more than three hundred men of 
colour...who have pledged ourselves with spartan fidelity" would "avenge the indignities" 
placed on blacks by "the Slave holding Tyrants."  Whereas Walker promised Hannibal, 
Nero promised that "a modern Leonidas" would lead his outnumbered army to victory 
against a more powerful slaveholding class, making Virginia the Thermopylae of 
America. Though some Virginians thought Nero's message to be a hoax, the governor 
placed the letter in his scrapbook under the label of "Liberator: Genius of Emancipation" 
and believed it an abolitionist attempt to scare an already shaken South by trying to incite  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further slave insurrection. A shaken slaveholding class needed to treat each threat 
seriously in the aftermath of the insurrection in Southampton.54 
 Nero, however, did not just stop with the promise of launching more slave 
insurrections.  He also explained that a vast conspiracy existed along with a network of 
communication that stretched from Haiti to the South as well as throughout much of the 
northern states. Walker's An Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World had all been 
part of a master plan for black revolution, Nero explained.  The letter identified Elijah 
Burritt as one of the plot's agents in the South and stated, "Our holy cause most surely 
was then in jeopardy" when the printer had been caught by Georgian authorities. 
However, "had it not been for a most masterly maneuvre [sic] of our Chief...Burritt 
would have lost his worthless life, and our fond hopes would have been blasted." He told 
southern readers "we have many a white agent in Florida, S. Carolina, and Georgia." 
Anyone could be a conspirator. 55 
 Nero also claimed that the plot had international connections to an enemy the 
South feared—Haiti. The letter declared that though "our beloved Chief is a Native of 
Virginia," he had escaped to Haiti where "his noble soul became warmed by the spirit of 
freedom, and an unqualified hatred for the oppressors of his race."  The only slaves to 
ever defeat white slaveholders and gain their liberty had taught the black hero how to do 
it in the United States. Haiti, Nero insisted, would come to the South, if not by directly 
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sending soldiers then by indirectly training American blacks in the tactics of winning a 
race war.56 
 Another frightening aspect of Nero’s letter for southern slaveholders was its 
explanation of how would-be insurrectionists would gather their weapons.  He wrote, 
"We have assurance of arms and ammunition from Non-Slaveholding States—I mean 
from individuals in those states, and Hayti offers an asylum for those who survive the 
approaching carnage."  The "approaching carnage" would be in the same vein as Turner's.  
The rebels planned to "spare neither age nor sex." Nero played on the southern stereotype 
of northerners in order to undermine their trust in the white North.  He said, "a Yankee, 
you know, will hazard his life for money."  Wealthy abolitionists who wanted to end 
southern slavery by any means necessary, he contended, could easily buy off the North's 
alliance with the South to quell slave unrest, forcing slaveholders to fight the enslaved 
warriors by themselves.57 
 Nero challenged the North's faithfulness to southern slavery as well as the 
slaveholders' control of their society.  He wrote, "There are more people in Boston, 
[New] York, Philadelphia and Hartford who know more of the circumstances of the late 
insurrection than any Slave holder in Virginia or North Carolina."  He promised that the 
United States postal service would again be used as a weapon against American slavery.  
Following David Walker's lead, Nero assured that "our handbills and placards will soon 
be found in your streets, and there will be enough to read them; this you cannot prevent—
                                                        
56 Ibid., 146-147. 
57 Ibid., 147. 
  95 
the Post Office is free for anyone—anyone has a right to receive communications through 
the medium of it."  He exalted the postal service as "machinery of vast power."  In only a 
few short years following Nero's letter, the slaveholders in the South would see what he 
meant as abolitionists mailed antislavery tracts to the South trying to convince them to 
give up slavery.58 
 Just as Gabriel's Rebellion had prompted some in Virginia to question the 
viability of slavery in the long term, proponents of making the state's population whiter 
saw Turner's insurrection as an "auspicious moment for action." Some Virginians 
believed the best remedy for the threat of a slave uprising was to devise "a means by 
which the blacks may be removed beyond our borders, and by which too, the number of 
slaves may gradually be diminished." Many Virginians demanded that something be done 
to ensure the safety of whites from the enslaved.  After the insurrection in Southampton, 
even the elderly James Madison worried about the dangers of holding so many people in 
slavery and recommended the sale of public lands as a way to pay for the removal of 
blacks from the Upper South.59 
 Turner's revolt provided the impetus for southern abolitionists to attack slavery 
and caused proslavery forces to change how they defended the South's labor system.  The 
state had a clear sectional divide between westerners, who had less representation and a 
very small black population, and easterners, where much of the state's black population 
lived and large-scale slavery had become a staple of life. While some challenged slavery  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Writings of James Madison ed. Gaillard Hunt (New York: G. P. Putnam and Sons, 1910): 9: 468-470. 
  96 
on moral grounds, other non-slaveholders of the state argued that Virginia needed to 
move towards becoming free soil in order to develop an industrial base and a more 
diverse economy that would offer more opportunity to poor whites.  Some slaveholders 
defended the practice and their labor system as others in the state, on both sides, believed 
that the best remedy for the divide between slaveholders and free soil advocates would be 
to split the state into two states.  Still others believed that slavery would naturally 
diminish within the state as planters shifted from growing tobacco to planting wheat and 
corn.  After a heated debate, the Virginia legislature decided to neither defend slavery nor 
enact a gradual emancipation scheme.  Future generations would have to grapple with the 
issue.60 
 The historian Alison Freehling has argued that much of the conversation 
Virginians had in the legislature hinged upon the "means, not ends" of removing chattel 
slavery from the Upper South. Antislavery proponents argued that colonization would 
have to be coupled with gradual emancipation while proslavery forces argued against the 
constitutionality of confiscating their property, maintained that colonization was 
impractical, and insisted that slavery would die a "natural death." The two sides of the 
debate over continuing slavery in the Old Dominion did agree on one thing—blacks 
posed a dangerous problem for whites, whether freed or enslaved.61 
 The debate over what to do about the black population did not just stay in 
Virginia. Other slave states—Delaware, Kentucky, Tennessee, Maryland, and North 
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Carolina—debated the role of blacks free and enslaved in their society.  Some banned 
more blacks from entering their states and placed more restrictions on all blacks living in 
the state. Others allowed the decaying profitability of slavery to force slaveholders to sell 
their chattel labor southward.  As the historian Lacy Ford has written, "For much of the 
upper South, the practical answer to the slavery question was to let their slaves become 
the lower South's problem."  The debate over slavery in the early 1830s in Virginia 
forced those most ardently proslavery to shift how they defended the institution.  Instead 
of proclaiming it entirely a necessary evil, proslavery advocates also began to make the 
case that it provided a positive result for both nonslaveholding whites as well as the 
enslaved. Slavery became good while black slaves became dangerous without a system of 
bondage to control them.62 
 Slavery, according to the most passionate supporters, not only helped raise blacks 
from barbarism, but also protected nonslaveholding whites from a dangerous enslaved 
population that could not operate as free people. Following the debates in the Virginia 
legislature during the aftermath of the Turner revolt, Thomas Roderick Dew, a professor 
of political law and eventually the president of the College of William and Mary, used his 
position as an expert and intellectual to write a defense of slavery that became a 
foundational argument for the proslavery movement in the 1830s and 1840s.  First 
publishing an article in the American Quarterly Review entitled "The Abolition of 
Slavery," Dew later expanded his thoughts into a book called Review of the Debate in the 
Virginia Legislature of 1831 and 1832. Among other topics in the book, Dew talked 
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about colonization, emancipation, Haiti, England, and insurrections as he tried to defend 
southern slavery from attacks launched by abolitionists.  Written only three years later, 
but nearly twice as long, Dew's Review acted as a proslavery counter to Walker's An 
Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World. While one talked about the evils of slavery, 
the other spoke of good things that came from southern slavery.  Each affected how 
Americans during the Jacksonian period understood slavery and slavery's future.63   
 Walker told his readers, whom he hoped would be black but knew would at least 
partially be white, that slavery had made his people "the most wretched, degraded and 
abject set of being that ever live." Dew told his mostly white audience, "Slavery, we 
assert again, seems to be the only means that we know of, under Heaven, by which the 
ferocity of the savage can be conquered, his wandering habits eradicated, his slothfulness 
and improvidence overcome." The institution of slavery, Dew wrote, had "been perhaps 
the principal means for impelling forward the civilization of mankind."  The professor 
believed that slavery offered the most progressive way for a civilization to advance 
through the "three stages in which man has been found to exist," the first being "hunting 
and fishing"; second, "the pastoral"; and finally, "agricultural."  What Walker had called 
degradation, Dew called civilizing, contending, "Nothing but slavery can civilize such 
beings, give them habits of industry, and make them cling to life for its enjoyments."  For 
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slaveholders defending the practice, slavery was the opposite of what Walker had 
proclaimed to the world. The enslavement of blacks promoted progress.64  
 Christian morality, just as in An Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World, 
also played a central role in Dew's proslavery argument. He contended that the possible 
course of direction for Americans was not between slavery being sanctioned as morally 
right or wrong.  Instead, Review of the Debates in Virginia shifted away from what he 
believed was the false choice offered by abolitionists. The professor maintained that 
slavery helped blacks and whites. Dew wrote, "We cannot get rid of slavery without 
producing a greater injury both to the masters and slaves, there is no rule of conscience or 
revealed law of God which can condemn us." He spoke of a physician not ordering a 
treatment to a disease if it would only "hasten the fatal issue" and justified the 
continuance of slavery because removal "would only hasten and heighten the final 
catastrophe."  While Walker expected God to punish the slaveholders for holding blacks 
in bondage, Dew anticipated commendation from the Almighty.  He believed white 
slaveholders should expect to hear that they had been "good and faithful servants" on the 
day of their judgment for choosing the higher good when debating an "original sin" that 
had been foisted up the United States by the British Empire.65     
 England, the nation David Walker called "the best friend" of blacks in the world, 
became part of the evidence in favor of slavery in Review of the Debate in the Virginia  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Legislature. Dew asked his readers to look at "the Parliament of Great Britain, [which] 
with all its philanthropic zeal" had "never yet seriously" thought about ending slavery in 
the Caribbean. Despite its antislavery movement, England validated slavery in the United 
States because the empire's inaction in the West Indies allowed proslavery defenders to 
argue that even the European nation friendliest to the enslaved still believed that ending 
slavery would be disastrous.  To demonstrate what the British in the West Indies believed 
about slavery, Dew informed his defense of slavery in the 1830s with Bryan Edwards' 
History of the West Indies, enlarging the influence in southern thought of the English 
historian from Jamaica. 
 Review of the Debate in the Virginia Legislature, like Walker's Appeal, also 
mentioned the violence and destruction seen during the Haitian Revolution. Whereas 
Walker's Appeal pointed to Haiti to show how whites had mistreated the enslaved, Dew 
used the former French colony as a warning to his white readers. He blamed 
Revolutionary France's "intemperate and phrenetic zeal for liberty and equality" for 
causing the "the bloodiest and most shocking insurrection ever recorded in the annals of 
history."  That mistake, he maintained, had cost France "the fairest and most valuable of 
all her colonial possessions." The nation had become "convinced of her madness." The 
French tried to restore slavery but it had already been lost. Once the enslaved had been 
freed, they could never be forced back into slavery. 
 Learning from that grave mistake, he said, "France, Spain, and Portugal, large 
owners of colonial possessions, have not only not abolished slavery in their colonies, but 
have not even abolished the slave trade in practice."  Professor Dew implied that the 
United States should follow the other slaveholding nations and preserve slavery in order 
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to maintain the country's racial stability.  Without slavery, Dew prophesied dire 
consequences for whites, not just slaveholders, but all whites who lived in the United 
States.66 
 Dew's task in defending slavery hinged on two counterintuitive principles: slaves 
could be dangerous, but slavery was peaceful and morally right.  The professor argued 
that David Walker's stance that the enslaved wanted to be free or that Nat Turner hated 
his master proved to be an exception.  He wrote that the enslaved of the South "generally 
loves the master and his family" and express "unfeigned grief at the deaths which occur 
among the whites." Blacks held in slavery in the United States acted differently from the 
enslaved of other portions of the New World, Review of the Debate in the Virginia 
Legislature argued.  Dew believed that the enslaved of the South had "imbibed the 
principles, sentiments, and feelings of the whites." He also challenged the idea that the 
black population would become much larger than the white population as he tried to 
placate moderates skeptical of his position. American slavery would remain secure as 
long as southern slaveholders remained in complete control over the slave system of the 
South.  Slavery naturally regulated itself.67 
 However, because blacks loved their masters, Dew contended that slavery helped 
to maintain racial peace in the South.  He wrote, "A negro will rob your hen roost or your 
stye, but it is rare indeed that he can ever be induced to murder you." He asked his 
readers to subscribe to the notion that "in dealing with a negro we must remember that we 
                                                        
66 Dew, Review of the Debate in the Virginia Legislature of 1831 and 1832, 5-6.  
67 Ibid., 113-114,, 119-130.  Dew wrote a detailed argument about the productivity of slave labor and 
westward immigration in which he opposed the nascent free-soil ideology being developed in the North.  
Eventually, he believed, westward immigration from Virginia would ease as more land became occupied 
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are dealing with a being possessing the form and strength of a man, but the intellect of 
only a child." Dew wanted his audience to know that there existed a simple notion about 
blacks living in the South—while southerners looked to their slaves as the source of 
insecurity, they should be looking to outside forces purposely causing the black 
population to rebel.  Developing a point that came to dominate white thinking in the 
South, Dew argued that slave rebels had not developed their rage because they wanted to 
be free.  Instead, only "demented fanatics" spurred on by outside forces like David 
Walker attacked their masters.68 
 Thomas Dew warned white America against supporting any form of antislavery.  
Whether they believed it or not, all antislavery proponents promoted insurrection in an 
indirect fashion as much as David Walker's Appeal had encouraged an uprising from the 
black population directly.  He wrote, "The great evil, however, of these schemes of 
emancipation, remains yet to be told.  They are admirably calculated to excite plots, 
murders, and insurrections; whether gradual or rapid in case, you disturb the quiet and 
contentment of the slave who is left unemancipated." Whites and blacks could not live 
freely together.  In freedom, he stated, a large black population would not know how to 
take care of themselves: the slaves' "worthlessness and degradation will stimulate him to 
deeds of rapine and vengeance." Slavery, as only a slaveholder with experience in living 
with black people could understand, protected the white, nonslaveholding population 
according to the growing proslavery movement.69   
                                                        
68 Ibid., 105, 113-114. 
69 Ibid., 101-102. 
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 Review of the Debates of the Virginia Legislature articulated one of the first 
justifications for preventing nonslaveholders from talking about or regulating southern 
slavery. When talking about western Virginians promoting antislavery legislation, Dew 
wrote, "The fact is, it is always a most delicate and dangerous task for one set of people 
to legislate for another, without any community of interests." Only slaveholders should 
be allowed to make rules about slavery.  He asked, "If a convention of the whole state of 
Virginia were called, and in due form the right of slave property were abolished by the 
votes of Western Virginia alone, does anyone think that Eastern Virginia would be bound 
to yield the decree?"  Over the next decade, slaveholders from across the nation would 
ask the same the question as the debate over slavery moved from state legislatures to the 
United States Congress.  Only those who held slaves and lived with a large black 
population understood what could happen if emancipation occurred against the will of the 
master class.70 
 Thomas Dew urged his readers to understand that all whites would suffer the 
consequences of freeing the enslaved. The proslavery author wrote, "let [Virginia] 
liberate her slaves, and every year you would hear of insurrections and plots, and every 
day would perhaps record a murder."  He contextualized the argument by talking about 
different places where the enslaved had been free.  Dew pointed to Guatemala and quoted 
a passage from Henry Dunn's Sketches of Guatemala that spoke of white men and women 
being forced to constantly arm themselves in order to defend themselves from blacks who 
sought revenge.  He pointed to the Haitian Revolution and the Amis des Noirs who he, 
again following Edwards, said had promoted insurrection in the Caribbean by giving                                                         
70 Ibid., 67 
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nonwhites "the same privileges and immunities as whites" and created a "strangely 
inharmonious" white population that could not rally to squash the black revolt in its 
infancy. Dew's message was clear: the enslaved blacks of the South in themselves were 
not dangerous, but if spurred on by people like David Walker or other antislavery leaders, 
insurrections would spring up and all whites would be called to defend themselves.71 
 The power of the fear that an outsider could induce a slave uprising became 
apparent in 1833 when Virginia's governor received a note from a concerned citizen. The 
letter talked about a "suspicious charlatan who is endeavoring to cause the slaves to rebel 
and make insurrection.” The stranger arrived with two other men and had with him “a 
large box supposed from the best evidence I can get to weigh from four to five hundred 
pounds and thought by the citizens at the closest house to contain arms. He was seen in 
the company of nine to ten slaves and heard by white persons to say if you will only be 
true you can get free. The slaves have been apprehended and brought before me, they 
state that he gave them money, treated them, and told them he had plenty of arms.”  He 
told the slaves that “he had got the negroes from Prince William County to join him and 
many others by some means got alarmed and immediately fled to Alexandria.” He ended 
his note with an ominous postscript: “We have no arms to defend ourselves.”  The specter 
of Nero's "Chief" seemed to hover over the note.  Strangers could not be trusted in a slave 
society on alert for abolitionists—white and black—who southerners believed sought the 
destruction of slavery at any cost.72 
                                                        
71 Ibid., 101-102, 114-115. 
72 G. Millan to John Floyd, Sept 9, 1833, Floyd Executive Papers, Library of Virginia. 
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 From the moment David Walker's pamphlet arrived in Virginia and Georgia to 
Turner's insurrection and its aftermath, southern slaveholders recognized a subtle shift 
had taken place in their world.  "Fanaticism" at one time seemed to be something foreign 
to the United States.  During the scare following Gabriel's Rebellion, frightened 
southerners pointed to the influence of the French and Haitian Revolutions as a 
contributing factor that spurred Prosser's attempt to overthrow slavery in Richmond.  
Slaveholders and their allies, in total control of the federal machinery of government, 
promoted a stance in regards to Haiti that they believed would help insulate the southern 
states in America from the Haitian Revolution.   
 However, when Denmark Vesey cited Haiti as an ally in a war against white 
Charleston, that caused slaveholders, both in South Carolina and in neighboring areas, to 
react with harsher restrictions about who could and could not sail into their ports, this 
time using local authority to solidify the power of the master class.  "Fanatical" influence 
on the slave population still seemed to be an issue of foreign policy instead of something 
to be debated domestically. 
 Things changed with An Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World.  While 
David Walker made a global plea to nonwhites, his pamphlet and its southwide 
distribution were entirely American.  Walker did not ask for a foreign entity to attack the 
South from the outside.  Instead, he wanted to undermine American slavery by 
overthrowing it from within.  He wanted an American version of Toussaint or Hannibal 
to rise from the South's enslaved population or come from the North's free black 
community.  He did not urge the enslaved to wait for Haiti, France, or even England to 
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save them from their bondage; he wanted southern slaves to free themselves through 
violence.   
 Walker did not hide who he was or what he wanted to do. In distributing the 
pamphlet to readers in the South he relied on two vital American systems of 
communication, sailors and the mail. Unlike the secretive agents—real or imagined—
from the outside that southerners blamed for infiltrating their slave population and 
causing problems, Walker brazenly attacked slavery in the United States and openly cried 
for insurrection to take place.  The packages he mailed to the South clearly listed his 
return address.  Walker assumed that at least some privileges granted in the Bill of Rights 
pertained to him and made use of his liberty to condemn southerners who believed he 
should have no rights to incendiary speech.  Without local laws barring "incendiary 
pamphlets" and protected by the Constitution from any slaveholder in the federal 
government who might try to regulate him, Walker exerted his own prerogative granted 
to him as an American when he mailed his pamphlets to people throughout the slave 
states using the United States postal system.  Northerners in Boston refused, despite their 
distaste for his pamphlet, to censor the black abolitionist.  
 David Walker took a chance when he assumed that certain inalienable rights 
granted to whites in Boston also pertained to him.  He proved correct in his belief.  
Nationally, despite some southerners with minor influence asking for the federal 
government to take action against Walker, powerful slaveholding interests in Congress 
deferred. Locally, even the most conventional Bostonians believed the abolitionists’ right 
to speak freely trumped the cries of powerful slaveholding politicians from the South 
who demanded action against the antislavery movement.  The refusal of Harrison Gray 
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Otis showed southerners where the end of northern protection of slavery had been drawn.  
Northern politicians would not allow the demands of slaveholders to dictate what their 
local laws would be or in what fashion they would be enforced.  
 In reaction to Walker's pamphlet and Boston's refusal to practice the censorship of 
one of its citizens, the Deep South states produced harsh new regulations over their own 
society.  For them, the attack on slavery, however small, needed to be met with harsh new 
regulations that made some outside the South uncomfortable with the repression. The 
Upper South did not take Walker's threat as seriously.  A large portion of Virginians 
laughed at the overreaction to Walker's pamphlet by their proslavery governor. Only 
Turner's insurrection and the debate that almost ended slavery in Virginia caused the 
moderate proslavery advocates of the Upper South to side with the forces extremely 
committed to the continuation and protection of slavery. Nero's letter following Nat 
Turner's insurrection would only throw fuel on the fire of doubt in the southern mind 
about how willing northerners were to defend slavery in the South. 
 The debate over slavery in Virginia that followed Turner's insurrection represents 
a key stage in the South’s development of a defense for slavery.  It showed that antiblack 
sentiment could be fused with an antislavery political movement. Virginians who wanted 
to end slavery did not want to do so in order to help black people. Instead, Turner gave 
some southerners the opportunity to fuse racism with antislavery. For these white 
nonslaveholders, the existence of large black populations in their state threatened their 
security.  They did not just want the end of slavery but also the end of black residence 
within proximity to their homes.  Later, during the 1840s, similar concerns would be 
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articulated again, this time by some northern Democrats, the party that willfully defended 
slavery. 
 William Freehling and Lacy Ford are correct when they argue that southern 
slaveholders did not fear a successful slave revolution happening in the 1830s. They did 
not need to while the American military existed to bolster their defenses in the case of a 
large emergency.  However, just because southerners believed that a Haitian-style 
revolution was not possible at present did not mean that slaveholders did not think such a 
thing could happen in the future. As in most cases, southerners made decisions based on 
their anticipation of future events. Despite Dew's insistence about the slave population 
not growing larger than the white one, many slaveholders in the South understood that 
the differences between slavery in the Caribbean and United States included the ability to 
expand slavery westward, thereby lessening a dangerous concentration of blacks in the 
older slave states, and a large white population in the North that had the obligation to 
defend their fellow citizens against an uprising.  As a new kind of northern antislavery 
appeared to willingly and openly attack slavery from the North, a new proslavery 
argument developed out of a need to retain the allies that still existed who would protect 
slavery.73 
 Thomas Roderick Dew articulated what became a foundational argument for 
proslavery forces for the next twenty years.  In short, black people had better lives as 
slaves and would never develop an insurrectionary impulse without the influence of 
outside abolitionists who tricked them into doing so. Simultaneously, however, slavery                                                         
73 Ford, Deliver Us From Evil, 356-357; William W. Freehling, The Road To Disunion: Secessionists at 
Bay, 1776-1854 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990): 178-181. 
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also protected nonslaveholding whites from a black population that would not know what 
to do if they gained their freedom and would ransack the countryside as they reverted 
back to a form of barbarism. Only in perpetuating the status quo could both whites and 
blacks in the South be assured of their happiness and safety. For whites in the South, this 
meant that abolitionism became not just an attack on slavery but also an attack on the 
safety of the South. Just a few short months after the publication of Dew's Review of the 
Debate in the Virginia Legislature, the South would have its world rocked. England 
chose Walker over Dew when Parliament decided to end slavery in the Caribbean. The 
South would have to shift its stance towards Great Britain as that nation went from a 
chief example of the practicality of slavery to a prime enemy of southern slavery.  
Throughout the 1830s security became the mainstay of the South's attack against the 
transnational antislavery movement that saw rapid growth in its ranks and organization. 
However, as slaveholders looked northward, their once trusted allies appeared to be 
growing apart from them and their peculiar institution. 
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Chapter Three 
Transnational Abolitionism and American Exceptionalism 
 
You cannot depend upon the North for any guaranty she gives you.  She may stipulate and promise, and 
make Constitutions, but so far as slavery in concerned, she will observe none of these. 
-Henry L. Benning's Secessionist Speech, Georgia, November 19, 1860 
 
It screamed across the page: "HIGHLY IMPORTANT TO THE WEST INDIES" 
appeared in both the Charleston Southern Patriot and the Richmond Enquirer. The 
South’s slaveholding neighbors came under successful attack from abolitionists in 
Parliament. The end of slavery in the Caribbean seemed near. Quoting an article from the 
London Globe, southern newspapers explained to their readership that the immediate 
emancipation of the enslaved of the English colonies appeared imminent. Both American 
newspapers reported that in response to the rumors of emancipation, "a deputation of 
gentlemen connected with the West Indies" had visited leaders in Parliament and 
"requested to be informed whether it was true that it was the intention of the government 
to emancipation the slave population."  The answer the West Indian representatives 
received "was in the affirmative."  In order to prevent chaos at this news, "an imposing 
force, composing of 15,000 men, would forthwith be sent to the West Indies."  The 
English appeared to expect trouble with emancipation.  So did the American planter 
class. Newspapers throughout the United States published reports about the debate in 
Parliament.  Antislavery and proslavery forces understood that England ending slavery so 
close to the United States would have major ramifications for the institution in the 
Western Hemisphere. Some cited sources from Liverpool, and others from London.  
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Slaveholders especially worried about the effects British emancipation would have on 
their own slave societies.1  
 Southern slaveholders anticipated unrest and trouble for the white, slaveholding 
population of the West Indies upon the freeing of the enslaved. American defenders of 
slavery throughout the slave states argued that abolition, especially without the 
apprenticeship system that eventually was included in the Abolition Act, would lead to 
freed blacks striking out against their former masters. Concerns over the security of 
slavery that stemmed from events in the Caribbean again filled the pages of southern 
periodicals as American proslavery forces predicted a repeat of the bloody race war that 
had engulfed Haiti during its revolution.  In June 1833 the Richmond Enquirer declared, 
"The scheme appears to us to be wofully [sic] harsh" and would be "ruinous in its 
consequences." The paper worried that "even our own shores may not altogether escape 
the hurricane." As with their predecessors, American slaveholders prepared for unrest 
predicated on the toppling of a slaveholding regime in the West Indies.2  
The British discussion of eventual emancipation of the enslaved in the West 
Indies gave proslavery forces in the South two targets to condemn: Great Britain and the 
ideology of free labor manufacturing.  As slavery in the Caribbean came under attack in 
the House of Commons, American slaveholders adopted an argument first developed by 
their West Indian counterparts and later asserted by Thomas Dew—slavery had a positive                                                         
1 Charleston Southern Patriot March 22, 1833; Richmond Enquirer March 26, 1833.Macon Weekly 
Telegraph April 10, 1833; Athens, Ga. Southern Banner, June 29, 1833. See also Charleston Southern 
Patriot May 8, 16, June 11, 18, 1833; Richmond Enquirer May 10, June 21, 25, July 26, 1833, and 
Charleston Mercury July 10, 16, 22, 23, 27, 30, 1833. 
2 Richmond Enquirer June 25, 1833; Joe Bassette Wilkins, "Widow on Freedom: The South's Response to 
the Emancipation of the Slaves in the British West Indies, 1833-1861" (Phd dissertation, University of 
South Carolina, 1977): 50-52, 68-70.  
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influence on society generally and blacks in particular.  The historian Edward Rugemer 
has shown just how greatly British abolition contributed to the development of the 
South's bold defense of slavery throughout the 1830s.  The debate in Virginia after Nat 
Turner showed that some southerners did not have the strident connection with slavery 
that had once been assumed. Like Virginia, a slave revolt had shaken England's 
Caribbean colonies and caused the planters of those islands to lose sympathy in the eyes 
of the British public. English abolition provided an example of the consequences of 
abolitionism left unchecked by a proslavery counterforce and showed that even the most 
engrained system of slavery could be toppled with the mere counting of votes and a 
signature placed on parchment. By the end of the decade, those in the Deep South would 
argue that a more active approach needed to be taken against the “fanaticism” of the 
North. The antislavery movement, the major proponents of slavery insisted, needed to be 
responded to with an active proslavery movement.3 
 During the summer months of 1833, proslavery forces in America attacked 
England's antislavery movement and free labor system. In August, just a few weeks 
before King William IV assented to abolition in the West Indies, a series of articles 
entitled "Poor Laws and Domestic Slavery" appeared in the Charleston Mercury, one of 
John C. Calhoun's media organs and a staunch defender of nullification. The newspaper's 
guest editorialist compared the lives of both the laboring class in England's 
manufacturing sector and the enslaved of the British West Indies with the treatment of                                                         
3 Edward Rugemer, "The Southern Response to British Abolitionism: The Maturation of Proslavery 
Apologetics," The Journal of Southern History 70 (May 2004): 221-248; Larry E. Tise, Proslavery: A 
History of the Defense of Slavery in America, 1701-1840 (Athens, Ga: University of Georgia Press, 1987): 
94-96; Gelien Matthews, Caribbean Slave Revolts and the British Abolitionist Movement (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 2006). 
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blacks held in bondage across the American South.  He also argued that slavery protected 
blacks from the racism they would experience as free people in the North.4 
 Most likely written by a member of the Palmetto State's planter elite under the 
pseudonym of "Pliny," the articles issued a tone of compassion for the poorest of society 
as they defended slavery and criticized England. Pliny began his series by writing, "To 
advance the condition of the labouring classes in comfort and security from misfortune, 
would be the most important improvement in human affairs."  In one part of his series the 
proslavery author quoted Robert Southey, the English poet who had been disgusted by 
the squalor of the English factory workers.  The state of the working class, the South 
Carolinian contended, displayed the hypocrisy of Britain’s antislavery movement as it 
attempted to eliminate slavery from the western world but did nothing for white workers 
back home.  England, he contended, should look at itself before criticizing the rest of the 
world.5  
 Articulating the “positive good” conception of slavery, Pliny argued that the 
enslaved of the South were materially better off than the poorest of England, despite the 
latter’s status as freedmen. He took exception to abolitionist claims that planters treated 
blacks like cattle.  The southerner wrote that the enslaved of the South, despite having 
"no political privilege," did however "have civil and moral rights."  Blacks in the South 
were treated humanely, he insisted.  Moreover, he pointed to Thomas Malthus and argued 
that while the slave populations of the West Indies had needed to import more workers to                                                         
4 The series appeared in the Charleston Mercury, August 9, 10, 12, 13, 14. 15.  For an in depth discussion 
of Pliny's "Poor Laws and Domestic Slavery" and its place among proslavery intellectualism see Rugemer, 
"The Southern Response to British Abolitionism," 224-247. 
5 Charleston Mercury, August 10, 1833. 
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retain its size under the brutal labor of British sugar plantations, the black population of 
the South had flourished. "This fact," the southerner maintained, "speaks volume in favor 
of the comfort of our negro population."  The rise in the American slave population 
compared to the West Indies, Pliny argued, proved southern benevolence towards their 
slaves, unlike their European counterparts. While other southerners fretted over the rise 
of the black population, defenders of slavery against England simultaneously used 
population growth as proof of their humanitarianism. Southern defenders of slavery, 
though admitting that they shared a common bond with the planter class of the West 
Indies, wanted Americans to understand that slavery in the South was not the same as 
slavery in the Caribbean.6   
 Pliny’s final article pointed to the mark of Ham, arguing that with slavery, "the 
protection they obtain in such a state of dependence, makes it the best condition for them. 
Slavery, for many southerners who attacked abolitionism, served to the betterment of the 
black population.  This was especially true in comparison to places in the New World like 
Haiti, which had seen former slaves become independent, and thereby became "lost" to 
France because of "the mistaken zeal" of the antislavery movement's fanatical belief that 
if slavery "were abolished, all evil would be redressed, and society stand forth 
regenerated and perfect." Pliny argued that "fanatics" who promoted the end of slavery in 
the United States and England did not understand the connotations of their actions, 
                                                        
6 Charleston Mercury, August 15  
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because they had been blinded by the sheer emotion of desire to free all those held in 
enslavement in North America and the Caribbean.7 
 As seen through the example of Pliny, who desperately believed he needed to 
attack England and differentiate Caribbean slavery and American slavery, southern 
slaveholders clearly understood what was at stake with end of slavery in the West Indies.  
Proslavery advocates in the United States outwardly expressed concern about the 
prospect of islands dominated by freed slaves lying so close to their own slave society.   
Duff Green, the son-in-law and close political ally of John C. Calhoun, argued in the 
United States Telegraph that white planters would leave the Caribbean, allowing the 
island to become controlled by the newly freed blacks. Just as with the Haitian 
Revolution, slaveholders in the United States had concerns about the possibility of living 
so close to a large population of free blacks.8   
 Slaveholders throughout the United States worried about their security in regard 
to their soon-to-be-freed neighbors. Across the Atlantic Ocean, the American chargé 
d'affaires to Belgium, Hugh Swinton Legaré, considered the ramifications of West Indian 
emancipation for the South. In 1829 the young South Carolinian had written that 
southerners felt "no uneasiness at all about the event of any servile war, unless it be 
complicated with some other kind of war."  Only outside pressure could cause unrest, he 
continued: "If our Northern friends will have the goodness to abstain...from propagating 
                                                        
7 Ibid., August 15. For an in depth discussion about the use of this Bible verse to justify slavery see Steven 
R. Haynes, Noah’s Curse: The Biblical Justification of American Slavery (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2002). 
8 The Writings of Hugh Swinton Legaré, Volume II (New York: Da Capo Press, 1970): 292-293; See also: 
Michael O'Brien, A Character of Hugh Legaré (Knoxville: University of Tennesee Press, 1985): 169-185. 
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the impracticable and dangerous doctrines about universal emancipation and equality of 
rights," slavery would maintain its safety. The enslaved themselves would never think 
about revolting against their southern slave masters, Legaré argued. Without help from 
abroad, blacks who rebelled against the master class in the United States would have no 
chance at success. He continued, "Let [the slave's] conspiracy be unaided by foreign 
power, and it will be easily suppressed." Slavery might be dangerous, Legaré admitted, 
but it could only become fatal if white fanatics were left unchecked.9 
 Just a few years later, the possibility of foreign meddling in the American slave 
system appeared more likely as the House of Commons ended slavery in the Caribbean, 
just miles away from the southern border. Unlike the nullifiers who seemed to turn every 
political debate into one about defending slavery, Legaré had been a rising unionist from 
South Carolina and served as the state's attorney general at the young age of thirty-three 
before going to Europe and living in Belgium.  For him, however, British emancipation 
created a cause for concern.  He noted in a letter to his friend Issac E. Holmes that a West 
Indian planter had asked him about emigrating from the Caribbean to the United States.  
The lack of a planter class in the Caribbean, for Legaré, supplied a harmful new additive 
to a possible American slave insurrection.  Furthermore, he told Holmes that, "Added to 
St. Domingo, [emancipation] will present you, at the mouth of the Mississippi, a black 
population of some 2,000,000, free from all restraint and ready for any mischief."  
Denmark Vesey, he remembered, had planned to partner with Haiti.  A future rebel 
leader, he deduced alarmingly, had more options for an alliance at his disposal if much of 
                                                        
9 The Writings of Hugh Swinton Legaré, 292-293. 
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the Caribbean came under the control of a freed black population.10   
 Legaré was not the only notable southerner to consider the size of the black 
population in the Caribbean. Just a simple statistic could mean much to a slaveholder 
who, when peering over the Gulf, saw a free large free black population that wanted to 
enact revenge against all planters in the name of their race. The Columbus Enquirer in 
Georgia also remarked that the "blacks are to the white in the proportion to 11 to 1." The 
South appeared to be nearly surrounded by free soil.  Indeed, they had become cornered: 
at the north by free soil and a growing antislavery movement, and at the east and south by 
freed blacks, suddenly empowered by the nation that the United States had already fought 
two wars against.  Loyalty from northerners, whether by directly protecting slavery or 
abstaining from attacks on the institution and leaving decisions to slaveholders, was 
imperative to slaveholders after British emancipation in the Caribbean because the 
community of slaveholders had so significantly and suddenly dwindled.11 
 Once again, southerners feared an invasion of their society from the outside. Just 
as American slaveholders worried the Haitian Revolution would spread to their shores in 
the 1790s, planters in the South feared that abolitionism in America would be bolstered 
by the success of the antislavery movement in Great Britain. South Carolinians especially 
felt pressure from British emancipation, because it followed so closely on the heels of the 
Nullification Crisis, when they were defeated by President Andrew Jackson’s hard stance 
against the most ardent defenders of state's rights and slavery. In a letter to his son,                                                         
10 The Writings of Hugh Swinton Legaré, Volume 1, 17, 215; Washington D.C United States Telegraph 
May 22, 1834; Wilkins, "Window on Freedom," 42-43, 64-65; O'brien, A Character of Hugh Legaré, 165-
166. For the Nullification debates see William W. Freehling, Prelude to the Civil War: The Nullification 
Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836. 
11 Columbus, Ga. Enquirer, August 10, 1833. 
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Charles Drayton II, a member of a wealthy planter family, wrote, "The great Slave 
question has started in England, if realized will transfer a great bearing on the United 
States: of course the whole evil will fall on the Southern section." American slaveholders, 
he warned, had to stay mindful of attacks against southern slavery as northern 
abolitionists gained a morale boost from the British Parliament. Ideas, after all, could 
spread like wildfire across the Atlantic and Caribbean—the early highways of 
information.12 
 In September 1833—just after the final announcement of the end of Caribbean 
slavery—the Charleston Mercury reprinted parts of a series of articles originally written 
in 1827 by Robert Turnbull, a man one historian has called "the archradical of the 
lowlands" of South Carolina for his staunch support of nullification.  Since their original 
publication, Turnbull had expanded his thoughts into a pamphlet entitled "The Crisis."  
To proslavery forces in 1833, his words seemed prophetic.  Six years before 
emancipation in the West Indies, the polemicist had pointed to William Wilberforce’s 
example and warned that abolitionists in England would not stop at just ending the slave 
trade. Wilberforce, Turnbull wrote, "avowed that their sole object was abolition of the 
trade, and no more." However, that changed once he accomplished his goal: "Now in the 
fulness [sic] of time, he openly advocates a general emancipation."  The antislavery 
movement, he insisted, had a plan of action to destroy slavery, not temper it.  Those in 
                                                        
12 Charles Drayton II to his son, August 13, 1833 in Drayton Letterbook, Drayton Hall, Charleston, SC 
quoted in both Joe Wilkins, "Window on Freedom: The South's Response to the Emancipation of the 
Slaves in the British West Indies," 60 and "Edward Rugemer, The Problem of Emancipation, vii. 
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favor of continuing slavery needed to understand that simple fact and prepare to defend 
themselves.13 
 In 1827, when Turnbull originally crafted his argument, he contended that if a 
small minority of abolitionists in the British House of Commons could turn into a 
majority, the same could happen in the United States.  He wrote, "The minority in the 
British Parliament was at first trifling.  I doubt if there were even twenty or ten in both 
Houses of Parliament who were for emancipation.  But yet the West Indies are hastening, 
with a very quick step, towards complete ruin."  For slaveholders in 1833, after the 
passage of the Abolition Act in England, his next statement seemed more powerful:  
"And so will South-Carolina assuredly be ruined, if at this day, there are twenty men in 
Congress, who are for emancipation, sudden or gradual, and the right of Congress to take 
even a vote, is not RESISTED as an ACT OF WAR by South-Carolina."  Turnbull asked 
his fellow members of the proslavery movement whether they wanted to be "like the 
weak, the dependant, and unfortunate colonists of the West-Indies" or instead, stand up to 
possible federal action against slavery in Congress.  Slaveholders, he insisted, had to be 
wary of the transnational antislavery movement becoming too large to fight back against.  
The editor of the Mercury added a note upon republishing Turnbull's writing: "Let every 
Southern man remember that like causes will produce like effects." Abolitionism seemed 
to be on the march; slaveholders, the newspaper warned, should be on their guard.14  
                                                        
13 Brutus [Robert Turnbull], The Crisis: or, Essays on the Usurpations of the Federal Government 
(Charleston: A. E. Miller, 1827): 128; Wilkins, "The Window on Freedom," 61-62; William W. Freehling 
ed., The Nullification Era: A Documentary Record (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967): 26-27. 
14 Brutus [Turnbull], "The Crisis," 64, 132. 
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 The discussion of British emancipation stoked fires that had been quelled after the 
Nullification Crisis.  For example, Henry Clay saw old wounds reopened as southerners 
discussed news from England. He expressed this concern to James Madison, writing, 
"The political malcontents in the South seem to have adopted a new theme to excite 
alarm and to disseminate Unfriendly to the Union."  Clay worried that emancipation in 
the West Indies "may give some aid to the efforts" to the former nullifiers and lead to 
another controversy.15   
 Clay was right.  In response to British emancipation the streams of thought from 
the nullification debates resurfaced regarding American exceptionalism and its unique 
version of government. Two newspapers typified the opposing sides, the Richmond 
Enquirer edited by unionist Thomas Ritchie, and the Charleston Mercury, which built on 
its former editorialist's ideas and worked to protect slavery in the United States regardless 
of the cost.  Throughout 1835, these two newspapers showed that the southerners divided 
on how best to protect slavery as well as how they anticipated the future of the nation’s 
expanding democracy and federal power to continue in a changing world. 
 Thomas Ritchie trusted the Union, as created after the American Revolution, to 
protect slavery and urged moderation in southern attacks on the antislavery movement.  
The editor insisted that the South and the West Indies had significant differences that the 
ardent proslavery movement simply ignored when it predicted dangers for slavery in the 
United States.  On the cusp of the end of West Indian slavery, Ritchie published a story 
with the headline, "ENGLISH EMANCIPATION." The article, parts of which had been 
                                                        
15 Henry Clay to James Madison, May 28, 1833 in The Papers of Henry Clay, eds. Robert Seager II and 
Melba Porter Hay (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984): 8: 643. 
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taken from another newspaper, argued the Founding Fathers had created a different 
system of governance than England. The British Parliament possessed "a power in the 
dearest points, over the lives and fortunes of thousands, when those who are most 
affected by their measures are unable to regulate or control them."  Caribbean 
slaveholders had no real representation in Parliament, Ritchie told his readers; most of the 
representatives had no contact with slaveholders but did know members of the antislavery 
movement.   The American slaveholder lived under a different kind of government—one 
that made the Union an exceptional example of a representative republic.16  
 The United States government had purposely been constructed differently from its 
British counterpart in the Palace of Westminster, the Enquirer reminded its readers.  The 
Constitution, Ritchie wrote, created "an inherent and insoluble difficulty in the legislation 
concerning slave-holders and their property, by those who are not only not slave-holders 
themselves, but cannot be made to comprehend the nature of that relation." The article 
continued by saying that the discussion of slavery was "left so exclusively to the 
legislation of the several States, that the Congress of all the States cannot touch [slavery] 
without a palpable usurpation" of constitutional restrictions.  "The silence" left by the 
Founders in regard to slavery was a "most wise one" because it put slaveholders in charge 
of slavery, unlike in England, where people who had never seen a slave decided the fate 
of the West Indies slave society. The Constitution protected slavery by not talking about 
it, and therefore it did not grant federal power to directly restrict it.  With their northern 
allies agreeing to that principle, slavery would be safe and abolitionists would be scorned, 
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just like the nullifiers, for promoting disunion.17    
  After the passage of the Abolition Act, the Enquirer published a statement signed 
by "A Pennsylvanian" that contrasted the debate over slavery in England and America.  
The article stated, "The Anti-Slavery People, Tappan, Garrison, and Co. will find more 
difficulty in creating an excitement in the middle and Northern States for immediate 
abolition, than they did in England." The planters of the West Indies had very few allies 
in the British government, the northern author explained. "In that country, the position of 
the various parties gave a fatal facility to combinations in Parliament favorable to the 
measure. The fanatics, the whigs, the liberals all found it their interest to unite against the 
West Indian proprietors; the latter could only count on the tories." Without support from 
nonslaveholders a thousand miles away in Europe, slavery in the West Indies was 
doomed without direct representation in Parliament. Things would be different in a nation 
where slaveholders had a say in a government divided to create the checks and balances 
of power.  The slaveholders in the South did not have the same political dependencies 
their Caribbean counterparts did.18 
 For Ritchie, the uniqueness of American government inherently made the South's 
position in defending slavery distinct from the rest of the slaveholding world. America’s 
exceptional form of government alone, he exhorted, would protect American slavery 
from abolition and insurrection. However, the editor also wanted to remind his southern 
                                                        
17 Ibid. 
18 Richmond Enquirer October 15, 1833; Charles Henry Ambler, Thomas Ritchie: A Study in Virginia 
Politics (Richmond: Bell Book and Stationary, 1913): 176. Unfortunately, no modern biography of Thomas 
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readers that slavery still had protectors in the North. The "Pennsylvanian" continued his 
letter by showing the sui generis nature of the United States. He wrote, "In this country, 
the state of the political elements is altogether different. The southern States have an 
independent existence in Congress, besides having their rights expressly secured to them 
by the Constitution.  The coalition of parties at the North is peculiarly hostile to any 
agitation of the slavery question.  No tears, therefore, can grow out of the insane efforts 
of the agitators."  Because no political issue could be made out of slavery that did not 
directly threaten the Union, there could be no way of creating an antislavery party in the 
fashion of Wilberforce's in England.19   
 Thomas Ritchie bristled at the notion that a few abolitionists could grow into a 
massive movement to end slavery by deploying federal power against the South's 
peculiar institution. He used his newspaper to trumpet a clear message when he printed 
the Pennsylvanian’s letter: the United States of America was different from England, and 
southern slaveholders should never forget it. By publishing a message from a northerner 
that contrasted the differences between the South and the West Indies, Ritchie hoped to 
show slaveholders that they had allies unwilling to allow the Constitution to be stretched 
in order to prohibit slavery in the South. This added to sentiments already expressed by 
the likes of Daniel Webster during the controversy over nullification. The written 
Constitution of the United States refused to address slavery, at least directly, unlike the 
unwritten constitution of England.20 
 While the Enquirer focused on the Union and its exceptional qualities derived                                                         
19 Richmond Enquirer October 15, 1833. 
20 Richmond Enquirer October 15, 1833; For Webster see Salem Gazette, March 5, 1833. 
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from the Constitution, Calhounites, led by the Charleston Mercury, built on principles 
first established during the nullification controversy. Instead of strictly sticking to the 
arguments about state's rights, they expanded their understanding of the American federal 
system and what should be done to protect slavery. If the Constitution served as the 
rulebook that Thomas Ritchie believed every political power under its jurisdiction needed 
to follow, the Mercury argued that the rules only meant something if they could be 
enforced.  They stressed that the referee held as much power as the rules. Throughout 
1835 and 1836, in an extraordinary transition from their earlier arguments based upon 
states’ rights, the proslavery movement claimed the founding documents did not have the 
capability to protect slaveholders from a persistent majority in favor of the abolition of 
slavery.  Calhoun’s former followers wanted active government protection of slavery 
without and worried little about moving the Overton window of an empowered federal 
government or the possible ramifications regarding slavery’s future. By allowing the 
federal government to protect slavery, southerners allowed the public see Washington's 
involvement with slavery as something that was sensible, regardless of whether it was 
proslavery or antislavery. 
 The Mercury challenged Thomas Ritchie directly by publishing an article from 
one of the Enquirer's rival newspapers in Virginia.  In a July 6, 1833, article entitled 
"SLAVERY—WEST INDIES: State Rights," published a month before the passage of 
British emancipation, the newspaper responded to the Enquirer's argument that American 
slaveholders could not be compared to planters in the British Caribbean. The Mercury 
article said, "True, [Ritchie] may say that Virginia has representatives in Congress, which 
the West India Planters have not in Parliament—but what that?"  For the ardent 
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proslavery forces, representation meant very little.  The newspaper declared that despite 
their representation, proslavery members of Congress could not "control those persons 
who can control their lives and fortunes."  Instead, the Mercury contended, southern 
"voices are merged in the clamors of the majority.  They are neither heard nor felt."  The 
majority, they believed, always had the ability to shout down the minority.21 
 According to the Charleston Mercury the Constitution of the United States had 
not created an exceptional government. Alternatively, the Founders had not even 
constructed a government that, in de facto, could be differentiated from England’s, which 
had ended slavery.  The newspaper put forward a hypothetical situation to its readers: 
"Suppose the Federal Government, should do as the British Parliament has done, and 
bring out its scheme of Emancipation?"  The pro-nullification author used the answer to 
mock the Enquirer's defense of unity and equality between the states.  The article asked: 
 "What is Virginia to do?—'Remonstrate,' says Mr. Ritchie.  What 
next? 'Protest,' says Mr. Ritchie.  What Next?—'Rush to 
revolution,' says Mr. Ritchie.—What next? 'Be hanged like dogs,' 
says A. Jackson, Esquire. And pray, may not the W. India Planters 
do these very things?"  
For these strident defenders of slavery, the South needed more than the Constitution and 
the representation granted to slaveholders in Congress. Rather, the South needed to be 
able to control the machinery of the federal government to ensure that their conceptions 
of federalism would remain unchanged by those who opposed them.22                                                         
21 Charleston Mercury, July 6, 1833. 
22 Ibid. 
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 The Charleston Mercury came very close to arguing that Andrew Jackson had 
spoiled the Constitution during the nullification controversy, rendering it useless in 
regards to protecting slavery.  Because "the Jackson Van Buren Party" had "deserted the 
principles of the Constitution," the newspaper contended, the United States had begun 
going down a path in which it no longer would serve as a beacon of freedom in a world 
ruled by kings and tyrants.  Instead, the newspaper claimed, "The doctrines of these men 
are of the very essence of monarchy, and must speedily reduce the States to the abject 
condition of the West India Colonies, unless their progress be arrested."23 Old Hickory's 
action had shown that the Constitution was indeed more flexible than many Unionists 
cared to admit, the ardent proponents of slavery maintained. 
 Despite the Enquirer's arguments otherwise, the existence of America's founding 
doctrines did not inherently make the creation of the United States government 
exceptional.  Those in control of how the American principles of government became 
defined mattered also.  The Mercury, and other outlets that agreed with the newspaper, 
believed Thomas Ritchie—and those southerners who agreed with him—had abandoned 
"principles to support men" and instead "flattered" himself "to live upon the profits of 
popular delusion and ignorance." Ritchie's faith in the Union, they believed, led him to be 
blinded by the incremental increase of power by the antislavery movement and its 
coincidence with the strengthening of federal power under Andrew Jackson.  The 
Constitution alone could not protect American slaveholders from a possible majority who 
opposed them and their system of labor because it had not created a government different 
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than that of England.24 
 The theme among southerners to disparage the usefulness of the Constitution in 
protecting slavery from abolitionists had grown since Nat Turner's rebellion. After the 
1831 Southampton revolt, Virginia's governor, John Floyd, had written privately in his 
diary that "we are gravely told there is no law to punish" abolitionists like William Lloyd 
Garrison, whom he believed had the "the express intention of inciting the slaves and free 
negroes in this and other States to rebellion and to murder the men, women and children" 
of the South.  He planned to make a note of his sentiment to the Virginia legislature.  Just 
two years later, Floyd's ideas had become a part of the mainstream proslavery 
movement.25 
 In the same July 6 issue of the Mercury that attacked Thomas Ritchie, the editor 
published another broadside against the North and the federal government controlled by 
Andrew Jackson. After blaming the North for some of the South's economic woes, the 
Mercury again compared the federal government to Great Britain by quoting charges 
against England in the Declaration of Independence as indictments against it.  The 
newspaper claimed grievances from "imposing taxes on us without consent" to rendering 
"the Military independent of and superior to the Civil power."  Other major points in the 
list included "exciting 'domestic insurrections amongst us" and conducting at attack on 
the South where the "known rules of warfare is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, 
sexes, and conditions."  For insurrection scares, the newspaper blamed not only 
abolitionists but the federal government, which they also called on for help during a                                                         
24 Ibid. 
25 Charles H. Ambler, The Life and Diary of John Floyd: Governor of Virginia, An Apostle of Secession, 
and the Father of Oregon Country (Richmond, Richmond Press, 1918): 161-162. 
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revolt.26 
 A major belief that separated Thomas Ritchie, the unionist, from his counterparts 
in South Carolina, who favored a more active approach to defending slavery, was their 
trust of the northern commitment to the South and their understanding of the free states.  
The Mercury treated the North as a foreign entity, something that needed to be infiltrated 
in order to gain information on the antislavery movement. In the eyes of the proslavery 
movement, the antislavery movement and the northern population in general had become 
synonymous and could not be separated. Even when northerners said they did not support 
the abolitionist movement, these southern slaveholders believed they were purposely 
covering their fanatical sentiments. By asserting that northerners spoke a version of 
coded language, proslavery forces could point to northerners who did not even hold 
antislavery beliefs and claim their statements were all part of a "fanatic" dialogue, thus 
adding to the southern distrust of northern intentions. They viewed the free states as 
separate from the South, and an enemy to their ideology.  The Mercury supplied the most 
sparkling examples of this phenomenon. 
 Going to the North, for some writers in the Mercury, became treated as if it were 
going behind enemy lines during a period of war.  In the summer of 1833 the newspaper 
published a letter from "A Spy In New York" that read like an intelligence briefing.  The 
author thought British emancipation had boosted the morale of the antislavery movement.  
His report read, "The Gladiators are in extasies [sic] at the latest news from England, viz: 
that all the slaves will be let loose on the Kings birth day. They have an idea that 
emancipation of the slaves in the West Indies will have a very great influence on the                                                         
26 Charleston Mercury, July 6, 1833. 
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south." The spy stated that "fanatical rascals" were "continually at work, with a zeal 
worthy of a better cause" and explained that when members of the Colonization Society 
looked to raise funds they lied to southerners.  When they asked for money in the North, 
he contended, they told people that they wanted to emancipate slaves in the slave states.  
However, "when the agents of the society are begging for money in the slaveholding 
States, their tone is changed: then they beg money to carry off the free negroes who are 
contaminating the slaves with notions of liberty." Fanatical abolitionists would say 
anything to get their way, and the rest of the northern population would willfully ignore 
their tactics.27 
 Whereas the Enquirer published articles from "A Pennsylvanian" to show that 
some northerners still wanted to protect slavery, the Mercury always viewed northern 
motives with a skeptical eye.  A correspondent to the Charleston newspaper supplied an 
article from the New York Commercial Advertiser written by "An Anti-slavery Citizen." 
The New York author contended that many northern members of the antislavery 
movement differed with their counterparts in England.  He argued that immediate 
emancipation from some in the North "did not mean political emancipation." Instead, 
some of those who advocated immediate emancipation, the article explained, did so as a 
way to promote moral suasion against slaveholding. The northerner continued, "Anti 
slave men preach the doctrine of immediate emancipation to slaveholders, as divines 
preach the doctrine of immediate repentance to sinners.  They aim at consciences and 
hearts of the slaveholders."   Southerners, the writer promised, could trust the North to 
keep the black population under the control of white planters.  Immediate emancipation                                                         
27 Charleston Mercury, Jul 23, 1833. See also May 31, 1833. 
  130 
was more an abstract idea, for some moderate proponents of antislavery, than a concrete 
policy initiative to be put into effect when the opportunity arose.28 
 The antislavery advocate’s words, republished in the Mercury, declared that 
immediate emancipation could not be forced on southerners.  He believed that slavery 
should be debated as a social issue instead of a political one.  He wrote, "As political men 
then anti-slavery men must be quiet" and insisted that some northern opponents of 
slavery did not want to set "the slave free to roam without restraint, to live in idleness; to 
butcher the whites, and to be lawless."  Some in the North accepted the premise that a 
freed black population would lead to danger for whites.  Moreover, this northern 
proponent of antislavery still presumed that southerners alone should control the future of 
slavery.  The planter class of the South could still expect northerners, even some who 
supported abolitionism, to promote local control over the slave system.29 
 The Mercury, however, remained unconvinced. The analysis offered by this 
newspaper showed how distanced from the North some southern members of the 
proslavery class had become.  Its editor wrote, "We give place to the following 
communication as a temperate and well expressed article upon the subject which it treats; 
and are fully confident that our correspondent is sincere in his aim to act upon the 
consciences and hearts of slaveholders only, and not interfere with the political compact 
between the States."  However, sincerity meant nothing for the editor of the Mercury.  He 
wrote, "It is admitted that as 'political men the anti-slavery men must be silent.' The 
article asked, "By what process then are their mouths to be opened in such a manner as                                                         
28 Charleston Mercury, July 10, 1833. 
29 Ibid. 
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that the principles they utter shall be divested of their political effect?"  If all of free 
speech was to be protected under the Constitution, the antislavery movement, regardless 
of its size, could not be separated from American politics under the current system. 
Abolitionism would always garner influence from the northern population. Even when 
northerners claimed that abolitionists should leave slavery alone, their actions, or in this 
case, inaction, meant more than words or genuine sentiment. Two years later, 
slaveholders would again reiterate that federally protected speech could not be consistent 
with a secure slave system.30 
 Just as with David Walker's Appeal, their society became infiltrated by the mail—
specifically, on the ship Columbia on July 29, 1835, as it steamed into a South Carolina 
harbor. Those in Charleston who expected to receive news from across the Atlantic 
would be disappointed. The Southern Patriot reported that the ship's cargo "had no 
further intelligence from Europe, and that the papers are commonly barren in information 
of any novelty or importance."  However, those who kept reading most likely became 
startled at what the Columbia had brought to their state.  Under the large headline of 
"INCENDIARY TRACTS AND PAPERS," the Mercury said the steamship had not been 
"merely laden, but literally overburthened, with the Newspaper 'The Emancipator' and 
two Tracts entitled 'The Anti-Slavery Record,' and 'The Slave's Friend," destined for 
circulation all over the Southern and Western Country." Slaveholders again prepared to 
squelch pamphlets they believed might spur insurrection and topple slavery in the 
South.31    
                                                        
30 Ibid. 
31  Charleston Southern Patriot, July 29, 1835.  Numerous historians have discussed the Abolitionist postal 
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 The slaveholders were not entirely overreacting in their denunciation of the 
antislavery mails as an invasion, since the conspirators, themselves, had intended the 
mailing to act as such. In 1832 William Lloyd Garrison—a main proponent of immediate 
emancipation for those held in bondage in the United States—organized the American 
Anti-slavery Society. By 1835 his organization had raised and set aside $30,000 for 
mailing antislavery tracts to slaveholders in order to persuade southerners to reconsider 
the enslavement of blacks on their plantations and in their cities. Throughout the summer 
of 1835, abolitionists mailed over 170,000 antislavery tracts—a number that equaled the 
entire output of southern media throughout the slave states. The Columbia carried one of 
the first packets to the South. The Southern Patriot called the action a "monstrous abuse 
of the privilege of the public mail" and called the antislavery writings "moral poison."  
The newspaper insisted, "Some mode of prevention should be adopted to abate this 
nuisance" and claimed that if nothing legally could be done by the Post Office, it would 
be "impossible to answer for the security of the Mail in this part of the country, which 
contains such poisonous and inflammatory matter." Many Charlestonians looked to their 
postmaster, Alfred Huger, a unionist during the nullification crisis, to make a difficult 
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decision that he did not want to make.32 
 Others, however, did not wait for an official position. Only a few hours after the 
Southern Patriot broke the news, leading slaveholders in South Carolina devised a plan to 
take the matter into their own hands. They prepared to set an example for the rest of the 
South by offering a harsh response to the northern abolitionists. That evening, members 
of the city's vigilance society, a group named the Lynch Men, broke into the post office 
and stole antislavery pamphlets.  Luckily for them, Huger had conveniently separated the 
tracts from the rest of the mail as he awaited word from his boss, Postmaster General 
Amos Kendall, on how to handle the provocative pamphlets. In a letter to Kendall written 
the following day, Huger described what happened and how he had planned to deal with 
the situation until he received further instruction. He explained that he had no control 
when the Lynch Men broken in to the office: "One of the windows was forced open by 
means of a crow bar, or some such implement; and however deeply I lament this 
occurrence, I cannot see how I would have prevented it. It is evident that the mail would 
have received the same violence, had the obnoxious papers been transmitted."33   
Huger felt helpless to stop the raid on the Post Office. Even if he tried to get in the 
way of those who wanted the pamphlets destroyed, he knew he would be unsuccessful. 
Despite his belief in the centrality of the federal government, the Charleston postmaster 
informed Kendall that he would work with local officials until a resolution to the crisis 
could be found.  He wrote, "I informed the leading men of both political parties that I 
should assume the responsibility of keeping back the incendiary publications until the                                                         
32 Charleston Southern Patriot, July 29, 1835; Dickerson, The Course of Tolerance, 85-86; John, Spreading 
the News, 260-261. 
33 Alfred Huger to Amos Kendall, July 30, 1835 published in Richmond Enquirer, August 25, 1835. 
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wishes of the Postmaster-General were expressed.  All seemed satisfied with this 
arrangement.” He ended his letter by telling the Postmaster General of the United States 
that the thieves had no plans to hide their crimes; rather, a bonfire fueled by the 
antislavery tracts had been planned. The city's community would not punish them.34 
 During the evening that followed the break-in, the Lynch Men stayed true to their 
word. The smell of burning paper filled the air on the parade grounds of the city. The 
buildings, which later would become the Citadel—the South Carolina military 
academy—served as a picturesque background as the smoke blurred the white buildings 
of the nearby campus.  Angry members of the proslavery movement lit thousands of 
pamphlets ablaze, along with the effigies of prominent antislavery leaders like Garrison 
and Tappan, as hundreds looked on. Slaveholders hoped they had sent a message to the 
abolitionists that their unsolicited tracts were unwanted in the South.35 
The Charleston Mercury surprisingly condemned the actions as rash and 
"premature."  Though insisting that "none could blame" those who broke into the post 
office, the newspaper believed that slaveholders had missed an opportunity.  Instead of 
immediately burning the pamphlets, the newspaper maintained the abolitionist mailings 
could have provided a test to see if the federal government would "protect us in our 
rights."  Furthermore, the Mercury continued: "We think it would have been better had 
the pamphlets been allowed to reach their destination, to put the whole Southern 
community on their guard."  The abolitionists had given the proslavery movement a 
chance to unify the South. Despite the fact that the antislavery pamphlets had been turned                                                         
34 Ibid; Wyly-Jones, "A New Look at the Controversy over the Abolition Postal Campaign, 289. 
35 Wyly-Jones, "A New Look at the Controversy over the Abolition Postal Campaign, 289. 
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into ashes, however, the pro-nullification periodical would still get its wish.  Much of the 
South united against this brash act by the abolitionists.36 
 Slave states, much like during the firestorm over the appearance of An Appeal to 
the Coloured Citizens of the World, set aside political differences and staged local rallies 
against the antislavery incursion into their society.  In Tennessee, the National Banner 
and Nashville Whig reported, "In our town the excitement has become great...A handbill 
of the most insidious and inflammatory nature was last week posted up at the corners, 
evidencing that the miserable fanatics are moving with concern, and that their plan of 
operations if wide spread."  The Richmond Whig gave an account of a steamboat 
passenger in Kentucky who found a copy of "Human Events" and declared, "one example 
of a coat of tar and feathers would be more effective than any argument, in cooling the 
zeal of these incendiaries."  In Norfolk, the Herald spoke of "a bundle of incendiary 
missiles from the abolitionists' pandemonium in New York," and maintained that, despite 
antislavery claims otherwise, "20 or 30 copies mailed for this post office, were directed 
to free negroes in the borough and vicinity," thus giving credence in the southern mind 
that abolitionists intended to spark a rebellion.  The Niles' Weekly Register reported 
"many other southern newspapers" had "paragraphs of a similar character.”  While 
abolitionists did not back down, claiming their right to free speech, vigilance became the 
watchword of the South in August 1835.37 
 The mailings rallied white southerners of all stripes against the abolitionists. 
Thomas Ritchie's Richmond Enquirer joined the call for the slave states "to guard, by the                                                         
36 Charleston Mercury, July 31, 1835.  
37 National Banner and Nashville Whig, August 5, 1835; Charleston Mercury, July 30, 1835; Niles' Weekly 
Register vol. 48, 402-403. 
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severest punishment, against the circulation of such papers from the Post Office." He 
argued the public mail needed to be regulated.  The newspaper also blamed the 
antislavery movement for threatening to cause disunion.  The Enquirer pleaded with 
northerners to guard the Union by keeping the question of slavery outside of the federal 
government’s reach. He wrote, "We warn the North again and again--to guard the Union 
and strip the Fanatics of all power and the Factions of all excuse." Two years earlier the 
Virginian editor argued against the nullifiers, claiming the exceptional nature of the 
American founding documents provided the answer for dealing with the question of 
slavery by not mentioning the issue at the national level. By mailing dangerous tracts to 
the South, he believed, abolitionists had acted much like radical slaveholders and 
overreached with their ideology to threaten national unity.38 
 Ritchie found himself caught between northerners unwilling to stop the 
antislavery movement from mailing their tracts to the South and proslavery forces who 
called for radical measures to prevent the circulation of "incendiary pamphlets" 
throughout the South.  Ritchie called for his readers to be leery of both the "Fanatics" and 
the "Factious," the former being abolitionists, the latter being the ardent proslavery 
movement. In articulating his moderate vision, he argued that "both are equally worthy of 
scorn and indignation of every honorable man."  Each side, blinded by their ideology, he 
claimed, threatened what made the United States unique—the Union.  When they 
threatened to ignore the Constitution's silence on the subject of slavery, they only offered 
destruction to the American experiment in democracy.39                                                          
38 Richmond Enquirer August 4, 1835 
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 Despite its large impact on the national scene, both in publications and in politics, 
Ritchie knew that abolitionism only consisted of a small portion of the northern 
population. He quoted the Baltimore Republican, which argued that slaveholders had 
support in the North because most northerners believed that "there is no one who has 
resided in places where the number of free blacks is large, who can fail to be sensible that 
it would be very imprudent to do anything which would have the effect to increase the 
number." The Baltimore newspaper said that whites in both New York and Philadelphia 
"furnish abundant evidence of the fact" and contended that animus towards the 
antislavery movement came from feelings of hostility towards blacks living in both the 
North and South, both free and enslaved.40   
 Ritchie used northern denunciations of the abolitionist postal campaign as 
evidence to criticize newspapers like the Mercury for purposely dividing the North and 
the South. Northerners still strongly opposed abolition, he insisted.  Both the antislavery 
and proslavery movements should be viewed as simply two sides of the same coin, each 
believing in their own radical solutions while undermining what made the United States 
unique. Ritchie exhorted that most northerners would remain against abolition because of 
their antipathy towards the black population, which promoted a feeling that slavery acted 
as a way to control an unwanted sector of American society. So long as the North 
rejected the idea of having a large, free black population living in the United States, 
slavery would be safe and those who said otherwise would seem like fools.  The white 
population in the free states would never support a slave over a white person.41  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 A few days later, the Enquirer cited the Boston Atlas as further proof that 
northerners still supported the South. The newspaper called for a meeting of city leaders 
to discuss the Abolitionist postal campaign.  It wrote,  "Let the Websters, and Otises, and 
Adamses...be invited to attend, to vindicate the fair fame of our city.  Let a manifesto go 
forth declaratory of our sentiments, as to the rights of the South, and of our abhorrence of 
the conduct of those combinations...encouraging the worst of all possible calamities 
which can befall a nation—A CIVIL AND SERVILE WAR."  At least a large portion of 
northerners believed in the Bryan Edwards idea about insurrection and saw abolitionism 
not just as a risk to the Union but also as a threat to national security. Some in the free 
states thought that insurrections and the freeing of the enslaved black population of the 
South would directly affect their lives. The Atlas was not alone; other southern 
newspapers published similar outcries by northern newspapers against abolitionism.42  
Alexis de Tocqueville also described the American fear of insurrection in his 
book Democracy in America.  He wrote, "Hitherto, wherever the whites have been the 
most powerful, they have maintained the blacks in a subordinate or a servile position; 
wherever the negroes have been strongest they have destroyed the whites; such has been 
the only retribution which has ever taken place between the two races." In the following 
weeks and months after the initial arrival of abolitionist tracts on the Columbia, 
proslavery forces responded by organizing themselves, looking to their northern allies, 
and waiting to see how the federal government would deal with the publications they 
deemed so dangerous to their slave society.43 
                                                        
42 Richmond Enquirer, August 7, 1835; see also National Banner and Nashville Whig, August 12, 1835. 
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  Frightened southerners genuinely believed the tracts could cause an insurrection 
by the enslaved population. One resolution passed at a meeting in Lincolnton, Georgia 
called the abolitionists "bloody Jacobins?—worse than the St. Domingo rioters and 
cutthroats." The Richmond Vigilance Committee argued that the discussion abolitionists 
wanted to have about slavery really revolved around whether or not the South should 
exist as a white-occupied area. The committee stated in the preamble to their resolutions 
against the abolitionists that "there is no means of removing the coloured ones—and the 
consequences, therefore, of the scheme of the abolitionists, must be the destruction of our 
race by force, or, what is yet more odious and detestable, by 'amalgamation,' or the 
merciless extermination of the black." In defending themselves against the antislavery 
movement, slaveholders positioned themselves as defending America's white republic 
and called on their northern allies to join them.44  
 The North reacted similarly to the incident. In the wake of the antislavery 
literature arriving in South Carolina, anti-abolition meetings sprang up mostly in the 
Atlantic states where slavery had been most firmly established. Susan Wyly-Jones, a 
historian of the abolitionist mailing campaign, examined the meetings and has shown that 
they typically had two aims: painting the abolitionists as fanatics and strengthening local 
militias and slave patrols, both of which they believed were intimately connected to 
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defending the slavery against the abolitionist schemes to spark slave insurrection.45   
 Northerners did respond to calls from the South to act against abolitionism.  The 
postmaster of New York, Samuel Gouverneur, the son-in-law of former President James 
Monroe, asked Arthur Tappan, the president of the American Anti-Slavery Society, to 
suspend the mailings "until the views of the postmaster general be received" after Alfred 
Huger had requested his assistance. In Ohio, even those who opposed slavery still 
attacked the idea of immediate emancipation. For instance, the Ohio State Journal and 
Columbus Gazette denounced immediate abolition as "the mischievous schemes of 
designing fanatics." They wrote, "if it was believed for a moment that the fanatic could 
injure the people of the South, the men of the North would put their feet upon them and 
crush our their venom; and if servile war should ever arise in the South, let the men of the 
north be but called upon and they will trample it down at once." The mayor of New York 
wrote that he believed nine-tenths of his city opposed the abolitionists.46 
 At town meetings from Portland, Maine, to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania—some 
being described as "being held without regard to party”—citizens passed motions that, 
despite recognizing slavery as immoral, condemned the abolitionist mailings. In 
Philadelphia, for example, a resolution read: "That we respond to the call of our brethren 
of the south, that we are their brethren and, as such, sympathize...and view with regret 
and indignation the incendiary measures which have disturbed their tranquility" and 
further pledged that "the young men of the north are prepared to meet the danger" and 
assist the South if an insurrection of the enslaved did occur.  Furthermore, the meeting  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resolved, "we regard the union of this country as inseparable from its freedom, greatness, 
and glory; that we consider no sacrifice too great to maintain it."  Like Thomas Ritchie in 
Virginia, people across the North viewed the abolitionists in the same fashion as the 
nullifiers; Union trumped fervid expressions of antislavery and proslavery.47 
 After the postal campaign, northerners who supported the southern right to 
slavery acted out against the antislavery movement. Violence against antislavery 
meetings rose drastically during 1835 and 1836, especially after the arrival of their 
pamphlets to the South. A few of the most well known antislavery crusaders had even 
been physically injured. Theodore Weld, for example, had been struck in the head with a 
rock at one antislavery gathering. The most famous example of these actions, though, 
occurred on October 24, 1835, in Boston.  Merchants of the city mobbed William Lloyd 
Garrison at a meeting of the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society and threatened to injure 
the antislavery editor before he was rescued from some of the most violent members of 
the proslavery mob. Northerners either fueled by antipathy towards blacks or from 
commercial connections to the South defended American slaveholders against the 
antislavery movement in the North. They also valued the Union and challenged those 
who they believed threatened it by acting outside of the constitutional framework 
established by the founders, much like they would do twenty-five years later when fire-
eaters sparked secession. Southerners view the North's reaction in a positive light, for the 
most part, seeing the attacks on abolitionists as their ally showing its loyalty. However, 
the strongest attack against the abolitionists who mailed tracts to the South would come 
from the man they formerly denounced, Andrew Jackson, and his postmaster general  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Amos Kendall.48  
 Unlike David Walker's Appeal, the abolitionist mailing campaign immediately 
became a national issue because of its size and scope, along with the government-run 
post office being the main courier of the pamphlets.  When An Appeal to the Couloured 
Citizens of the World first came to South Carolina, some requested that the federal 
government censor Walker, though the state's senator rebuked the idea because he 
believed the issue should be resolved among the states. As tracts from the North came to 
the South and slaveholders claimed they threatened their security and attacked federal 
post offices, officials of the national government had no choice but to play a role in 
deciding how to treat the mailings at the highest levels of government. 
 Postmaster General Amos Kendall acted first. Born in Massachusetts, educated in 
New Hampshire, but settled in Kentucky where he thrived as an editor of a Jacksonian 
newspaper, the postmaster general served as a member of Andrew Jackson's "Kitchen 
Cabinet."  On August 4, Kendall responded to the urgent request from Alfred Huger.  A 
few weeks later, the postmaster general's letter became published for the nation to read. 
Kendall wrote, "Upon a careful examination of the law, I am satisfied that the postmaster 
general has no legal authority to exclude newspapers from the mail, nor prohibit their 
carriage or delivery on account of their character or tendency, real or supposed."  He 
explained that he did not "want to confer to the head of an executive department a power 
over the press, which might be perverted or abused."  However, despite his reluctance to 
censor the mail directly, Kendall told Huger that he was also "not prepared to direct you  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to forward or deliver the papers." The reason, he stated, came from the reason the postal 
system had been created in the first place: "the post office department was created to 
serve the people of each and all of the United States, and not to be used as the instrument 
of their destruction."49 
 Though he agreed the law said otherwise, Kendall felt forced to protect the South. 
He found a way to justify undermining the law and preventing the controversial tracts 
from being delivered by the American postal system.  The postmaster general wrote to 
his deputy in South Carolina, "We owe an obligation to the laws, but a higher one to the 
communities in which we live, and if the former be perverted to destroy the latter, it is 
patriotism to disregard them. Entertaining these views, I cannot sanction, and will not 
condemn the step you have taken” by refusing to deliver the mail.  One of the leading 
Jacksonians thus endorsed a version of nullification that used individual employees of the 
federal government instead of state legislatures.  He granted each local postmaster the 
authority to determine what should and should not be delivered through the American 
mail service.50  
 Kendall's actions sparked a debate among newspapers in the North. Some 
criticized the postmaster general. The New York Evening Post condemned the 
postmaster's actions and called for him to resign.  The newspaper asked, "Who gives him 
a right to judge of what is incendiary and inflammatory?  Was there any reservation of 
that sort in his oath of office."  The Boston Atlas, which had condemned the abolitionists, 
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also chastised Kendall's letter.  It inquired, "What higher duty can we owe to the 
community in which we live, than to obey the laws which that community has framed?  
Is an individual, or class of individuals, to say—we deem such a law to be unjust, and it 
is patriotism in us to disregard it?"  The Atlas exclaimed, "There was but one course for 
the postmaster general to have pursued; and that it to have directed his subordinate officer 
to follow the law as it was laid down, and leave the result to the law." Without following 
the laws, the rights granted in the Constitution would be meaningless.51 
 Much of the northern media, however, supported the prevention of antislavery 
tracts being mailed to the South and praised Kendall's actions. The Albany Argus said the 
postmaster's decision was a "prompt, liberal, and just reply." A newspaper in Cincinnati 
argued that laws could not be enforced without the will of the people and that laws could 
only work if those who enforced them had been given a certain amount of discretion in 
their application. The New York Commercial Advertiser took censorship of the 
antislavery movement one step further.  It wrote, "If the madmen who are scattering fire-
brands, arrows and death, cannot be persuaded, or 'rebuked' to silence, we see no other 
alternative, than for the slaveholding states to protect themselves, by establishing all the 
odious machinery of passports and examinations, to which travelers in Europe are 
subjected." The slaveholders still had allies in the North.52 
 Southern newspapers varied in their responses to Kendall's conception of a 
"higher law" and the possibility of postmasters gaining authority to censor mail they 
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deemed incendiary. In Natchez, Louisiana, a newspaper asked with bluster, "Where is the 
man in the South who would not rather receive a bushel of abolition trash, (which can 
easily burn,) than to have his own private affairs pried into by every rascally deputy 
postmaster, or clerk, who might choose to say he suspected they contained incendiary 
matter?"  For this southerner, his privacy trumped any concern that the pamphlets could 
get into the wrong hands and cause trouble with the enslaved population.  However, most 
southern newspapers praised the postmaster general for his actions.  The Athens, Georgia 
Southern Banner for example, wrote, "In justice to Mr. Kendall's views, and the propriety 
of the course he has adopted...there is, we believe, but one opinion here; and that is one of 
unqualified appropriation." Overall, the South supported Kendall's actions as the nation 
awaited to see any official reaction from the White House.53   
 As part of dealing with the attacks on the Charleston post office, Amos Kendall 
sent a copy of his Huger letter and an explanation of his motives for suspending the 
delivery of the antislavery tracts to the White House.  He told Andrew Jackson that he 
believed "these steps carried out will pacify the South." Old Hickory agreed. The 
president, a slaveholder, concurred with the idea that abolitionism often led to 
insurrection. He responded to the postmaster general, "I have read with sorrow and regret 
that such men live in our happy country—I might have said monsters—as to be guilty of 
the attempt to stir up amongst the South the horrors of servile war—Could they be 
reached, they ought to be made to atone for this wicked attempt, with their lives."54    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Unfortunately for the president, the law said otherwise.  He wrote to Kendall, 
"But we are the instruments of, and executors of the law; we have no power to prohibit 
anything from being transported in the mail that is authorized by law." Because of how 
the law was understood under the Constitution, Jackson continued by telling Kendall, 
"the only thing that can be done is what you suggested." In order to censor the mail at the 
federal level, the law would have to be changed by Congress. President Jackson planned 
to accede to the South's demand and censor the antislavery movement through the power 
of the federal government. When the congress reconvened from summer recess, he would 
ask them to provide a law that gave him the power to regulate the mail.55 
 Though the postal campaign did not convince many southern planters to give up 
slavery, the abolitionists did make one important gain from mailing their tracts to the 
South.  While many unionists believed the issue of black enslavement in the United 
States of America should be left to individual states, those who opposed slavery often 
used the founding documents of the United States to nationalize the issue, at least for a 
short period of time before the two-party system attempted to remove it from national 
conversation.  In an open letter from the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society, the group 
explained, "We have said, in the words of the Declaration of Independence, that 'all men 
are created equal,' and that liberty is an unalienable gift of God to every man. We know 
of no clause in the constitution, which forbids our saying this."56   
 Furthermore, just as free speech laws protected David Walker in Boston, the 
antislavery society insisted that the Bill of Rights protected antislavery speech at the  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national level, even if some accused them of fomenting insurrection. The abolitionists 
argued, "It is said that the constitution of the United States forbids our acting, in any way, 
on this subject.  Admit, for a moment, that slavery is, as is so confidently asserted, 
guaranteed by the constitution; is not the liberty of speech and of the press also explicitly 
guaranteed?" Mirroring the Charleston Mercury, the group's letter asked, "[I]f it be found 
that they cannot co-exist, the question is before the country—which of them is best worth 
preserving?" The members of both the antislavery and proslavery movements admitted in 
the abstract that they believed free speech and slavery—or at least for slaveholders, a 
secure slave population—could not exist in harmony.  People, however, do not live in 
abstractions alone, and the United States Congress became tasked with a tedious 
balancing act.57  
 President Jackson forced Congress to act when in his seventh annual message to 
Congress he wrote, "I invite your attention to the painful excitement produced in the 
South by attempts to circulate through the mails inflammatory appeals addressed to the 
passions of the slaves, in prints, and in various sorts of publications, calculated to 
stimulate them to insurrection and to produce all the horrors of servile war."  The 
president took the opportunity to regain some of the loyalty of southerners that he may 
have lost because of the Nullification Crisis and postured himself, and his party, as 
defenders of southern slavery against abolitionist intent to incite black rebellion.58   
After giving his respect to "the state authorities to whom it properly belongs" for  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censoring the antislavery tracts, Jackson continued, "it is nevertheless proper for 
Congress to take such measures as will prevent the Post Office Department, which was 
designed to foster an amicable intercourse between all the members of the Confederacy 
from being used as an instrument of an opposite character."  The president asked 
Congress to pass "a law as will prohibit under severe penalties the circulation in the 
Southern states through the mails of incendiary publications intended to instigate the 
slaves to insurrection." In a choice between free speech and slavery, as posed by both 
members of the anti- and proslavery sides of the debate, Old Hickory chose to protect the 
latter.59 
 The Senate moved first. John C. Calhoun led the way in trying to develop the upp 
chamber of Congress's response to the president's call for action against the antislavery 
tracts being sent to the slave states. The South Carolina senator asked that a special 
committee be formed to write Jackson's requested regulation of the mail.  Despite some 
objection—for instance, from Senator Felix Grundy, a Tennessean who served as 
chairman of the Senate's Post Office and Post Roads Committee—his colleagues granted 
Calhoun's request and created a group of four southerners and one northerner in charge of 
writing legislation regarding "incendiary pamphlets." The South Carolinian served as the 
committee's chairman.60   
Calhoun's insistence on forming a special committee stemmed from two concerns.  
Firstly, because only one southerner sat on the ordinary group designated to form policy 
regarding the post office and the South Carolinian did not believe that President Jackson  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had the influence to properly convince northerners to protect slavery in an appropriate 
fashion. Secondly, the South Carolinian worried that the president and his party might 
take the opportunity granted by the controversy to extend his presidential power.  
Furthermore, the leading nullifier had been put into a precarious situation by the 
president. Calhoun still intended to offer a state's rights proposal that could protect 
southern slavery without empowering the federal government—something that clashed 
with newer proslavery ideas developing back home that argued the best way to ensure 
slavery would never be threatened by the federal government was wield its national 
power.61 
 Calhoun's committee reported its findings a few months later to the Senate.  
However, its concluding report and suggested bill had the oddity of not being endorsed in 
the whole by the majority of its members.  Only Calhoun and the senator from North 
Carolina, Willie Person Magnum, completely supported the bill the committee submitted, 
while the other three members took issue with portions of the proposal. However, 
Calhoun read the committee's long report on the senate floor and explained that they 
"fully [concurred] with the president as to the character and tendency of the papers which 
have been attempted to be circulated in the south." Despite their agreement on the 
problem, the chairman continued, "But, while [the committee members] agree with the 
president as to the evil and its highly dangerous tendency, and the necessity of arresting 
it, they have not been able to assent to the measure of redress which he recommends," 
mainly that Congress should regulate the mail. Agreement over how to treat the topic of 
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slavery in the Senate would be hard to find.62    
 John C. Calhoun managed to provide a state's rights rationale for not censoring 
the antislavery movement through the national government, as Jackson had proposed. 
The special committee had concluded, "that congress has not the power to pass such a 
law; that it would be a violation of the most sacred provisions of the constitution, and 
subversive of reserved powers essential to the preservation of the domestic institutions of 
the slaveholding states." The report also cited the first amendment as a reason that a law 
censoring the mail might be unconstitutional.  However, the reasoning did not come from 
infringement on the free speech of antislavery American citizens; instead, the old nullifier 
argued, the first amendment prevented the federal government from having power to 
control the post office.  This convoluted justification enabled Calhoun to attack Jackson’s 
assertion of power without directly protecting the free speech rights of abolitionists.63 
 Despite these concerns, though, the special committee did offer legislation to 
stifle the antislavery movement's use of the mail as a tool to spread their message to the 
South.   The proposed bill essentially made it unlawful for a postmaster to put any 
publication that criticized slavery into the mail if the law of its destination deemed it 
incendiary and a threat to the safety of the slave system. It gave the postmaster general 
the authority to dismiss any deputy who violated the law and forced his deputies to know 
the laws of every destination where the mail they were asked to send might be circulated.  
Finally, it sanctioned the postmaster to destroy any pamphlet deemed incendiary if those 
who attempted to mail the tracts did not retrieve them.  Following Amos Kendall's  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approach, the law submitted by Calhoun's committee empowered postmasters to judge 
what was and was not inappropriate to be sent via the postal service, making them the 
agents of censorship for slaveholders.  Calhoun argued that instead of giving power 
directly to the federal government, his bill used national powers to reinforce state laws.64 
 The Senate debated the committee’s bill for months. Many did not see much of a 
difference between Calhoun and President Jackson's proposals, and therefore discussion 
focused on the merits and effectiveness of Calhoun's bill. The debate did not have a 
sectional tendency; northerners offered their approbation while senators from slave 
states—though none from the lower South—gave their disapproval.  Support for the 
possible law focused mostly on the reasoning of President Jackson—national security 
trumped free speech.  The president's party men in the senate took up his cause to defend 
slavery through the federal government and shore up the Democratic Party in the South 
for the upcoming presidential election.65 
 A loyal deputy of the Jackson political machine, future president and senator from 
Pennsylvania James Buchanan, parroted Old Hickory when he defended his decision in 
favor of the bill and urged his colleagues to do the same.  He told his fellow senators that 
he believed the law to be "absolutely necessary" in order to protect the South from 
"servile insurrection."  Buchanan insisted that the security of the nation rested on the  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stifling of the abolitionists.  He admitted that "unless in extreme cases, where the safety 
of the Republic was involved, we should never exercise this power of discrimination 
between what papers should and should not be circulated through the mail." Senator 
Buchanan added, "The Constitution, however, has conferred upon us this general power, 
probably for the very purpose of meeting these extreme cases, and it is one which, from 
its delicate nature, we shall not be likely to abuse." Ordinary citizens who wrote ordinary 
publications did have to fear the federal government squelching their speech.  Fanatical 
abolitionism, on the other hand, threatened the nation and must be stopped.  Just as with 
the Haitian Revolution and suppression of black sailors after Denmark Vesey's alleged 
plot, extraordinary measures needed to be taken. The security of slavery and the safety of 
the nation had become entwined.66 
 Four objections arose in the Senate against the proposed federal regulations of 
antislavery tracts in the mail.  Firstly, some southerners worried that using federal 
authority to censor their publications would lead to abolitionists being viewed by parts of 
the country as martyrs, hence working against the protection of slavery in the long run. 
Secondly, senators from both free and slave states believed the bill to be unconstitutional. 
Thirdly, by creating what historian Merrill Peterson has called the doctrine of “federal 
reinforcement,” the law gave so much authority to the states that there would be no 
constitutional limits to government power at the federal level because it allowed the 
Tenth Amendment to make the rest of the Bill of Rights moot.  Finally, Calhoun's 
proposal, despite his objections otherwise, made slavery a national issue and the federal 
government an ally to its protection against those who legally had the right to criticize it.   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It increased the federal relationship to slavery from protecting slaveholders from an 
insurrection and helping them in recovering runaway slaves, to actively participating in 
squelching criticism of slavery. The last three reasons served as the major indictments 
against Calhoun's bill.67 
 Senators from both the North and the South attacked the bill. John Davis, the 
senator from Massachusetts, vehemently argued that Calhoun's proposal violated the First 
Amendment, which for many of his colleagues seemed obvious. However, the most 
effective reply to Calhoun came from Henry Clay. While Buchanan argued that the 
president's message had received praise across the nation, Clay said otherwise.  
Americans, he insisted, did not support government intervention in circulating 
newspapers. The Kentuckian opposed the bill because "it was unconstitutional; and, if not 
so, that it contained a principle of a most dangerous and alarming character" due to the 
power it gave the federal government. Delivering tracts to the addressed postal office did 
not threaten slavery, he maintained, because local law dealt with them once they arrived. 
The Great Compromiser argued that if state laws could regulate how mail would be 
circulated, they could also eventually use the same premise to attack antislavery speech in 
the North directly. Under the principles proposed in the bill, state laws trumped federal 
laws; therefore, local legislatures that passed the most draconian regulations would steer 
the nation's legal system.  It opened the door for government dictated by the most radical 
activists, whether proslavery or antislavery.68 
 Daniel Webster also gave a stirring defense of the freedom of the press.   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However, after the famous senator and orator from Massachusetts showed how the bill 
put too much of an onus on deputy postmasters to know each state's specific laws 
regarding speech and criticized its vagueness for making it impossible to know what was 
and was not "incendiary," Felix Grundy attempted to save the bill. The Tennessean 
worked to simplify the law by placing the onus of local law on the postmaster who 
received the tracts instead putting the responsibility on those who sent them.  He hoped 
that this clarification would bolster the constitutionality of the bill. However, upon the 
final vote, the Senate rejected Calhoun's attempt to regulate the circulation of antislavery 
newspapers through the mail by a vote of twenty-four to nineteen. The federal 
government would not define incendiaries at the national level.69 
 The debate in the Senate reflected the discourse between Thomas Ritchie and the 
Charleston Mercury.  While every southerner from the Deep South voted in favor of the 
bill, the senators from the Upper South split their votes, which proved decisive.  Six votes 
against the bill came from the representatives of Kentucky, Maryland, Virginia, and 
Delaware.  Had three senators who voted against the bill instead voted in favor of it, the 
new regulations regarding the postal service would have passed the upper chamber of 
Congress.  Many of the senators from the Upper South followed Richtie's idea that the 
Constitution already protected slavery. Furthermore, the vote also showed that slavery 
did have support in the North. Though resulting from party loyalty as much as their favor 
of slavery, four northern senators favored the draconian bill that expanded federal 
protection of slavery.  In the lower chamber of Congress, things happened differently.70  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 The House of Representatives and the United States Senate operated differently.  
Whereas in the Senate one person, such as John C. Calhoun, could spark a heated debate 
the Speaker of the House had more control over who could propose a bill or address the 
chamber.  After President Jackson's annual address, the House of Representatives had 
very little debate over the issue and chose to stay out of the controversy altogether. The 
members of the lower chamber refused to create a special committee to write a bill 
because its members believed the issue did not need special attention. The House of 
Representatives decided to follow Ritchie and Clay's beliefs about the postal campaign—
the Constitution protected slavery and the freedom of the press.71 
 After debating issues regarding the postal service in ordinary fashion, the House 
of Representatives passed a bill made up of forty-six sections that organized the United 
States postal service. Only one made reference to the antislavery pamphlets.  The section 
forbade anyone working for the post office from detaining "any letter, package, pamphlet, 
or newspaper with intent to prevent the arrival and delivery" and punished "any 
postmaster" who might "give a preference to any letter, package, pamphlet, or newspaper 
over another" with a fine and possible imprisonment. The House of Representatives 
passed the bill in June 1836 and the Senate assented to it a few weeks later, therefore 
sending the bill to be signed into law by the president.  Despite the fact that the law 
would most likely be disobeyed, Congress had rejected Andrew Jackson and John C. 
Calhoun's attempt to nationalize the protection of southern slaveholding against the 
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antislavery movement.72   
  The postal campaign showed the divide, both regionally and nationally, over how 
to treat slavery under the Constitution.  Moderates like Thomas Ritchie won the day 
when Congress eventually determined that the federal government should stay out of 
actively supporting slavery against a mobilizing abolitionist campaign.  By following a 
strict version of the Constitution, which granted very little authority to protect slavery 
outright, the United States could protect both free speech and the interest and safety of 
slaveholders.  Other southerners were pleased that a precedent had not been set for 
federal action that could eventually be used against slavery. 
 Furthermore, the negative response by a large portion of northerners to antislavery 
tracts being sent southward showed slaveholders that, as had been argued in the Enquirer, 
many in the North did condemn the principles of abolitionism, even if the debate in the 
Senate showed the limits of their support for slavery. Antiblack sentiment and concerns 
about insurrection gave northerners without strong feelings about slavery a reason to 
chastise those who wanted it to end and gave pause to some who might consider 
immediate emancipation. The middle ground in the North regarding the political issue of 
slavery remained in existence because the postal campaign connected ending slavery with 
helping the enslaved while both sides—as Ritchie called them, the Factious and 
Fanatics—had little authority under the Constitution to promote what they believed. 
During the late 1830s and 1840s, though, that would change.     
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 British emancipation both frightened slaveholders and empowered a new 
outspoken proslavery movement. With the freeing of the enslaved in the West Indies, the 
world seemed more dangerous for the planters living in the American South. Instead of 
being firmly ensconced in the middle of Atlantic slavery, after emancipation in the West 
Indies by England, southerners found themselves on its eastern edge. Rather than having 
fellow Caribbean planters willing to accept rebellious slaves from the United States, 
acting as a possible safety valve, southern slaveholders saw hundreds of thousands of free 
blacks that they believed sought revenge against everyone who held slaves. Most 
importantly, though, losing England as a justification for the morality of the South's labor 
system undermined a key rationale for theorists who defended slavery.  However, it also 
opened a new avenue for the proslavery movement and created an issue that would 
dominate American politics for a decade. 
 During the discussion of British emancipation and the debate over the postal 
campaign, the proslavery movement backed away from the limited government approach 
to defending slavery.  The rise of the abolitionists in the House of Commons made them 
believe that people who thought the Constitution alone could protect slavery had been 
mistaken. For the members of the proslavery movement, the end of slavery in the British 
West Indies showed that a majority in the legislature acted as the judge of constitutional 
limits.  For the proslavery movement the documents that people like Thomas Ritchie 
believed made the United States exceptional, and therefore capable of protecting slavery 
and individual rights such as free speech, had in fact not created a government much 
different from the one their forefathers had revolted against during the American 
Revolution. 
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 While ardent defenders of slavery had criticized planters who asked for federal 
legislation against David Walker's Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World roughly 
five years before, the size of the abolitionist postal campaign, along with the example of 
West Indian emancipation, made the former nullifiers reject the radical state’s rights 
position that chastised federal involvement in anything remotely respecting slavery to a 
more active approach.  For them, if slavery were to be protected, the federal government 
would have to directly put in safeguards instead of solely reacting against antislavery 
legislation as they had done with the Missouri Compromise. The Senate vote on 
regulating the mail showed that a majority could be found if members from the border 
South voted the proslavery line.  The task of the proslavery movement would be to find 
an issue that northerners and people in the Upper South, filled with antipathy towards 
blacks, could support. 
 Hostility towards Great Britain seemed to be the answer. Though the 
emancipation of the West Indies by England undermined the moral argument for slavery, 
having a nation the United States had already fought two wars with would help politically 
during the decade after the postal campaign.  England, like Haiti during the Adams and 
Jefferson administration, could be viewed as an enemy who threatened the United States 
as a whole, thus broadening America's proslavery foreign policy to include nations that 
opposed slavery. Though being hemmed in by free soil on three sides of their border gave 
planters concern, it also created political issues on which to build the proslavery 
movement. During the rest of the decade and continuing in the 1840s, the strident 
defenders of slavery would move past just defending slavery through state's rights 
ideology or using their extra power in Congress to stifle antislavery rhetoric. Instead, they 
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actively used the federal government to promote slavery while rallying national support 
to their side by making claims about national security against foreign abolitionism and 
the fear of insurrection.  
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Chapter Four 
The Growing Proslavery Fear of the Abolitionist Power  
 
San Domingo, so often referred to, and so little understood, is not a case where black heroes rose and 
acquired Government...Do you wonder, then, that we pause when we see this studied tendency to convert 
the Government into a military despotism? Do you wonder that we question the right of the President to 
send troops to execute the laws whenever he pleases, when we remember the conduct of France, and that 
those troops were sent with like avowal, and quartered on plantations, and planters arrested for 
treason...and brought away that insurrection might be instigated among their slaves?  
-Jefferson Davis, January 10, 18611 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the abolitionist postal campaign in the summer of 1835, 
proslavery forces went on an offensive that changed the nature of the debate over slavery 
in the United States. After years of responding to antislavery attacks against their system 
of labor in a defensive manner, southern planters turned to actively promoting slavery 
through the expansion of federal power. The speeches and writings of two southern 
politicians in particular during this period, George McDuffie and James Henry 
Hammond, typify this transition of the South from the belief that the federal government 
should have a laissez faire relationship to slavery in the states to a belief that it should 
take a more active role in support of slavery. While this aggressive new proslavery 
movement rippled across the South, however, it also made waves in the North. In January 
1836 Charles Sumner, then a lecturer at Harvard Law School who would later become a 
lightening rod for the antislavery movement, noted that the actions of the proslavery 
movement three months prior had "generally caused many to think favorably of 
                                                        
1 Jefferson Davis, "Remarks on the Special Message on Affairs in South Carolina. Jan. 10, 1861" in Jon L. 
Wakelyn, ed., Southern Pamphlets on Secession, November 1860-April 1861 (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1996): 139. 
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immediate emancipation who never before inclined to it."2 As white southerners became 
more and more unyielding about the federal government’s responsibility for defending 
slavery, northerners who had previously resisted the calls of the antislavery movement 
now joined with it in opposition to a new, more dangerous proslavery doctrine.   
 In politics, early firebrands often become forgotten while the feelings they 
inspired remain for years, if not decades. South Carolina, as it had during the 
Nullification Crisis and would during the months leading to the Civil War, served as a 
base from which ardent proslavery ideas developed and then spread to the national level. 
Two major speeches—one by governor McDuffie, the other by freshman congressman 
Hammond—especially resonated throughout the United States. The first emerged at the 
same time that John C. Calhoun—South Carolina's leading politician—tried to establish 
new regulations against antislavery pamphlets being sent through the mail. In response to 
the growing strength of those who opposed slavery, South Carolina’s governor, George 
McDuffie, the so-called "orator of nullification," addressed the question of slavery in his 
annual report to the state legislature.  His fiery speech was published in both northern and 
southern periodicals as he attempted to draw a line in the sand regarding the acceptance 
of slavery in the United States of America while also working to paint the antislavery 
movement as a domestic threat to the security of the union at large.3                                                          
2 Charles Sumner to Francis Lieber, January 9, 1836 in Memoirs and Letters of Charles Sumner ed. Edward 
L. Piece (Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1877): 1: 173; Anne-Marie Taylor, Young Charles Sumner and the 
Legacy of the American Enlightenment, 1811-1851 (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001): 
48-87. 
3 "Governor McDuffie's Message on the Slavery Question, 1835" in American History Leaflets Colonial 
and Constitutional eds. Albert Bushnell Hart and Edward Channing (New York: A. Lovell & Company, 
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 The governor launched his broadside against abolitionism because he believed 
that those who wanted to end slavery had tried to infiltrate the South in order to 
undermine southern safety—and, therefore, American security.  McDuffie called 
abolitionists "wicked monsters and deluded fanatics" who masked their true beliefs with 
religion in order to trick Americans in the North into following them towards destroying 
the American republic that was dedicated to the protection of white liberty. Whiteness in 
the United States, not just slavery, was what the "fanatics" of the North wanted to disrupt. 
They wanted, he insisted, to "fulfill the fiend-like errand of mingling the blood of the 
master and the slave, to whose fate they are equally indifferent, with the smoldering of 
our peaceful dwellings." The antislavery societies that had sprung up during the early 
years of the 1830s, the governor continued, represented a real threat to the safety of every 
white family who lived within the borders of the South.  For McDuffie, antislavery 
northerners were almost demonically possessed and clung to an "unholy creed." They 
would do anything to achieve their goals. "Murder itself," McDuffie argued, became "a 
labor of love and charity" for those who wanted to end the enslavement of blacks in the 
United States.4 
   The South Carolina governor echoed the sentiments of Robert Turnbull a decade 
earlier.  He adamantly urged southern slaveholders to remember world history when they 
anticipated the future of slavery in their own country.  The push for the emancipation of 
the enslaved would only gain strength if white southerners did not fight back, he 
proclaimed, and southern slaveholders did not need to look far to see his point—the 
Caribbean was close by. He stated, "The experience of both France and Great Britain                                                         
4 "Governor McDuffie's Message on the Slavery Question, 1835," 2. 
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fearfully instruct us, from what small and contemptible beginnings, this amis des noirs 
philanthropy may rise to gigantic power."5 The acknowledgement of the history of other 
systems of slavery emboldened American planters to take action. 
 While urging those listening to him to consider the history of other nations, the 
governor furthered his defense of slavery by calling abolitionism un-American. Foreign 
elements, he argued, hoped to influence the North and propel anti-Americanism among 
the abolitionists in the United States.  He declared, "The crime which these foreign 
incendiaries have committed against the peace of the States, is one of the highest grade 
known to human laws," referring to the fears of insurrection and the British slight against 
the South Carolinian Negro Seaman's Act.6  All Americans—not just slaveholders—
would need to be vigilant and stand guard against a foreign invasion of antislavery 
pressure on the North that threatened to topple the system of slavery and weaken the 
United States in general. 
 After voicing these warnings, Governor McDuffie offered a proposal to the white 
South. He insisted that the State of South Carolina through its local government set an 
example in resisting the antislavery movement.  He hoped to inspire other slave states—
and slavery's northern allies—to defend slavery against its foes that wanted not only to 
end slavery but to destroy the white population of the South, thus shredding the very 
fabric of the Union. He told the legislature, "It is my deliberate opinion, that the laws of 
                                                        
5 Ibid., 2-3. The Société des amis des Noirs or Amis des noirs was a French abolitionist group created in the 
late 18th century that slaveholders blamed for the insurrection that helped spark the Haitian Revolution. 
See Daniel P. Resnick, "The Societe des Amis des Noirs and the Abolition of Slavery" French Historical 
Studies 7 (Autumn, 1972): 558-569. 
 
6 "Governor McDuffie's Message on the Slavery Question," 1835," 2. 
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every community should punish this species of interference by death" and that the state 
should consider the members of the antislavery movement "enemies of the human race." 
Furthermore, he urged the assembled state representatives to move quickly, saying, "I 
trust the Legislature will not adjourn till it discharges this high duty of patriotism."7   
 According to the governor, slaveholders needed to answer the call at home first, 
but not stop there. The times necessitated that they should proceed further by taking their 
proslavery message to a national audience and seeking stronger restraints against 
abolitionism by using the power of the federal level against the antislavery movement in 
the North.  McDuffie pointed to the fact that "any laws which may be enacted by the 
authority of this State" did not have the power to "punish or repress offences committed 
within its limit." This posed a problem for those who wanted to safeguard slavery.  In 
order to ensure that the history of the French and English West Indies did not repeat itself 
in the United States, planters needed to do more outside of their respective states and 
local authorities. "If we go no farther" than passing laws that repress the antislavery 
movement in slave states alone, the governor alleged, "we had as well do nothing" 
because "the outrages against the peace and safety of the State are perpetrated in other 
communities" in which southern laws did not apply.8   
 Through this speech the governor acknowledged that slavery was indeed 
dangerous to those who held millions of blacks in bondage. While northerners refused to 
suppress the antislavery movement, "the authors of all this mischief" continued to 
"concoct their schemes, plant their batteries, and hurl their fiery missiles among us,                                                         
7 Ibid., 3. 
8 Ibid., 3-4. 
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aimed at that mighty magazine of combustible matter, the explosion of which would lay 
the State in ruins." By claiming that it would be the state that would be attacked instead 
of slavery or slaveholders, the governor included all whites, not just those who owned 
slaves.9 Even the most vociferous defenders of slavery, those who argued that the 
institution was beneficial to whites and blacks alike, had to acknowledge that the kindling 
that was America's enslaved population could alight into a blazing fire like the Haitian 
Revolution, which would sweep every white person up in its destruction. 
 To prevent that bloody Caribbean event from reoccurring in mainland America, 
McDuffie believed the proslavery movement needed to become nationalized, thereby 
completely securing itself against its hated enemies who wanted to dismantle American 
slavery once and for all.  He stated that it was the South's "imperious duty" to "demand of 
our sovereign associates the condign punishment of those enemies of our peace, who 
avail themselves of the sanctuaries of their respective jurisdictions to carry on schemes of 
incendiary hostility against the institutions, the safety, and the existence of the State."  
Following his demands for more concessions from the free states to pursue the censorship 
of the antislavery movement, he further defended slavery in the South by tapping into the 
deep reservoir of proslavery thought that had been created throughout the previous 
decades.  Echoing the sentiments of “Pliny,” who had just a few years before completed a 
comparative study of the laboring classes of nations that had already ended slavery, the 
South Carolinian relied on religious interpretation and political theory to defend the 
peculiar institution.  Because slavery was a good thing, according to southern planters, 
slaveholders must ask for federal protection.  They had to validate their intellectual                                                         
9 Ibid. 
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justification for the institution's existence within the United States with federal law while 
keeping it safe from those who wished to do it harm.10 
 First, however, McDuffie needed to gain support from outside his state. He had to 
convince Americans, North and South, that the antislavery movement would hurt the 
entire nation if it was left unopposed. As part of his defense of slavery against the 
antislavery movement, he portrayed the slaveholders of the South as the defenders of a 
white American republic, an issue that resonated with the defenders of slavery until the 
Civil War. Those who wanted to end slavery, he declared, also wanted to end the political 
power of whites in the United States. He contended that the "state of political 
amalgamation and conflict, which the Abolitionists evidently aim to produce, would be 
the most horrible condition imaginable, and would furnish Dante or Milton with the type 
for another chapter illustrating the horrors of the infernal regions."11 The difference 
between social amalgamation in the South and "political amalgamation" with North had 
to be sharply drawn for those living in antebellum America. The mixing of the races in 
the South would have little implication for many northerners who lived hundreds of miles 
away from the southern population and may have had little contact with blacks generally. 
However, "political amalgamation" inherently affected northerners who shared the same 
federal government with those in the South by granting blacks the power to win elections 
and head to Washington authorized to vote on every bill that passed through Congress.  
Instead of creating Heaven on Earth, the governor maintained mockingly, the religious 
antislavery movement portended to summon Hell.                                                         
10 Ibid., 4-10. 
11 Ibid., 6. 
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 In the eyes of many planters, action needed to be taken while time allowed and 
the antislavery movement was still weak. McDuffie wanted the slave state assemblies, 
especially South Carolina's, to issue a "disclaimer" that the United States Congress could 
not "interfere in any manner" with slavery. He believed "Though the right to emancipate 
our slaves by coercive legislation has been very generally disclaimed by popular 
assemblages in the non-slaveholding States, it is nevertheless important that each of those 
States" be given such a notice "as a permanent record for our future security."  The 
northern allies of slavery would offer their support if proslavery southerners pushed hard 
enough, the South Carolinian reasoned to his state's legislators.  He ended his speech by 
saying, "The liberal, enlightened and magnanimous conduct of the people in many 
portions of the non-slaveholding States forbids us to anticipate a refusal on the part of 
those States to fulfill these high obligations of national faith and duty." The fate of the 
union and security of the nation rested upon the North’s protection of  the South from 
antislavery interference with the South's black labor force, the governor insisted.  If 
slavery ended, "ten millions of poor white people would be reduced to destitution, 
pauperism and starvation."12 McDuffie’s powerful speech resonated with southerners. In 
the coming weeks another South Carolinian, a man new to the House of Representatives 
who wanted to make a name for himself among the slaveholding class, would put his 
ideas into action.   
 A few months prior to his proslavery address to the state legislature, Governor 
McDuffie visited the plantation home of one of South Carolina's newly elected members 
of Congress, James Henry Hammond, for a lively conversation about the future of  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American slavery.  Hammond was a man who desperately wanted to be considered a 
giant among his peers in the Palmetto State's planter elite.  During the Nullification 
Crisis, Hammond gained fame as an ardent supporter of Calhoun, and he defended 
slavery whole-heartedly during discussions over the emancipation of the West Indies and 
the abolitionist postal campaign. In the heated summer of 1835, Hammond wrote the 
editor of the New York Evening Star, demanding that free-state governments take action 
against the abolitionists by silencing them with "Terror" and "Death."  To show the 
newspaper editor that he was serious, the congressmen-elect compared southern slavery 
to the recently abolished slavery of the West Indies.  He wrote, "The Northern Fanatics 
must not expect to find in us the unrepresented colonial subjects of an arrogant 
monarchy."13 American slaveholders, unlike their Caribbean counterparts, aimed to fight 
back against those who wanted to interrupt the institution of slavery established below 
the Mason-Dixon Line.  The United States of America would not act like England. 
 Having studied Thomas Roderick Dew’s defense of slavery in the aftermath of 
Nat Turner's insurrection, Hammond believed, like his governor, that something needed 
to be done to strengthen slavery in the United States. Slaveholding southerners, he 
contended, would stand against the abolitionist threat to the South.  In that cause he had 
no doubt.  However, he believed that planters could no longer be only "abject apologists 
of slavery." Instead, they needed to "openly, manfully erect and roll back the misdirected 
tide of public sentiment" and establish a "ground selected for battle as will cover us best 
                                                        
13 Hammond to M. M. Noah, August 19, 1835 in the Papers of James Henry Hammond (Library of 
Congress); Drew Gilpin Faust, James Henry Hammond and the Old South: A Design for Mastery (Baton  
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both behind and before and make the triumph as bloodless as possible."14 Washington, 
D.C. and the halls of Congress offered an arena in which proslavery advocates could take 
a stand against the growing antislavery movement of the North and the world, as it 
moved towards implementing plans for the emancipation of the enslaved.  Like the postal 
campaign just months before, the battle between proslavery and antislavery forces would 
revolve around the concept of free speech in the United States. 
 The right to petition the government for grievances in America long antedated the 
Bill of Rights or the Constitution. The first recorded act of the colonial government of 
Connecticut regarded a grievance between neighbors, and throughout the colonial period 
the reception of petitions from the populace originated more bills in America than any 
other source of legislation. However, when Hammond arrived in Washington in 
December 1835, he would forever change the meaning of the right "to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances" in the United States. Understanding the 
significance of his actions, the South Carolinian believed he could make a name for 
himself within the proslavery movement by challenging centuries of precedent in the 
English-speaking world as he worked to defend slavery against the growing tide of 
antislavery sentiment in the northern states.15 
 For over forty years the House of Representatives dealt with petitions in a 
particular fashion: one day every week, while in session, the House received petitions and 
                                                        
14 James Henry Hammond to I. W. Hayne, September 21, 1835; James Henry Hammond to Dear Sir, 
September 4, 1835 both in the Papers of James Henry Hammond (Library of Congress); Faust, James 
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15 Stephen A. Higginson, "A Short History of the Right to Petition Government for the Redress of 
Grievances," The Yale Law Journal 96 (Nov., 1986): 142-166; Faust, James Henry Hammond and the Old 
South, 156-164. 
  170 
sent them, based on subject, to the committee that acted on the concerns the petition 
expressed.  Sometimes this arrangement varied; most of the time it did not.  On 
December 16, 1835, a little over a week after the first session of the new Congress 
convened, four congressmen presented petitions from their constituencies.  Only one, 
though, sparked a major discussion on the House floor.  John Fairfield from Maine and 
one of 155 freshmen members of Congress, "presented the petition of one hundred and 
seventy-two ladies residing in his district, praying for the abolition of slavery in the 
District of Columbia." What followed would change the practice of petitioning forever in 
the United States of America. 
 Usually, the submission of petitions, sometimes also referred to as memorials, by 
congressmen created very little discussion on the House floor, but this particular petition 
brought about a different reaction.  Fairfield asked that his submission be moved to the 
Committee on the District of Columbia. However, before a motion to lay the bill on the 
table of the committee could proceed—thus dismissing it from further discussion—the 
antislavery representative from Vermont, William Slade, asked that the memorial be 
printed and distributed to every congressman.  He believed that the issue of slavery and 
the slave trade in Washington, D.C. could be separated from the abolition of slavery in 
the South.  He insisted that his colleagues consider the memorial because the Constitution 
allowed for Congress to dictate the laws of the capital, and therefore slavery within the 
Washington limits, despite restrictions regarding slavery in the states.   However, after a 
short discussion about whether the merits of slavery in the nation's capital could be 
debated, an overwhelming majority, 180 in favor and only 31 against, chose to ignore 
Slade's request and table the antislavery petition.  Slavery was not to be discussed on the 
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House floor. Immediately after the vote, various congressmen presented nine more 
memorials without note.16 
 Two days after Fairfield presented his petition to Congress, another congressman, 
this time from Massachusetts, asked the lower chamber to receive a request to end 
slavery in the District of Columbia.  This time the small sparks turned into a flickering 
flame as James Henry Hammond seized his opportunity to strike against the antislavery 
movement and assert congressional power in favor of slaveholders and southern slavery. 
The South Carolinian moved that the House formally not accept antislavery petitions, 
rather than simply receiving and ignoring them.  He argued, "The large majority by 
which the House had rejected a similar petition a few days had been very gratifying to 
him, and no doubt would be very gratifying to the South." Congress, he proclaimed, 
should show the antislavery movement in the North that it had no jurisdiction in regards 
to slavery at the national level, even if the Constitution authorized Congress to pass laws 
regarding the nation's capital.  Hammond changed the game by asserting a proslavery 
definition of the First Amendment. Speaker of the House and future president James K. 
Polk—stunned by the actions of the South Carolinian—tried to resolve the crisis without 
starting a fight over slavery in the halls of the Capitol, a conflict that many of Hammond's 
congressional colleagues in the North and South, according to Polk, "desired to avoid."17 
As the House fell into disorder while debating the validity of Hammond's request, Polk  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Great Battle in the United States Congress (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996): 197-214; William W. 
Freehling, The Road to Disunion: Secessionists at Bay, 1776-1854 volume 1 (New York: Oxford University 
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failed to stifle the issue. Slavery again became part of the discussion among the 
representatives of the lower chamber of Congress. 
 In his initial request that the House refuse antislavery memorials, Hammond 
stated he could not "sit there and see the rights of the southern people assaulted by the 
ignorant fanatics from whom the memorials" came to Washington.18 His motion did not 
pertain to constitutional rights, but instead to "sacred" ones, which went beyond the rules 
of the Constitution. For some of Hammond's southern colleagues, though, the issue 
offered them a way to defend their region's honor while at the same time boosting the 
protection of slavery overall.   
 When a representative from New York implied that Hammond's actions proved 
the existence of "fanatics and incendiaries at the South, as well as the North, who hoped 
to profit by agitation" of the subject of slavery, one of Hammond's fellow South 
Carolinians stood up and vehemently defended him. Francis Pickens said, "We desire [a 
discussion about slavery] because we believe we have been foully slandered before the 
world; and I stand here prepared, at any time...to vindicate the institutions of the people I 
have the honor in part to represent, from the foul aspersion and calumny thrown upon 
them."19 As Christmas approached, some in the House of Representatives hoped the 
holiday recess might serve to temper the debate over the petitions. They would be greatly 
disappointed.  Members of the proslavery movement had more motivation than hurt  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feelings for defending slavery in the South. 
 At the beginning of 1836, while the Senate debated the application of the 
principle of free speech with regard to unsolicited antislavery publications sent 
slaveholders, the House of Representatives became further consumed with the limits of 
the First Amendment's guarantee of the right to petition Congress.  Though both authors 
were from South Carolina, Calhoun and Hammond differed on their understanding of the 
usefulness of the federal government. While Calhoun hoped to limit federal power over 
regulating the mail by making postal delivery contingent on state laws, Hammond took a 
more straightforward approach: Congress should not accept the antislavery memorials 
because they jeopardized the safety of the South—and thus the nation. The safety of 
slavery was a national issue for Hammond. Much of the debate in the House of 
Representatives revolved around security and the dangers antislavery posed to all white 
southerners, not the power of the federal government growing in power to the point in 
which it could end slavery, which Calhoun feared.   
 Hammond later admitted that he had acted impulsively when he first challenged 
the antislavery movement's right to petition Congress to regulate slavery in Washington, 
D.C.  However, upon his return to Washington in January, he was ready to better explain 
the actions he had taken the month before. As Hammond's biographer Drew Gilpin Faust 
has described, the perfervid young defender of slavery wanted to "show that the most 
fundamental issue at hand was not the right of petition, but the South's right to survival." 
Roughly two weeks later, Hammond would get his chance. In a two-hour speech, the 
twenty-eight-year-old congressman who dreamed of achieving greatness made a case for 
the federal government’s active protection of slavery. Congress’ passive rejection of 
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abolitionism was no longer enough.20 
 Hammond's speech on the House floor served as an announcement by the 
proslavery movement that its supporters would be willing to do battle in Congress against 
the growing antislavery movement of the North. Slaveholders had become convinced that 
northern antislavery activists wanted to gain power over the South’s institution through 
Congress just as the abolitionists of England had come to power in Parliament. As 
Hammond had told the northern newspaper editor in his letter just eight months before, 
he and the rest of the proslavery movement planned to actively oppose the growth of 
antislavery and antislavery societies in the North with a vigor that surpassed their 
Caribbean counterparts’ a decade prior.  The South Carolinian did not disappoint his 
fellow members of the proslavery movement in his aggressive attacks against 
abolitionism in the United States.   
 The presumed grand conspiracy of abolitionism, similar to the one advanced in 
the Nero letter found after the Turner insurrection, seemed to be moving forward once 
again.  Hammond began his speech by describing what could be called the "Abolitionist 
Power," a machination among northern abolitionists to slowly gain power and destroy 
slavery in the United States. He pointed to the petitioners as "persons who are pursuing a 
systematic plan of operation intended to subvert the institutions of the South, and which, 
if carried into effect, must desolate the fairest portion of America, and dissolve in blood 
the bonds of this confederacy."21 A worldwide scheme had been implemented to end 
slavery and create chaos among the plantation societies that relied on black enslavement.  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Hammond warned the planters in the United States that North America would be the 
location for final battle between slaveholders and abolitionists. 
 Accepting the antislavery petitions, the South Carolina congressman argued, only 
helped to strengthen the efforts of the conspirators, allowing abolitionists to take control 
of the federal government and change the definition of constitutional authority regarding 
slavery.  The petitions themselves, he insisted, served as evidence of the growing strength 
of the Abolitionist Power in the North.  He asked Congress to consider the number of 
signatures on petitions against slavery.  "These petitions are signed by between seven and 
eight thousand persons," Hammond fearfully pointed out.  Furthermore, "some of them 
[signed] as representatives of large societies." Taken together, the southern planter stated, 
"some forty thousand persons petitioning Congress at this session" represented "no small 
evidence of the strength of the abolition party."22 Southerners and their allies in the North 
needed to be ready to fight back against an enemy that was growing stronger and more 
willing to pursue new ways to achieve their goals. 
 James Henry Hammond hoped to paint the antislavery movement as an inherently 
anti-Union domestic enemy of the United States by reading quotations he had gathered 
from antislavery newspapers that echoed the sentiments of William Lloyd Garrison's 
motto of no union with slaveholders.  Following this iteration, he read aloud a letter he 
had received from a proslavery northerner from western New York who Hammond said 
was a "shrewd observer of events passing around him." The letter explained that some 
abolitionist organizations wanted to change the question from "that of emancipation of 
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the slave to that of the continuance of the Union."23 The former nullifier, who often cried 
for disunion, argued that the nation was under a concerted attack by a fanatical 
organization that hoped to weaken bonds between the states in order to destroy the South 
and its slave system. 
 The writer from the North, moreover, warned Hammond that antislavery tracts 
had been circulated at prayer meetings, as abolitionists in the North labored "to unite her 
people against you." The movement hoped to achieve sectionalism because it would 
leave southern planters on their own. The South Carolinian used this letter to describe the 
real threat posed by the antislavery movement to the Union and to advise his fellow 
congressmen that a Haitian-style revolution could one day take place in the United States. 
He stated: "I endeavor to convince my neighbors that these pamphlets are false in every 
particular, and that if they join the cry of abolition, they must partake of the enormous sin 
of bringing on a civil war, of destroying our Union, and of causing the renewal of the 
horrors of St. Domingo."24  Once again, the echoes of the Haitian Revolution sounded in 
the halls of the Capitol. If it could happen in the Caribbean—just a few hundred miles 
away from the South—the proslavery representative implied, it could happen in the 
United States.  Hammond therefore hoped to tie the antislavery movement to the 
unraveling of national security. 
 The "gentleman" from New York ended his note to the congressman by telling the 
South Carolinian that "Congress will be the ultimate scene of the struggle." Hammond 
used the letter to justify to the proslavery coalition and their northern allies that the time  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had come to claim federal authority and protect slavery with the strength of the federal—
not just local—government. When a New York congressman demanded the name of the 
author, Hammond replied, "I cannot give it. I will vouch for his character.  But such is the 
state of society around him, I hear it would prove dangerous if not fatal to him, if I 
disclose his name."25 Hammond thus described the North as a truly authoritarian society 
that would not hesitate to silence anyone who dared defend slavery.  
 Hammond continued his speech by listing three ways he believed slavery could be 
ended in the United States: "Through the medium of the slaveholder—or the 
Government—or the slaves themselves." He then explained his anticipation of the odds 
and feasibility of each contingency coming to pass. Hammond first examined the chance 
that slaveholders might decide, as some in Virginia had just a few years before, that the 
enslavement of blacks should be ended because of the inherent threat slaves posed to 
their masters, against whom they might rise up in arms.  Slavery was safe when left 
alone, he contended, mirroring Thomas Roderick Dew’s response to Nat Turner's 
rebellion in Virginia. "There may be nervous men and timid women," Hammond said," 
whose imaginations are haunted with the unwonted fears, among us, as there are in all 
communities on earth; but in no part of the world have men of ordinary firmness less fear 
of danger from their operatives than we have."26 Without antislavery interference, those 
held in bondage throughout the South would remain passive.   
 Furthermore, Hammond believed that moral suasion would have little effect on 
the planter class of the South, asserting, "In the whole history of the question of  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emancipation, in Europe or America, I do not remember a dozen instances of masters 
freeing their slaves, at least during their lifetimes, from any qualms of conscience."27 The 
South, according to Hammond, appeared committed to slavery in the face of the 
antislavery movement’s moral accusations. "The abolitionist can appeal only to the hopes 
or fears or interest of the slaveholder, to induce him to emancipate his slaves," Hammond 
told his audience. 28 The antislavery calls for emancipation for moral reasons would fall 
on deaf ears in the South. 
 The moral suasion of abolitionists did not keep James Henry Hammond up at 
night because he believed that no slaveholder would ever willingly give up his chattel 
property due to conscientious objection.  After all, most southern religious leaders had 
blessed the South's peculiar institution in one form or another. Richard Furman, for 
example, had told his southern flock after the 1820s Vesey scare that, "the right of 
holding slaves [was] clearly established in the Holy Scriptures." Moreover, after the 
abolitionist postal campaign, southern religious leaders took a more active approach in 
defending slavery from the pulpit, just as public servants such as Hammond had in the 
realm of politics.29 Slavery appeared to be safe from the danger of moral suasion. 
 Next, Hammond challenged what he considered another part of the Abolition 
Power's history of success—English emancipation in the West Indies.  He asked his 
fellow members of Congress to examine the "probability of success [that the  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abolitionists] can call upon the Government to emancipate our negroes." Hammond 
believed he needed to show why West Indian-style emancipation, which reimbursed 
slaveholders for freeing the enslaved, could never become a practical solution in the 
United States. He estimated the number of people held in slavery in the South to be about 
"2,300,000" and "their annual increase" to be "60,000," remarking that, "even the British 
Government did not dare to emancipate the slaves of its enslaved West India subjects 
without some compensation" though "they gave them about sixty per cent of their value." 
The United States, Hammond argued, would have to pay roughly four hundred dollars to 
free every enslaved man, woman, and child in America. The government money 
necessary for this undertaking, he calculated, "would amount to upwards of nine hundred 
millions," a sum of money nearly thirty-times the size of the entire federal budget.30 
 Paying the former planters for emancipating the enslaved on their plantations 
would not be the only cost of emancipation, either.  Though the South Carolinian did not 
mathematically tally the possible extra cost, he insisted that freed blacks could never live 
with their former masters; they would have to be sent away from the country of their 
birth.  The government could never pay for this. The congressman ended his computation 
with a simple analysis that looked towards the future: "The value of their annual increase, 
alone, is twenty-four millions of dollars; so that to free them in one hundred years, 
without the expense of taking them from the country, would require an annual 
appropriation of between thirty-three and thirty-four millions of dollars." The idea of 
white Americans paying twice the cost of the Louisiana Purchase in order to free blacks, 
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he concluded, was "physically impossible."31 The abolition of slavery as it took place in 
the English colonial holdings could never happen in the United States. 
 Another reason for the impossibility of compensated emancipation in the United 
States had nothing to do with economics.  Rather, Hammond argued, "the moment this 
House undertakes to legislate upon this subject, it dissolves the Union." The South would 
never accept losing the battle to control the federal government. If such a thing were to 
happen, and the antislavery movement were to gain enough government power to 
actually attempt ending slavery, Hammond promised that he would "go home and preach, 
and if I can, to practice, disunion, and civil war if need be."  His reasoning was plain: if 
the South and its slaveholding elite could no longer be protected, "a revolution must 
ensure, and this republic sink in blood."32  
 Slaveholders throughout history typically did not like war because it often created 
the possibility of unrest within the slave population. However, radical members of the 
proslavery movement often talked about the chance of civil war occurring if antislavery 
politicians attempted to wield the strength against southern enslavement.  Hammond's 
speech on the House floor therefore gives us early insights as to why southern 
slaveholders might risk a civil war by abandoning the Constitutional government rather 
than staying within the confines of a Union they perceived to be completely controlled by 
those who opposed slavery. There was, therefore, only one way that slavery might be 
ended in the United States—through slave insurrection, just as in the French colony of 
Saint Domingue four decades earlier.    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 Hammond believed abolitionists understood that insurrection offered the best way 
to end slavery in America, and he told Congress "the only remaining chance for the 
abolitionists to succeed in their nefarious schemes will be by appealing to the slaves 
themselves; and say what they will, this is the great object at which they aim."  He argued 
to Congress that the aims of the antislavery societies of the North were clear: "all their 
meetings, publications, lectures, and missions" revolved around one goal, to "excite a 
servile insurrection" and to teach "the slave to cut his master's throat."33 The antislavery 
movement, according to one of the most vocal members of the proslavery movement, did 
not want simply to end slavery but also to kill all those who owned slaves or lived in a 
slaveholding community.  
      The South Carolinian nevertheless believed the Abolitionist Power's attempt to 
undermine the loyalty of the enslaved population would ultimately fail. Hammond 
insisted that "Every insurrection which has yet been meditated—and there have been very 
few—when not discovered by some faithful slave, has been soon discovered by the 
whites."  Furthermore, he told his northern colleagues, "I say it boldly, there is not a 
happier, more contended [sic] race upon the face of the earth.  I have been brought up in 
the midst of them, and, so far as my knowledge and experience extend, I should say they 
have every reason to be happy."  He also challenged John Quincy Adams’s belief that 
enslaved families were routinely separated when slaveholders sold them. Slaveholders 
loved their slaves, he insisted. Hammond asserted that the enslaved themselves would 
never participate in "the horrid process of burning and assassination" supported by 
abolitionists against the slaveholding class, despite the possibility that some might have a  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"secret" wish for emancipation.34   
 In his concluding remarks, however, Hammond turned from his confidence in the 
happiness and passivity of the black population in the South to a blunt appeal to racial 
prejudice. During the final minutes of his fervent defense of slavery, he asked the House 
of Representatives what he believed to be a hypothetical question: What if slavery could 
be erased peacefully?  Would Americans be "prepared for the consequences which must 
follow?" He wondered,  
Are the people of the North prepared to restore to 
them two fifths of their rights of voters, and place 
their political power on an equality with their own?  
Are we prepared to see them mingling in our 
legislation?  Is any portion of this country prepared 
to see them enter these halls and take their seats by 
our sides, in perfect equality with the white 
representatives of an Anglo-Saxon race—to see them 
fill that chair—to see them placed at the heads of 
your Departments, or perhaps some Othello, or 
Toussaint, or Boyer, gifted with genius and inspired 
by ambition, grasp the presidential wreath.35 
The white population of the United States, James Henry Hammond contended, regardless 
of section, would never allow their white republic to give equal standing to black 
freemen.   
 Hammond's long congressional address ended with what he believed would be a 
frightening thought for the white public to ponder. Gradual emancipation, he argued,  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would be impossible to implement, while immediate emancipation, as he earlier 
suggested, proved too costly and dangerous. He pointed to the West Indies, specifically 
Jamaica, as an example of a failed gradual emancipation scheme and implied that 
northerners in the U.S. did not fully understand black people.  He continued, "Those who 
know the negro character cannot doubt, what the recent experiments in the West Indies 
fully prove, that the first step you take towards emancipation bursts at once and forever 
the fetters of the slave."  Emancipation in South Carolina, he warned, "would not last a 
day, an hour" before a "civil war between the whites and the blacks" broke out, "the 
result of which could not be doubtful, although it would be accompanied with horrors 
such as history has not recorded" and "the blacks would be annihilated." He closed by 
saying, "such a catastrophe would be inevitable."36 Slaveholders and their northern allies 
could therefore come to only one conclusion. In order to prevent such a catastrophe, they 
needed to actively control the federal government and ensure that abolitionists never did.  
Defenders of slavery and the Union could begin by ending the acceptance of antislavery 
petitions by what many have called "the People's branch of government," the House of 
Representatives.37   
  Throughout this debate regarding the acceptance of antislavery petitions and the 
resulting discussion of slavery that followed in the nation’s capital, a large group of 
southerners and their northern allies branded the antislavery movement a dangerous 
threat to the nation. During the initial debate over receiving petitions to remove slavery 
from the national capital, it became apparent that some slaveholding members of  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Congress did not see abolitionists as moralists so consumed by their beliefs that they did 
not understand the consequences of their actions.  Instead, several southern 
representatives began to describe abolitionists as evil enemies who purposely wanted to 
kill white southerners. Waddy Thompson, one of Hammond's South Carolina colleagues, 
moved past simply calling abolitionists "fanatics." He angrily told the House, "The 
fanatics?  Fanatics, did I say sir? Never before was so vile a band dignified with that 
name.  They are murderers, foul murderers, accessories before the fact, and they know it, 
of murder, robbery, rape, infanticide."38 
 Antislavery members of Congress, however, challenged the highly charged new 
language that was emerging in the proslavery movement. William Slade from Vermont 
rhetorically asked if their debates following the Turner insurrection had caused slave 
rebellion, and wondered, if slaves had not fomented insurrections then, why would 
petitions now produce them? Quoting a Virginian newspaper's recollection of the debate 
over slavery in the Old Dominion, he asked: "If it was 'glorious' and safe for Virginia to 
'grapple with the monster' in 1832,"39 why would not it be glorious for Congress to do the 
same? The answer he received to this question shows just how far the proslavery 
movement had shifted in its understanding of how best to defend slavery in the South 
after the emancipation in the West Indies and the abolitionist postal campaign.   
 James Garland, from Virginia, rose to respond to the Vermont congressman and 
explained why southern members of Congress had recently become more concerned 
about petitions sent to the Capitol, as compared to the years and decades before.  He said,  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"There is another reason why the action of Congress should be more decisive now than at 
any former period, and why the people of the South should call for a more direct 
expression of the sentiments of this House heretofore. On former occasions there was no 
extraordinary feeling of alarm...of danger, spread throughout [the South]."  However, 
following the postal campaign abolitionists had shown how much they threatened the 
security of the slave system.  Garland emphasized, "The spirit of insurrection and 
insubordination was not then abroad.  It was reversed for the last summer's campaign of a 
few fanatics."  Like fellow congressman Waddy Thompson, Garland no longer accepted 
the idea that abolitionists did not understand the result of undermining the power of 
slaveholders in the South.  He continued, "My colleagues called them blood-hounds, but 
that term is too mild.  I call them fiends of hell."40 Abolitionists wanted to kill southern 
whites—not just end slavery—the Virginian told the members of Congress. 
 Furthermore, Garland put pressure on northern allies to stand strong with the 
proslavery movement by tying together everyone who supported ending slavery under 
one tent.  In the eyes of the proslavery forces in Congress, northerners could no longer 
get away with being against abolition but not actively working to protect slavery.  The 
Virginian stated, "These abolitionists (I class them all together) have excited a feeling of 
alarm in the South which cannot easily be quieted.  The safety of our wives and our 
children is endangered by their mischievous and incendiary attempts to produce a servile 
insurrection among our slaves" because abolitionists, he argued, "calculated to encourage, 
if not to excite, the slaves themselves to insubordination and insurrection" because "they 
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know everything that transpires here."41  
 While Garland did not ask for direct aid from northerners to help control the 
enslaved populace, he told Congress that southerners did have a request for their northern 
allies. He appealed "to our brethren of the North in behalf of our wives and our children, 
and for the protection and security against the instigators of midnight murder and 
assassination.  Our northern friends cannot realize our true situation; they are distantly 
removed from our slave population, and know but little of their character and 
disposition." Proslavery congressmen claimed that northern congressmen, like the 
abolitionists in the British Parliament who lived thousands of miles away from the 
Caribbean, would experience little danger if an insurrection broke out.  The South, the 
congressman argued, meaning, of course, white southerners, understood its precarious 
position involving its slave population better than anyone else.  He asked northerners who 
supported the South: "Knowing our danger, and feeling it, too, we appeal...to the North to 
do their duty to the South, and to the Union by discharging their obligations to the 
constitution."  The time had come, in the words of another southern congressman, for the 
North to show whether "they are either for [the South] or against [The South]."42  The 
population of the free states, according to the members of the proslavery movement, held 
the duty of preventing the United States from becoming like the new enemy of slavery, 
England.    
 As in most political negotiations, the proslavery movement did not get exactly 
what it wanted in the end.  Rather than directly violate the First Amendment—or at least  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redefine it—the Democratic–led Congress passed a rule proposed by South Carolinian 
Thomas Pinckney that became known as the "gag rule."  The new rule, which had to be 
re-introduced at the beginning of every session of Congress, stated that the House must 
accept every antislavery memorial, but must also immediately table that petition from 
further discussion without further consideration.  This automatic rejection of antislavery 
petitions caused uproar in parts of the North and from antislavery members of Congress, 
especially former president John Quincy Adams, who would spend the rest of his life 
fighting what he considered the notorious rule at the beginning of each congressional 
session.  It soon became apparent to the American public, however, that southerners had 
gained more authority over the machinations of Congress.43 
 The extremists within the proslavery movement were left unsatisfied. Pinckney 
would be defeated in the next election because of the criticism that he allowed the House 
to accept dangerous petitions before disposing of them, as well as for "rebelling" against 
Calhoun, who after seeing the effectiveness of Hammond moved to create an even 
stronger gag rule in the Senate. The movement did win a significant victory, however. 
Northern Democrats joined an almost unanimous southern congressional delegation—
only three dissented—in voting in favor of the new rule. Despite their attempts to hurt the 
vice president's chance at victory in 1836 by forcing him to choose a side of the slavery 
debate, the Pinckney rule actually helped solidify Martin Van Buren's electoral chances 
in the year's upcoming presidential elections. In supporting slavery without eroding his 
northern base, Andrew Jackson's chosen successor, Martin Van Buren, a New Yorker 
who was distrusted by the South nevertheless managed to keep intact his delicate  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coalition of proslavery southerners and their northern allies and win the presidency. By 
the 1840s the proslavery movement would be even more powerful, and the gag rule 
would be further strengthened and would include more topics deemed unacceptable to 
discuss in Congress because they threatened slavery.44 
 The clash between antislavery members bearing petitions against slavery and 
passionate defenders of the South's peculiar institution showed that the Democratic Party 
might be the vehicle by which the proslavery movement could achieve its ends. Over 60 
percent of Democrats from the free states joined every southern representative—though 
some of the ardent proslavery partisans chose to boycott casting a vote because 
Pinckney's gag technically accepted petitions in Congress—in voting for the gag rule.  
Speaker of the House James K. Polk explained, "the unanimous vote of the friends of Mr. 
V. Buren (with less than half of dozen exceptions) on Pinckney’s resolutions must satisfy 
that they are sound upon that subject [of slavery]."45 While the Senate discussed the role 
of free speech in a nation that held slaves and decided that the former trumped the latter, 
the House of Representatives did the opposite. 
 Northern Democratic support for the South against antislavery petitions was not 
confined to the halls of Congress. New York Governor William Marcy took on the 
abolitionists in 1836, contending, as did others of the proslavery movement, that their  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plans of emancipation would lead to "servile war" rather than a peaceful transition to free 
labor.  According to Governor Marcy, "The very first act in this scheme of abolition, 
which is carried on under the guide of religion, morality, and love for mankind, would 
open with insurrection, massacre, and servile war, in which, if the slaves triumph, their 
masters must be victims." He also criticized the belief that concerns over safety could be 
used to promote the ending of slavery in the United States.  Marcy wrote, "If slave-
owners ever concur in any plan for the abolition of slavery, it must arise from a better 
motive than fear." He argued that abolitionists hurt the antislavery movement by making 
southern slaveholders more determined "to maintain the institution of slavery" and stated 
that if southerners did not feel that they could be protected under the Constitution, they 
would surely leave.46 The South had friends in high places in the North in the form of the 
Democratic Party. 
 During the debate over the petitions, slave state legislatures sent their own 
resolutions to Congress, illustrating the proslavery understanding of free speech.  
Kentucky—not Alabama, Louisiana, South Carolina, or other Deep South states that had 
become well known for the devotion of their legislatures to slavery—offered a succinct 
explanation of why free speech laws needed to be slanted towards defending slavery.  
Their petition read: "The freedom of the press is one thing—its licentiousness another; 
whilst the former is justly dear to every freeman, the other is the object of deep 
reprobation. It cannot be that the right of discussion at the North carries with it the right 
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to excite a portion of the population of a sister State to rapine and murder."47 The 
members of the proslavery movement did not just win a symbolic victory with the 
establishment of the gag rule; rather, they legitimized their understanding of the freedom 
of expression within the realm of mainstream politics and proved to themselves the 
viability of an active defense of slavery at the national level. 
 Proslavery forces in Congress also saw how powerful the argument against the 
Abolitionist Power could be, and they hoped to extend it to foreign policy and national 
defense. During the debate, southerners labeled England as a partner in an international 
conspiracy to attack southern slavery. For example, during a discussion of abolitionism in 
the Senate, Alfred Cuthbert, a Georgian, stated, "Why am I...insensible to these terrors?  
For this plain and obvious reason, that the spirit of abolition was not an American spirit; 
it was transplanted from a foreign soil; it belonged not here, and was a base mockery of 
what had passed in another country, whose relations to their slave populations were not 
similar to ours, but stood in absolute contrast with them."48  
 American patriotism, the senator exclaimed, would stand up to abolitionism—
which he believed consisted of foreign principles—because the United States was 
inherently different from England and other European nations that had experienced an 
end of slavery in their colonial holdings. "Our people had evinced that patriotism in 
resisting with energy and success that wide-spread and wild spirit of fanaticism which 
threatened to produce jealousies and heart-burning in a united and happy country" though  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this fanaticism, he said, had "tended to weaken the bonds of Union" it ended up only 
showing "its durability and its strength...As the lofty pine on the mountains becomes 
more firmly rooted as it is shaken by the tempest, so had the love for this Union taken 
deeper roots in our hearts."49 
 While the proslavery movement attempted to define the antislavery cause as anti-
American, it also worked to paint their opponents as being anti-white and did so by 
hoping to portray the abolitionist movement as pro-black. Cuthbert expressed his belief 
that "there is a stronger natural horror and aversion for the black race in the North than in 
the South."50 That aversion, he believed, could tie together the Union. Therefore, 
supporting slavery at the national level, to maintain the safety of all white Americans 
from what southerners routinely called a "servile war," became a way of supporting 
national security from outside forces as well. 
  West Indian emancipation, even before it was officially enacted, had scared 
American planters. Many proslavery southerners saw in the British Empire the worst 
combination they could imagine—a powerful nation with large military capabilities and 
colonial holdings, merged with a substantial population of newly freed blacks, located 
just hundreds of miles off the American coast, instilled with the "fanaticism" of the 
antislavery movement. Southern planters viewed England as a state sponsor of 
abolitionism intent on spreading its message with no regard for the safety of Americans. 
England, and Europe in general, they feared, wanted to spread the Haitian Revolution's 
spirit to the United States. The goals of the Abolitionist Power to end slavery through  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insurrection or federal power could be put into action unless the rest of those who lived in 
the United States took precautions.  One southern congressman summarized this idea on 
the floor of the House of Representatives in 1836.  He stated, "In the presence of the 
armed monarchies of Europe, with all the powerful elements both on this and the other 
side of the Atlantic, already in incipient commotion, already rumbling in their deep 
crater," Americans would have to remain strongly tied together in order to fight off the 
incoming enemy intent on threatening the American white republic.51 Slavery needed to 
be protected so that the nation could defend itself rather than being torn apart by 
abolitionists hoping to create "prolific discord" and force the United States into 
succumbing to the Abolitionist Power. 
 As the historical record proves, the fear among southern planters that stemmed 
from English abolition in the West Indies was far from new. A few years before 
emancipation was carried out in the English West Indies, a southern diplomat to Jamaica 
named Robert Monroe Harrison warned the South about the possibility of the Caribbean 
islands serving as a launching pad for abolitionism against American slavery. Harrison 
worried that following the emancipation of the West Indies, Great Britain would pressure 
other slaveholding nations to free their slaves. When other countries refused, he 
contended, England would enact policies to foment insurrection. He further argued that 
once emancipation was implemented, all black Jamaicans should be banned from 
entering the United States, since they would undoubtedly travel from the Caribbean in 
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order to "poison the minds of the Negroes in the Slaveholding States!"52 Many 
southerners believed that American slavery in the 1830s, just as during the Haitian 
Revolution, could become infected by the spreading influence of freedom in the Western 
Hemisphere. 
 Furthermore, in 1833, Robert Harrison asked his superiors in the State 
Department to send a warship to the Caribbean, arguing that Jamaica was on the verge of 
a large insurrection due to its upcoming emancipation of the enslaved.  From June 1833 
to August 1, 1844, the day of emancipation, Harrison sent seven dispatches asking for the 
American Navy to patrol the Caribbean, each predicting certain rebellion similar to that 
of the Haitian Revolution.  Far from being alone among the proslavery adherents, 
Harrison's beliefs were shared by many other proslavery leaders.  During the 1830s and 
1840s, southerners used their power in Congress not only to attack northern abolitionism 
through policies such as the gag rule, but also to reinforce the security of their slave 
system by promoting stronger defensive measures in the Gulf of Mexico. Strong defenses 
would prepare the U.S. for the possibility of England quenching its "fanatical" urge by 
using their colonial black population to strike against slavery in the United States of 
America.53 
 Proslavery proponents utilized arguments based on national security and distrust 
of Europe to bolster the federal government's role in protecting slavery in the United 
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States.  The proslavery, pro-South tilt of the Twenty-Fourth Congress extended beyond 
the gag rule.  As the first session came to a close in July, Congress appropriated money 
"towards the purchase of a site and the building of an arsenal of deposite [sic] and general 
construction" near Fayetteville, North Carolina, with very little debate.  In another 
example of members from the deep South more assertively pressing for federal 
provisions, Senator William Rufus King of Alabama tried to move a proposed armory 
"for the West" to his state, nearly 400 miles southeast of the original project location.54 
King did not get his way; however, his proposal resonated with other southerners who 
believed they needed to have more protection closer to home. He had actively promoted 
the military strengthening of the southern states—especially the Gulf Coast, the avenue 
some planters feared could be used to attack the South from the Caribbean. When 
southerners actively used the federal government for protection and expansion of its 
interests, concentrated power in Washington, especially military strength, no longer 
seemed to be the biggest threat to slavery in the United States. 
 The fear of ending up like feckless the planters of the Caribbean became a 
constant theme of proslavery rhetoric as the decade of the 1830s came to a close. In 1838, 
for example, future senator of South Carolina Robert Barnwell Rhett argued that Europe 
actively worked against slaveholding interests. He worried about the influence that 
England or France might have on the northern population of the United States, telling his 
South Carolina audience to "Mark this history of fanaticism in foreign nations.  Born in 
atheism, and baptized in the blood of revolutionary France, it accomplished its purpose 
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there.  In England it has sprung up under the guise of religion and it has accomplished its 
purpose there.  It has never yet failed, and never will fail, in accomplishing its purpose, 
where the slaveholder does not control his own destinies."55 When Rhett talked about the 
"blood" that had "baptized" abolitionism in France, he did not mean the Reign of Terror 
in Europe. He meant the death of whites in the Caribbean. He combined Anglophobia 
with the undercurrent of fear that a Haitian-style revolution could happen in America to 
insist that the northern allies of enslavement in the United States continue to support the 
proslavery cause. 
 The mixing of resentment against a former foe in England with a latent belief that 
a Haitian–type revolt could occur in the United States spurred proslavery supporters in 
the federal government to promote southern military defenses.  Southerners, furthermore, 
went beyond trying to win the placement of a few armories throughout their region 
instead of in the North. As historian Matthew J. Karp has shown, slaveholders also tried 
to spread the influence of the proslavery movement within the navy during the 
antebellum period because they believed that the expansion of naval forces would protect 
the slave states from an invasion launched by England from the West Indies.56 
 Haiti, as it always had, remained a threat in the minds of southern planters. 
During his one term as a representative of South Carolina, Hugh Swinton Legaré gave a 
speech that showed how much spokesmen of the proslavery movement worried about the 
threat free blacks of the Caribbean posed to the American slave system.  In December 18, 
1838, Legaré—like Hammond before him—challenged the reception of a petition offered  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by Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts; however, unlike Hammond’s, Legaré’s petition 
did not have a direct relationship to the enslavement of blacks in the United States.  
Rather, the memorial offered by the northern congressman prayed "for the recognition of 
the Republic of Hayti, and the establishment of international relations with her."57   
 To Legaré, this petition seemed as dangerous, if not more so, than asking for the 
ending of slavery in the nation's capital.  He also believed it to be another part of the 
grand conspiracy of the Abolitionist Power to eradicate slavery from the country by any 
means necessary.  He told Congress, "The memorials before you, as I understand, are but 
another step in the war which a band of wicked conspirators are daring to wage upon the 
constitution and the peace of the country." The petition, Legaré claimed, "[aimed] at 
abolition" and was "part of a system" that intended "the ruin of the South."  Recognizing 
Haiti, he maintained, would make the South, "from the Susquehanna to the Red river—
from the capes of Virginia to the recesses of the Missouri," feel uneasy and "[throb] with 
indignation and alarm" because it "involves their life and being." The mere discussion of 
officially recognizing the only nation to be born from a slave rebellion needed to be 
squashed because that, too, threatened the safety of slavery in the southern parts of the 
United States.58 The gag rule, at least for the proslavery movement, needed to be 
extended to foreign policy. 
 The idea of black troops wearing the red coats of the British army and marching 
throughout the South to free the enslaved of America was the planters' greatest 
nightmare. Nearly three weeks after Legaré attacked the petition to officially recognize  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Haiti, the proslavery members of Congress again attempted to assert their authority by 
igniting fears of an attack by England launched from the West Indies against the slave 
states on the Gulf of Mexico. The issue revolved around where to build a new dry dock 
for the navy—Philadelphia or Pensacola, Florida. Waddy Thompson opened the debate 
for the southern side by quoting the words of the former Secretary of the Navy, Samuel 
Southard of New Jersey, who Thompson stated had with his "enlarged and enlightened 
patriotism which has illustrated his whole public life," urged Congress to fortify Florida 
because, as he quoted further from the former head of the Navy, " 'The whole country 
from Alleghany to the Gulf, is interested in establishment of a naval station at Pensacola.  
With whatever nation we may be at war, the principal theater will be the Gulf of Mexico, 
and the object of attack the commerce of the Mississippi.' "59 
 Legaré also put himself in the middle of the debate over where the new naval 
yards should be built.  He wanted to shore up the defense of the southern coastline, 
however, and touched on a threat far more dangerous than simply the loss of 
commerce—the British antislavery impulse.  The South Carolina congressman told the 
House of Representatives that he believed the United States needed a stronger naval 
presence in the Gulf of Mexico because the West Indies might serve as "either the 
strongholds of the great powers, with a view to hold us in check, or dens of picaroons and 
bucaniers [sic]" who would threaten the South.60  Southern slaveholders explicitly 
showed that outside dangers of attack, even from unorganized pirates, could weaken their 
control over the enslaved population they held in their cities and on their plantations.    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 Other proslavery leaders expressed their concerns more explicitly, rather than 
mentioning pirates and buccaneers as Legaré did.  An editorialist in the Charleston 
Southern Patriot wrote that having a naval station in Florida was desperately needed 
because England always served as a constant threat to American slaveholders.  He stated 
that Key West could act as an "avenue of entrance to the enemy—to the black regiments 
of [England's] cruel policy."61 If England could serve as the conveyor of the Haitian 
Revolution to America, the Gulf of Mexico presented the path that led from the West 
Indies to the United States South.  
 Southern leaders were not alone in sensing both the dangers to the nation posed 
by England's antislavery impulse and the possibility of that nation using blacks troops to 
spur rebellion and chaos among the enslaved population in a time of war. Many 
northerners concurred. In 1837, for example, Captain Charles Stewart, a Philadelphian 
who throughout his life served various positions within the United States Navy, wrote 
about the threat posed by America's former enemy.  In a published letter to the secretary 
of the navy, he declared, "The new principles of European policy and reform in relation 
to their American colonies, aided by the fanatics spread over our own country, exciting 
an insurrectionary spirit among a numerous class of our south-western 
populations...admonish us not to trust too far our own peaceful habits and passive 
disposition, but to apply all means...for the permanent defense of that interesting portion 
of the Union." A naval station in Pensacola, he argued, would serve the interest of 
national defense against the possible invasion from the West Indies.62  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 During the 1840s, tensions between the United States and England seemed to be 
growing as the two nations conflicted over England’s right to enforce the ban of the 
African slave trade by searching American ships. This tension grew after slaves on the 
American ship Creole rebelled against its white crew, gained control of the vessel, and 
guided it to freedom in the English Bahaman Island of Nassau, where the British 
government protected them from planters demanding their return to America.63 Many 
leading southerners believed they needed to act, and they created plans to do so. The 
British, to them, seemed ready to up the ante in regards to slavery. 
 In order to blunt what they perceived as a growing antislavery influence in their 
hemisphere, southern politicians developed a strategy to keep American slavery safe from 
the supposed "fanatics" of both the North and England.  Supported by the newly 
ascendant Tyler administration following the death of President William Henry Harrison, 
proslavery forces positioned national military and foreign policy in opposition to the 
international antislavery movement— perceiving England as a national security threat 
that hoped to spark a massive insurrection throughout the slave states. The proslavery 
movement gained near total control of the federal government and implemented a 
program focused on the strengthening of southern military defenses and the expansion of 
slavery westward.  
 As soon as he became secretary of the navy under President Tyler, Abel P. 
Upshur, one of the president's fellow Virginians, concentrated his efforts on 
strengthening the U. S. Navy's presence in the Caribbean. He worried that without a 
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stronger show of naval power in the Gulf of Mexico, the South was at risk of invasion 
and possible slave insurrection incited by the English, both of which would be 
devastating to the slave states. In a report to the Senate, Upshur wrote, "The nature of our 
institutions presents a very strong appeal upon this point.  A war between the United 
States and any considerable maritime Power would not be conducted at this day as it 
would have been even twenty years ago."  The English, with the strongest navy in the 
world, definitely fell under the category of "any considerable maritime power," and they 
would not fight fairly. Instead, they would use the southern labor force against the United 
States in whole and the South in particular.  He continued, "It would be a war of 
incursions aiming at revolution. The first blow would be struck at us through our own 
institutions."64 The Virginian had not forgotten the history of Lord Dunmore during the 
American Revolution. Americans understood that the "revolution" Upshur wanted to 
avoid would be launched by the enslaved, emboldened by British antislavery sentiments, 
to follow the example of the Haitian rebels decades before.   
 While wanting to protect slavery, Upshur also understood the great liability such a 
large enslaved population posed to the safety of not just the region of the South but also 
to the nation as a whole. Abolitionists who wanted to attack the South, he reported, would 
unleash "the hostile elements of our social system against one another." While incursions 
launched by English steamships would be bad for every portion of the nation, he 
explained, "in the southern portion of our country they might, and probably would be 
disastrous in the extreme." Numerous southerners during the early 1840s worked to 
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strengthen the defense against the antislavery movement and promoted the expansion of 
American naval power as a way to do it.65 
 Leaders of the proslavery movement openly expressed the fears that black West 
Indians might be used to attack the United States South. In 1841, for instance, Alabama 
Congressman Thomas Butler King, sitting on the Committee of Naval Affairs, wrote that 
the South's "unprotected harbors might be entered by fleets of armed steamers, loaded 
with black troops from the West Indies, to annoy and plunder the country."66 It was not 
just the prospect of the British attacking the United States again that made southern 
slaveholders nervous.  Rather, the feasibility of England using black troops—a group of 
warriors whom the enslaved people of the South might rally to join in a war against the 
master class—made plantation owners ask the federal government for more military 
protection in the Gulf of Mexico. While the expansion of federal power by enlarging the 
Navy might have seemed to some as antithetical to the South's states rights dogma, in the 
1830s it coincided with increased antislavery pressure both from the North and from 
England and was viewed by many as a way to protect slavery from an outside foe.67 
 However, for many southern planters and politicians, the expectation of extending 
slavery into the American West became the primary means of maintaining a stable 
system of slavery in a world that appeared to be heading towards abolitionism. The 
proslavery movement believed westward expansion of the United States—implemented 
by a federal government sympathetic to slaveholding—offered the best path to ensuring  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that the South would not become like the West Indies: hemmed in by limited land and 
dependent on a hostile government for protection. Unlike the Caribbean, where England 
had a stronghold, America had the West—a vast expanse of land that proslavery 
southerners believed could be used to defend slavery against abolitionism. With 
antislavery bolstered by Great Britain and supported by a growing percentage of 
northerners, the proslavery cause came to depend upon the South's not being hemmed in 
by free soil on its north, west, and Caribbean borders.   
 The specter of black troops from the Caribbean fighting for an English Empire as 
it invaded the United States from the West seemed too dangerous a possibility for 
Americans to sit idly by and miss their chance at claiming possession of the territory all 
the way to the Pacific.  One military officer, writing in a newspaper from New Orleans in 
1840, and republished in the Army and Navy Chronicle, wrote that he worried about "the 
unscrupulous fanatics of England" joining forces with Mexico in order to colonize "the 
Californias with her colored allies" from the Caribbean colonies. The author wrote, "Let 
Great Britain succeed in planting her colored battalions in the [Californias], and she will 
then have the Union surrounded by a chain of posts from New Brunswick to Honduras." 
Once again, protecting slavery became merged with protecting national security.  The 
editorialist admitted that "all the energies of the Southern States" would be needed in 
order "to resist" if a black colony became established in the western part of the 
continent.68 By including the Canadian province of New Brunswick, just north of Maine, 
as one of the destination points for the "chain" that Great Britain looked to be tightening 
around the United States, the writer inherently tied the slave states' concerns about black                                                         
68 Army and Navy Chronicle, March 5, 1840. 
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troops with the safety of the northeastern free states.69 
 During the 1830s, the southern proslavery movement, following the abolitionist 
postal campaign, called for the South to assert its control more actively over the 
machinery of the federal government.  Leading this charge in posture, politicians from 
South Carolina challenged their state and others to follow their lead against what they 
considered to be a growing Abolitionist Power, an international scheme linking between 
radical abolitionists in both the North and England to not just end slavery, but to kill 
slaveholders and dismantle the white American republic as well. States’ rights alone 
could not protect American planters from a strengthening antislavery movement.  A 
powerful federal government, with a Congress that openly worked on the side of the 
South, was also needed to protect southern slavery against outside influence. 
 This new tactic of the proslavery movement scored its first victory by 
implementing the gag rule, which regulated what kind of petitions could be heard in 
Congress. It would not be the last.  Southerners and their allies saw the newly freed 
English West Indies as a dangerous threat to the United States in general and the slave 
South in particular. Though vital to American trade, the Gulf of Mexico could also serve 
as a highway leading rebellious freed black men directly into the underbelly of national 
security. Such an attempt by England could incite a massive rebellion on the part of the 
South's large enslaved population. In reaction to this threat, southerners called for more 
defenses and a stronger navy to protect the southern coastline. 
 The feelings of foreboding that some in the United States sensed from England                                                         
69 Sam W. Haynes, "Anglophobia and the Annexation of Texas: The Quest For National Security," in eds 
Sam W. Haynes and Christopher Morris, Manifest Destiny and Empire: American Antebellum 
Expansionism (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1997): 115-145. 
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did not just stem from that nation's superior maritime power, but also from some of its 
claims on lands in the western part of the North American continent.  Southerners 
actively worried that England, in conjunction with Mexico, planned to create black 
colonies to the west of the American border—despite frequent reassurances by English 
leadership that they held no such plans. Americans sought options not only to protect 
itself but also to expand as a growing nation.  In the 1840s, however, California did not 
become the top priority for American slaveholders who wanted to expand slave territory 
in North America. Instead, the proslavery movement first looked closer to home, across 
the Sabine River from Louisiana.  There, American immigrants rebelled against the 
Mexican government when slavery became endangered and created their own 
independent nation that stretched from the Gulf Coast to the Rio Grande. If annexed to 
the United States, the Republic of Texas offered massive amounts of new land to 
American slaveholders that could serve as a buffer from a potentially aggressive England 
while also expanding the South’s slaveholding region. With an invigorated proslavery 
class using the Democratic Party as an apparatchik to control the federal government, the 
debate over the annexation of Texas would launch a discussion about the future of 
slavery in the United States of America and the role of the federal government in serving 
to protect it that would simmer for two decades. 
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Chapter Five 
Texas Annexation and the Proslavery Promise 
 
 
WHEREAS, The recent developments in Federal affairs make it evident that the power of the Federal 
Government is sought to be made a weapon with which to strike down the interests and property of the 
people of Texas, and her sister slave-holding States, instead of permitting it to be, as was intended, our 
shield against outrage and aggression, THEREFORE...Texas is of right absolved from all restraints and 
obligations incurred by said compact, and is a separate sovereign State, and that her citizens and people are 
absolved from all allegiance to the United States or the government thereof. 
-Texas Ordinance of Secession, February 1, 1861.1 
 
 
As the nation's appetite for westward expansion grew in the late-1830s and 1840s, 
southern slaveholders looked hungrily at territories as far away as California. Closer to 
home, however, a new republic, filled with slaveholding emigrants from the United 
States, had just been founded. Sympathetic to America and desirous of joining their 
neighbor as a part of the United States, Texans offered their southern counterparts a vast 
new area in which to expand slavery. The promise of this region touched off a debate 
over Texas annexation that reverberated across the nation. American politics would 
become consumed with the question of slavery’s role in American expansion from an 
unlikely source—John Tyler. Eventually, the debate over slavery's role in expansion 
would eventually tear the nation apart at the seams and lead to the deadliest war in the 
nation's history. Adding Texas to the Union became the first time that Americans debated 
                                                        
1 David Franklin Houston, ed., American History Leaflets, Colonial and Constitutional, November 1893: 
Ordinances of Secession and Other Documents, 1860-1861 (New York: A. Lovell and Company, 1893): 
15-16. 
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the issue of increasing its slaveholding era after the emancipation of the British West 
Indies. 
 Despite Mexico's objections to the institution of slavery, many immigrants to 
Texas between 1822 and 1825 came from the American South, bringing their slaves with 
them and creating an enslaved society that mirrored that of their former country. 
Throughout the decade before the Texas Revolution, Texans routinely found ways around 
Mexican laws that barred enslavement by creating loopholes in the law, such as calling 
slaves "indentured servants," that allowed slavery a de facto existence in Mexican Texas. 
Stephen F. Austin, regarded as the “Father of Texas,” believed that his new colony 
"must" have slavery in order to survive.  Though Austin echoed the sentiment of his 
fellow colonists, the Mexican government tightened regulations on the institution in the 
1830s.  Subsequently, the Texan leader described his ambivalence towards bringing more 
enslaved blacks into his colony.  In a letter to his business partner in 1831, Austin—born 
two years after the beginning of the Haitian Revolution—wrote, "I sometimes shudder at 
the consequences [of slavery] and think that a large part [of] America will be Santa 
Domingonized in 100 or 200 years." Slavery, he believed, brought with it inherent danger 
many slaveholders before him had believed: the larger the black population, the increased 
chance of a massive rebellion. His fellow colonists, however, demanded more slaves. 
Seeing no alternative, Austin concluded, "I am now in for the question and there is not 
retreat."2 Regardless of Austin’s fears, the people made the decision and supported the                                                         
2 Stephen F. Austin to Samuel May Williams, April 16, 1831 in The Papers of Stephen F. Austin ed. 
Eugene C. Barker (Washington and Austin, 1924-1928): 2: 645; Randolph B. Campbell, An Empire for 
Slavery: The Peculiar Institution in Texas, 1821-1865 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1989): 1-
34; Randolph B. Campbell, Gone to Texas: A History of the Lone Star State (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2003): 110-114. 
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importation of more black slaves into their growing colony. Texas would be slave 
country despite the laws of Mexico outlawing it. In the years that followed its revolution 
Texas would be viewed as being able to hold at least two million slaves by some 
proslavery adherents, serving as a safety valve for excess slaves in the growing enslaved 
population of the United States South.3 
 In April 1834 relations between Mexico and Texas began to deteriorate. Antonio 
Lopez de Santa Anna came to power and repudiated the national constitution, 
proclaiming himself dictator and promoting a more centralized government. By 
September 1835, Texans held a convention to discuss how they should react to the 
strengthening of the Mexican federal government. The following month, Americans in 
Mexico's northeastern province clashed with Santa Anna's forces in the Battle of 
Gonzales. The Texas Revolution had begun.4  
 Leaders in Washington watched intently for news from Texas, determining how 
the United States should react. Just as southern planters worried about possible 
insurrections inspired by the abolitionist postal campaign, their counterparts in Texas 
worried that Mexico's armed forces planned to foment black rebellion in order to help put 
down the white Texans. One participant in the Texas Revolution expressed the fear many 
Texans felt. Mexicans, he wrote, would introduce "the sickly philanthropy of the 
abolitionists in the United States." The planters in control of Texas believed free blacks 
could only create more danger in their new country. Therefore, to mitigate the risk of                                                         
3 Austin Texas State Gazette, July 17, 1858; Marshall Texas Republican, December 10, 1858; Campbell, 
Empire For Slavery, 65-66. 
4 Campbell, Empire for Slavery, 40-41. Mexican laws prohibited slavery, however, for many years slavery 
in Texas was simply ignored by the Mexican government as it practiced a version of salutary neglect for its 
northeastern border province to the United States. 
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insurrection during the revolution, the provisional government made it illegal for "any 
free negro or mulatto to come within the limits of Texas." The original constitution of the 
Republic of Texas, created in 1836 before independence, took this approach a step further 
by enshrining into constitutional law a prohibition of any further permanent residencies 
for free blacks within the Lone Star Republic. It stated, "No free person of African 
descent, either in whole or in part, shall be permitted to reside permanently in the 
republic without the consent of congress."5  Just as South Carolinians and Georgians had 
proposed harsh new restrictions in the aftermath of insurrection scares, Texas 
slaveholders in revolution viewed black people—both free and enslaved—as a dangerous 
element of society. The only way to ensure the safety of a slave society was to ensure that 
the overwhelming majority of blacks living in the area remained in bondage.  
 As fighting continued between the Texans and the Mexican government, Stephen 
F. Austin worked to ensure victory and independence through an American alliance.  In a 
letter to Lewis F. Linn, a senator from Missouri, Austin pleaded for help by posturing 
Texas as a sister to the United States, claiming that its revolution against Santa Anna's 
government was important to American security.  He wrote, "For fifteen years I have 
been laboring like a slave to Americanise Texas—to form a nucleus around which my 
native countrymen could collect and grow into a solid body that would forever be a 
barrier of safety to the Southwestern frontier, and especially the outlet of the Western 
world—mouth of the Mississippi—and which would be the beacon-light to the Mexicans 
                                                        
5 Journal of the Proceedings of the General Council of the Republic of Texas Held at San Felipe de Austin, 
November 14th, 1835 (Houston, 1839): 173; Campbell, Empire for Slavery, 45-47. 
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in their search after liberty."6 Providing help for Texas independence provided safety for 
the American slave South, which the fledgling republic bordered on the east, he 
contended. 
 The Texas War of Independence, Austin warned, had devolved into a "war of 
extermination against anglo-Americans, and their principles and interests."  He did not 
believe, however, that Americans should worry about a Mexican invasion in the western 
frontier. Instead, he argued that Americans had to be wary of "the peril of an Indian and 
servile war—the murder of women and children, and the loss of civilization of Texas."7 
Recognition of Texas as an independent nation, he assured Linn, would serve as a 
necessary, preventative measure against insurrection in the American slave states.  
 Austin contended, "The Americanism of Texas, is of more real service to the 
protection of Louisiana, Arkansas and Missouri." The United States, the Texan 
proclaimed, had a duty to "march into Texas, and say to the pirate Santa Anna, 'stop,' a 
great and philanthropic and free people, will not stand tamely by and see justice, 
constitutional right and humanity, wantonly violated at her door; nor can a paternal 
Government tolerate such a state of things on its most vulnerable and important frontier."  
Austin's reasoning was easy to understand for any American who valued stability and 
safety in the United States. Any other alternative, Austin wrote, would "bring the bloody 
tide of savage war, and the horrors of negro insurrection" to the American South.8 
Washington needed to act, he pleaded; otherwise a slave rebellion that could be spread                                                         
6 National Banner and Nashville Whig, May 25, 1836, Baltimore Gazette and Daily Advertiser, May 10, 
1836; Richmond Enquirer, May 17, 1836; St. Louis Daily Commercial Bulletin, June 3, 1836. 
 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
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throughout the American South could be sparked in the Texas prairies.  
 Following the Battle of San Jacinto, where Texan troops captured the Mexican 
president and forced him to sign a treaty granting Texas independence, the new Lone Star 
Republic immediately requested to join the United States. Sam Houston, the general who 
defeated Santa Anna and new president of Texas, wrote to Andrew Jackson in November 
1836, expressing a "great desire...that our country, Texas, shall be annexed to the U. 
States" because Texas, despite having gained its separation from Mexico, would be very 
unlikely to "to sustain ourselves against any power who are not impotent."  He asked that 
Old Hickory, acting as a "friend of liberty," use his sway to gain Congress’ acceptance of 
Texas as a new state in the Union.9 
 Texas statehood would be viewed differently than Texas recognition in 
Washington. Firstly, President Jackson, as well as his successors Martin Van Buren and 
William Henry Harrison, believed that annexation could not be considered without 
disturbing the nation's diplomatic relationship with the Mexican government or adding to 
a political rift between the North and South that had occurred during the 1830s. Despite 
trying to purchase Texas earlier in his term, Andrew Jackson delayed his decision to 
recognize Texas as a sovereign nation until months after the capture and capitulation of 
Santa Anna. Americans, he believed, would not want to spark a possible war with their 
neighbor. Though many in the United States wanted to annex this new republic bordering 
Louisiana and Arkansas, Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren decided to tread lightly 
for fear of annexation creating another sectional crisis between the free and slave states.                                                         
9  Randolph Campbell, Gone to Texas: A History of the Lone Star State (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2003): 160-165; Sam Houston to Andrew Jackson, November 22, 1836 republished in Washington, 
Tx. Texas National Register, December 17, 1845. 
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They both worked to temper the issue of slavery within American politics.10 
 By the late 1830s, the longstanding posture of Jackson and Van Buren towards 
Texas seemed a wise one. Hostility against annexation grew in the free states, where 
many opposed slavery’s expansion. The movement to add Texas to the Union persisted in 
the background of American politics, however, even as the country went through a 
financial crisis that crippled the economy in 1837. Anti-annexationists continued their 
onslaught against annexationists.  No one summed up the movement’s resentment better 
than William Ellery Channing. Born in New England to the son of a signer of the 
Declaration of Independence, Channing first gained fame in 1819 as a Unitarian minister 
who challenged Calvinism in Baltimore. At that time, his antislavery conviction had not 
fully developed, and years passed before the theologian concluded that slavery was a 
moral blight that should be dealt with swiftly. This transformation that led him to the 
antislavery movement came only after spending time in the Danish West Indies on the 
cusp of British emancipation.  Once committed to the abolitionist cause, however, he 
served as a leading, clear voice for the movement outside the halls of Congress while 
John Quincy Adams continued to fight against slavery within it.11 
 Channing's works on slavery were advertised in antislavery newspapers as a way 
to spread his message.  In 1837 he wrote "A Letter on the Annexation of Texas to the 
United States" that he addressed to Henry Clay—the presumed frontrunner for the Whig 
                                                        
10 Register of the Debates, 24 Cong., 2 sess., 1137-1140; John M. Belohlavek, "Let the Eagle Soar!" The 
Foreign Policy of Andrew Jackson (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1985): 117-118, 233-234. 
11 Arthur W. Brown, William Ellery Channing, (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1962): 45-48; Edward 
Bartlett Rugemer discusses in closer detail Channing's conversion to the antislavery movement and the 
connection between American and British abolitionism.  See Rugemer, The Problem of Emancipation, 145-
179. 
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nomination in 1840. The letter received attention in numerous newspapers throughout the 
North. Channing's letter established the antislavery movement’s position regarding the 
annexation of Texas. The minister warned Clay, the former president of the American 
Colonialization Society, that if he used his political power to "promote" his "views on the 
subject of this communication," it would "accomplish a good, to which, perhaps, no other 
man in this country is equal."12  In his public message Channing articulated the 
antislavery position, explaining their devotion against Texas annexation and showing 
why the two Democratic presidents sympathetic to expansion had refused to seriously 
attempt annexation.  
 In the beginning sections of his polemic against expanding the American borders 
to encompass Texas, Channing disputed the legitimacy of the Texas Revolution.  He 
insisted the event had been "criminal" in exercise because the Texan colonists had 
deliberately disobeyed the oaths they took to submit to Mexican laws when they were 
granted land—especially regulations regarding the importation of slavery to the area.  He 
argued that because American colonists had sworn allegiance to Mexican authority and 
the Catholic church, they had no right to claim a grievance against Mexico for "being 
denied the right of worshipping God according to the dictates of their consciences" or 
being denied jury trials because "they were fully aware, before becoming the adopted 
citizens of the country, that this mode of trial was utterly unknown to its jurisprudence." 
Furthermore, Channing maintained that the consolidation of the government under Santa                                                         
12 William E. Channing, A Letter on the Annexation of Texas to the United States (London: 1837): 2; 
Boston Liberator, June 30, 1837; Portsmouth Journal of Literature and Politics, August 12, 1837; 
Newport, RI, August 12, 1837; Philadelphia National Gazette, August 12, 1837; Baltimore Sun, August 12, 
1837; Cincinnati Weekly Herald and the Philanthropist, August 18, 1837; Boston Courier, August 28, 
1837. 
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Anna, the actions that sparked the Texas Revolution, was not in fact a usurpation of 
power.  Rather, the Mexican dictator's move "was ratified by the National Congress 
according to the rules prescribed by the Constitution, and was sanctioned by the Mexican 
people." Taken altogether, Channing declared, "Texans, a handful of strangers, raised the 
standard of revolt, because the government was changed by a nation of nine millions 
without their consent."13 For Channing and many others in the antislavery, anti-
annexation movement, Texans who rebelled against Mexico were unjustified in claiming 
that their rights had been revoked. Unlike the American Revolution, the Texas 
Revolution was a fraud. 
 Channing provided additional evidence of the illegitimacy of the Texas 
Revolution. He challenged the actual number of revolutionaries who lived in the Lone 
Star Republic, portraying the movement for independence as a sort of coup d’état 
launched by a small cadre of slaveholders rather than a major revolution launched by the 
people. He believed the Texan revolution could better be defined as an "insurrection" led 
by Americans living there. He wrote that those who raised "the standard of war" against 
Mexico was likely smaller than the number of discontents that could be found in the 
"suburbs of London," insisting that "their revolt may be compared to the rising of a 
county in Massachusetts or Virginia for the purpose of establishing a separate 
sovereignty."14 Dissent by such a small group of people, the antislavery leader stated, 
should not be allowed to turn into legitimate revolution—simply because it coincided 
with the interests of the planter class in the United States.                                                         
13 Channing, A Letter on the Annexation of Texas to the United States, 2. 
14 Ibid., 8. 
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 Slavery, and the southerners who wanted to extend its reach, served as the 
foundation for Channing's critique of both the Texas Revolution and annexation. He 
understood that the complaints of Texans against the Mexican government revolved 
around the illegality of slavery. Channing admonished southerners who partook in "the 
project of dismembering a neighboring republic" in order to "overspread a region which 
had been consecrated to a free population" with slavery. He insisted that "men and money 
were thrown from the United States into that region to carry on the war of revolution," 
and in doing so, the United States violated international law by allowing its citizens to 
wage a war against Mexico.15 He warned that allowing private residents of the United 
States to serve as temporary revolutionaries set a precarious precedent for the nation. 
Adding Texas as another slave state would create an even more dangerous model for 
American expansion, the antislavery theologian feared. 
 Channing also worried that the annexation of Texas, after such close involvement 
in its revolution by Americans, would alter the precedent for United States declarations of 
war. He wrote, "Texas is a country conquered by our citizens; and the annexation of it to 
our Union will be the beginning of conquests which, unless arrested and beaten back by a 
just and Kind Providence, will stop only at the Isthmus of Darien." He warned that if the 
citizens of the United States—especially those in free states—accepted land for slavery 
by conquest, then wars for expansion would never stop. If Texas, he asked, then why not 
all of Mexico? If all of Mexico, then why not all of Central America?  He wrote, "Our 
Eagle will whet, not gorge, its appetite on its first victim, and will snuff a more tempting 
quarry, more alluring blood, in every new region which opens southward." In summation,                                                         
15 Ibid., 12-14. 
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he said, "[to] annex Texas is to declare perpetual war with Mexico."16 Slaveholders 
would never stop pushing for greater expansion.  
 The New Englander told those who read his pamphlet that if they accepted the 
growth of slaveholding territory by the barrel of the gun, then they should be prepared for 
continual war, not just with their neighbors to the South, but also those to the north in 
Canada. Adding Texas to the Union, he argued, would only foster another war with 
England because "collision with the West Indies will be the most certain effect of the 
extension of our power in" the Gulf of Mexico. American planters, Channing stated, 
could not allow West Indian freedom to influence the slaveholding South; therefore, they 
would never "cultivate friendly sentiments towards communities whose whole history 
will be a bitter reproach to their institutions, a witness against their wrongs, and whose 
ardent sympathies will be enlisted in the cause of the slave."17 Instead they would use 
federal foreign policy to get their way. By pointing to the addition of Texas to the Union 
as a dangerous precedent, William Ellery Channing helped to create a template for moral 
opponents of slavery movement in particular, and the larger antislavery movement in 
general. He verbalized the protest of many northerners against a planter class that had 
realized the potential for slavery that came from controlling the machinery of a growing 
federal government.  
  Channing identified the Slave Power in 1837. He wrote, "In opening to ourselves 
vast regions, in which we may spread slavery, and in spreading it...the slave-holding 
States may bear rule in the national councils, we make slavery the predominant interest of                                                         
16 Ibid., 17-18. 
17 Ibid., 26. 
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the State." Adding more territory would not just spread the evil of slavery across the 
North American continent, but also consolidate the proslavery movement’s strength in 
the federal government. He predicted what slaveholders would do with their expanded 
power. By adding more slave states, Americans would make slavery "the basis of power, 
the spring or guide of public measures, the object for which the revenues, strength, and 
wealth of the country, are to be exhausted.  Slavery will be branded on our front as the 
great idea, the prominent feature of the country. We shall renounce our high calling as a 
people, and accomplish the lowest destiny to which a nation can be bound."18 He 
maintained that if northerners willfully chose to add more slave territory to the Union, 
Americans could no longer blame their forefathers for planting slavery in the United 
States. Instead, the nation and the institution of bondage of blacks in the American South 
would remain imprinted upon the soul of the nation forever. Channing believed that an 
open broadcast of strong antislavery views might redirect the course of the nation and 
check the desire for American expansion. Channing would not be alone in his cause. 
 In 1837, while Channing worked to stir opposition to the annexation of Texas 
outside of Washington, John Quincy Adams worked inside the halls of the House of 
Representatives to accomplish the same end. Adams thought he could show how 
unpopular adding more slave territory was among northern citizens by pointing to 
petitions from roughly one hundred thousand Americans from free states arguing against 
Texas annexation, as well as several memorials passed by northern state legislatures from 
Maine to Michigan that opposed an American incorporation of the Lone Star Republic. 
Forced to follow the Gag Rule, however, the House had tabled the petitions without  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debate. In one instance, a congressman from Ohio was not allowed to read a letter from 
his governor to the House of Representatives in Washington because it opposed adding 
Texas to the Union. In another, one northern state implored its congressional delegations 
to "protest against the admission of any new slave State or the annexation of Texas."19 
 As the recognized antislavery leader in the House of Representatives, John 
Quincy Adams offered a proposal regarding the future of slavery that would resonate for 
decades to come, in both the North and the South.  He argued that preventing the addition 
of more slave territory to the United States would end slavery in North America, stating, 
"I believe, if Texas is not annexed to this Union, that the time is not remote when there 
will not be a slave either in these States or in Texas." His rationale was straightforward: 
"if Texas is excluded, in the first place she will operate as a drain for the slaves from 
South Carolina; and that that State will be so drained of its slave population that the white 
inhabitants, including the gentleman and his friends, will be the first to urge the propriety 
of abolition."20  
 Southerners in the audience received the statement from Adams with laughter, but 
he ignored it.  He believed that if Texas were excluded from the United States and 
squeezed between two free nations, that eventually, it would find itself becoming a free 
territory. What neither Adams nor Channing anticipated, however, was how their                                                         
19 Speech of John Quincy Adams of Massachusetts, Upon the Right of the People, Men and Women, to 
Petition; on the Freedom of Speech and of Debate in the House of Representatives of the United States; on 
the Resolutions of Seven State Legislatures and the Petitions of More Than One Hundred Thousand 
Petitioners, Relating to the Annexation of Texas to This Union (Washington, D.C.: Gales and Seaton, 
1938): 8-9, 30-38; Portsmouth, Nh. Journal of Literature and Politics, February 4, 1837; Hartford Times, 
February 4, 1837; Saratoga Sentinel, February 7, 1837; Hallowell, Me. Cultivator and Hallowell Gazette, 
June 6, 1840. 
 
20 Ibid., 82. 
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arguments about draining slavery away from the American Southeast, or fighting a war 
with either Mexico or England, might be co-opted by those who wanted to add Texas to 
the Union.  If annexationists could create a narrative that combined national defense (as 
well as national pride) with antiblack sentiment, they could successfully convince the 
nation to embrace their cause and support the addition of more slavery territory to the 
Union. The proslavery cause, by happenstance, would find itself in the position to do just 
that shortly following the inauguration of a new president in 1841.  
 With the economic Panic of 1837 dominating politics during the presidential 
campaign of 1840, adding Texas to the United States gained little traction.  Both 
candidates—incumbent Martin Van Buren and newcomer William Henry Harrison—did 
not want to risk losing political standing by discussing such a divisive topic. As the first 
presidential candidate to actively campaign for the office, Harrison, “the Hero of 
Tippecanoe,” won the election and thereby ushered the first Whig president into the 
White House. In his two-hour inaugural address, which he delivered on a cold and rainy 
spring day in the nation’s capital, the new president never mentioned Mexico, Texas, or 
the expansion of American landholding in the West.  Instead, the old general focused on 
Whig principles, paying particular attention to the role of government and the economic 
standing of the nation. Harrison portrayed himself as a president who prioritized internal 
improvements—much to the delight of his Whig party and especially Senator Henry 
Clay. For the first time since John Quincy Adams resided in the White House a different 
party than the Democrats assumed total control of the federal government, winning both 
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houses of Congress as well as the presidency.21  
 Illness struck the president just weeks after his inauguration. The old general and 
ninth president of the United States died thirty days after assuming office, on April 4, 
1841. For the first time in history of the nation, the Vice President moved into the White 
House to fulfill the remainder of his running mate's term of office. For three years and 
eleven months, John Tyler, a Virginian aristocrat and former Democrat, would serve in 
the first Whig president’s stead.22 
 The death of the president so soon after his inauguration sent shock waves 
throughout Washington and the nation. As a leader of the antislavery movement in 
Congress, John Quincy Adams expressed in his diary the anxiety he felt that slavery still 
"festered" below the surface of American political life.  He was greatly concerned about 
the role the southern institution would play in both the policy and politics practiced by 
Harrison's replacement, a man whom the former president deemed so unsuited for the 
office that he refused to grant him the actual title of president, referring to him instead as 
"Acting President of the United States.” Adams believed that at the least, Tyler would 
actively work to protect slavery; at the worst, he would seek to expand it.  On the day that 
William Henry Harrison died, Adams wrote in his diary that the man who would replace 
him was "a political sectarian, of the slave-driving, Virginia, Jeffersonian school, 
principled against all improvement, with all the interests and passions and vices of 
                                                        
21 Inaugural Address, Tuesday, March 4, 1841" in Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the United 
States from George Washington, 1789, to George Bush, 1989 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1989): 79-97. For examples of how Americans reacted to the Log Cabin and Hard Cider campaign 
see A.B. Norton, Reminiscences of the Log Cabin and Hard Cider Campaign (Dallas: A. B. Norton, 1888). 
22 Norma Lois Peterson, The Presidencies of William Henry Harrison and John Tyler (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 1989): 31-44. 
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slavery rooted in his moral and political constitution—with talents not above mediocrity, 
and a spirit incapable of expansion to the dimensions of the station upon which he has 
been cast by the hand of Providence, unseen through the apparent agency of chance." The 
weather seemed to fit John Quincy's mood, he finished his entry for the day by noting, 
"This day was in every sense gloomy—rain the whole day."23 He knew the inaugural 
address read to the nation just  prior had suddenly been rendered meaningless.  The man 
who now occupied the White House would never follow the plan Harrison had set for his 
presidency. Tyler—a slaveholder who supported the censoring of the abolitionists in 
1838—would not adhere to the anti-expansionism of the Whig party.  
 As Adams had predicted, President John Tyler soon found himself at odds with 
his own party. Upon the death of President Harrison, Henry Clay, like John Quincy 
Adams, trivialized Tyler's position as president of the United States, dubbing the new 
commander-in-chief with the sobriquet of "His Accidency." Though Clay had been left 
off the top of the ticket in favor of Harrison, the Kentucky leader still believed he could 
shape the policy initiatives of the first Whig administration. The roadblock to internal 
improvements, in the form of Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren, had at last been 
removed. Furthermore, the presidential cabinet remained filled with Old Tippecanoe’s 
appointments loyal to the Whig Party. Finally, Clay thought, the national government 
could build infrastructure and create a more centralized banking system, both of which 
had been maligned under Democratic control of the executive's chair. Clay finally had his                                                         
23 Memoirs of John Quincy Adams Comprising Portions of His Diary from 1795 to 1848, ed. Charles 
Francis Adams (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co, 1876): 10: 455-457. Other members of Congress also 
debated whether Tyler would remain the Vice President or ascend to the presidency.  See Congressional 
Globe, 27 Cong, 1 sess., 3-4; Lyon Gardiner Tyler, The Letters and Times of the Tylers in Two Volumes 
(Richmond: Whittett and Shepperson, 1884): 1: 572-582. 
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chance to implement his vision.24 
 Tyler had different plans for the nation's future.  Soon after he assumed office, it 
became apparent that John Quincy Adams was accurate in his labeling of the new 
president as a man from the "Jeffersonian" or Democratic school of politics. Tyler, who 
had once referred to Clay as a "corruptionist" and praised Andrew Jackson's Maysville 
Road veto as "a good first step," showed his true colors after he assumed the duties of 
commander-in-chief. During the early months of his term, the new president vetoed a bill 
passed by the Whig-controlled Congress authorizing the resuscitation of the Bank of the 
United States, an institution despised by the followers of states’ rights and beloved by 
those faithful to Clay. In his veto message, Tyler wrote, "I regard the bill as asserting for 
Congress the right to incorporate a United States Bank, with power and right to establish 
offices of discount and deposit in the several States of this Union, with or without their 
consent, a principle-to which I have always heretofore been opposed, and which can 
never obtain my sanction." 25  
 The president would stay true to his word. When Clay ushered through a banking 
bill that he hoped would satiate the president’s states rights proclivities, Tyler vetoed it 
again, causing his entire cabinet (except Secretary of State Daniel Webster who was 
working to settle a border dispute between Maine and Canada while in Europe) to 
immediately resign in protest. With this, the president lost his party. After nearly two 
                                                        
24 Edward P. Crapol, John Tyler: The Accidental President (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2006): 16-20; Freehling, The Road to Disunion, vol 1, 1776-1854, 362-364. 
25 John Tyler to Littleton W. Tazewell, May 28, 1830 in Lyon G. Tyler, Letters and Times of the Tylers, 1: 
412; Message from The President of the United States Transmitting with his Objections, the bill entitled, 
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years of acrimony between the Whigs and the president, Webster, too, quit his post. A 
longtime acquaintance and colleague of the new president from the Virginia state 
legislature, Abel P. Upshur, believed he could help John Tyler create a coalition of his 
own by urging the president to focus on the West. If his political message could be 
delivered in the right way, the president could create an organization all his own. He 
would seek help from his fellow comrades in the proslavery movement.26 
 Born in Virginia and experienced in practicing both law and politics in the Old 
Dominion, Abel Upshur came to epitomize the dual nature of the proslavery movement 
following both the Nat Turner insurrection and the Abolitionist postal campaign. In the 
1820s he had believed that slavery would eventually be ended in Virginia. During the 
1830s, however, things changed. Like many slaveholders, Upshur had been heavily 
influenced by Thomas Dew's defense of slavery following Nat Turner's rebellion in 
Southampton.  By the end of the decade, Upshur himself had written a long tract 
defending state rights against what he believed to be incursions by the federal 
government. By the turn of the decade, however, in the years before becoming Secretary 
of State, the Virginian changed his views once again. Rather than adhering to the states’ 
rights of the Jeffersonian school, Upshur advocated the creation of a strong federal 
government that used its power to protect slavery nationally, while at the same time 
protecting the individual power of the states to regulate the southern institution. For him, 
like so many others in the 1840s, these two ideas regarding slavery did not clash.27                                                         
26 Freehling, Road to Disunion vol 1, 363-364; Claude H. Hall, Abel P. Upshur: Conservative Virginian 
(Madison: The State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1964). 
27 [Abel P. Upshur], A brief enquiry into the true nature and character of our Federal Government: being a 
review of Judge Story's Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (Petersburg: Edmund and 
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 In 1839 Upshur joined the chorus of slaveholders who believed that proslavery 
forces needed to control the machinery of the federal government in order to protect 
slavery. The first step, he wrote in the Southern Literary Messenger, was for southern 
politicians to turn slavery into a matter that concerned more than just the planter class of 
the South. He wrote, "We have been in the habit of contemplating [slavery] rather as a 
domestic than as a political institution." Change had come to American politics, he told 
southerners. He continued, "It is fortunate for us that we are no longer permitted to view 
[slavery] in so imperfect a light. It is as a political institution that it possesses the highest 
interest to us, and in that character only I propose now to consider it."28 The time had 
come, he argued, for slaveholders to realize that slavery was indeed something more than 
a cultural staple of the American South. 
 Abel Upshur, like many people who write about political philosophy, based his 
ideas in part on his imagined projection of America’s future. His outlook could easily be 
described as pessimistic in the long term. All free societies eventually perished, he 
proclaimed in "Domestic Slavery." The only real project for a free people was to lengthen 
its period of free government.  In this task, Americans had an advantage that many other 
free people in civilizations before them had not had—a unique structure of government 
aimed at protecting the liberty of those it deemed free. He stated, "In contemplating the 
future decline of liberty in the United States, it cannot escape us that there is a want of 
perfect analogy between our republics and those of every other age and country." 
American exceptionalism established at the nation's founding by the Constitution served 
as the bedrock for protecting America's free society. He continued: "Our form of                                                         
28 Abel Upshur, "Domestic Slavery," Southern Literary Messenger 5 (October 1839): 677. 
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government has no example among [the rest of the world]; it is peculiar in its structure, 
and we may well hope that it is much more solidly founded and better balanced," a 
balance that allowed for federal strength with local control over particular interests.29  
 However, it was not just the composition of American government or the 
exceptional nature of the country's founding that safeguarded liberty in the nation, 
Upshur declared.  Slavery also played an essential role in securing liberty for whites in 
America. He explained to the readers of the Southern Literary Messenger that American 
slavery itself was exceptional when compared to other slaveholding republics throughout 
history.  While ancient civilizations acquired slaves through war with their neighbors, 
American planters found class stability in the explicitly racial division of the workforce.  
He wrote, "Our safety is in the color of the slave; in an external ineffaceable distinction 
of nature.  With us, there is no margin in the word manumitto, which transmutes the slave 
into the free citizen." The implication of his statements would be obvious to those who 
read his message: in trying to free the slaves, abolitionists hoped to undermine American 
exceptionalism and fall into the traps that had brought down free republics in the past. 
Southern slaveholders fused slavery to the American belief that their nation was different 
from the rest of the world. Near the end of his article, he argued that American freedom 
would last the longest in the South because of its unique slave system. Upshur concluded, 
"To my mind it is clear, that in this country Liberty is destined to perish a suicide; she 
will owe her destruction to her own excesses alone. And perish when she may, I am much 
deceived if her last entrenchment, her latest abiding place, will not be found in the slave-
                                                        
29 Ibid., 684-687.  
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holding states."30 
 Unlike societies without slavery, where labor and capital opposed each other and 
threatened to collapse the entire system, he argued, slavery served as the most stable 
system of labor because "the last man with whom the slave would unite, is his overseer." 
Upshur did not, however, avoid the obvious truth that slavery could become dangerous—
especially in times of war.  Instead he reassured his readership that "a very small 
squadron, prepared to march promptly and rapidly to any point of danger, would be 
sufficient to put down the best planned servile insurrection."31 As long as the military 
could protect slavery, liberty for whites would last longer in America than in any other 
place. For Abel Upshur, slavery had become a good that helped secure American liberty 
from a tumultuous class revolution seen in places like France so long as the slave-based 
society received protection from uprisings and outsiders. This ideology would play a 
major role in his thinking while he served the Tyler administration. 
 When Upshur first arrived in Washington as Tyler’s head of the Navy, many in the 
political class believed him to be both an extreme states rights disciple and an ardent 
defender of slavery.  One Ohio newspaper described the new Secretary of the Navy as 
someone who "has zealous ideas of the beauty and utility of the slavery system, and can 
knock down any man living upon the theory of that point." Political watchers, however, 
soon discovered that Upshur’s worldview rested on the conviction that a strong federal 
government could go hand in hand with protection of slavery. Once the Virginian started 
his new job, he actively employed the machinery of the federal government to protect  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slavery by strengthening its power and promoting reforms within the Navy that created a 
stronger standing military presence.  Once he became Secretary of State following Daniel 
Webster's resignation, Upshur, along with the president, began promoting ideas that 
stretched constitutional limits in order to protect U.S. slavery from a world that appeared 
to be turning against it.32  
 President Tyler, along with his handpicked cabinet, understood that Americans, or 
at least an electoral majority of them, would only resist the temptation of expansion for so 
long. Many Americans wanted to add more land to their nation, but no party willingly 
took action in facilitating those ends. The president—and therefore Tyler's—role as 
leader of American foreign policy gave him a chance to fill the void.  Texas offered a 
convenient way to gain popularity among the people despite the lack of enthusiasm he 
received from both the Whigs and Democrats in Washington. Soon after rising to the 
presidency, Tyler sent an agent to England in order to gauge that nation's interest in 
connecting itself closer to Texas.  Thus the man no one thought would ever be president 
initiated a plan to add land to the United States that his predecessors worried could 
contribute to the sectionalism that simmered below the surface of American politics in 
the 1840s.33                                                         
32 The actions Upshur took with the Navy are discussed more fully in chapter 4 of this dissertation. See also 
Matthew J. Karp, "Slavery and American Sea Power: The Navalist Impulse in the Antebellum South," The 
Journal of Southern History vol 87 (May 2011): 284-324; Claude H. Hall, "Abel P. Upshur and the Navy 
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 Throughout 1843 and 1844, Texas annexation reemerged in the public 
consciousness, prodded on by the president and his supporters. The issue initially 
reappeared in the form of a letter by Thomas Gilmer, a friend of Tyler, which had been 
published in The Madisonian, the pro-administration newspaper out of the nation's 
capital, in January 1843. Gilmer, elected to the House of Representatives as a Whig from 
Virginia, offered the first signs that the proslavery movement would continue to use the 
federal government to protect and expand slavery by cloaking it with the language of 
national prosperity and defense of the Union—tasks the public perceived as directly 
corresponding with the divided powers of the Constitution.34  
 Calling slavery "a subject of extreme delicacy," Gilmer understood the 
importance the institution would play in American opinions towards the annexation of 
Texas. He perceived the sectional tension that both presidents Jackson and Van Buren 
sensed immediately following the Texas Revolution and knew the proslavery movement 
needed to nationalize the issue in order to gain some sympathy in the North. Antislavery 
leaders, after all, had not stopped their opposition to adding more slave territory to the 
United States. Again, William Ellery Channing, during the final weeks before his death, 
spoke for many citizens in the North when he tied William Lloyd Garrison's cry of "No 
Union with Slaveholders!" to annexation.  Speaking in Lenox, Massachusetts, the 
theologian fortified his opposition to slavery, declaring that free states should not be held 
liable for the evils of slavery and saying, "Better that we should part, than be the police of                                                         
movement that favored using a powerful federal government to promote and defend slavery in the 
aftermath of the 1830s as well as its direct connection to the Wilmot Proviso, which will be discussed in 
chapter 6. 
34 Washington, D.C., The Daily Madisonian, January 23, 1843; Houston Telegraph, February 15, 1843. 
Gilmer's letter was initially published in the Baltimore Republican and Argus, January 19. 
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the slave-holder, than fight his battles, than wage war to uphold an oppressive 
institution." Channing could see how the proslavery movement had adjusted itself over 
time, incorporating the power of the federal government and pointing to the movement 
for Texas as evidence of this new tactic.36    
 Channing continued his speech by declaring, "So I say, let the Union be 
dissevered, rather than receive Texas into the confederacy. This measure, besides 
entailing on us evils of all sorts, would have for its chief end, to bring the whole country 
under the slave power, to make the General Government the agent of slavery." Little over 
a week after its initial publication, Garrison's Liberator published correspondence that 
further warned the antislavery movement to be prepared to push back against Texas 
annexation, criticizing Gilmer for masking the proslavery movement with the cloak of 
nationalism. Abolitionists like Channing and Garrison, as well as those who supported 
them throughout the free states, prepared themselves to do all they could to block the 
expansion of slavery territory.37  
 Just as they had during the Haitian Revolution, British emancipation of the West 
Indies, and the abolitionist postal campaign, the proslavery movement needed to find a 
way to convince those lacking antislavery moral sentiment in the North to join their cause 
by painting Texas annexation as an act that directly promoted or benefited the entire 
nation, not just southern slavery. Gilmer alluded to how much the North, especially the 
Midwest, would gain from annexation. He explained that adding "the unusually fertile 
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territory" would benefit the free states more than the slave South. Texas, he argued, 
would "be rapidly peopled" by Americans who would "open a market at home for the 
manufactures and agricultural products of all the non-slaveholding States," otherwise 
something that would only be available "under the restrictions and disadvantages of 
foreign competition," costing the free states thousands of dollars. Gilmer asserted that 
only the South could oppose adding Texas due to economic concerns, writing that 
annexation "would foster a competition for which it could find no immediate equivalent, 
except in the vast acquisition of national wealth, prosperity, and harmony which would 
result."38 Adding Texas would be a big win for the North, the Virginian maintained. 
 The congressman hoped to portray slaveholders as patriotic supporters of 
annexation for the benefit of the Union. However, Gilmer also unwittingly fulfilled 
Channing's prophecy that expansionists would not be satisfied with gaining Texas alone. 
He argued that America was ready to reach for greatness, and thus, for unlimited 
expansion: "Our federative Union, in the spirit of its adoption, is capable of indefinite 
extension. Space and numbers will only add to its blessings."39 The southern Whig hoped 
national pride would inspire those in the North to join him in soliciting the federal 
government to take action regarding Texas, despite it being slave territory.  
 More than patriotism, however, would be needed in order to convince enough 
northerners to join Tyler's new coalition in favor of expansion westward. Two particular 
issues worked to persuade some in the free states that America should expand its borders. 
The first was anti-black sentiment. Gilmer vaguely touched on this concern in his letter  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about Texas, arguing, "The culture of cotton and sugar in the United States has done 
more to withdraw slavery southward, than all the expedients which the wisdom of this or 
other generations could devise."40 His implication for those in the North, many of whom 
had an aversion to black people, was clear: adding Texas to the nation would force blacks 
to move out west, away from the Upper South and the North.  This idea would evolve 
over the years into an effective weapon in the debate over slavery.  
 The second subject used by those who wanted to add the Lone Star Republic to 
the Union involved America's old foe, England, and its abolitionism. Gilmer made this 
point explicitly, stating, "The prejudices of England against slavery are philosophically 
confined to sympathetic meetings, popular harangues, and a neighborly disposition to see 
us dissolve our union on account of it." Americans, together, should worry about what the 
English had planned in Texas and Mexico. He continued, "England, whose possessions 
and jurisdictions extend over so large a portion of the globe, whose influence is felt every 
where, will either possess or control Texas, if it does not come under the jurisdiction of 
the United States."41 Gilmer did not let the threat of possible crisis go to waste. Without 
quick action, the congressman urged to his fellow citizens, danger loomed ahead. During 
the 1830s proslavery forces outside the presidency had used emancipation in the West 
Indies as a way to actively promote the use of the federal government to bolster the 
defense of slavery in the United States. The topic of annexation fit into this template 
neatly, and the Tyler administration—partially propagandizing but also genuinely 
concerned that England did indeed have plans for Texas—used this information to  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promote annexation as a safety measure.42  
 Concerns from the Tyler administration over English machinations in Texas did 
not stem from sudden twisting of the facts. The southerners in charge of American 
diplomacy based their ideas on the concerns slaveholders in the South had felt for nearly 
half of a century.  In 1841 American slaveholders butted heads with England once again.  
This time, the enslaved aboard the Creole had rebelled against the slave traders holding 
them in bondage. After securing the ship, they sailed to Nassau in the Bahamas where, 
over American protests, the English governor freed every slave held on board. Thus, 
when Gilmer warned readers to be wary of Great Britain's abolitionism, he only made 
public the tensions Americans in and out of the White House felt and had discussed in 
anxious correspondence to each other. England, they believed, wanted to control Texas in 
order to end slavery. Therefore, in the early months after his rise to office, John Tyler 
tasked Duff Green, a former editor of the Washington Telegraph and loyal ally to John C. 
Calhoun, to work as his agent in England.  Planning to capitalize on the Texas annexation 
issue, the president wanted to gauge the exact mood in England regarding the Lone Star 
Republic.43  
 After arriving in England in December 1841, a month after the Creole incident, 
Green quickly set out to accomplish this task. During his time in Europe, he reported 
back to the United States that the British Empire planned to create a commercial 
monopoly by controlling the oceans and expanding its landholdings in North America to  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encompass California and Oregon, giving them a stronger foothold in the Pacific. He 
believed England feared both American manufacturing in the North as well as the power 
that southern cotton gave to the United States on the world market. Green wrote to his 
confidant and mentor, John C. Calhoun, that England found "it impossible to maintain 
her commercial and manufacturing superiority, because she cannot raise cotton, sugar 
&c., as cheap in India as it can be raised in the United States, Cuba, and Brazil."44 He 
believed that England wanted to use its military strength to reshape the composition of 
the global economy. 
 The abolitionists weakened the British Empire, Green told his mentor. "Her war 
on slavery and the slave-trade is intended to increase the cost of producing the raw 
material in the United States, Brazil, and Cuba" in order to further profit from the East 
India Company.  He concluded with the proslavery theory that England pursued 
abolitionism not out of moral reasons, but rather economic necessity, writing, "you will 
find that England has much more than a work of benevolence in the suppression of the 
slave-trade." He told the senator from South Carolina, as well as the president, that 
Americans needed to be prepared for war—just as Upshur had argued only a few years 
before, when he tried to strengthen the Navy.45 
 By 1843 John C. Calhoun made it a high priority to find a way to use federal 
authority to add Texas to the Union. Throughout the next year, the South Carolinian 
received other worrisome letters that seemed to build on the fears that many southern  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slaveholders felt regarding the supposed Abolitionist Power. Abel Upshur, who in July 
1843 became secretary of state after Daniel Webster joined the rest of Harrison's cabinet 
in resignation, wrote to Calhoun echoing the fears of slaveholders originally sparked in 
the 1830s.  He stated, "There can be no doubt, I think, that England is determined to 
abolish slavery throughout the American continent and islands, if she can. It is worse than 
childish, to suppose that she mediates this great movement, simply from an impulse of 
philanthropy." The United States needed to act against anticipated antislavery aggression, 
just as they had done after emancipation in the Caribbean and the Abolitionist postal 
campaign.  In the minds of powerful slaveholders in control of the federal government, 
Texas was the perfect place to take a stand. 
 Abel Upshur, fearful of both slave insurrections in the South and intervention by 
England, grew more determined to bind Texas to the Union. English meddling in Texas, 
he wrote to John C. Calhoun shortly after becoming the nation's chief diplomat, "is the 
beginning of her operations upon us. If she should succeed, the slaves of Louisiana and 
Arkansas, will find an asylum in Texas and it will be impossible to prevent them from 
seeking it. This government will not do any thing to aid the slave-holder, and of course, 
he will take the matter into his own hands.  He will reclaim his slave by force and this 
will lead to—war."46  
 Upshur's trust in slavery's northern allies had been shaken over the past decade. 
He wrote that a war with England had the potential to be disastrous for the South, 
because "the Northern States will not aid in a war, waged for such a cause, and this will 
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lead to a separation of the Union."47 After the abolitionist postal campaign, many 
powerful slaveholders began to distrust those in the free states. Anything short of an 
active defense of slavery, for some planters, signified a willingness to aid and abet the 
"fanatics" that hoped to sow insurrection among the slave population. Within this 
conspiratorial worldview, slaveholders in the administration clung to the annexation of 
Texas as a way to protect the slave South. 
 John C. Calhoun also embraced Texas annexation as an incredibly significant 
issue for the future of slavery.  Besides receiving letters from Duff Green, the former 
nullifier also heard from Ashbel Smith, the Texas minister to England and future regent 
at the University of Texas.  Smith warned that England would destroy slavery in Texas 
and create a nightmare for southern planters, especially on the western border.  He wrote, 
"I sincerely believe that the ultimate purpose is to make Texas a refuge for runaway 
slaves from the United States, and eventually a negro nation, a sort of Hayti on the 
continent" that would be protected by the British government.48 Visions of black soldiers 
marching through Louisiana no doubt filled the South Carolinian's mind. The danger of 
Haiti had been enough for southern planters to take action at the turn of the century, when 
Calhoun had been just a young man, but old enough to remember the fear that 
insurrection sparked in his native Palmetto State. The prospects of the slave states being 
neighbored by black nations to both the southeast and west, along with the growing 
abolitionist threat to the north simmering in the free states and to the south in the West 
Indies, no doubt frightened Calhoun. He and other slaveholders in powerful positions, 
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residing both in and out of Texas, became convinced that the only way to ensure their 
safety would be to make sure that the Lone Star Republic became the Lone Star State.    
  Upshur understood that admitting Texas as a slave state "would be received, at 
first, with a brush of repugnance" from northerners.  He determined that it was his and 
other annexationists’ duty to explain why protecting southern slavery from England had 
become necessary for those living in the free states as well as slave states.  He hoped that 
"the more the subject is reflected on, the more clearly will [northerners] see that the 
measure is absolutely necessary.  To the South, it is a question of safety; to the North, it is 
one of interest."49 Southerners needed to find a way to regain support from those in the 
free states who did not object to slavery on moral grounds.  
 While serving as President Tyler's chief diplomat, Upshur felt pressure from 
England he could not keep to himself. John C. Calhoun was not his only confidant in 
relating his fears that England had begun pursuing the course of universal emancipation.  
He also sent an urgent letter to the United States minister to Great Britain, Edward 
Everett, which stated, "The movements of Great Britain, with respect to African slavery, 
have at length assumed a character which demands the serious attention of this 
Government." He believed that "There are many and strong reasons for believing that the 
abolition of domestic slavery throughout the continent and islands of America is a 
leading object in the present policy of England." Though the president "would be 
reluctant to believe that any design unfriendly to this country...enters into the policy of 
England," Upshur thought it his duty to convince the president otherwise because "the  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bare suspicion " that England wanted to free the enslaved of the United States was 
"calculated to excite, and in this instance has actually excited a very strong sensation 
among our people."50 The Abolitionist Power could undermine the system of slavery 
simply through language, without using any force, just as it had during the abolitionist 
postal campaign.  Indirect action by the antislavery movement could light the spark that 
fired a full-blown insurrection. 
 In a different letter to Everett, postmarked on the same day as his first but marked 
“confidential,” Abel Upshur explained how devastated the South especially, and the 
United States as a whole, would become if slavery were to end in the slave states.  He 
told the American minister to England that three-fourths of American exports derived 
from enslaved labor.  However, he also included northern interests, writing, "There is still 
another interest which must share largely in this ruin. The vast capital now employed in 
manufacture of cotton goods must sink in value in proportion as the labor which produces 
the raw material shall be withdrawn."51 The entire nation, not simply the slaveholders or 
the slave states, he maintained, was connected by slavery whether the North, and the 
abolitionists, liked it or not. This became the message that the secretary and others in the 
proslavery movement began to spread. 
 Americans needed to ensure that Britain remained out of Texas because, as 
Upshur wrote, "It is obvious that slavery could not easily be maintained in a country 
surrounded by other countries whose Governments did not recognize that institution."  
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While many in the North were "as much opposed to the institution as England itself," 
their opposition remained different from English territories like Canada because the 
American Constitution had, from its inception, protected slavery by making it a reserved 
right of each state. It never formed, as Canada did in the 1840s, an area "whose 
Government did not recognize" the South's peculiar labor system. Despite any and all 
objections, the Constitution continued to protect the slaveholder, and "the absconding 
slave, therefore, has many chances against him before he can reach Canada."52 America's 
federal system therefore worked to the advantage of the master class by protecting the 
South from a North that seemed to be growing more antislavery by the day. 
 Without Texas, however, Upshur maintained, the Creole incident still fresh in his 
memory, the tables turned against the United States. He wrote, "Texas, however, lies 
immediately on the border of Louisiana and Arkansas. The slave would have nothing 
more to do than simply to cross the Sabine or the Red River, and he would find himself a 
free man." In direct opposition to the stance of William Ellery Channing, therefore, the 
Virginian argued that war would undoubtedly result if the Texas Republic fell under 
British influence, stating, "Scenes of violence and collision between the people of the two 
countries would be of almost daily occurrence; resentments would be kindled; and a war 
de facto would prevail," a war between the entire nation of the United States and 
England, not just the South, he insisted.53  
 The threat of war with the British Empire, along with the understanding that many 
in the free states felt little sympathy for blacks—enslaved or free—would serve as the  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basis for arguments in favor of annexation. Though Upshur saw this, he would never live 
to see his goals realized. Just days after his greatest achievement—pressuring President 
Sam Houston of Texas with an ultimatum that ultimately added the Lone Star Republic to 
the Union—Upshur, the former Secretary of the Navy, decided to join the president and 
the new Secretary of the Navy, Thomas Gilmer, on a tour of a new sloop-of-war, the 
Princeton. Armed with a newly designed cannon, the ship cruised along the Potomac 
River in February 1844. President Tyler stayed below the deck, delayed by dignitaries 
wanting to talk to the president, and missing the show planned by Gilmer, Upshur, and a 
host of others to celebrate the ship’s tour and guests of honor. After firing off the cannon, 
nicknamed the Peacemaker, more than once to entertain those on board, Gilmer talked 
the reluctant captain into firing the gun just one additional time. Advising those watching 
to open their mouths to avoid concussion, the secretary of the Navy, standing with 
Upshur near the cannon, ordered the gun to be fired. Instantly, a flash appeared as the gun 
exploded violently. The Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Navy, and many others, 
including other members of Congress and several sailors, died instantly from the blast. 
With this disaster aboard the Princeton, annexationists suddenly lost two major 
proponents of their goals for acquiring Texas. Others, however, would soon take Gilmer 
and Upshur's place, showing the force of their new brand of proslavery politics.54 
 Once the chief advocate in the Tyler administration was gone, the proslavery, pro-
annexation movement found a much-needed voice in Senator Robert J. Walker. A 
Democrat from Mississippi, Walker took up the cause in Congress and in the media of 
explaining to northerners the importance of adding Texas to the Union. He knew, as  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Upshur and other pro-annexationists did, that with just a fraction of solidarity from those 
who lived in the free states, Texas could join the Union despite antislavery opposition. 
Doubts about adding Texas as another slave state, however, still lingered in many parts of 
the nation. By the beginning of 1844, Senator Walker became determined to change the 
minds of those in the free states who still remained undecided. He published what soon 
became the cornerstone of the proslavery movement's argument for making Texas part of 
the United States of America.55 
 Robert Walker had charisma that could induce the most reluctant opponent to join 
his side of a debate. Subsequent to practicing law in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Walker, in 
his mid-twenties, moved to Mississippi to work in a successful practice in Natchez. Nine 
years later, Mississippi elected him as the first Yankee to serve in the Senate from their 
state. Like Channing's anti-Texas message a few years before, the senator published his 
argument in favor of annexation in the form of a letter, replying to a group of citizens 
from Carroll County, Kentucky, who had asked for his opinion on the issue. In a roughly 
thirty-page response, the Mississippi Democrat laid out an argument that would 
successfully convince many northerners in his own party—now in control of the House 
of Representatives after scoring victory in the North—to back annexation. Copies of 
Walker's letter spread across the country, both North and South, in newspapers and in 
pamphlets. Wealthy southerners even created a "Texas Fund" that served, along with 
Senator Walker's franking privilege, to finance its publication and circulate his pamphlet 
by the thousands. Robert Walker, and the promises he made, would play a pivotal role in  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northerners’ response to the expansionist impulse of the 1840s.56 
 The key components of Walker’s letter were a natural consequence of the 
transformation of proslavery ideology. Whereas the movement had previously viewed the 
federal government with suspicion, it too embraced the power and duty of the 
government to protect slavery. Drawing on the concerns and ideas of Gilmer and Upshur, 
the senator molded an argument for annexation based on two fundamental principles that 
transcended sectional lines—securing the safety of the Union from foreign aggression 
and protecting the white republic. First, however, Walker needed to undermine the 
position of his opponents, especially those Congress like John Quincy Adams and Henry 
Clay. He helped to shake some of their standing by pointing to their respective legacies as 
president and former secretary of state and reminding the nation that both these popular 
leaders had not always so opposed gaining land in Texas. 
 In the beginning of his appeal for the acceptance of Texas into the Union, the 
Mississippi Senator argued that the territory had never actually left. He maintained that 
Texas at no time ever truly belonged to Mexico and should always have been part 
American landholding as a piece of the Louisiana Purchase. He contended, "Our right to 
Texas, as a part of Louisiana, was asserted and demonstrated by Presidents Jefferson, 
Madison, Monroe, and John Quincy Adams. No one of our Presidents has ever doubted 
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our title; and Mr. Clay has ever maintained it as clear and unquestionable."57 By turning 
the issue from the "annexation" to the "re-annexation" of Texas, Walker transcended 
sectional tensions brought on by slavery and turned it into an issue of national pride. He 
also undercut those like William Ellery Channing, who argued against the morality of 
launching the Texas Revolution as a quasi-war of conquest. After all, Americans who 
fought against Mexico were only defending territory that rightfully belonged to the 
United States. 
 However, unlike his predecessors from the proslavery movement, Walker also 
directly engaged in a public discussion of slavery, race, and the role that Texas would 
play in protecting not just the South, but also the nation as a whole. For the first time, he 
created a singular, synthesized argument that could be repeated ad nauseum by 
annexationists. Just as Thomas Jefferson in 1776 had pointed to "domestic insurrections 
amongst us" and endeavors "to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless 
Indian Savages" against Americans in the Declaration of Independence, Walker stated 
that Native Americans could be stifled in their attacks against American citizens through 
annexation. Without Texas, he claimed, the nation would "surrender" the "Red river, and 
Arkansas, and their numerous tributaries, for thousands of miles, to a foreign power. It 
brings that power upon the Gulf, within a day's sail of the mouth of the Mississippi, and 
in the interior, by the curve of the Sabine, within about one hundred miles of the 
Mississippi." Texas could not be trusted to those who did not hold American interests in 
highest regard. Its proximity to the American South empowered foreign nations to be "in  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immediate contact with sixty thousand Indian warriors of our own, and with many 
thousand of the fiercest savage tribes in Texas, there to be armed and equipped for the 
work of death and desolation."58 Though he referred to "a foreign power" and thus 
avoided the specific issue of England and its abolitionism, he did express to his readers 
that without Texas, not only would enslaved blacks be inspired to insurrection by 
abolitionists, but Indians armed by the largest empire in the world would also rise up 
against their old foe.   
  Walker also disputed the American antislavery movement’s loyalty to the United 
States. He wrote, "The avowed object of this party is the immediate abolition of slavery. 
For this, they traverse sea and land; for this, they hold conventions in the capital of 
England; and there they brood over schemes of abolition in association with British 
societies; there they join in denunciations of their countrymen, until their hearts are filled 
with treason; and they return home, Americans in name, but Englishmen in feelings and 
principles."59 He further argued that the goal of the abolitionists was to overthrow the 
government and dissolve the Union, thus not only challenging the existence of American 
democracy itself, but also the idea of American exceptionalism that many in the North 
held dear.  
 Northerners feared that the addition of Texas, with the possibility that it could be 
separated into many slave states, would allow the South to gain an upper hand in national 
politics, both in the Senate and through the electoral college system of presidential 
elections.  They worried that the entire federal system that balanced the power between  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the two sections would collapse.  In response to those concerns, the Massachusetts 
legislature passed a resolution calling for an amendment to the Constitution that removed 
the three-fifths compromise, believing that it gave southerners an overrepresentation in 
Congress. Walker was ready with an answer.60 
 To mitigate northern concerns that Texas might increase the power of slave states 
in the federal government, he promised that "reannexation" would "only change the 
locality of the slaves, and of the slaveholding states, without augmenting their number."  
Slaves would move farther away from the North without strengthening the power of the 
slave states that already existed in the Union.  Abolitionists who prophesied wars over 
slavery overstated their sense of doom. While adding another large slave state seemed to 
strengthen the Slave Power, as Channing argued, the evidence he provided, the 
Mississippi senator said, was only circumstantial and did not include anticipations of 
black immigration, both free and enslaved, away from the North and Upper South that 
would create more free states dominated by a white population. In fact, Walker 
contended, the Union would be protected against sectionalism because the new state in 
the Southwest would draw slaves away from the nation's capital. Washington D.C. would 
be free of slaves within twelve years, he promised, "and that question, which now 
occupies so much of the time of Congress, and threatens so seriously the harmony, in not 
the existence of the union, would be put at rest by the annexation of Texas."61 Adding the 
Lone Star Republic to the United States was, therefore, an attack against the sectionalism 
that had boiled to the surface of American politics in the 1830s.  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 Many other proslavery members of Congress who argued in favor of the 
acquisition of Texas utilized Walker's argument that the Upper South would soon become 
free territory, and it soon became the annexationists’ favorite talking point. Senator James 
Buchanan, representing Pennsylvania, told fellow northerners in Congress, "I yet feel a 
strong repugnance, by any act of mine, to extend the present limits of the Union over a 
new slaveholding territory." Yet, following Walker's assertion, Buchanan also explained, 
"The acquisition of Texas would ere long convert Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, 
Missouri, and probably others of the more northern slave States into free States, I 
entertain no doubt."62 Acquiring Texas as part of the United States would not challenge 
the balance of power between the free states and the slave states. If the promises of 
Robert Walker and those who parroted his pamphlet came true, more free states than 
slave states would be created by Texas annexation. 
 In his Letter, the senator from Mississippi built on Thomas Gilmer's notion that 
the North depended on slavery just a much as the South in order to make ends meet.  
After repeating the claim that northern manufacturing depended on raw materials grown 
from the South, he also added that slaveholders served as customers for northern 
businesses.  Ending slavery immediately, as the abolitionists demanded, would have 
ruinous consequences for the North. Walker said that with emancipation, the North could 
expect "one universal bankruptcy" that "would overspread the country, together with all 
the demoralization and crime which ever accompany such a catastrophe." He argued that 
ending slavery would not just leave northerners poor, but also hungry. Beggars, he 
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claimed, "would ask us in the streets, not for money, but for bread."63 The proslavery 
voice in favor of Texas annexation therefore hoped to use anxiety over an unsettled future 
without slavery to bring some of the population in the free states to his side by claiming 
that blacks, free and enslaved, who many in the North saw as a threat to their society, 
would be moved southwestward, creating a whiter—and for many whites, a safer—
society in the eastern part of the United States. 
 The economic consequences of emancipation, however, would be the furthest 
thing from the minds of the white North if abolitionists got their way, the senator from 
Mississippi claimed.  The beggars that Walker prophesied would appear in the free states 
would not just be northern whites who lost their jobs. Blacks would also immigrate to the 
North without any preparation for participating in a free society. Without their masters to 
control the black population in the South, the former Pennsylvania lawyer proclaimed, 
northern whites would watch as the black population, fleeing their former masters, 
inundated their cities and towns while having no place to live or work because of their 
lack of skills. Texas joining the Union, he stressed, played a vital role in keeping blacks 
away from the free states where many in the white population already despised them. In 
the final section of his polemic, Robert Walker resurrected the old idea that had been 
discussed by the planter class on numerous occasions after the American Revolution, 
when slavery in the United States faced a challenge in the form of an insurrection or 
foreign emancipation. The West offered a place for excess slaves, a place to which a 
group of people that many nonslaveholders wanted their society to have little connection 
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with, could be sent.64  
 Walker's Letter represented one of the first times in the debate over annexation 
when the discussion moved beyond just Texas and developed into an entire doctrine 
regarding the expansion of slavery westward and southward.  He claimed that the 
expansion of American slavery to the Southwest would create a kind of safety valve for 
excess slaves—something that the colonies in the West Indies never could have achieved 
because of the nature of their government and their isolation as islands. However, the 
safety-valve thesis did not just pertain to the South and the slave states; it also involved 
the protection of the white population of the North, many of whom felt racial hatred 
toward blacks regardless of their status as a slave, former slave, or free man in a free 
state. Walker wrote, "The slaves being emancipated, not by the South, but by the North, 
would fly there for safety and protection; and three millions of free blacks would be 
thrown at once, as if by a convulsion nature, upon the States of the North."65 Texas 
annexation would act as a vessel to keep free blacks away from the states above the 
Mason-Dixon Line by encouraging immigration to the Southwest.     
 The genius of Walker's Letter, from a proslavery point of view, was that it made 
the entire nation accountable for slavery because it connected the federal expansion of 
slavery to positive consequences for the country as a whole, without forcing slavery onto 
free localities.  Having grown up in the northeastern state of Pennsylvania, the senator 
from Mississippi was attuned to the racial sensitivities of the North. He understood that 
white workers in the free states, cherishing their whiteness, felt antipathy towards blacks  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who might compete for their jobs and also valued the nation as a white republic. Walker 
played on those feelings in order to gain support for annexation specifically, and for 
slavery broadly, in the North. He insisted that if blacks immigrated to the North, the price 
of wages for white laborers would diminish as they had to compete against blacks for 
work "whilst the poor-house and the jail, the asylums of the dead and dumb, the blind, the 
idiot and insane, would be filled to overflowing; if, indeed, any asylum could be afforded 
to the millions of the negro race whom wretchedness and crime would drive to despair 
and madness." He further added that the loss of the Texas market and the "immense free 
black population" would force white workers to see that their "wages would be reduced 
until they would fall to ten or twenty cents a day, and starvation and misery would be 
introduced among the white laboring population."66 Whites who already held disparaging 
views of blacks would have little sympathy for the expansion of black enslavement at the 
expense of their jobs. 
 To ensure that his readers understood that other northerners joined him in his 
beliefs regarding abolitionism and slavery, Walker cited two speeches given by free-state 
politicians during the last session of Congress. First, he pointed to the words of a New 
Yorker.  Quoting a speech delivered in Congress in 1843 by Richard Davis, a Democrat 
from Poughkeepsie, Walker wrote that even northerners understood "the abolition of 
slavery in the southern States must be followed by a deluge of black population to the 
North, filling our jails and our poor houses, and bringing destruction upon the laboring  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Verso, 2007): 43-64; Alexander Saxton, The Rise and Fall of the White Republic: Class Politics and Mass 
Culture in Nineteenth-Century America (New York: Verso, 2003): 95-182. Walker seems to disregard how 
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portion of our people."67 Informed northerners too, Walker exhorted, thought that 
emancipation would only bring trouble for the free states.   
 Secondly, after using the controversial census of 1840 to show the rise of insanity 
and crime among free blacks in the North, Walker pointed to medical opinions to verify 
his prophesy about the ramifications of the abolitionist success. Alexander Duncan, a 
Democrat and doctor from Cincinnati, Walker explained, warned his congressional 
colleagues that "no man's fireside, person, family, or property would be safe by day or 
night." The result of emancipation, Walker quoting Duncan as saying, "would be to 
inundate the North with free blacks, with "paupers, beggars, thieves, assassins, and 
desperadoes, nearly all penniless and destitute, without skill, means, industry, or 
perseverance to obtain livelihood."68 By stating that blacks had a tendency towards 
violence, especially when granted their freedom, Walker hoped to show how the threat of 
insurrection transcended sectionalism. Just as proslavery northerners explained the 
North's connection to protecting slavery by referencing their own sons going south to put 
down insurrections during the fear over the Haitian Revolution, the Mississippi senator 
used examples of northern proslavery opinion to show whites in the free states that they 
could not shelter their own lives from the outcome of ending slavery.  
 In order to gain the trust of northerners who read his pamphlet, Walker made 
assurances for a future where northerners would never have to worry about coming into 
contact with slavery and would rarely share public space with blacks. By expanding 
slavery to the Southwest, slaves, and even the U.S. black population as a whole, would  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move away from the North.  He asserted, "Much if not all of this great evil, will be 
prevented by the reannexation of Texas. Since the purchase of Louisiana and Florida, and 
the settlement of Alabama and Mississippi, there have been carried into this region, as the 
census demonstrates, from the States of Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and Kentucky, 
half a million of slaves, including their descendants, that otherwise would now be within 
the limits of those four States." He added that annexing Texas to the Union "must recede 
to the same extent from the northern of the slaveholding States, from the expulsion into 
them of free blacks, by abolition, gradual or immediate, would thereby be greatly 
mitigated, if not entirely prevented." If northerners wanted nothing to do with slavery, 
then adding Texas as a slave state, over thousand miles away from most northern cities, 
provided the best solution.69   
 Walker ended his letter with a promise. He pledged, "The African being from a 
tropical climate, and from the region of the burning sands and sun, his comfort and 
condition would be greatly improved, by a transfer from northern latitude to the genial 
and most salubrious climate of Texas.  There he would never suffer from the exposure to 
cold and frost, which he feels so much more severely than any other race."  The outcome 
of adding another state to the Southwest was clear: "There is but one way in which the 
North can escape these evils; and that is the reannexation of Texas, which is the only 
safety-valve for the whole Union, and the only practicable outlet for the African 
population, through Texas, into Mexico and Central and Southern America."70 Though 
Texas served as a safety valve against insurrections for southern slaveholders by working  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as a buffer against abolition, it also acted as a funnel for removing blacks from the United 
States, eventually forcing them to migrate to Mexico, Walker told his northern readers. If 
northerners who opposed slavery due to their dislike of black people would join him in 
supporting his cause, they would soon find the black population dwindling in the United 
States, making America an even whiter republic. Texas annexation was here 
characterized as colonization without the cost. Those in the North would not soon forget 
this assurance from Senator Walker when Texas eventually joined the Union and 
sharpened tensions between America and Mexico. 
 Walker's promise soon became a favored talking point for Democratic politicians 
who favored annexation. James Buchanan epitomized this tactic, restating his colleague 
from Mississippi's claims repeatedly in Congress. Buchanan stated that "Spaniards, 
Indians, and negroes, blended together in every variety...would receive our slaves on 
terms of perfect social equality." He continued that the Rio Grande seemed the natural 
boundary "between the Anglo-Saxon and Mexican races," between white and non-whites 
who naturally felt antipathy toward one another. "Providence," after all, the future 
president stated, "generally produces great changes by gradual means....May not, then, 
this acquisition of Texas be the means of gradually drawing slaves far to the South, to a 
climate more congenial to their nature; and may they not finally pass off into Mexico, and 
there mingle with a race where no prejudice exists against their color?"71 In trying to 
persuade other northerners to join him, Buchanan laid out the southern boundary of 
Manifest Destiny at Texas. Those skeptical of his claims would remember that line in the 
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future as well.  
 The annexationists, following Walker's promise, purposely overstated the impact 
on the black population when they maintained it would just eventually fade away in what 
would become the Lone Star State, thus taking away the taint of sectionalism from the 
process of annexation. The belief that the northern black population would diminish with 
the addition of Texas helped the annexation movement in the North withstand Secretary 
of State John C. Calhoun's attempts to sectionalize the acquisition of Texas. In a series of 
letters to the British minister to the United States in April 1844, Calhoun, having replaced 
Abel Upshur as secretary of state, wrote that the "Federal Government" had the 
"imperious duty" to add Texas to the Union as a way to protect the South from British 
abolitionism. The South Carolinian hoped to force abolitionists into accepting the 
premise that the federal government had the obligation to protect slavery in the South.72  
 Although Calhoun's actions angered those who already supported the antislavery 
movement, Walker's connection between abolitionism and immigration certainly helped 
retain enough support for the annexation movement. Newspaper subscribers throughout 
New England read the argument in favor of Calhoun's letter and claimed that Calhoun 
was only standing up to British meddlers. After all, the article contended, blacks enslaved 
in the South were better off than free blacks in the North, according to the census. 
Because people then, as today, typically trusted figures produced by their government to 
be unbiased, whites with racist pretensions relied on what the government told them to be 
factual. Average citizens felt little reason to believe the government would purposely 
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configure statistics to twist facts; and with little contact with blacks, they would have 
little grounds for challenging the census. Others in the Northeast read about the fear that 
planters had over the possibility of England gaining control of Texas. A newspaper editor 
from Connecticut told his readers, for example, "The sugar planters are friendly to a 
protective Tariff, but they view their future safety of vastly greater consequence than the 
temporary benefits of protection." One slaveholder asked the newspaper, "Do we care for 
temporary depreciation, when weighed against the possibility of permanent destruction?" 
Southerners should worry about their safety, the newspaper editor explained.74 After 
Walker and other proslavery, pro-annexationists made national campaigns appealing to 
racial tension and national security, many in the North had no problem accepting Texas if 
it meant fewer blacks in the North and increased safety in the South.  
 Many southerners also supported the idea of the safety valve and the principle that 
Texas would serve as a buffer against abolitionists who wanted to cause a slave rebellion. 
Many living in the South came to accept the notion that Texas increased southern security 
when Andrew Jackson wrote a public letter, republished in numerous newspapers 
throughout the slave states, offering his embrace of the annexation of Texas. Old Hickory 
warned southerners about the possibility of chaos being introduced to the southern 
lifestyle by Great Britain and echoed Walker’s idea that the Sabine River could be used 
to stir “the negroes to insurrection,” causing “the lower country” to fall “and with it New 
Orleans” while “a servile war rages through the whole South and West.” By adding 
Texas, the South’s border would be moved to the Rio Grande, the former president  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stated, “which is itself a fortification, on account of its extensive, barren, and 
uninhabitable plains.” With Texas, the old general concluded, the United State would 
have “such a barrier on our west” that it would be “invincible.”75  
 During the political season of 1844, Walker's thesis served as a way for opponents 
to attack Henry Clay and Martin Van Buren, the two anticipated nominees in the 
presidential election. Both men originally opposed annexation before changing their 
minds due to political expediency. Henry Clay, who was nominated by the Whigs, took 
the most damage from Texas annexation. One "letter by a New York gentleman in 
Louisiana," published in the Connecticut Republican Farmer, showed how much traction 
annexation had gained among voters, both North and South.  He wrote, "The last time I 
traveled on the Western waters was May, 1840.  Then, everybody, almost, seemed in 
favor of Harrison; now, almost all seem in favor of the Democratic nominees.  I have met 
numbers of well informed persons on my route, from Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, 
Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Georgia, and Louisiana."76 Democrats, however, gained 
momentum in 1844 by simply choosing to dump Van Buren and go with an ardent 
proponent of expansion, James K. Polk who, after Robert Walker changed the rules at the 
Democratic convention, won the nomination and eventually the presidency on a platform 
of territorial expansion.  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 The Texas issue did not create sectional fissures within the Democratic Party 
between antislavery northerners who supported Van Buren and opposed the extension of 
slavery in the West. Rather, the issue papered over cracks in the rank-and-file foundation 
caused by the economy—such as banking, the tariff, and improvements. Democrats who 
realized that the party was being held together by loose affiliations saw annexation as a 
powerful issue, just as Tyler had, and chose to run with it. Many within the Democracy 
believed that Texas offered a way for their party to separate itself from Whig opponents 
in the election of 1844 and thereby unify their own party, which many believed faced 
losses in the upcoming election.77 
 Whereas Tyler and his supporters hoped to create a new party by supporting 
annexation, Democratic power brokers saw the issue as a way to renew their party, which 
had lost power for the first time in decades. Expansionists saw Texas annexation as 
fulfilling the Democratic ideology of economic independence. The fear of overpopulation 
abounded among many northeastern Democrats who worried that crowded cities would 
lower wages for the working class. They argued that cheap land in the West offered city 
workers, who currently depended on employment from others in order to stay alive and 
prosper, the opportunity to secure a farm in Texas and work for themselves. Proponents 
therefore contended that Democratic principles reverberated throughout the annexationist 
argument, and they believed that instead of being driven by sectional, slave power 
interests, party and national ideology defined the argument more. Tyler had succeeded in 
creating an electoral base out of the issue of Texas. However, when Democrats embraced  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expansion without nominating Tyler as their standard bearer, the president removed 
himself from seeking reelection.78 
 Walker's message connecting antislavery views with England resonated with 
many in America, and Democrats used his thesis to gain votes.  Just as Federalists tried to 
tie their opponents to the French after the Haitian Revolution, Democrats in 1844 did 
their best to connect the Whigs, and the antislavery movement, to the British.  
Furthermore, Texas helped to sustain the middle ground between antislavery and 
proslavery radicalism. Several Democrats criticized both radical antislavery and 
proslavery positions on Texas and rejected calls by southern radicals who threatened 
secession over Texas.  Annexation allowed many southerners to argue that slavery was 
best protected within the Union, thus undermining those in the planter class who had 
begun to criticize the American system of government.79  
 In the end, Texas would join the Union under a cloud of controversy. As the 
antislavery movement filibustered the final treaty between the United States and the 
Republic of Texas that made it the twenty-eighth state, Tyler and those in favor of 
annexation needed to find a way around the Constitution.  They did so by passing a joint 
resolution in the House and Senate that only needed a majority vote, unlike treaties, 
which require a two-thirds vote in the Senate. Both the Washington Globe and New York 
Evening Post, along with other less prominent newspapers, supported the joint resolution 
to annex Texas and worked to squeeze out the final votes for passage by slim margins.  
They, along with much of the nation, believed that adding Texas to the United States  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represented the providential march of Americans towards the Pacific.  Furthermore, 
having no distaste for the expansion of slavery westward, many Democrats in the North 
supported the congressional resolution that acted as an endrun around the Constitution 
because several believed Robert Walker when he wrote that the addition of Texas might 
indeed end slavery in the long run.80 During the final days of his term, John Tyler, at long 
last, signed the bill that formally invited Texas to become the twenty-eighth state, which 
they would accept a few months later.  
 Those in the North, however, would not forget the promise Walker and his 
supporters made about funneling slavery through Texas to South America. Nor would 
southerners who embraced the need for a safety valve for slavery accept that Texas would 
be enough to protect the slave South from future black population growth leading to an 
insurrection. As tensions grew with Mexico, the United States elected a new president, 
James K. Polk, who successfully campaigned explicitly on national expansion and 
manifest destiny. Americans soon found themselves in a controversial war in which 
victory resulted in hundreds of thousands square miles being added to the United States.  
It would be over determining the future of that new land that Walker's promise came into 
direct conflict with the expectations held by southerners in the slave South who believed 
the federal government had the duty to keep their states secure against a servile 
insurrection. 
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Chapter Six Wilmot's Proviso and the Slaveholding Crisis   
If you confine the slaves to the cotton States within their present limits, you will compel the white 
population of that region either to abandon it to the black, or to endure the debasing consequences of an 
admixture of races. Thus they have to decide a question both of existence and civilization, as well as of 
liberty. 
 
-John Holcombe's Secessionist Speech, Virginia, March 20, 18611 
   
The clouds opened and the sky boomed with thunder on March 4, 1845, as Chief Justice 
Roger Taney stood, Bible in hand, to swear in the next president of the United States. The 
temperature had fallen to the forties, and the jurist and the president-elect stood against 
the cold. Behind them rested the white columns of the United States Capitol’s East 
Portico, where the president-elect’s star had risen during his tenure as Speaker of the 
House. The marble columns sharply contrasted with the ocean of umbrellas flowing 
before them, where thousands of American citizens stood in inches of mud to hear their 
new president's first national address. Few had expected him to win the nomination of his 
party, even less thought he could gain victory over the nationally renowned Henry Clay, 
but James Knox Polk of Tennessee—nicknamed "Young Hickory" because he had been a 
protégé of Andrew Jackson—had beaten the odds, becoming the eleventh president of the 
United States of America.2 
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 During the campaign for the presidency in 1844, Polk had followed a set of 
positions laid out by Robert Walker, the man who had helped push through Congress the 
annexation of Texas. Walker had played an influential role in helping the former Speaker 
of the House obtain the nomination at the Democratic National Convention when he 
pressed a rule change that made it nearly impossible for the former president, Martin Van 
Buren, to receive enough votes for the nomination. A member of the pro-annexationist 
camp, Polk took the idea of expansion further than even President Tyler had dreamed 
when he declared that he stood not for the annexation of Texas alone but of Oregon as 
well. Riding the popular sentiment of expansion welling up in some parts of the United 
States, especially in the South, while effectively using smear tactics on his opponents, 
"Young Hickory" became the heir of Jackson following his former mentor as president of 
the United States by the narrowest of margins, winning New York by only five thousand 
votes when the abolitionist Liberty Party stripped the Whigs of nearly ten thousand votes, 
tilting the state's electors to the Democrats.3 
 Telegraph operators tapped descriptions of the scene. A man reputed to be one of 
the best stump speakers in the nation by friends and foes alike, Polk delivered his 
inaugural address to his fellow citizens, expressing his vision for the future of the United 
States on that cold March day. At the age of forty-nine, James K. Polk became the first 
person in his forties to become president of the United States. Understanding his                                                         
3 Sean Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln (New York: W. W. Norton and 
Company, 2005): 566-575; Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of 
America, 1815-1848 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007): 682-690; Michael F. Holt, The Rise and 
Fall of the American Whig Party: Jacksonian Politics and the Onset of the Civil (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999): 201-206; William Dusinberre, Slavemaster President: The Double Career of 
James Polk (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003): 119-140; Leonard L. Richards, The Slave Power: 
The Free North and Southern Domination, 1780-1860 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
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youthfulness might make some Americans uneasy, the new president assured the nation 
that he understood what so many Americans saw as the “exceptional” nature of the 
Union. Calling it the "most admirable and wisest system of well-regulated self-
government among men, ever devised by human minds," the new president told the 
audience, "Every lover of his country must shudder at the thought of the possibility of its 
dissolution."4 He pledged to protect the uniqueness of the American Union that so many 
of his citizens believed made their nation special among the rest of the world. 
 A steadfast member of the proslavery movement and a large slaveholder himself, 
the president told the crowd that he hoped to unify the country by challenging 
abolitionism, which he held responsible for causing a rift between the free and slave 
states.  Polk viewed the antislavery movement as the greatest threat to the Union that so 
many American citizens loved.  He continued, "It is a source of deep regret that in some 
sections of our country, misguided persons have occasionally indulged in schemes and 
agitations, whose object is the destruction of domestic institutions existing in other 
sections." Polk said that Americans would never allow the Union to crumble over 
slavery.  "I am happy to believe that at every period of our existence as a nation, there has 
existed, and continues to exist, among the great mass of our people, a devotion to the 
Union of the States, which will shield and protect it against the moral treason of any who 
would seriously contemplate its destruction." He told northerners, however, that the 
South would not receive any special interests either. Instead, Americans, he wrote, shared 
a "common destiny." All "peculiar interests of sections or classes, must operate to the 
                                                        
4  Thomas Hart Benton, Abridgement of the Debates of Congress from 1789 to 1856: Dec. 4, 1843-June 18, 
1846, vol. XV (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1861): 237-238.  
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prejudice of the interests of their fellow-citizens, and should be avoided."5 The nation 
would move forward together, he promised. 
 Like Walker, whom Polk appointed Secretary of the Treasury, the new president 
believed that acquiring more land in the West would serve as the best way to unite the 
country behind the goals of security and national greatness. Texas was important to the 
Union, Polk stated, because "the safety of New Orleans and of our whole south-western 
frontier against hostile aggression, as well as the interests of the whole Union, would be 
promoted by it." However, to show his devotion to the country as a whole, he also 
focused on the "re-occupation" of the American Northwest, contending: "Our title to the 
country of Oregon is clear and unobjectionable."6 Americans, he hoped, would rally 
behind expansion if they believed the nation—altogether—would benefit from it, 
regardless of where they lived.   
 President Polk's stance regarding the American-British dispute over Oregon 
Territory fulfilled the Democratic platform of 1844. His posture that the claim for Oregon 
by the United States was "clear and unobjectionable" came directly from his party's 
position on western lands.  In Baltimore the Democratic National Convention had 
resolved "the re-occupation of Oregon and the re-annexation of Texas at the earliest 
practicable period are great American measures which this Convention recommends."  In 
the months that followed Polk's inauguration, a wing of the Democratic Party that 
demanded "all Oregon" soon created a slogan: "Fifty-four Forty or Fight!" The 
catchphrase referred to the extreme north latitude of Oregon Territory, which today is the                                                         
5 Ibid., 239. 
6 Ibid., 239-240. 
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southern border of Alaska.  Gaining control of this land would block England from 
having a Pacific port, thus weakening what most saw as America's biggest military rival 
in North America. These expansionists willingly risked a clash with England for more 
territory. However, the fight for additional lands would not materialize in the rainy 
forests of the Northwest, and the Polk administration negotiated a settlement that only 
gave one-half of the territory to the U.S, granting the United States what would 
eventually become Oregon and Washington. Instead, the "fight" that so many 
expansionists anticipated occurred nearly two thousand miles away from 54° 40 north 
latitude.7 Just as the anti-annexationists had predicted, the United States found itself 
embroiled in a tense standoff with its southern neighbor on the border of Texas less than 
a year after James K. Polk's inauguration. 
 The annexation of Texas by the United States enraged many in Mexico City.  
Mexican newspapers called for war as the only method that could save their nation.  
Despite wanting to avoid conflict, the Mexican President José Joaquín de Herrera called 
for states to fill their quotas for troops and told his diplomats in France and England to 
explain that his nation had no choice but to fight the United States. To make matters 
worse, Polk demanded the border of Texas be pushed southward to the Rio Grande—not 
the Nueces River, as Mexico claimed—and in response authorized nearly 8,000 troops, 
led by General Zachary Taylor, to be garrisoned on the American determination of the 
Texas border. He hoped to intimidate the Mexican president into selling the United States                                                         
7 Kirk H. Porter and Donald Bruce Johnson, eds, National Party Platforms, 1840-1964 (Urbana: University 
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the northern half of his country—modern-day sections of New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, 
and California. The new president was willing to offer Mexico $40 million for the 
territory, believing, condescendingly, that Mexicans would gladly sell a huge portion of 
their nation to the United States. For years, members of the proslavery movement had 
wanted American control of California in order to weaken British strength in North 
America. Mexican officials unsurprisingly declined the offer by the Americans.8 
 American and Mexican troops squared off on the border for months.  Finally, in 
April 1846, the tension turned into conflict when Zachary Taylor received intelligence of 
a Mexican corps crossing the border and in response sent a reconnaissance team, led by 
Captain Seth Thornton, to scout the area. As Captain Thornton wandered twenty miles 
away from camp with seventy soldiers under his lead, he stumbled into an ambush set by 
the Mexican army. After a small battle, eleven Americans were killed, and six wounded. 
The rest had been captured in a resounding victory, inspiring a thrill that spread 
throughout Mexico. The Mexican general in charge of the battle proclaimed his pleasure 
at having started a war with the United States. However, on the American side of the 
battle, a little-known lieutenant in Taylor's army, Ulysses S. Grant, analyzed it in a 
different way.  Writing after the fact, Grant wrote, "We were sent to provoke a fight, but 
it was essential that Mexico should commence it. It was very doubtful whether Congress 
would declare war; but if Mexico should attack our troops, the Executive could 
announce" that war with Mexico had already begun. Few would stand in the way of a war                                                         
8 David A. Clary, Eagles and Empire: The United States, Mexico, and the Struggle For A Continent (New 
York: Bantam Books, 2009): 62-103; Hietala, Manifest Destiny: American Exceptionalism and Empire, 
Revised Edition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985): 153-156; Robert W. Merry, A Country of Vast 
Designs: James K Polk, The Mexican War, and the Conquest of the American Continent (New York: 
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defensively protecting the nation, as the administration knew. President Polk had 
received his wish. Two weeks after hearing the news from Texas, he urged Congress to 
declare war against Mexico and called for volunteers to be raised and a "liberal 
provision…made for sustaining our entire military force and furnishing it with supplies 
and munitions of war."9 The president prepared to unleash the dogs of war. 
 Congress immediately took up the measure proposed by Polk, and the 
Democratic-controlled House of Representatives passed quickly the declaration of war. 
Only seventeen members dissented. The Senate, however, hesitated to involve the United 
States in a military conflict, and both Whigs and some Democrats wanted time to debate 
the issue. One of those Democrats was John C. Calhoun who, despite having been so 
staunchly in favor of Texas annexation, hoped to slow down the nation's march towards 
war with its neighbor. The South Carolinian believed there should be a difference 
between "hostilities" and "war" with Mexico, noting that one was a short term brush-up, 
and the other a long-term military confrontation. Just days before the vote, Calhoun wrote 
to an acquaintance that "I deplore [fighting against Mexico] every way." He worried "that 
it may arrest, or even defeat the settlement of the Oregon Question, [and] introduce the 
interference of both England [and] France before it is concluded." Hostilities with 
Mexico, he feared, opened the possibility of a larger military contest between the 
Abolitionist Power in England and the United States. However, despite Calhoun's best 
attempts at slowing down the process, the senate consented to a declaration of war 
against Mexico with a vote of 40 to 2, with three senators, including Calhoun, refusing to                                                         
9 Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant, Two Volumes In One (Old Saybrook, Ct: Konecky and 
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vote. For the first time in the nation's history, the United States prepared to fight a war 
exclusively on foreign soil.10 
Only a few months after the initial declaration of war, the president, believing the 
conflict would be ended quickly, asked Congress for two million dollars in order to 
negotiate lands away from the Republic of Mexico.  The American military action against 
their neighbor now created the possibility for Polk, and many other expansionists, to 
seize upon their dreams of creating a continental American republic. The United States 
would stretch from the Atlantic to the Pacific, more than quadrupling its size in seventy 
years. Proceeding with the Mexican War opened a political divide between Whigs and 
Democrats over the topic of westward expansion. Whigs took the same stance they had 
during the debate over Texas annexation—no more land meant no more sectional strife. 
The Democrats, however, held the majority in both chambers of Congress and had the 
advantage of riding the wave of popular enthusiasm for their measures in the election of 
1844, which promised more land to the white working class in the North and the yeomen 
in the South. Confident that they could continue to make westward expansion a national 
issue by following Robert Walker's template for promoting the acquisition of more land, 
Democratic leaders believed the call for money to pay for Mexican land seemed an easy 
task for Congress to perform. They would be surprised at the weakness of their national 
coalition.11 
                                                        
10 John C. Calhoun to Thomas Clemson, May 12, 1846 in The Papers of John C. Calhoun, 95-96; 
Congressional Globe, 29 Cong., 1 sess., 783-787; Merry, A Country of Vast Designs, 245-252.  
11 The best discussion of what happened in Congress during the initial introduction of Wilmot’s Proviso 
still remains David M. Potter, The Impending Crisis, 1848-1861, ed. Don. E. Fehrenbacher (New York: 
Harper and Row Publishers, 1976): 18-24, 64-75. See also Chaplain W. Morrison, Democratic Politics and 
Sectionalism: The Wilmot Proviso Controversy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967) for 
  265 
Not wanting to take up too much time on such a mundane task, leaders in the 
House of Representatives limited the debate about the president’s appropriation bill to 
only a couple of hours. Two Whigs expectedly attacked President Polk’s expansionist 
plan and challenged his need for an appropriation of two million dollars. Robert 
Winthrop of Massachusetts expressed concerns about "a bill to place two millions of 
dollars at the disposal of the President 'for any extraordinary emergencies which might 
arise out of intercourse with foreign nations'" without "a word about peace" or Mexico. 
He worried about the possibility of perpetual wars of conquest. Two Democrats came in 
support of the measure to grant the president an appropriation that they insisted could end 
the war and promote peaceful relations between Mexico and the United States.12  
Next, the Speaker of the House, John W. Davis from Indiana, recognized a 
freshman congressman from Pennsylvania with a record of loyalty to the White House. 
Davis assumed that Polk’s plan risked nothing from hearing him speak. The error of that 
assumption would resound throughout the rest of American history. In the ten minutes 
allotted to him, David Wilmot first told Congress that unlike his Whig colleagues, "he 
believed [the war with Mexico] a necessary and proper war." He insisted that 
congressmen who said it was a war for conquest were mistaken. Wilmot stated that he 
"trusted it was not to be a war of conquest." He trusted that the president was "sincerely 
ready to negotiate for an honorable peace." The congressman who voted with the 
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president on every issue—from the Oregon border to the tariff—appeared to be defending 
Polk once again from his harsh critics.13   
After expressing his confidence in the president's war effort, however, Wilmot 
dropped a bombshell that altered the course of American politics and helped lead to the 
Civil War. He explained that while he did not disagree with adding more land to the 
United States, "he was most earnestly desirous that a portion of territory on the 
Pacific...should come into our possession by fair and honorable means." His opposition 
would stem from only one objection. As the congressman explained, "whatever territory 
might be acquired, he declared himself opposed, now and forever, to the extension of this 
'peculiar institution' that belongs to the South." He had voted in favor of Texas 
annexation because "slavery had already been established there," he said. "But, if free 
territory comes in," such as land from Mexico that had not seen legal slavery in decades, 
"God forbid that he should be the means of planting this institution upon it."14 Uneasiness 
loomed over the House of Representatives as southerners prepared to refute the 
Pennsylvanian's charges. Members watching could only anticipate what would happen 
next. 
David Wilmot soon found the opportunity to turn his words into actions, 
proposing an amendment to the president's appropriation bill that would change the 
political debate regarding expansion for years to come. Modeled after the familiar 
language Thomas Jefferson used in authoring the Northwest Ordinance, the Democratic                                                         
13 Congressional Globe, 29 Cong. 1 sess., 1214; Charles Buxton Going, David Wilmot: Free-Soiler (New 
York: D. Appleton and Company, 1924): 47-93. 
14 Congressional Globe, 29 Cong. 1 sess., 1214. 
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newcomer proposed “as an express and fundamental condition to the acquisition of any 
territory from the Republic of Mexico by the United States…neither slavery nor 
involuntary servitude shall ever exist in any part of said territory, except for crime, 
whereof the party shall first be duly convicted.”15 This proposal forever after became 
known as the Wilmot Proviso.16 In reaction, southern slaveholders argued the stability of 
their slave labor system could not be maintained and protected by the federal government 
as the rising population of the North gave more power to the free states and the 
antislavery movement. President Polk's hopes of national unity in marching the nation 
towards the Pacific began to unwind. 
News of the Wilmot Proviso spread quickly throughout Washington.  Panicked 
agents of the administration rushed to Capitol Hill, hoping to lobby faithful Democrats to 
kill the amendment. Soon, urgency grew great enough to bring three cabinet members in 
order to the House to twist the arms of party members. They desperately tried to keep 
their coalition together. Many of those in attendance watching the drama play out on the 
House floor feared that the political Pandora’s box of slavery had been opened as 
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Democratic leadership acted desperately to keep it closed. However, debate was still 
limited. Voting on the appropriation bill started within two hours of Wilmot’s proposal as 
had been scheduled. In a last-ditch effort to save the bill’s passage from causing 
momentous sectional strife, a Democrat from Indiana offered his own addendum to the 
bill, replacing the proviso with an extension of the Missouri Compromise line of 36° 30’ 
all the way to the Pacific. The compromise measure was voted down 89 to 54.  Next, 
Wilmot’s amendment to prohibit slavery in the West passed by a vote of 80 to 64.  Of all 
the votes against the Wilmot Proviso, only three came from congressmen outside of the 
South. The proslavery movement in the House of Representatives frantically sought a 
way to stop the prohibition of slavery in the lands acquired from Mexico while 
Democratic leadership tried to keep their national coalition together, attempting to table 
the measure after it became apparent that Wilmot's Proviso would stay in the bill. They 
failed.17  
The roll call produced a stark divide, not between the usual suspects—Whigs and 
Democrats—but rather, between the politicians from free and slave states. Northerners 
opposed postponing consideration of the bill, while southerners tried to prevent a vote on 
the appropriation from going to the floor. Representatives from the South, hoping a delay 
would allow cooler heads to prevail, floundered in their attempt to table Polk’s request 
for negotiation money. The bill, Wilmot’s amendment included, came to a vote. The 
legislation passed, 85 to 80, with the division for and against being almost completely 
sectional. The House then sent the bill to the Senate. A simple request for an 
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appropriation opened a small crack in the national two-party political system of the 
United States.  Antislavery politicians soon sought a way to pass Wilmot’s amendment in 
the Senate.18 
Democratic unity over sectional issues had been decaying for years, as northern 
representatives grew tired of forestalling their own initiatives in favor of southern 
demands to protect slavery. This was a especially true for the New York contingent of 
Van Burenites known as the Bucktails who believed that southerners had become too 
powerful a force in their party. The fissure became apparent in 1844 when John Quincy 
Adams finally found a sufficient coalition of Congressmen, including fifty-four 
Democrats, to repeal the gag rule. Southern power over the Democratic Party generally, 
and the House of Representatives specifically, had declined, allowing something like the 
Wilmot Proviso, inconceivable just a few years before, to actually pass the lower 
chamber of Congress. The appropriation bill served as the perfect vehicle for Wilmot's 
amendment to prohibit the further extension of slavery westward, as it was both 
desperately wanted by President Polk and presented to the Congress with a sense of 
urgency.19 
Because the following day was a Sunday, the Senate did not take up the Wilmot 
Proviso until two days later, the last day of the congressional session. Senator John 
Davis, a Massachusetts Whig friendly to the bill, tried to speak until it would be too late 
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to send the bill back to the House for revision without the proviso’s prohibition of slavery 
in the West.  However, because of a miscalculation—the clock in the House was faster 
than the one in the Senate—Davis spoke too long. With eight minutes left in the Senate 
session, Davis was informed that the House had already adjourned.  Thus, the first 
session of the Twenty-ninth Congress expired. Those in favor of keeping slavery out of 
national politics had apparently dodged the issue once again. For the first time in history, 
a controversial bill had been talked to death in the United States Senate, albeit by 
accident.20  
After such an anticlimactic resolution to the Wilmot Proviso crisis, public reaction 
remained quite muted. This, as well as the break between sessions, convinced the 
administration that it could lean on enough rogue Democrats to convince them to change 
their vote and thus prevent any further sectional clashing. Polk had written in his diary 
that the Wilmot Proviso was a "mischievous [and] foolish amendment," and wondered, 
"what connection slavery had with making peace with Mexico it is difficult to 
conceive."21 These presidential pretensions soon would mean very little as the beginning 
of second session of the Twenty-ninth Congress approached.   
President Polk did, indeed, talk to Wilmot during the congressional recess for 
Christmas at the end of December 1846. In their meeting, the president told Wilmot, "I 
did not desire to extend slavery, that I would be satisfied to acquire by Treaty from 
Mexico the Provinces of New Mexico and the Californias, and that in these Provinces                                                         
20 Ibid., 1220; Potter, The Impending Crisis, 22; Going, David Wilmot, 101-102. 
21 Milo Milton Quaife, ed., The Diary of James K. Polk: During His Presidency, 1845 to 1849, volume II 
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slavery could probably never exist." The slaveholding president held to the conviction 
that slavery would never take root in West. Wilmot promised the president that he would 
not re-introduce a bill to restrict slavery in land acquired from Mexico, but that "if it was 
moved by others he would feel constrained to vote for it."22  
Just a few weeks later, Wilmot was forced to keep his word. Preston King, 
another northern Democrat closely connected to Van Buren, reintroduced Wilmot’s 
proviso—this time adding it to a bill asking for three million dollars of negotiation 
money. Possibly stemming from a taunt launched by northern Whigs that Democrats 
would never accept adding free territory to the nation due to their devotion to the South, 
Preston's version of the proviso took things a step further. Instead of prohibiting slavery 
from any of the lands acquired from Mexico only, his version stated that slavery would 
be banned from "any territory which shall hereafter be acquired by or be annexed to the 
United States." After years of working to keep the issue of slavery out of politics, 
politicians faced a new, intense sectional controversy in the form of an appropriations bill 
that paid for lands not yet conquered from a war not yet won. Again, the votes split 
according to section, with many northern Democrats joining Whigs in attacking the 
expansion of slavery. Wilmot's supporters became ever more determined to keep black 
slaves out of the West, while antislavery Whigs took the opportunity to strike against the 
institution they found to be immoral. Two groups, with two different reasons to oppose 
                                                        
22 Ibid., 288-289, 299. 
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slavery, formed an unlikely bipartisan coalition to prevent slavery from entering any 
more American territory.23 
In their initial attack against the Wilmot Proviso, proslavery southerners 
connected patriotism and national pride in the success of the military campaign against 
Mexico to the defense of American exceptionalism. After the short war, southerners 
argued they earned the right to bring their slaves into the Mexican Cession because of 
their disproportionate participation in the war against Mexico. The percentage of 
southerners in the officer corps was higher than the South’s proportion of the nation’s 
population because the three-fifths compromise gave the slaveholding region more places 
at West Point—most appointments came in the form of congressional appointments to the 
military academy.  For many slaveholders opposed to the Wilmot Proviso, the fact that 
southerners risked their lives to gain territory in the West made any restriction of slavery 
a slight not just against civilian slaveholders but also to those from the South who fought 
valiantly for the military during the war against Mexico, many southerners argued.24 
Congressman Franklin Welsh Bowdon of Alabama took up opposition to Wilmot 
in the name of southern veterans of the war against Mexico. He declared to the House of 
Representatives, “In the prosecution of the war in which we are now engaged, the South 
                                                        
23 Congressional Globe, 29 Cong., 2 sess., 105; Potter, The Impending Crisis, 64-65; Morrison, Democratic 
Politics and Sectionalism, 30-32; Michael F. Holt, The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party: 
Jacksonian Politics and the Onset of the Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999): 250-255; 
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has willingly tendered her treasure and the blood of her noblest sons.  Now, as heretofore, 
she gloriously rallies around the national flag, rejoices in its triumphs, and morns its 
disasters. When the contest is over, and victory won, she will demand, not the badge of 
degradation, but an equal participation in the fruits of a joint struggle.”25 Slaveholders 
had fought for western lands too, the Alabaman insisted. Excluding slavery from any 
newly acquired land effectively punished southerners for risking their lives in battle. 
 Unlike reactions to the Haitian Revolution, the abolitionist postal campaign, or 
the fears caused by Denmark Vesey and Nat Turner, white southerners’ proximity to free 
territory did not cause a split in the southern vote over the Wilmot Proviso.  People in the 
southwestern slave states joined the older slave states in the East in protest against the 
restriction of slavery from lands acquired from the Mexican war.  For example, according 
to newspaper reports, a large population in the newly added state of Texas opposed the 
proviso. The editors of Houston Democratic Telegraph and Texas Register stated, “We 
know of no person in the State who has expressed a willingness to sustain this Proviso: 
but on the contrary, we have found that it is so universally condemned here, that we 
considered it unnecessary to hazard a remark against it.”26 Though Polk prepared to veto 
any measure containing a restriction against slavery in the West, the proslavery 
movement feared the Wilmot Proviso’s steadily growing support and consolidated into 
one voice of opposition.  Whereas northern doughfaces or southern moderates such as 
Henry Clay tried to smooth over sectional tension with compromise throughout the 
1830s, the Wilmot Proviso—in both the North and the South—became a yes or no                                                         
25 Congressional Globe, 29 Cong., 2 sess., 1847, 140. 
26 Houston Democratic Telegraph and Texas Register, April 13, 1848. 
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proposition for Congress, something upon which middle ground would be difficult to 
find.27 
 Some proslavery citizens decided to take their complaints directly to the seat of 
the federal government in Washington. The Daily Picayune of New Orleans reported, 
“Efforts are making to obtain a subscription with a view to establish a Washington paper 
which 'shall reflect the public sentiment of the South on the abolition and Wilmot proviso 
question.’ ”28 Far from just seeing the proviso as an affront to their sensibilities, as 
historians have suggested, southerners viewed Wilmot's actions and success as evidence 
that the Abolitionist Power had gained strength within the federal government. One 
congressman even called the Wilmot Proviso an act of war against the South. Despite the 
fact that southerners talked of disunion, they tried to show their loyalty to the United 
States and painted the potential sectional rift as the consequence of antislavery movement 
aggression towards the South, something that could be dealt with while remaining within 
the fold of the Union.  
When the House of Representatives again voted to ban slavery from the West, the 
proslavery movement felt compelled to react against a possible future that hemmed the 
South in with free soil. It soon became clear that, unlike the abolitionist postal campaign, 
the Wilmot Proviso had gained a surprising amount of traction in the North. When free-
state Democrats voted in favor of the amendment, it proved to southerners that                                                         
27 Dusinberre, Slavemaster President, 144. 
28 New Orleans The Times Picayune, August 26, 1847; The Wilmot Proviso speech of Hon. J.C. Dobbin, of 
N. Carolina, delivered in the House of Representatives, February 11, 1847, on the Wilmot Proviso 
prohibiting slavery in any territories whatever that may hereafter be acquired by the United States 
(Washington, D.C.: Blair and Rives, 1847): 1. 
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northerners were less willing to protect slavery than ever before. As an attempt to regain 
support for slavery in the free states, many southern members of Congress harkened back 
to the Constitutional Convention and stressed the exceptional nature of the nation’s 
founding in hopes of portraying to northerners an American tradition of compromise on 
the issue of slavery. David S. Kaufman from Texas, for example, talked about the give 
and take of the Founding Fathers as they negotiated the creation of the American federal 
system. The Texan said, “Our constitutional union…was based upon compromise, and by 
compromise alone can it be preserved. But when you depart from this principle; when 
you take the lion’s share of the common stock, and appropriate it to one portion of the 
Union, and leave nothing for the other, you at once destroy that equality which is the 
basis of all lasting unions.” 29 Following the lead set by his proslavery predecessors, the 
congressman implied that voting for the proviso was a direct attack against America's 
founding—against its exceptional nature and form of government. This was something 
Kaufman hoped northerners who held tightly to the idea of American exceptionalism and 
unionism would find appalling. 
 Southern newspapers flashed headlines across the South warning about the 
restrictions placed on slavery in the West and how they undermined the Constitution. The 
Richmond Enquirer splashed the words "THE WILMOT PROVISO!" in the middle of its 
front page. The article warned that abolitionists had decided to destroy the national union. 
"The tocsin, 'the fire bell at night,' is now sounding in our ears; the madmen of the North 
and North West have, we fear, cast the die, and number the days of this glorious Union," 
                                                        
29 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, 29 Cong., 2 sess., 1847, 149-154. 
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the newspaper declared.30 The South was being assaulted, the Enquirer told its readers, 
by fanatics so blinded by their hatred for slavery that they risked tearing the nation apart.  
 Southern Democrats understood that they needed to act fast before many of the 
voters in their states turned against them and searched for a new vehicle to represent them 
in Congress. Despite considering emancipation just fifteen years earlier during the 
aftermath of Nat Turner, Virginia's reaction to the Wilmot Proviso was no different than 
South Carolina's. Besides reporting the news out of Washington that the House of 
Representatives had passed a prohibition of slavery in the lands acquired from Mexico, 
the Enquirer also detailed a meeting held by Democrats in the Old Dominion in which 
the politicians vowed to fight the Wilmot Proviso with all their power. The newspaper 
encouraged "all Virginians and Southern men" to "unite, heart and hand, in resisting, 
even unto death, the doctrines of [Wilmot's] proviso."31 Southerners from the upper slave 
states appeared ready to join those in the lower South in the fight against Wilmot's 
restrictions on slavery in the territories. 
 As Democrats from the slave states colluded, they appeared to be losing their 
former allies and replacing them with new ones. Two weeks after the Enquirer shared 
that Democrats had met to discuss how they should react, the Charleston Southern Patriot 
reported that southern members of both parties joined together, also in Richmond, to 
discuss how they would respond in a unified voice of opposition against the proviso. On 
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line all the way to the Pacific. See, Charles Henry Ambler, Thomas Ritchie: A Study in Virginia Politics 
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the floor of Congress, one Mississippian stated that with the passage of Wilmot Proviso 
the South had been “betrayed by our friends, and are to be robbed of our rights by those 
on whom we have reposed our confidence and trust." Slaveholding leaders insisted that 
free-state congressmen had broken the sacred compact forged during the American 
Revolution when they voted against the extension of slavery in the territories.  The 
Constitution, they insisted, prevented any kind of restrictions on slaveholding even if it 
gave Congress authority over the territories. One Virginian compared restricting slavery 
in the territories to limiting other well-known constitutional rights.  He asked, “Can you 
abolish the trial by jury in the Territories, or in the District of Columbia?”32 To some 
proslavery members of Congress, America’s commitment to the Constitution, something 
that made the nation different than the rest of the world, appeared to be eroding.  
The historian Michael Morrison has argued that the ideology of the American 
Revolution and its meaning for the United States played a crucial role in the development 
of the sectional crisis that swirled around the Wilmot Proviso. Antislavery northerners in 
favor of the restriction of slavery argued that the Founding Fathers had fought to protect 
liberty from intrusion of the Slave Power along with independence for white westerners.  
Proslavery southerners, on the other hand, believed the Revolution and Constitution 
crafted in 1787 represented the United States’ defense of minority rights under a 
constitutional government.33 
                                                        
32 Congressional Globe, 29 Cong., 2 sess., 112, 134; Charleston Southern Patriot, February 26, 1847. 
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Revolutionary ideology from the 1770s, however, did not make up the core of the 
debate over the Wilmot Proviso. Instead, southerners worried specifically about the 
erosion of their distinct definition of American exceptionalism. During the 1830s, those 
in the proslavery movement had debated whether the founding and the Constitution had 
created a government that differed from the Parliament of England, which had ended 
slavery in the West Indies without the direct representation of Caribbean planters. 
Fearing a similar outcome for themselves, southerners argued with their antislavery 
counterparts that the federal government must not be malleable enough for one section of 
the country to lose its power, subjecting the American planter class to the same outcome 
Parliament inflicted on Caribbean slaveholders. For many, the federal government's 
protection of slavery had protected something already established and agreed upon at the 
Constitutional Convention. Antislavery political maneuvering in the West was a radical 
change that proslavery forces contended should require a large consensus in order to be 
enacted.34 
Slaveholding politicians believed the American Revolution and the Americans 
conception of their nation as exceptional, embodied by the Constitution, offered them a 
powerful ideological foundation to use against the antislavery movement. J.C. Dobbin, a 
North Carolina member of the House of Representatives, reminded northerners that those 
who attended the Constitutional Convention "compromised their personal opinions on the 
altar of patriotism.”35 The implication was clear: to restrict the ability of slaveholders in 
                                                        
34 See chapter three of this dissertation. 
35 J. C. Dobbin, The Wilmot Proviso Speech of Hon. J.C. Dobbin, Of North Carolina Delivered in the 
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the South from bringing the enslaved to the West broke the solemn commitment offered 
to southerners during the struggle for American independence and the ratification of the 
Constitution. Essentially, it made the republic established by that document no different 
than any other form of democracy in the world, because its promises could be broken and 
its rules changed by a simple majority. He contended that both Georgia and South 
Carolina would never have joined the national confederation without the promise that 
slavery could never be legislated out of existence by the federal government. For the 
congressmen this included threatening slavery indirectly by not allowing it to be spread 
to other territories. Dobbin urged his northern compatriots to put their patriotism and faith 
in the Union ahead of their antislavery conviction. The proslavery movement once again 
hoped to unveil the antislavery movement’s disloyalty to the United States.  
Dobbin was not alone in this line of attack against the proviso. Proslavery forces 
hoped that portraying abolitionists as antithetical to the founding and the meaning of 
American exceptionalism would cause northern Democrats—whom they believed had 
simply been caught up in a temporary furor caused by the Wilmot Proviso—to feel 
uneasy with their new antislavery allies. George W. Towns, the governor of Georgia, 
stated in his inaugural address that the Wilmot Proviso was "an act repugnant to the 
Constitution, destructive of our rights, and dishonorable to George Washington as one of 
the parties to the Federal Compact.”36 Many local politicians reiterated the idea that 
threatening the rights of slaveholders assailed the father of the nation himself and eroded 
the agreement between free and slave states that so many believed to be the foundation of 
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American uniqueness. Wilmot, many proslavery opponents proclaimed, worked to make 
the United States no different from the rest of the world. 
The proslavery movement as a whole, not just politicians working in the confines 
of the Capitol or state legislatures, worked to characterize the Wilmot Proviso as an 
attack on the Constitution. One southern newspaper from South Carolina, the Southern 
Patriot, wrote, "The great founders of this country entered into a deliberate compact and 
understanding, as a fundamental condition of the Union, that in its federal capacity, the 
government should never, directly or indirectly, meddle with the question of internal 
slavery.”37 By expanding federal power to protect slavery during the 1830s, southerners 
had opened the pathway for Wilmot's proviso. In the 1840s, southerners had to reconcile 
their statements that the founders wanted the federal government to not "meddle with the 
question of internal slavery" with the strengthened power they had advocated in defense 
of slavery while they dominated the national government over the past few decades. They 
did so by claiming that the reasoning and precedents created in defense of slavery over 
the years included any "indirect attacks" on the southern institution, making any action by 
the federal government that could be deemed as antislavery fall under the proslavery 
definition of what was unconstitutional.38  
Many slaveholders did feel genuinely slighted by their northern colleagues in 
Congress who supported Wilmot's attempt to keep them out of all land taken from  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38 The proslavery movement would make similar claims against ending the slave trade in the nation's 
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of the Constitution granting "exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever" in the District of Columbia. 
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Mexico. Howell Cobb, who within a few years would become Speaker of the House, felt 
outrage at the moral condemnation from northerners that he believed underpinned the 
Wilmot Proviso. He asked, "Where is the reason urged by the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania to show that the North, or that portion of the North who sympathize with 
him, occupy 'the right,' and that the South occupy 'the wrong?' What is the proposition? 
Where does it originate?" Cobb, like most southerners, lived in a society where their 
moral leaders had helped them justify black enslavement. He felt anger, the Georgian told 
Congress, because "the whole people of the Union are involved in a war with a foreign 
country," but "a large portion of the community shall be excluded from all participation 
in the advantages and benefits resulting from it."39 To southerners this prohibition meant 
they held an inferior rank to northerners within the federal government. 
Other southerners complained the Wilmot Proviso acted as a direct insult to 
slaveholders in the South. Supreme Court Justice Peter V. Daniel, who later would join 
the majority in the Dred Scott decision that overturned the possibility of restricting 
slavery, railed against the northern passage of the prohibition against the expansion of 
slavery. He wrote that it "pretends to an insulting exclusiveness or superiority on the one 
hand, and denounces a degrading inequality or inferiority on the other; which says in 
effect to the Southern man, Avaunt! You are not my equal, and hence are to be excluded 
as carrying a moral taint with you. Here is at once the extinction of all fraternity."40 
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Inferiority in the sense that he and other southerners meant, however, was not intended 
mean as men on a personal level or as a lesser or immoral people, but rather as citizens of 
equal standing under the government being treated as though they had less than full 
citizenship. 
 The proviso, some slaveholders worried, also imperiled the security and politics 
of the South. If they could not dominate the machinery of the federal government, the 
proslavery movement insisted, then only an equitable stake in federal power could offer 
the South safety. Having a pendulum of power that would swing back and forth between 
the two regions left the door open for radical abolitionists to take extreme actions. The 
fears originally brought about by the West Indian emancipation matured with the passage 
of the Wilmot Proviso. Channeling Robert Turnbull, who twenty years earlier had warned 
southerners about the growing strength of antislavery sentiment both in Parliament and 
the United States Congress, John C. Calhoun argued that the South could not abide losing 
more power at the federal level by allowing the creation of free states alone from the 
Mexican Cession. On the floor of the Senate he proclaimed that the people of the South 
"are in a minority in the [House of Representatives], in the electoral college [sic], and I 
may say, in every department of this Government, except at president [and in] in the 
Senate of the United States."41  
The South Carolinian took offense to the proviso also. Continuing his discussion 
of the proviso in the Senate, he yelled to his audience, "I say for one, I would rather meet 
                                                        
41 Congressional Globe, 29 Cong., 2 sess., 453-455. The senator's remarks also ran in newspaper coverage 
of the debate over the Wilmot Proviso, see Macon Daily Telegraph, March 2, 1847. Calhoun did not make 
reference to whether or not he believed the Supreme Court to be on the side of slaveholders in the South. 
  283 
any extremity upon the earth, than give up one inch of our equality—one inch of what 
belongs to us as members of this great republic." Angered, he exclaimed, "What! 
acknowledge inferiority! The surrender of life is nothing to sinking down into 
acknowledgement of inferiority."42 Some historians have wrongly suggested that Calhoun 
had reacted in such a fashion because Wilmot threatened his conception of southern 
manhood and that the slaveholding rhetoric about equality and rights stemmed from a 
slight against their code of honor. The South Carolinian did, no doubt, consider honor an 
important aspect in his attacks against the proviso; however, his main basis for opposing 
Wilmot went beyond that, and involved a deeply rooted political outlook that developed 
in the slaveholding South throughout the first half of the nineteenth century as they 
perceived the repercussions of emancipation in the Caribbean. 
After vowing never to accept inferiority, Calhoun clarified that he had the 
Abolitionist Power on his mind, proclaiming: "I have examined this subject largely—
widely." Prepared to explain his position, he stated, "I think I see the future if we do not 
stand up as we ought. In my humble opinion, in that case, the condition of Ireland is 
prosperous and happy—the condition of Hindostand is prosperous and happy—the 
condition of Jamaica is prosperous and happy, to what the southern States will be if they 
should not now stand up manfully in defense of their rights."43 John C. Calhoun clearly 
focused not on masculinity, but on England, and the recent emancipation of the West 
Indies, when he spoke of maintaining equality within the Union. Significantly, the three 
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places he lists as "prosperous and happy" had all been subordinated under the British 
Empire. For Calhoun, to "stand up manfully" served as a call for southerners to stand up 
as free adult citizens in the American Republic rather than be subjugated by a distant 
capital that did not have the South's best intentions in mind. 
Calhoun painted a clear portrait for those who listened to him. He argued that if 
southern slaveholders did not stand up for their right to carry slavery westward, they 
would be placed in the same situation as the former master class of Jamaica and the rest 
of the West Indies: bankrupt and outnumbered by former slaves—a mere colony reliant 
on help from outsiders, who held slavery in contempt, for the protection of their personal 
safety and wealth. Southern independence would be lost if Wilmot got his way because 
slaveholders would lose political power while simultaneously being surrounded by an 
ocean of free soil filled with whites who wanted little to do with black people—free or 
enslaved. The result, he feared, would be an already rising slave population growing in 
density as well, undermining both the value of the enslaved as well as the safety of every 
white slaveholder and non-slaveholder in the South. 
Furthermore, the proslavery movement came to adopt the notion that the proviso 
overturned American exceptionalism. They began to resist the idea that the United States 
Constitution, and the federalism it established, fundamentally differed from the English 
government that Americans had abandoned in 1776. Pandora's box had been opened 
when proslavery southerners used the power of the federal government to get their way in 
the 1830s and early 1840s by claiming that the defense of slavery rested in the federal 
power of foreign diplomacy as much as it did among the states. The slaveholding South, 
led by Calhoun and other ardent defenders of their region's peculiar institution, now 
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needed to develop a way to reconcile a powerful federal government they had helped to 
create with the encroachment of the growing antislavery movement that appeared to be 
on the verge of claiming federal authority. 
Throughout August 1847 the Charleston Mercury, an organ of Calhoun support, 
railed against the Wilmot Proviso and explained in further detail how Wilmot and his 
supporters planned to undermine the Constitution in order to make the American national 
government resemble the British Parliament, thus eroding the exceptional nature of the 
United States. In bold print the newspaper published the words, "The Wilmot Proviso is 
Abolition, Aggressive, Revolutionary, and subversive of the Constitution and its 
guaranties to the Slaveholding States." The Mercury, as well as many other proslavery 
outlets and supporters, believed the restriction of slavery from lands acquired from the 
Mexican War specifically worked to alter the character of the nation. In their minds, 
northerners who voted for the proviso wanted to spark a dramatic change in how the 
Constitution functioned by putting "the Constitution itself in the hands of Abolition." 
Northerners who hoped to pass Wilmot's prohibition of slavery's expansion wanted a 
revolution, a new form of government different from the one that currently existed in the 
United States. The Mercury concluded its initial examination of the proviso by explicitly 
saying, "A revolution is in progress by the Wilmot Proviso. The equality of states and of 
American citizens is destroyed....The guaranties of the Constitution, often disregarded, 
are about to be utterly overthrown and rendered useless; and the Constitution and Slavery 
are being transferred by the Wilmot movement to Abolition and its allies."44 Antislavery 
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northerners, these southern journalists explained, hoped to usurp the Constitution through 
revolutionary means. The Mercury alerted its readership that the idea of fomenting an 
abolitionist revolution had grown from foreign influence. The newspaper wrote, 
"Although a disposition existed with a class of individuals in this country to attack the 
slave institutions of the States, it was not until after the example of British West India 
Emancipation, that it was taken up by any of the States and became excited to dangerous 
activity and power."45  
The English had emboldened the abolitionist movement with their success in 
ending slavery in the Caribbean, the Charleston newspaper stated. It had begun when 
Massachusetts attempted to undermine the Negro Seaman Act of South Carolina after the 
Denmark Vesey scare in Charleston. That event was described by the Mercury as "a most 
dangerous insurrection...planned and instigated by foreign colored persons (St. Domingo) 
who had seduced the colored natives, free and slaves, into a bloody plot to murder the 
whites." Caribbean emancipation, the newspaper contended, had awoken "a kindred spirit 
at the North." The fanatics from Massachusetts had sent "agents with her commissions to 
invade the territories of South Carolina and Louisiana, to brave their authority, and to 
break the laws enacted to protect themselves from domestic insurrection and servile 
massacre."46 The Wilmot Proviso, the South Carolina periodical declared, was just the 
next step of the Abolitionist Power's monumental conspiracy for destroying slavery in the 
United States, and therefore, the South. 
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Other southern newspapers also publicized that foreigners had inspired the North 
to re-engage in abolitionism. The Macon Weekly Telegraph, for example, even took that 
notion a step further by connecting antislavery Democrats directly to a larger abolitionist 
movement that wanted to destroy the Constitution and slavery in the United States.  The 
support for Wilmot did not just stem from only a few abolitionists who had forced the 
South's former allies into supporting the bill, the newspaper insisted. Instead, the 
conspiracy had a deep global tinge. As the author wrote, "They are brothers to the 'red 
republicans' of Paris....They have their allies with the British; and they are not wanting 
friends in the dominions of England, to render assistance to their fellow-devils in the 
United States, by way of the West Indies."47 The Caribbean—once a base of support for 
slavery—now served as a launching point for abolitionist attacks that were propelled by 
Europeans who wanted to end the American way of government along with their goals of 
destroying slavery. 
As Robert Turnbull had predicted at the time of British emancipation of the West 
Indies, the Mercury argued that abolitionists hoped to change the rules that governed the 
nation in order to achieve their goal of ending slavery in America, either directly through 
majority rule in Congress—as they did with the Wilmot Proviso—or indirectly, by 
creating so many free states from the Mexican Cession that an amendment to the 
Constitution could be pushed through on a purely sectional. The newspaper wrote that the 
abolitionists would soon "have two-thirds which are required to propose the amendments; 
and at no very remote day will have the three-fourths necessary to carry it, which will 
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give to their Congress the power to abolish Slavery." Slavery needed to expand in order 
to protect itself from the fanatics who had gained control of the North and wanted to 
destroy the South's labor system they hated so much, southerners feared.    
The Abolitionist Power, however, would first just use its newfound strength to 
frighten the South, the Mercury exhorted, writing, "The end aimed at is to get the power 
granted by the Constitution, not perhaps to exercise it at once, but to hold in terrorem 
over us, and by it to rule and subject us to whatever measures of taxation, revenue, or 
expenditure their interests may dictate; and eventually perhaps, at some moment of 
fancied interest, or under the excitement of feeling or fanaticism, to end our suspense by 
consummating the act."48 The Mercury told readers that the "fanatics" did not simply 
want to end slavery—they also wanted to treat the South as though it were a colony of the 
North, extracting the region's wealth before finally crushing the slaveholding society they 
held in so much contempt. The proslavery movement had come to believe the antislavery 
movement did not just want to end slavery; it also wanted to punish the South for having 
owned slaves in the first place. 
 The fears of slaveholders that first arose after the Haitian Revolution and then 
during emancipation in the British West Indies again came to the forefront of southern 
political thought as those who read about the Wilmot Proviso anticipated what the future 
safety of slavery would look like if the proviso were implemented. Several southerners 
believed that cordoning off the slave states and surrounding them with free territory 
threatened not only future prosperity in the West for slaveholders, but the entire security  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of the South for the next generation of southern white citizens. They believed 
abolitionists, and the northern Democrats who suddenly found themselves aligned with 
them, were using Wilmot's restriction of slavery in the West as an attack against 
slaveholding in general. In response, many from the slave states found themselves not 
just defending the right to bring their slaves into the lands acquired from the Mexican 
War but also fortifying slavery where it already legally existed.   
 Just as when the news of English emancipation came to American shores in the 
1830s, southerners defended slavery by contrasting it with free labor. Congressman 
Robert W. Roberts, from Mississippi, argued for slavery in the House of Representatives 
by comparing it to domestic servitude in the free states. Northern free labor had replaced 
English free labor in southern rhetoric that defended the enslavement of blacks in 
America.  He said, "[Northerners] deem a limited servitude better adapted to their 
purpose: we regard an unlimited servitude the most proper and beneficial. Now is it 
asking too much to extend to us the same scope of judgment they claim for themselves?  
If servitude is wrong it must be wrong in all of its parts."49 Both regions, he claimed, 
would be culpable if "servitude" were to be found immoral. The representative did his 
best to show that the divide separating North and South could be bridged if only 
northerners would understand that the two regions did not have significant differences 
about how America's government should function to protect slavery from outside 
interference.  
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Several slaveholders took the nearly unanimous acceptance of Wilmot’s Proviso 
by northern politicians, Whig and Democrat, as proof that abolitionism had gained a 
strong foothold in the mindset of northerners. Many suggested that northerners supported 
the proviso in order to gain an edge on their political competition, using slavery as a way 
to be re-elected. As an example of this, Shelton Leake of Virginia pointed to his 
colleague from Massachusetts—Robert Charles Winthrop—as a Whig who opposed the 
original appropriation for negotiating with Mexico for land but changed his vote in favor 
once Wilmot became added to the bill. The Virginian believed that the “spawned 
fanaticism in the North” caused Winthrop to change his vote in favor of something he 
first opposed.50 Many of his region's former allies could still be redeemed, he believed. 
There was still time to change their votes that sided with "fanaticism." However, what 
most southerners did not understand was that the Democratic vote in favor of the Wilmot 
Proviso had less to do with slavery and more to do with the black population of the 
United States.  
As debate in the House of Representatives raged over the reintroduction of the 
Wilmot Proviso, the author of the original prohibition of slavery in the West stood in 
Congress and explained, for himself and for those who joined him in voting in favor of 
the proviso, why he had risked such sectional strife during a period when, many believed, 
the nation could unite against the foreign enemy of Mexico. David Wilmot told the 
members of the House of Representatives that he wanted to "vindicate" himself from the 
charges of abolitionism that had been, and would continue to be, launched against him by 
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both southern congressman and Democratic newspapers loyal to Polk. He so wanted his 
remarks to be recorded accurately that he would later transcribe them in the record 
himself. As the House listened intently, the Pennsylvanian reassured his fellow 
Democrats that he was, indeed, one of "the friends of the Administration." He stated, "I 
have stood at home, and fought single-handed—no, I was not single-handed, because my 
party was with me—but I have stood at home, and fought time and again, against the 
Abolitionists of the North...I have met them at their meetings and assailed them."51 
Wilmot wanted his friends in Congress to have no doubt that he remained a Democrat 
faithful to Democratic policies and was not a convert conjoined to the fanatical beliefs of 
abolitionism. 
Wilmot’s actions, however, had much less to do with President Polk than with 
what he believed to be the southern domination of the federal government—something 
that many within the proslavery movement had been building for years. David Wilmot 
challenged southerners who asked for compromise, saying, "I would go as far as any man 
in this House for compromise. Were it a question of concession and compromise, I might 
perhaps say to the North, Concede again, as you have done before, bow to the South, as 
you have done on all previous occasions." The question, in the congressman's mind, 
however, regarded fairness and equal protection under the federal government, rather 
than compromise. Wilmot continued: "What, then, do we ask? Sir, we ask for neutrality 
of this Government on the question of slavery."52 The North, he told his southern 
colleagues, had decided to stand up for itself.   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In their move to strengthen the federal government's protection of slavery against 
foreign enemies, especially with the annexation of Texas, southerners had overreached. 
Now, David Wilmot informed the House, northern Democrats had checked the South's 
excessive power. He reminded his colleagues, "I was in favor of the annexation of Texas. 
I supported it with the whole influence which I possessed, and I was willing to take Texas 
in as she was." Robert Walker's letter regarding the annexation of Texas and the promises 
he made took the brunt of the Pennsylvanian's ire. After talking about Walker's promise 
for future free states, he said, "We are fighting this war for Texas and for the 
South....Now, sir, we are told that California is ours. And all we ask in the North is, that 
the character of its territory be preserved."  He asked, "Shall the South make this 
Government an instrument for the violation of its neutrality, and for the establishment of 
slavery in these territories, in defiance of the law [already established there by Mexico's 
abolition of slavery]?"53  
While many Democrats, including Wilmot, believed in the responsibility to 
protect slavery where it already existed, those in the North thought that it had reached its 
limits when southerners tried to expand slavery all the way to the Pacific. Again, Robert 
Walker's promises made to the North in order to assure the annexation of Texas came 
back to haunt the proslavery movement.  Wilmot admitted that he believed slavery to be 
"a great political and great social evil" that "we will have to work out in our free 
Government here."  He contended—as many future Republicans, including Wilmot 
himself—would in the 1850s, that the free, white enterprise system of labor in the North 
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outpaced the South.  He stated, "Contrast Michigan and Arkansas," which had both 
joined the Union less than a year apart from each other.  "In twenty years," the 
Pennsylvanian continued, "Michigan has assumed a high position among the States of 
this Union. She has all the elements of a great State; cities, flourishing towns, and highly 
cultivated fields; with a population that outnumbers three or four times that of Arkansas.  
And yet Arkansas has even a better soil, even superior natural advantages."54 Yet, the free 
state experienced better growth, the Pennsylvanian claimed. This national investment was 
what northern Democrats were fighting for when they voted in favor of the Wilmot 
Proviso. 
 Wilmot contended that slavery stagnated the economic and population growth of 
southern states. However, his opposition to slavery in the West seemed to stem from his 
disapproval of slaveholders bringing black people to any territory gained from the 
Mexican War, rather than to slavery itself. The congressman insisted that he offered his 
proviso because it helped fulfill Robert Walker's promise to funnel the black population 
away from the North and into the nations south of the United States. He reminded 
Congress, "Why, Mr. Walker told you, when he was urging the annexation of Texas, (and 
I admit the force of his argument,) annex Texas, and you open a frontier of two thousand 
miles bordering Mexico, where this slave and black population, as it shall increase and 
press upon the country, can pass off, and become mingled up with the mixed races of 
Mexico and South America."55 As he spoke those words the gavel came down, disrupting 
him. Wilmot's time to talk on the floor of the House of Representatives had expired.   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 By arguing that adding more land in the form of Texas would funnel away blacks 
from the northern states, Robert Walker had created a perfect storm by bridging antiblack 
sentiment and antislavery feelings regarding the Mexican Cession. The Wilmot Proviso 
thus had little to do with abolitionism, its author proclaimed, but rather secured the 
maintenance of a free, white republic. For Wilmot, creating slave territory to the west of 
Texas excluded his constituency that wanted nothing to do with black slaves, or black 
people for that matter, from the spoils of the Mexican War. In his revised remarks that he 
edited himself to be placed into the congressional record, Wilmot further clarified his 
stance on slavery, writing, "I have no squeamish sensitiveness upon the subject of 
slavery, no morbid sympathy for the slave." Instead, his goals stemmed from serving his 
own constituency. White northerners in the laboring class would not move to a place 
where slavery existed. Wilmot continued, "I plead the cause and the rights of white 
freemen. I would preserve to free white labor a fair country, a rich inheritance, where the 
sons of toil, of my own race and color, can live without the disgrace which association 
with negro slavery brings upon free labor."56 The Pennsylvanian made sure that his 
intentions were clear. He wanted the proslavery followers of Robert Walker to keep their 
word. Wilmot and those who supported him, he had told Congress, planned to keep 
theirs. 
 Throughout the nineteenth century, slave insurrections both foreign and abroad 
influenced the South’s politics and culture. Southerners understood history. Much like 
during the early 1830s, white southerners felt disturbed over a growing wave of outside  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antislavery sentiment washing upon their slave society.  During the aftermath of both the 
Haitian Revolution and the Turner insurrection, distress over the anticipation of a 
growing slave population lacking an outlet for excess slaves had frightened many. What 
made Wilmot’s proviso doubly frightening for much of the planter class was the 
possibility of a federal government, controlled by this new antislavery coalition, that 
would not help the South maintain the safety of its peculiar institution. The loss of power 
to control the future of slavery in the West stood as an example that they could not count 
on northerners to defend them anymore. During the nineteenth century, slaveholders had 
become accustomed to using the fear of insurrection as a way to compel northerners to 
work with them to protect slavery. The tepid alliance between the slave South and free 
North had worked from the Haitian Revolution to West Indian emancipation. Now, 
however, it suddenly appeared to be cracking due to the pressure exerted on it during the 
fight over Texas. 
Robert Walker's letter, and his ideas about Texas being a safety valve for excess 
slaves, had worked almost too well. Many southern intellectuals believed the expansion 
of slavery outside of the South offered the only way to keep their region safe from 
possible harm stemming from an overabundance of slaves. Others in Congress also 
supported Walker’s idea about Texas.  South Carolina Congressman Isaac Holmes 
thought that if the South were surrounded by free states, the region would be “smothered 
and overwhelmed by a festering population that was forbidden to migrate, pent in and 
walled around on the exhausted soil—in the midst of [an enslaved population] strong in 
idleness” who could be instigated by abolitionists to “revolt and murder.” The South 
Carolinian called the slaveholding states’ being hemmed in by land that illegalized black 
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enslavement the most “awful calamity…in the widest stretch of his imagination.” A 
safety valve was needed for a safe and stable slave system to be maintained.57 
 Those who lived in a slave society knew that violence could erupt at any moment.  
Slave revolts had the possibility to affect the entire population of the South, slaveholder 
and yeoman, free and enslaved. Often pointing to the gruesome warfare that occurred in 
Haiti at the turn of the nineteenth century, slaveholders believed that without effective 
governmental mechanisms in place to maintain a strong ruling presence over the enslaved 
population, blacks would decline into a state of barbarism. As the slave population grew, 
many white southerners anticipated that maintaining tight control over their enslaved 
labor force only became more difficult, and the consequences of failure more disastrous.  
Many slave owners understood how dangerous their slaves could be. For the first time 
southerners, and especially the planter class, glimpsed the reality of being completely 
surrounded by territory they believed to be hostile to not just slavery but to blacks also.58   
 Anticipation about the future played a significant role in the southern reactions to 
the Wilmot Proviso. For many, a Malthusian understanding of population theory told 
them that such a circumstance would lead to the destruction of not only slavery and the 
economic prosperity it brought to many slaveholders, but also their very lives. Several 
slaveholders looked past initial hopes of prohibiting the expansion of slavery to the West 
and glanced further in the future, beyond their own time. The Charleston Mercury 
published an estimation regarding the expected population statistics of the slave states in  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1950, over a hundred years into the future, if the proviso became implemented. The 
newspaper worried about what would happen when the South, according to its 
calculations, had a population of 90 million people, over a third of whom were black, 
which the Mercury declared could "not participate in the improvements of the white 
race."59 With that view in mind they prepared to defend themselves against the proviso, 
which they perceived as the first step towards their annihilation. 
 Just as they had during earlier debates over the extension of slavery, slaveholders 
worried about non-slaveholders leaving the slave states for the newly created free 
territory because "the lower classes of whites will have gradually passed off into the Free 
States, retreating before the cheaper labor of the blacks." The Mercury best expressed this 
fear, writing, "When a great body of the white population will have emigrated, as we 
have shown, the remainder, impelled by a sense of insecurity or disgusted with a land 
abandoned to hopelessness barbarism, will follow in the footsteps of the first, and the 
country be finally abandoned entirely to blacks." The South, the proslavery periodical 
cautioned, would be completely desolated by its future black majority because "their 
habits have never entirely forsaken their descendents in America; and left to their own 
control, they would rapidly return to barbarism, and invite for themselves the fate of the 
Aborigines of America." In response to the claim that whites would eventually have no 
choice but to “exterminate” the black population of the South, the Mercury told its 
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readers it "does not admit of a reasonable doubt."60 
 As the Wilmot Proviso proved to the South that its power in Congress had begun 
to wane, a great number of southerners concluded that abolitionists intended to destroy 
the South by fomenting slave insurrections, creating dire consequences for all whites 
living in the slave states. Hemming in the South by surrounding it with either ocean or 
free soil served as part of that plan, they believed, and the proslavery movement made a 
vigorous effort to call out to their former allies in the North asking them to defend 
southerners against the "fanatics" who threatened the security of Union. During the 
discussion of the Wilmot Proviso in the House of Representatives, one Mississippi 
congressman, for example, stated that support for the proviso meant encouragement for 
the "canting Abolitionist, who secretly and stealthily, openly and fiendishly, overleaps 
the barriers of the Constitution, and tramples up its sacred guarantees, in order to 
undermine your rights and obliterate your privileges, scatters fire-brands, arrows, and 
death among you, envelops your house in flames, and murders your wife and children 
before your eyes, to him this soil is free. It is a city of refuge where he may [include] the 
avenger of blood." In the minds of several slaveholding proponents, a vote for the 
restriction of slavery became the equivalent of voting for slave revolts, much like voting 
for the recognition of Haiti or refusing to censor the abolitionist mailings had been 
labeled in years prior. Antislavery in any form threatened the health and well-being of 
everyone who lived in the slave South, the most ardent defenders of slavery claimed. 
Proslavery supporters in the South needed to separate northern allies who might help 
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them defend their enslaved labor system from their abolitionist enemies, who now posed 
a serious threat to the safety of the South.61 
 The Charleston Mercury, still leading the slaveholder's response to the proviso, 
declared that the debate over restricting slavery to the South revolved around the present 
"security of the slave institution, even within our own States." The newspaper wrote, 
"Our safety can only be secure in our own hands. It can only be secured by union 
amongst ourselves, and by a resolute determination to preserve the equality of rights 
constitutionally ours." The South's northern allies could no longer be trusted. 
Abolitionists, the firebrand periodical announced, had plans to spur the rebellion of the 
enslaved with the proviso.  The lives of all southerners were at risk, the Mercury warned, 
"We shall be surrounded by a population hostile to us. On every side girt round with 
those who will continually excite our slaves to insubordination and revolt, which it would 
be folly to suppose would forever be resisted." With power of the federal government in 
the hands of those who hated slavery, there would be little help from those outside the 
South in putting down an insurrection. "In it," the newspaper concluded, "we may see a 
servile war with all its horrors. If the white triumphs, victory itself will be death. If 
foreign aid," such as England, "make the slave the victor, misery far greater than death 
will follow him whose unbridled passions will find in the contempt of all restraint human 
and divine a theatre for its that will make humanity shutter."62  For white southerners—all 
white southerners—Wilmot portended a war to the death, much like the French had 
experienced during the Haitian Revolution, but worse—instead of being surrounded by  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ocean, American slaveholders would find themselves surrounded by hostility. Unlike 
their Caribbean counterparts, there would be little sympathy from the rest of the world. 
Thomas Bayly, a Virginian, told the rest of Congress that opponents of slavery 
should be dealt with swiftly before they could do real damage to the South's slave society 
by empowering the abolitionists to strike at the southern institution once again. 
Abolitionists threatened to destroy the South through physical force, he told his 
colleagues in the nation's Capitol.  He told the House that radical members of the 
antislavery movement had the goal of extinguishing slavery “at every hazard and by any 
means, even by deluging the South with blood.” 63 If this were the case, the South needed 
to defend itself in order to prevent not only economic loss, but destruction of their 
property and their way of life.  Northern moderates on the issue of slavery, the Virginian 
contended, needed to stop playing politics with slavery and protect the South from attacks 
launched by those who wanted to overturn the system through racial revolution. 
Newspapers in the South pointed out their fear that abolitionists—now 
emboldened by the Wilmot Proviso—could cause upheaval throughout the South. In an 
article about Whig leadership in the federal government, a Florida newspaper said 
"[southern Whigs] must look at [abolitionists] as intending to be true to their pledges; as 
the deadly enemies of the dearest interests of your constituents and of the South; as the 
chosen leaders of those fanatics who will, if they can, liberate your slaves, even by fire 
and sword...prepare the way for the grand drama of Abolition, at whatever hazard, 
throughout the slaveholding states." James Henry Hammond and other slave owners                                                         
63 Ibid. 
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warned their compatriots that the Free Soil movement challenged the southern way of life 
in places where slavery already existed.  The restriction of slavery in the Mexican 
Cession was just the first step to ending slavery—possibly through the instigation to 
revolt by the enslaved themselves—by northerners who opposed the South’s labor 
system.  Southern defenders of slavery needed to do everything they could to protect their 
region against the antislavery movement’s attempts at destroying their society.64 
The Haitian Revolution again gained currency in the language of the proslavery 
movement as they tried to diffuse the support for the Wilmot Proviso. With their large 
enslaved majority, white South Carolinians felt the most apprehension over the prospect 
of a Haitian-like slave rebellion. Whites in the Palmetto State often took extra precaution 
against slave insurrection.  One visitor from Georgia described Charleston as similar to a 
town on the frontier "where the tocsin is sounded, and the evening drum beaten, and the 
guard set as regularly every night as if an invasion were expected.  In Charleston, 
however, it is not the dread of foreign invasion, but of domestic insurrection."  
Furthermore, the former governor of the state, James Henry Hammond, worried that with 
the addition of only free states gained from the Mexican Cession, northerners would “ride 
over us rough shod, proclaim freedom or something equivalent to our Slaves and reduce 
us to the condition of Hayti…if we de do not act now, we deliberately consign our 
children, not our posterity, but our children to flames.” As the belief that preventing 
slavery from entering the West might lead to an eventual uprising of the enslaved gained 
acceptance in the South, it is not surprising that South Carolina leaders stationed                                                         
64 Tallahassee Floridian, August 8, 1840; Drew Gilpin Faust, James Henry Hammond and the Old South: A 
Design for Mastery (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Press, 1982): 284. 
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themselves at the forefront of the opposition to the Wilmot Proviso.65 
Waddy Thompson, a former congressman from South Carolina, feared that the 
Wilmot Proviso would cause whites in the South to leave the region, joining the chorus of 
other southerners who worried about demographic change and its future consequences. 
Thompson wrote that the proviso’s “victory is worse than fruitless—its ultimate result 
will be to convert [the South], the fruitful mother of heroes and statesmen, into another 
San Domingo Pandemonium—[where their] children will be forced to leave a soil 
consecrated by the blood of patriot ancestors…and see the marble on their tombs 
converted into hearth stones, and their graves ploughed over by a free negro proprietor.”  
The South Carolinian believed that preventing the expansion of slavery to the West could 
only lead to a population dominated by blacks. Wilmot, some slaveholders worried, 
imperiled the South.66 
In the House of Representatives, Thomas Bayly reminded northerners that 
Ohioans had rejected a settlement of emancipated slaves in the summer of 1846.  The 
congressman believed Wilmot’s slavery stipulation would lead to the emancipation of the 
enslaved due to the political gains of antislavery membership in Congress and the 
creation of only free states in the West.  Abolition meant race war, the Virginian warned.  
He asked his colleagues in the House to “look at Santo Domingo.  It was almost a 
paradise.  It was one of the most beautiful and prosperous portions of the earth.  By the 
                                                        
65 Frances Anne Kemble, Journal of a Residence on a Georgian Plantation in 1838-1839 ed. John A. Scott 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961): 39; Quoted in William Barney, The Road to Secession: A New 
Perspective on the Old South (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972): 104-105. 
66 Greenville Mountaineer, October 15, 1847. 
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means of a servile insurrection, instigated, and aided by British fanatics, the terrors of 
which no pen can describe, and no heart can contemplate…there was indiscriminate 
massacre of the whites, without regard to age, sex, or condition.” The congressman also 
insisted that such an insurrection stemming from emancipation could only lead to the 
“extermination” of either the white or black race in the United States where “the South is 
deluged in blood, and is made one vast scene of desolation.”  Many slaveholders 
contended that Haiti proved that whites and blacks could not live peacefully in an 
integrated society.  They tried to frame the debate so that whites in the North had to 
choose between their own race and the enslaved blacks.  Wilmot’s proviso also forced 
many in the South to focus on their own region’s safety instead of national issues that 
crossed sectional lines.67   
 The sectional tendency of the vote for the Wilmot Proviso also made some 
southerners change their mind about their devotion to the Union, especially if the 
Constitution seemed to be changing to resemble foreign governments that had initiated 
emancipation. During the Nullification Crisis in South Carolina, Benjamin F. Perry sided 
with Andrew Jackson and the power of the federal government.  He had been a 
proslavery Unionist. However, with the passage of the Wilmot Proviso, the South 
Carolinian denounced the amendment as an antislavery plot.  He postulated that the 
enactment of Wilmot would lead to the eventual freedom of blacks, and then to their 
domination of the electorate because “in most of our Districts and Parishes in South 
Carolina, there is a majority of Slaves, and being set free, [they] could carry all the                                                         
67 Congressional Globe, 29 Cong., 2 sess., 1847, 348.  Framing the slavery issue as one between choosing 
in favor of whites or blacks would be common theme throughout the 1850s, for a famous example see the 
Lincoln-Douglas debates, especially the debate at Charleston, Illinois. 
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elections, and fill all the public offices.”  Once the former slaves dominated the 
population of southern society more than they already did in some heavily enslaved 
states, Perry contended, blacks would “intermarry with [white] children” and serve in 
Congress.  He pointed out that antislavery proponents did not even give free blacks in the 
North the equality that they intended to implement in the South.  He assumed that this 
came from the northern understanding of the danger posed by a free, burgeoning black 
population.  In defending slavery against restriction from the lands of the Mexican 
Cession, southerners strengthened their own intellectual defense of their regional labor 
system as a whole.68 
 After the House adopted the Wilmot Proviso for a second time in February 15, 
1847, John C. Calhoun also foresaw a scenario in which the continuation of antislavery 
attacks on slavery might lead to the destruction of the South.  Regaining the clout he had 
lost for opposing the Mexican War, the senator led the defense of slavery and the 
slaveholding states against the Wilmot Proviso. From the Senate floor Calhoun explained 
the southern resistance to proposed restriction of slavery in the West.  He said, "Our 
opposition rests on the ground that they will be ruinous to us, if not effectually resisted. 
We know what we are about; we foresee what is coming, and move with no other 
purpose but to protect our portion of the Union from the greatest calamities—not 
insurrection, but something worse.  [The expulsion] in time [of] the white population of 
the Southern States and [will] leave the blacks in possession [of the South]."69 The senior 
                                                        
68 Pendleton, Sc. Messenger, December 17, 1847.  
69 The Papers of John C. Calhoun vol. XXIV eds. Clyde N. Wilson and Shirley Bright Cook (Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1999): 190. 
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statesman of South Carolina believed that if "those influences on the other side be 
permitted to go on, the result of the whole will be, that we shall have St. Domingo over 
again."70 
 Calhoun reminded those in Congress that the federal government had the 
constitutional duty to protect slavery in the United States in an active fashion. He asked, 
“[was] this government, under the solemn guarantee on of the Constitution, entered into 
by all the States, to protect the government of each other against domestic violence…not 
bound to adopt the most efficient measures to prevent the policy of the British 
government in reference to Texas, and which must have ended in insurrectionary 
movements in the neighboring States, from being carried into effect?"  The former 
nullifier challenged northern supporters of slave restriction in the West. If the federal 
government had the duty to annex Texas because it protected the South from the effects 
of British emancipation, how could the Wilmot Proviso be legal?  Southerners, the 
senator proclaimed, demanded that those in the North stay true to their constitutional duty 
and to protect slaveholders from their slaves by opposing the Wilmot Proviso.71   
The Wilmot Proviso offered John C. Calhoun the perfect opportunity to regain his 
position as leader of the proslavery movement. He told his followers that he wanted the 
South to take the fight to the North instead of just reacting to antislavery forces in 
Congress, and he suggested that the South attack constitutional stipulations that favored 
most of the free states.  Specifically, he recommended the exclusion of northern ships and                                                         
70 Ibid., XXV, 347. 
71 State and Federal Relations: The States and the United States, IV ed. Herman V. Ames (Philadelphia: 
Department of History, University of Pennsylvania, 106): 4-7. 
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commerce from southern ports, creating a proslavery boycott of goods produced by free 
state industry.  He threatened northerners with action and told antislavery senators, “If 
your vessels cannot come into our ports without the danger of such piratical acts…you 
have caused this state of things by violating the provisions of the Constitution and the act 
of Congress for delivering up fugitive slaves, by passing laws to prevent it, and thus 
make it impossible to recover them when they are carried off by such acts, or seduced 
from us, we have the right, and are bound by the high obligation of safety to ourselves.”  
While such an embargo might hurt the South economically, he hoped that this action 
might bring northern moderates on the issue of Wilmot’s amendment back to the side of 
the South and the protection of slavery. Economic security was less important than 
physical safety.72 
 The most ardent defense of slavery offered by John C. Calhoun came in the form 
of a call upon all of the southern state governments to pass legislation rejecting the 
proviso. As an example for local politicians to follow, he offered a resolution to the 
Senate that explained the proslavery position on the prohibition of slavery from the 
Mexican Cession.  In response the Virginia legislature unanimously passed a 
denunciation of the proviso. Calling it "The Platform of the South," the Virginia 
legislature, using almost the exact same language as Calhoun, resolved that “the 
government of the United States has no control, directly or indirectly, mediately or 
immediately, over the institution of slavery, and that in taking any such control, it 
transcends the limits of its legitimate functions by destroying the internal organization of 
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the sovereignties who created it.” Other slaveholding state governments, such as 
Alabama and Georgia, followed the Old Dominion’s lead and passed similar 
condemnations of Wilmot’s amendment. Slaveholders would protect their labor 
institution with or without the help of the federal government.73 
 Calhoun and his allies in southern state legislatures did not stop with the 
regulation of slavery in the Mexican Cession. They continued by attacking the authority 
of the federal government to regulate slavery in any land acquired by the nation, even 
north of the traditional Missouri Compromise line many regarded as the standard of 
compromise on the issue. Their resolution further stated: “That all territory which may be 
acquired by…the United States…belongs to the several states of this union, as their joint 
and common property, in which each and all have equal rights” and called any 
“enactment by the federal government of any law which should directly or by its effects 
prevent the citizens of any state from emigrating with their property of whatever 
description into such territory” a “derogation of that perfect equality that belongs to the 
several states as members of this Union, and would tend directly to subvert the Union 
itself.”74 With the adoption of the Platform of the South, ardent proslavery advocates 
blamed antislavery sentiment for any cracks that occurred to the Union over the issue of 
slavery in the territories. The reactions by slaveholders to the Wilmot Proviso helped to 
create the intellectual foundation for the radical defense of slavery. If the federal 
government was not going to use its power to defend slavery, as it had done decades 
prior, southerners would work to weaken Washington's power.  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74 Ibid. 
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Despite President Polk and the Democratic-controlled Senate eventually finding a 
way to garner enough votes in the House to negotiate lands away from Mexico without 
the Wilmot Proviso, its initial passage in the House of Representatives by a nearly 
sectional vote became a turning point in American history that would loom large for over 
a decade. The negative southern reaction to the proviso did not arise simply out of 
response to an insult or fear of economic disadvantage in the future. Rather, southerners 
contended that northern support for Wilmot signaled the enhanced strength of the 
antislavery movement in the free states, which for decades had been feared as southerners 
watched slavery end in the Caribbean and worried about the growing sway that the 
abolitionists in England had over one of the most powerful nations in the world. How 
slaveholders responded to Wilmot was greatly influenced by decades of previous history, 
and the decisions of prior generations. 
A major component in the reaction of the South to the Wilmot Proviso stemmed 
from the fear of slave insurrection similar to one experienced by French slaveholders on 
their former colony of Saint Domingue. Many in the South worried that in the future such 
a bloody upheaval of their own society might take place. Slaveholders anticipated a day 
in which their enslaved population would grow too large to control if slavery’s restriction 
from the West became law, especially with a federal government dominated by those 
hostile to the South’s enslaved labor system.  Many believed the only inevitable outcome 
of being hemmed in by free soil was a deadly race war in which either whites or blacks 
would be removed from the land.  This belief had been developed for decades among 
southern intellectuals as slaveholders reacted to various insurrection plots, real or 
imaginary, domestic and abroad.  
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 The Wilmot Proviso became a tipping point in the politics of slavery in the United 
States by granting the opportunity for proslavery radicals to gain a foothold in the 
mindset of the South; the proviso tarnished the trust between slaveholders and those in 
the North who willfully supported slavery for political gain for years. Many pro-southern 
political and intellectual leaders began to believe that Robert Turnbull had been right 
when he said abolitionists would eventually overrun the American federal government in 
the same fashion that they did Parliament. Tapping into the fear that an Abolitionist 
Power aimed for the violent destruction of their society, radical leaders of the proslavery 
movement gained confidence as they organized an opposition to the proviso by calling 
for the legalization of slavery throughout all of the United States territories, not just 
below the line of latitude struck during the sectional bargaining of the Missouri 
Compromise.  These southerners wanted the South to act in an aggressive manner against 
the antislavery movement, just as they had during the 1830s as slavery became abolished 
in the Caribbean.  
 Stemming directly from the reaction to the Wilmot Proviso, the Platform of the 
South gave fire-eaters an intellectual foundation from which to start challenging 
American exceptionalism by questioning how different the Constitution was from other 
forms of government, especially Parliament, thus eroding the belief throughout the slave 
states that the American form of government was different from the rest of the world, 
something northerners still forthrightly believed. From 1846 until the 1860, Wilmot's 
proviso became a political litmus test for politicians, both in the free and slave states. 
Political leaders tried to find a way to bridge the divide caused by the issue of whether or 
not to allow slavery into the American West, but they were fighting several decades of 
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history. Beliefs and anticipations for the future that had developed since the 1790s would 
not be easily assuaged by the simple give and take of the American political tradition of 
compromise. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
 The Southern Turn Against American Exceptionalism 
 
 
Experience has proved, that slaveholding States cannot be safe, in subjection to non-slaveholding States. 
Indeed, as no people can ever expect to preserve its rights and liberties, unless these be in its own custody. 
To plunder and oppress, where plunder and oppression can be practiced with impunity, seems to be the 
natural order of things. The fairest portions of the world elsewhere, have been turned into wildernesses; and 
the most civilized and prosperous communities, have been impoverished and ruined by anti-slavery 
fanaticism. 
 
-The Address of South Carolina To Slaveholding States, December 25, 18601 
 
 
The Wilmot Proviso's passage in the House of Representatives had an immediate 
impact on the course of politics in the United States. In the election of 1848 both Whigs 
and Democrats faced sectional predicaments. Each party hoped to show the South that 
they could be trusted on the issue of protecting slavery without disenchanting the North, 
where opposition to slavery was steadily growing. In the North a new party had been 
formed out of emboldened antislavery proponents who had not only overturned the gag 
rule and passed the Wilmot Proviso but also worked to end the slave trade in the nation's 
capital.2 Spurred by the positive reception of Wilmot’s legislation in the free states, 
antislavery politicians formed this third party out of a coalition of northern Whigs (who 
opposed slavery mostly because of moral reasons), northern Democrats (who mostly 
opposed the expansion of slavery on racial grounds), and former members of the Liberty                                                         
1 Journal of the Convention of the People of South Carolina, Held in 1860, 1861, and 1862 (Columbia, SC: 
R. W. Gibbes, 1862): 473. 
2 For the long history of slavery in the nation's capital see Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic (New 
York:  Oxford University Press, 2001): 49-88. The proslavery movement saw the debate over regulating 
slavery and the slave trade in Washington, D.C. as another example of Robert Turnbull's prophecy about 
abolitionism during British emancipation of the West Indies as coming true. 
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Party. With this new coalition, the Free Soil Party was born. The organizers of the new 
party, meeting in Buffalo, New York, announced that they gathered "as a union of 
freemen, for the sake of freedom, forgetting all past political differences in a common 
resolve to maintain the rights of free labor against the aggressions of the Slave Power, 
and to secure free soil to a free people" and supported "the National Platform of Freedom, 
in opposition to the sectional Platform of Slavery."3   
 The Free Soilers nominated former occupant of the White House Martin Van 
Buren as their first presidential candidate. In a remarkable display of the changes that had 
reverberated through slavery politics, the party named their vice-presidential candidate 
Charles Francis Adams, the son of the recently deceased John Quincy Adams. Though 
Van Buren and Adams had been political enemies in the 1820s, they now joined forces 
against expanding slavery to the West. Armed with the slogan, "Free Soil, Free Labor, 
Free Speech, Free men," the new party hoped to rally the North to its side by making 
slavery in the territories—not slavery where it had already been established in the 
South—a major issue in the national election.4  
                                                        
3 O. C. Gardiner, The Great Crisis or, Three Presidential Candidates Being A Brief Historical Sketch of the 
Free Soil Question in the United States, From The Congresses 1774 and '87 to the Present Time (New 
York: WM. C. Bryant and Company, 1848): 138-139; Joel H. Silbey, Party Over Section: The Rough and 
Ready Presidential Election of 1848 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009): 76-85, 164-166; Joseph 
G. Rayback, Free Soil: The Election of 1848 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1970): 201-230; 
Leonard Richards, The Slave Power: The Free North and Southern Domination, 1780-1860 (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 2000): 154-155; Jonathan H. Earle, Jacksonian Antislavery and Politics 
of Free Soil, 1824-1854 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2004): 161-169; Sean Wilentz, The 
Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln (W. W. Norton and Company, 2005): 602-628. For a 
discussion on the creation of the Free Soil Movement in New York, see Earle, Jacksonian Antislavery, 49-
77. 
4 Silbey, Party Over Section, 76-78; Rayback, Free Soil, 228-229; Earle, Jacksonian Antislavery, 163-168. 
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 Hoping to compete in the South without losing the North, the Whigs and the 
Democrats each devised ways around the Wilmot Proviso. Democrats needed to choose a 
new candidate who would appeal to voters at a national level. Three candidates for the 
nomination emerged at the beginning of the convention: Levi Woodbury, a former 
senator from New Hampshire and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court appointed by 
Polk; James Buchanan, a former senator from Pennsylvania who was the current 
Secretary of States; and Lewis Cass, senator from Michigan and former Secretary of War 
for Andrew Jackson—none of these men owned slaves. They hoped to balance the ticket 
by nominating for vice president William Orlando Butler, a Kentuckian known more for 
his accolades as a commander of troops during the Mexican War than for his loyalty to 
slavery.5 
 In order to garner votes in the South, the Democratic Party clearly stated that 
"Congress has no power under the Constitution to interfere with or control the domestic 
institutions of the several States." However, the party said very little about the issue of 
slavery in the territories in its official doctrines. Furthermore, as a way to prove their 
party stood for the Union, Democrats resolved that "all efforts of the Abolitionists or 
others made to induce Congress to interfere with questions of slavery, or to take incipient 
steps in relation thereto, are calculated to lead to the most alarming and dangerous 
consequences." Democrats depicted themselves as Unionists who wanted to protect the 
sanctity of the Constitution while simultaneously assuring slaveholders that their slave 
property remained safe from federal intervention. Abolitionists would have to cast their                                                         
5 Silbey, Party Over Section, 62-65. Robert E. May, John A. Quitman: Old South Crusader (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University, 1985): 212-215. 
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votes for someone else, they declared. By focusing little attention to the role Congress 
played regarding slavery in the territories, the party hoped to avoid the issue of the 
Wilmot Proviso, both in the North and South.6 
 Lewis Cass, however, knew he could not simply avoid the Wilmot Proviso by 
ignoring slavery in the western territories. The presidential candidate hoped to walk a fine 
line between sectional tensions over slavery by supporting a form of popular 
sovereignty—discussed as an alternative during the initial furor over Wilmot's proposed 
prohibition of slavery in the Mexican Cession—that would grant control over slavery to 
those who actually lived in new territories. A few months before the convention, Cass 
answered an inquiry from a Tennessee Democrat about his position by composing a long 
letter discussing the Constitution and the American ideals of self-government. He wrote, 
"I am opposed to the exercise of any jurisdiction by Congress over this matter; and I am 
in favor of leaving to the people of any territory, which may be hereafter acquired, the 
right to regulate it for themselves, under the general principles of the Constitution."7 A 
week later, his letter was published in the Washington Union. The Michigander hoped 
that by taking power to regulate slavery in the territories and giving it to the people 
themselves, he could satisfy both antislavery northerners and proslavery southerners. 
 However, the Democratic platform did not go far enough for some ardent 
defenders of slavery. Months earlier, the Democratic Party of Alabama had developed a 
                                                        
6 Porter and Johnson, eds, National Party Platforms, 10-12; Silbey, Party Over Section, 65-67. 
7 Gardiner, The Great Crisis, 43; Michael A. Morrison, Slavery and the American West: The Eclipse of 
Manifest Destiny and the Coming of the Civil War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997): 
84-86; David M. Potter, The Impending Crisis: 1848-1861 (New York: Harper and Row, 1976): 56-64. 
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platform for their state's delegates that commanded their delegation not to vote for any 
candidate who had voted for the Wilmot Proviso or who might hinder the expansion of 
slavery in the territories in general. The proslavery movement wanted the federal 
government to actively protect slavery as it had done during the decades before. The 
Alabama platform unequivocally stated that Congress could not regulate slavery in the 
states or any of the territories—directly challenging supporters of the Wilmot Proviso. 
The proslavery movement decided to take a stand against what they deemed a weak 
attempt by Democrats to avoid facing the issue directly. Many in the South believed that 
without the expansion of slavery the white population of the South would dwindle, 
leaving a larger, more dangerous slave population behind.8    
 The proponents of the Alabama platform argued that Cass had to do more to 
protect slavery. Granting the citizens of the West full power to decide whether slavery 
would exist in American territories did not satisfy these radical supporters of the South's 
peculiar institution. Rather, they took the defense of slavery a step further than the 
Democratic Party did, claiming that the enslavement of blacks must be protected 
everywhere and in every territory until statehood had been achieved. While the Free 
Soilers championed freedom as a national ideal and slavery as a sectional one, William 
Lowndes Yancey and like-minded leaders in the proslavery movement proclaimed the 
opposite. Though it would be roundly praised in the southern press, Democrats in 
Baltimore overwhelmingly rejected the radical proslavery platform by a 216 to 36 vote. 
                                                        
8 Eric H. Walther, William Lowndes Yancey: The Coming of the Civil War (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2006): 101-104; J. Mills Thornton III, Politics and Power in a Slave Society: 
Alabama, 1800-1860 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978): 172-175; Macon Weekly 
Telegraph January 7, 1851. 
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Yancey and one other delegate left the convention in protest, regarding rejection of their 
platform as evidence that northern Democrats were not serious about protecting slavery 
from the threats of the antislavery movement. Popular sovereignty, for now, would 
provide the Democratic Party with adequate justification to oppose the Wilmot Proviso.9 
 The Whigs adopted a much different strategy. As an organization propelled by 
such antislavery politicians as John Quincy Adams, Whig leaders knew slaveholders 
analyzed its party with great caution. Bereft of political experience or acumen, Zachary 
Taylor therefore emerged at the beginning of the Whig national convention in 
Philadelphia as their presumptive nominee. Some in the party worried that he was unfit 
for the presidency. One Whig who knew Taylor well said he was "an honest, plain, 
unpretending old man who, if left to his own course, would be as honest as it is possible 
for a man to be, but about as fit for the President of these United States as any New 
England Farmer that one might select out of a thousand, with his eyes shut." Another 
member of the party, Congressman Horace Mann, writing after the election that would 
make Taylor president, stated that the former general "talks as artlessly as a child about 
affairs of State, and does not seem to pretend to a knowledge of any thing of which he is 
ignorant." Zachary Taylor would prove that during volatile times, a lack of understanding 
of politics or government policy did not preclude a candidate from running a successful 
presidential campaign in a democracy.10 
                                                        
9 Ibid., Silbey, Party Over Section, 67. 
10 Quoted in John C. Waugh, On The Brink of Civil War: The Compromise of 1850 and How it Changed 
the Course of American History (Wilmington, DL: Scholarly Resources, 2003): 34-35; Mary Tyler 
Peabody Mann, Life of Horace Mann (Boston: Lee and Shepard, 1904): 292. Michael F. Holt, The Rise and 
Fall of the American Whig Party: Jacksonian Politics and the Onset of the Civil War (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999): 259-330.  
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  Despite a sizeable opposition who feared Taylor did not actually believe in Whig 
principles, the former Mexican War general managed well the officers of the convention. 
Old Rough and Ready—a nickname garnered during his long career in the military dating 
back to the War of 1812—never trailed on a ballot for the nomination. Despite only 
partially committing to the Whig program, Taylor won the nomination based on one 
single asset that his opponents lacked: he was a slaveholder and war hero highly regarded 
in the North. He was thus electable at a time when the country was divided on 
contentious issues, most significantly the Wilmot Proviso and the question of slavery’s 
future in the territories. To balance the ticket Millard Fillmore—a former congressman 
from Buffalo who had opposed the annexation of Texas and once complained about the 
South's domination of Congress—was nominated for vice president.11 
 Though capable of speaking in generalities about internal improvements or the 
tariff, Zachary Taylor's quest for the presidency in 1848 revolved primarily around his 
personal story as an anti-partisan leader who refused to advocate strictly northern or 
southern, Whig or Democrat, solutions on the campaign trail. He told America that he 
was a different kind of candidate, one who would be a post-partisan leader in a nation 
that saw sectional tension threatening the union. His supporters claimed that he was "the 
people's candidate," a man more loyal to his country than to any political party. As a 
Whig stated in one campaign pamphlet, "To love him, it is only necessary for his 
countrymen to know him, not alone as a soldier, but as a man and a citizen." The 
pamphlet went on to share stories from his time in the army and included sections about                                                         
11 Silbey, Party Over Section, 68-71. Paul Finkelman, Millard Fillmore (New York: Times Books, 2011): 
24.  
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"his morality and temperance" and "his modesty and unassuming manners" as well as 
praise for his familiarity "with human suffering" because "General Taylor's heart is filled 
with the tenderest sympathies, and quickens to the noblest impulses."12 Old Rough and 
Ready refused to be cornered by the issues brought upon American politics because of 
the Wilmot Proviso. Instead, Whigs hoped that a slaveholder with good war stories would 
trump the ideas of a midwestern senator who hoped to find compromise over slavery in 
the West. 
 Because Taylor refused to engage in any political fight, he was able to bridge the 
sectional tensions caused by Wilmot just a few years earlier. He served as a blank slate 
that partisans could project their belief on and tell themselves that he was their man. 
Massachusetts Whigs tried to paint Taylor as being completely in favor of the Wilmot 
Proviso, attacking Martin Van Buren as a "Northern man with Southern principles" for 
his role in the effort to censor newspapers during the abolitionist postal campaign and 
attacking the former president's role in preventing slavery in the nation's capital from 
being discussed, quoting him as saying, "I must go into the Presidential chair the 
inflexible and uncompromising opponent of any attempt to abolish slavery in the District 
of Columbia, against the wishes of the slaveholding states." The party leaders insisted 
that the "few dissatisfied Whigs" who felt "indignant at the attempt of the slave power to 
extend [slavery] into territory now free" should understand that forming a third party 
                                                        
12 A Sketch of The Life and Public Services of General Zachary Taylor the People's Candidate for the 
Presidency, with Considerations in Favor of his Election (Washington, DC: J. T. Towers, 1848): 1, 24-25; 
Silbey, Party Over Section, 108-110. Democrats did indeed try to counter stories of their own about Cass, 
for example, one pamphlet connected Cass to Jefferson by publishing the nomination of Cass for a marshal 
post in Ohio by the writer of the Declaration of Independence and third president. See A Sketch of the Life 
and Public Services of General Lewis Cass, YA Pamphlet Collection, Library of Congress.  
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would not suffice in standing up to slaveholders. Taylor, they insisted, represented the 
perfect candidate to stand up to southern interests because he was "not only a Whig" but 
also a "free soil Whig...who many years ago declared his attachment to the free soil 
principle." With a northerner in Fillmore, who the party insisted was "known and 
appreciated" throughout Massachusetts and "by every freeman in this Commonwealth," 
they would have someone who "would give his casting vote against the extension of 
slavery."13 The Whig ticket, even with a slaveholder, northern Whigs declared to their 
fellow citizens in the free states, could be trusted to resist adding slavery to the western 
territories.  
 In the South, Whigs told southerners the opposite. When Democrats in the South 
tried to tie Old Rough and Ready to the Wilmot Proviso by insisting that he would have 
to be loyal to antislavery Whigs in the Northeast, his party's base, southern Whigs 
pointed to his being a slaveholder. Attempting to show their candidate’s allegiance with 
the South on the issue of the Wilmot Proviso, some southern advocates successfully 
contrasted Taylor's southerness with Cass as a way to alleviate fear that his northeastern 
supporters would control the Whig nominee. For example, James Henry Hammond wrote 
in his diary his thoughts about the election and Taylor that encapsulates this idea: 
"Taylor, a slaveholder, pure, firm, and patriotic and of sound judgment, I still prefer him 
and would vote for him." Southerners trusted one of their own, Hammond continued, "As 
a Southern man and slaveholder, I thought the South should support him without regard 
to party, especially as Cass was openly anti-slavery." Hammond liked Taylor’s explicit                                                         
13 Address adopted by the Whig State Convention, at Worcester, September 13, 1848. Together with the 
Resolutions and Proceedings, 9-12.  
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promise to rise above party politics and "to be a moderate Whig and an Independent 
candidate who would accept support from all parties, but bind himself to none." Others, 
such as the Democrats of Virginia, proclaimed to their fellow citizens that Taylor's 
election would eventually lead to "your homes, and your fields" flowing "with the blood 
of yourselves and your neighbors, shed by servile hands in a civil war." The refutation of 
the Wilmot Proviso was the major issue for most southerners.14  
 In the end, proslavery southerners would have to decide who they trusted more: a 
Democratic Party that had protected slavery for decades but now nominated a northerner 
with a spotty record on slavery; or the Whigs—a party filled with those morally opposed 
to slavery that had nominated a slaveholding war hero who portrayed himself as an anti-
partisan leader opposed to Wilmot’s contentious proposal. When the votes were tallied, 
the slave states split evenly, with Cass and Taylor each winning six slave states. Taylor, 
however, won the Electoral College majority in the North with a different sectional 
divide: Cass won every state in the Northwest while Taylor won every state in the 
Northeast with the exception of Maine and New Hampshire. The Free Soil campaign of 
Van Buren won 10 percent of the popular vote, but the cause of excluding slavery in new 
territory would not yet galvanize an electoral majority in the free states. Old Rough and 
Ready, running as a man who would rise about sectional tension, had been elected the                                                         
14 Carol Bleser, ed., Secret and Sacred: The Diaries of James Henry Hammond, a Southern Slaveholder 
(Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1988): 189-191. Address Of The Democratic State 
Convention To The People Of Virginia in Richmond Enquirer, September 26, 1848. Whigs in the South 
contrasted Taylor with Cass by stating that he in fact did support the Wilmot Proviso, for example, In one 
pamphlet they quoted him as saying, "He would have voted for it, if he had voted at all, last year." See 
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twelfth president of the United States. It would be the final time a slaveholder would ever 
reside in the White House.15 
 In January 1848, as the two parties prepared to choose who they would nominate 
in their upcoming elections, James W. Marshall, who had been hired to build a sawmill in 
California on the American River, recovered a few flakes of metal from his water wheel.  
The carpenter immediately knew what it was—gold. At first, news of Marshall's find was 
viewed with skepticism in the East. However, when President Polk officially affirmed in 
his State of the Union address to Congress that gold had been found in California, the 
mad dash was on. California became a national—even international—sensation. 
Hundreds of thousands of fortune-seekers migrated to the American territory upon 
hearing news that laborers in the West were making as much as twenty-five times the 
wages of their eastern counterparts. California's population swelled.  Nearly 300 million 
dollars worth of gold would be mined from the California soil over the next six years. As 
the territory's population grew, the proslavery movement waited to see how the new 
president would handle the issue of slavery in California—a large portion of which was 
south of the old Missouri Compromise line.16  
 Polk anticipated that the gold rush would cause a massive population increase in 
California. In his final State of the Union address in 1849 he asked Congress to organize 
the territory despite political reservations regarding the Wilmot Proviso. The president 
worried that without organization, Californians would launch a revolution of their own 
and declare themselves free from United States control. Polk told Congress that he would                                                         
15 Silbey, Party Over Section, 129-146. 
16 Malcolm J. Rohrbough, "The California Gold Rush as a National Experience," California History 77 
(Spring 1998): 16-29. 
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accept the extension of the Missouri Compromise line or any similar alternative that 
would pass. His main imperative was to ensure that California remained under United 
States jurisdiction as thousands of people from all over the world came to the Pacific 
Coast in search of striking it rich.17 
 One such alternative to the extension of the Missouri Compromise line came from 
Stephen A. Douglas, the recently elected senator from Illinois. On the day that Polk asked 
Congress to act, Douglas proposed that the entire Mexican Cession be brought into the 
Union as one state, thus avoiding the Wilmot Proviso altogether. Though Polk supported 
the idea, others in Congress believed that such a large state would be too difficult to 
manage, despite the bill’s provision allowing additional states to be carved out of the 
territory in the future. The loudest opposition came from the two extreme sides of the 
Wilmot Proviso. Antislavery northerners declared that they would accept nothing short of 
implementing a total prohibition of slavery in the Mexican Cession. The proslavery 
movement, meanwhile, castigated the Douglas bill as an attempt to pass the proviso by 
whitewashing it. Proslavery southerners had begun to distrust northern Democrats after 
the passage of the Wilmot Proviso. These contentions would put the issue on hold, 
leaving a new Congress and the novice President Taylor to work out a compromise.18 
 Zachary Taylor, whether from his lack of political experience or his arrogance as 
America's latest war-hero president, believed that he could rise above the Wilmot-
generated sectional partisanship that had created a deadlocked Congress during the 
second half of his predecessor's term. Accepting the trope that slavery could never exist                                                         
17 Morrison, Slavery and the American West, 96-100. 
18 Ibid, 100-101; Potter, The Impending Crisis, 76. 
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in the West—as had Polk—and believing that severe reactions to proslavery southerners 
had derived only from politicians hoping to score political points, the new president 
adopted a policy regarding western territory that proved to many southerners that they 
had been fooled into believing that Old Rough and Ready was more of a slaveholder and 
less of a Whig. Taylor's time in office would instigate a crisis that nearly split the Union 
and showed the proslavery movement a glimpse of what a president not devoted to 
slavery could do. After Taylor's presidency, southern radicals would demand a president 
devoted to using the federal government to protect slavery in the West.19 
 Taylor's underestimation of proslavery southerners’ fear of being surrounded by 
free soil caused further division during a time when many hoped to move past the 
controversy sparked by the Wilmot Proviso. In August 1849, just months into his 
presidency, Taylor took a stance on the westward expansion of slavery that caused 
southerners to reconsider their loyalty to the Union. The new president sent a 
commission, led by the slaveholder Thomas Butler King, to California with instructions 
to promote the creation of a state government that, most likely, would request the 
territory’s entrance as a free state into the Union. Realizing that using free soil language 
would help his party win seats in the midterm elections, the new president told a crowd in                                                         
19 For an overview of the Taylor presidency see Elbert B. Smith, The Presidencies of Zachary Taylor and 
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Mercer, Pennsylvania: "The people of the North need have no further apprehension of the 
extension of slavery." He promised his audience that the Whigs could function as the 
vehicle for free soil and issued an executive order warning Americans that any efforts 
they made to spark revolution in Cuba would be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the 
law. Taylor, the slaveholder who many proslavery southerners had trusted on the issue of 
blocking the Wilmot Proviso, abruptly condemned attempts by proslavery southerners to 
annex additional slave territory to the United States.20 
 Many proponents of the proslavery movement supported a formal response from 
the slave states against Taylor's actions. As he had done in reaction to the Wilmot 
Proviso, John C. Calhoun warned that the policy pushed by the administration would turn 
the South into a mere colony of the North. He wrote a letter that he hoped every southern 
congressman would sign, condemning the impetuous actions of antislavery members of 
Congress. Antislavery northerners "disturbed" the "tranquility" of the South with 
"systematic agitation."  He told the Congress in a speech titled the "Southern Address" 
that the efforts to prohibit the extension of slavery and abolish the slave trade in the 
District of Columbia would result in the North "holding the white race at the South in 
complete subjection."21 The Abolitionist Power had been planning on these actions for 
years. Calhoun believed that the South needed to respond to the antislavery movement in 
unison and hoped that southerners would rally behind his letter. This endeavor ultimately 
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Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1908, volume V (Washington, DC: Bureau of National Literature and Art, 
1908): 7-8. 
21 Niles' National Register, vol. LXXV, 84-88. 
  325 
failed. Though some southern legislatures would later approve of the idea, only 48 out of 
the 121 southern members of Congress agreed to sign the document.22 
 As the issue of slavery in California went unresolved throughout 1849, proslavery 
politicians began to move towards Calhoun's position. Southern members of the 
proslavery movement viewed the issues of extending slavery to the West and protecting 
the slave trade in the nation's capital as examples of free state abolitionists’ desire to 
change the relationship between the federal government and the South. Historians of the 
sectional crisis have pointed to the speech of Robert Toombs during the heated contest 
for the election of the Speaker of the House in December 1849 as evidence of this 
growing separation between the North and the South. Toombs, a Georgia congressman 
who had rejected Calhoun's call for southern unity just eleven months before, railed 
against antislavery Whigs and Democrats in late 1849, proclaiming that if slavery were 
kept from New Mexico and California he would have no choice but to declare "for 
disunion."  However, when put into the context of the southern reaction to the 
emancipation of the West Indies in the 1830s—where they watched the planter class 
there lose any sense of representation in Parliament—the background of his claim that 
northerners attempted "to fix a national degradation upon the States of this Confederacy" 
becomes clearer.23 In this light, it appears that southerners had anticipated for decades the 
southern response to Taylor’s plan for the West. For several in the proslavery movement,  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the exceptional nature of government that separated the United States from England had 
long worn away. Taylor, more by incompetence than by antislavery motive, had merely 
fulfilled the prophecy of Robert Turnbull's prophecy in the 1830s that the antislavery 
movement would eventually use the federal government to act against slavery. 
 During the 1850s, just as the slave population was growing and southern fears of 
insurrection started gaining currency again, radical abolitionists, both white and black, 
began delivering lectures and performing plays in the North that praised the Haitian 
Revolution. Toussaint Louverture again became a hero for many radical abolitionists, 
with some comparing him to George Washington while others compared him to 
Napoleon. For abolitionists, Toussaint had evolved into a legendary man of war to be 
praised for his bloody pursuit of freedom. The discomfiting idea that slavery in America 
would end in violence started to percolate among the most ardent members of the 
antislavery movement.24  
 To many planters, Taylor's actions seemed like a hostile betrayal by one of their 
own. The slaveholding president had sided with the fanatics who hoped to spark 
insurrection. Their fears were only confirmed when Horace Mann, a Whig congressman 
from Massachusetts elected to serve in John Quincy Adams’s former seat, responded to 
the cries of southerners for disunion by telling Congress, "The state of slavery is always a 
state of war. In its deepest tranquility, it is but a truce," and therefore the insurrection was 
both inevitable and preferable to the extension of slavery. Without the president uttering a 
word of disapproval, Mann challenged radical proslavery southerners by inferring that the  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civil war that would inevitably result from secession would spark a slave insurrection. He 
further stated, "With the creation of every human being, God creates this love of liberty 
anew. The slave shares it with his master, and it has descended into his bosom from the 
same high source. Whether dormant or wakeful, it only awaits an opportunity to become 
the mastering impulse of the soul. Civil war is that opportunity." To southerners who had 
convinced themselves for decades that outsiders sparked insurrections, no better evidence 
could be attained of the Abolitionist Power threatening to unleash "servile war" and 
thereby sparking a second Haiti. The antislavery Whig had made it public knowledge, 
slavery's defenders believed.25     
 By the end of 1849 the United States of America desperately cried out for a 
statesman to lead the nation through another sectional crisis over slavery. The state of 
Kentucky hoped that it could provide that man, and the state legislature re-elected Henry 
Clay—who had left the Senate nearly seven years prior—back to his old position. At first 
reluctant to fill his former role in the upper chamber of Congress, the Great Compromiser 
quickly made his chief goal the resolution of slavery in the West. Throughout the first 
half of 1850, Clay hoped to formulate a compromise plan that would allow California to 
enter the Union as a free state in exchange for concessions to the proslavery elements of 
Congress. For nearly a year, the Senate chamber resounded with the voices of living 
legends. Three aging giants, Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, and John C. Calhoun, along 
with two new entrants into the Senate, Jefferson Davis and William Seward, all gave 
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brilliant speeches. Clay and Webster fought for unity and compromise, Seward attacked 
slavery's existence, and Davis and Calhoun defended the South's labor system.26 
 The proslavery movement's champion orator, Calhoun, had become so weakened 
by illness during the debate that he could not himself deliver his final major speech to the 
Senate. Rendered feeble by tuberculosis, the South Carolinian listened to his own words 
as his friend, Virginia Senator James M. Mason, read Calhoun's closing argument in 
defense of the expansion of slavery. The dying Calhoun spoke like a convert who now 
believed that the American system had lost its exceptional nature, due to the "long-
continued agitation of the slave question on the part of the North." An equilibrium had 
been created at the founding of the nation, he argued, that "afforded ample means to each 
[section] of protecting itself against the aggression of the other." However, as the 
population of the North outpaced the South, that equilibrium had been destroyed. Free 
states now dominated slave states, both in the number of states that existed and in the 
Electoral College. Calhoun blamed the federal ban against slavery in the Northwest 
Ordinance and the funneling of tax money from imports from the South to the North for 
creating such a discrepancy in the population of the two sections.27 
 The dominance of the free states, the South Carolina senator contended, came at 
the same time that "every portion of the North entertains views and feeling more or less 
hostile to [slavery]." While "fanatics" saw slavery "as a sin, and consider themselves 
under the most sacred obligation to use ever effort to destroy it," the "not so fanatical"                                                         
26 Remini, At The Edge of the Precipice, 37-62; Merrill D. Peterson, The Great Triumvirate: Webster, Clay, 
and Calhoun (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987): 431-475. 
27 Congressional Globe, 31 Cong., 1 sess., 451-452.  
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still regarded the southern institution "as a blot and a stain on the characters of what they 
call the nation, and feel themselves accordingly bound to give it no countenance or 
support." However, Calhoun claimed, southerners understood slavery in a way 
northerners could never comprehend. "The southern section regards [slavery] as one 
which cannot be destroyed without subjecting the two races to the greatest calamity, and 
the section to poverty, desolation, and wretchedness; and accordingly they feel bound by 
every consideration of interest and safety, to defend it."28 The institution of slavery 
needed to be protected and supported by the federal government because, as slaveholders 
had argued for decades, outside "agitation" could spark a race war. 
 The rest of Calhoun's speech read as if it were Robert Turnbull's prediction from 
the 1830s. Calhoun contended the exceptional nature of the Union began to weaken when 
the "fanatical portion of the North," intent on "destroying the existing relation between 
the two races of the South," tried to spark insurrection by mailing abolitionist pamphlets 
through the mail. "The South was thoroughly aroused. Meetings were held everywhere, 
and resolutions adopted, calling upon the North to apply a remedy to arrest the threatened 
evil."29 Southerners had needed to defend themselves because the North would not.  
 Congress, the South Carolinian proclaimed, had failed to protect the safety of 
slavery by not imposing a censorship of mail delivery. "Neither party in Congress had, at 
that time, any sympathy with" the abolitionist movement. However, northerners, fearing 
that they would lose votes by not defending free speech, united together to favor the 
                                                        
28 Ibid., 452. 
29 Ibid. 
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reception of petitions. In doing so, Calhoun maintained, the antislavery movement had 
gained "a position in Congress from which agitation could be extended over the whole 
Union."  Turnbull had been proven right, the gaunt senator told his colleagues in his 
valedictory address. By not squashing abolitionism in its cradle, the movement had 
grown powerful. "Instead of being weaker, all the elements in favor of agitation are 
stronger now than they were in 1835, when it first commenced, while all the elements of 
influence on the part of the South are weaker."30 The Union would not collapse from a 
single blow, Calhoun argued, it would just slowly fall apart over time. The Wilmot 
Proviso had been just one more tear in the fabric of the nation. Calhoun, and those who 
followed him, opposed Clay's compromise because he believed it was yet another step 
towards ending slavery in the United States and sparking racial combat in the South.  
 In less than a month the longtime leader of the proslavery movement would be 
dead, but his legacy would live on in the form of a radical proslavery movement led by 
radicals labeled “fire-eaters” who built on his ideas articulated in response to the Wilmot 
Proviso and the possible prohibition of slavery in the West throughout the 1850s. Their 
ethos revolved around one principle articulated by one of its chief members, Robert 
Barnwell Rhett: "The South must protect itself, no slaveholding communities can be safe 
but by their own energies." The Constitution, which made the United States unique, he 
maintained, would mean nothing if slavery could be regulated by the federal government. 
As the Senate continued to debate Clay's compromise plan, several proslavery 
southerners took to heart Calhoun's call for a convention of southern leaders and 
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organized a meeting in Nashville, Tennessee, to portray a unified front against the 
antislavery movement. Five states sent an official delegation to Tennessee: Texas, 
Georgia, Virginia, South Carolina, and Mississippi. Delegates named at local party 
conventions and caucuses in those states represented four other states—Florida, Alabama, 
Arkansas, and Tennessee—in an unofficial capacity.31  
  One speech delivered in Nashville by fire‐eater Nathaniel Beverley Tucker of Virginia showed that the twin fears of being encircled by free soil and enduring a Haitian‐style insurrection persistently hounded southerners. In an address calling for the creation of a new nation comprised only of slave states, Tucker argued that such a southern confederacy should take control of Haiti and make it a repository for free blacks from the South. He stated, "But let a place be found nearer home, where a colony of free blacks may be established under a provincial government, protected, regulated and controlled by a Southern Confederacy, open to all who will go to it, and from its proximity accessible to all....The folly and madness of France have prepared it. It is Hayti."32 The most ardent fire‐eaters firmly believed that having a large black population, especially with a free black class, would be 
                                                        
31 Potter, The Impending Crisis, 104-106; Walther, William Lowndes Yancey, 119-123; Thelma Jennings, 
The Nashville Convention Southern Movement for Unity, 1848-1851 (Memphis: Memphis State University 
Press, 1980): 105-134. Rhett quoted in Walther, The Fire-Eaters, 137; Charleston Mercury, September 29, 
1848. Another attempt by the fire-eaters to assert its strength came in the form of reopening the 
international slave trade. However, those attempts were always dismissed throughout the 1850s by 
northerners and most southerners—even ardent proslavery southerners—alike. See Fehrenbacher, The 
Slaveholding Republic, 180-181. 
32 Nathaniel Beverley Tucker, Prescience: Speech Delivered By Hon. Beverly Tucker, of Virginia, in the 
Southern Convention, Held At Nashville, Tenn., (Richmond, VA: West and Johnson, 1862) 31-32; Walther, 
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dangerous to the white South, and they hoped to find a safety valve for excess slaves as the population of the black population of the South continued to grow. 
 Meeting in June 1850, the timing could not have been worse for those zealous 
proslavery delegates who hoped to see a significant statement coming out of the 
Nashville Convention. Though some fire-eaters sought to galvanize the South against any 
congressional action, most of the attendees still preferred a more moderate approach. As 
the Senate debated Clay's compromise measures, the Nashville Convention waited. After 
nine days had passed, the delegates decided against passing any resolution that could be 
perceived as anti-Union. Instead, the majority favored the extension of the Missouri 
Compromise line—going against the Calhoun stance that slavery should be legal in all 
the territory in the West, from Oregon to California—and proposing an idea that had not 
passed during the initial reaction to the Wilmot Proviso.33 The Nashville Convention 
turned out to be more about southern politicians heavily involved in the proslavery 
movement trying to make a statement rather than actually creating a unified organization 
that represented the southern people. Without formal delegations from each slave state, 
the convention was doomed to fail in any attempt to make a significant statement in 
support of slavery's future in the West. As happened during the Nullification Crisis, most 
southerners still wanted to wait and see what the future would hold. 
  Zachary Taylor spoiled any chance of an amicable settlement by acting on his own, rather than giving Clay's compromise the crucial support it needed. Unlike the Missouri Compromise, which had gained support from President Monroe, Clay’s                                                         
33 Jennings, The Nashville Convention Southern Movement for Unity, 135-166.   
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new compromise did not sufficiently measure up to Taylor's expectation that California be immediately admitted to the Union despite the firestorm of debate it might incur. Taylor encouraged California to adopt a constitution, which would most likely exclude slavery, thereby enraging proslavery southerners. Old Rough and Ready seemed to view himself as Andrew Jackson and the issue of expansion of slavery outside of the South as nullification. By background a general, Taylor believed in taking decisive action and implementing a solution that his subordinates had to follow. So with a divided Congress and the threat of a veto from the president, Clay's compromise failed to pass in either chamber of Congress.34 
 Though he did not intend to turn the entire Mexican Cession into one state the 
way Douglas’s plan had intended, Taylor's rigid stance effectively bypassed the Wilmot 
Proviso through executive order, but to the southern planter class, the result was the 
same. Taylor's policy gave a reason for the proslavery movement to protest him 
specifically and the Union in general. Proslavery forces now saw two branches of the 
federal government—the presidency and the House of Representatives—as being in 
support of the Wilmot Proviso's restrictions against the extension of slavery in new                                                         
34 Richard L. Leonard, The Slave Power: The Free North and Southern Domination, 1780-1860 (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000): 96-99; Potter, The Impending Crisis, 90-99, 106-107; 
Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic, 271-272; Remini, At The Edge of the Precipice, 37-90. Clay's 
compromise consisted of eight measures: California would be admitted as a free state; New Mexico would 
be allowed to vote on the issue of slavery without congressional interference; the state of Texas would 
relinquish its claim on New Mexico territory; the federal government would assume all of Texas' pre-
annexation debt; Congress would declare it "inexpedient" to prohibit slavery in Washington, D.C. while 
Maryland remained a slave state; the slave trade would be banned in the nation's capital; the fugitive slave 
law allowing slaveholders to go into free states to capture escaped slaves would be strengthened; and, 
finally, Congress would have no power under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution to prohibit or 
obstruct the trading of slaves among the slave states. See, Robert Pierce Forbes, The Missouri Compromise 
and Its Aftermath: Slavery and the Meaning of America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2007): 63-71, 89-95. Clay's compromise would fail when these resolutions were bundled together in what 
became known as the "omnibus bill." 
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American lands. But proslavery arguments about slave insurrection appeared to fall on 
deaf ears. Unlike the confrontation between Jackson and Calhoun over nullification, 
Taylor's actions regarding the prohibition of slavery from the West created a broader 
opposition in which the threat of military action from the president would unravel the 
Union rather than bring a single rogue state like South Carolina back into the fold. 
Southern opposition to Wilmot was a feature in nearly every slave state. For many 
southerners, the possibility of being surrounded by free soil was indeed perceived as a 
fundamental threat to their way of life and safety.35 
 President Taylor, however, would never have the chance to enact his plan of 
settling the question of slavery in the West through executive fiat. The Fourth of July in 
1850 was a sunny day of heat and humidity. The president had long been interested in 
watching the construction of the Washington Monument and celebrating the nation's 
seventy-fourth birthday. Special speakers had been invited to celebrate the occasion. 
Most attendees only stayed to listen to the main event—a speech delivered by Senator 
Henry S. Foote—and to witness the dust from Tadeusz Kościuszko's tomb, a Polish hero 
of the American Revolution, as it was deposited in the unfinished monument. The 
president, however, stayed to listen to George Washington’s step-grandson also deliver 
an address. For two hours, the president sat in the heat drinking chilled milk and eating 
cherries, two foods that doctors had advised the inhabitants of the nation’s capital to 
avoid due to the possibility of their contamination by the Asiatic cholera epidemic. After 
the president went home, he began to feel ill. Taylor was soon diagnosed with 
                                                        
35 Smith, The Presidencies of Zachary Taylor and Millard Fillmore, 100-104. 
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gastroenteritis, the stomach flu. On July 9, 1850, the second Whig president to be elected 
to the White House, like William Henry Harrison before him, died in office. Vice 
President Millard Fillmore, like John Tyler before him, became an unlikely president.36 
 Almost immediately on becoming president, Fillmore changed course from 
Taylor's stance on the issue of California and began to work to pass a compromise in 
Congress. The man many southerners had derided as an abolitionist when he was paired 
with the Louisiana slaveholder on the Whig ticket became the South's best hope for 
protecting slavery in the West. Determined to start his administration without any 
influence from his predecessor, Millard Fillmore accepted the resignation of Taylor's 
entire cabinet upon entering office. The new president immediately appointed Daniel 
Webster, Clay's chief ally, as secretary of state and threw the full weight of his 
presidency behind finding a way to pass the proposed compromise. He also masterfully 
defused the growing standoff between Texas and New Mexico by delivering a message 
that made it clear that he would use presidential force if Texas took steps against New 
Mexico while promising to refrain until Congress made "appropriate" legal action.37 
 In August, with the threat of a presidential veto no longer hanging over Clay's 
compromise bill and the aging Clay himself away from Washington recovering from 
illness, Stephen Douglas went into action trying to rework the failed resolutions that 
many had hoped would save the Union. Through parliamentary tricks and political tact, 
Douglas, remembering that the Missouri Compromise had never been voted on as one                                                         
36 K. Jack Bauer, Zachary Taylor: Soldier, Planter, Statesman of the Old Southwest (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University, 1985): 314-316. 
37 Potter, The Impending Crisis, 110; Waugh, On The Brink of Civil War, 180.  
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piece of legislation, separated the omnibus bill and had the Senate vote separately on 
each resolution. By the first week of September, each part of Clay's compromise laid on 
the desk of President Fillmore, where he signed them.38 
 In what the historian David Potter has deemed "the Armistice of 1850," the 
Illinois senator managed to garner an affirmative vote on every aspect of Clay's bill by 
forging a small coalition of moderates who wanted compromise with the sectional 
partisans who would only vote for a bill that favored their worldview. Only three 
northern senators voted in favor of a strengthened Fugitive Slave Law, while unanimous 
northern votes carried the bill for the admission of California as a free state despite 
receiving only six votes in favor from southern senators to eighteen who opposed it. A 
similar ratio was seen in the voting pattern in the House of Representatives. Clay's 
compromise passed with little spirit of compromise actually being found in the halls of 
Congress. Only four senators and twenty-eight congressmen voted in favor of each 
resolution that made up the so-called Compromise of 1850.39 The stark wedge created by 
the Wilmot Proviso separated the sections. As the North believed it fought against the 
Slave Power and the South believed it was seeing the conspiracy of the Abolitionist 
Power put into place, a large portion of the electorate in both the free states and slave 
states distrusted each other.  
 The congressional deadlock caused by the Wilmot Proviso appeared finally to be 
over. Once the final votes were tallied and the resolutions passed, senators and 
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congressmen celebrated. They believed the Union had been saved. Lewis Cass 
contended, "I think the question is settled in the public mind" and vowed not to give 
another speech on the subject. Stephen Douglas, too, promised to "never make another 
speech upon the slavery question in the Houses of Congress." Newspapers encouraged 
Americans to celebrate. The Wilmot Proviso and the questions it raised in the public—
both North and South—had been vanquished. The question had finally been resolved.40 
 The reaction and the debate sparked by the Wilmot Proviso had been decades in 
the making. The belief that they had avoided civil war and sectional confrontation by 
passing Clay's compromise as a set of individual resolutions did not change southerners’ 
belief that slavery still needed to expand in order not only to survive as a labor source but 
also to maintain the security of white society. During the 1850s the fear of slave 
insurrection actually grew as southerners lost their control over the federal government. 
During the "Crisis of 1850," for example, Alabama saw mobs rise in towns throughout 
the state, organizing vigilante groups that attacked those critical of slavery. In one 
instance, a proslavery editor was censured because he only drove abolitionists out of the 
state instead of "making a more deliable [sic] mark" on the perpetrators by physically 
assaulting them. These fears continued to build throughout the decade as the issue of 
slavery in the West, and the role of the federal government in protecting the southern 
institution, took center stage of national politics. The conflict stemmed over one major 
difference: while most northerners outside of the abolitionist movement believed that 
slavery's expansion and slavery’s continued existence in the states could be separated                                                         
40 Thomas Hart Benton, ed., Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, vol XVI (New 
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politically and practically, southerners perceived them as one and the same issue.41 The 1850s, a decade that saw southerners constantly trying to expand where slavery could go while antislavery northerners fought back, has been heavily documented and debated by historians. The southern impulse to defend slavery against "fanatics" who hoped to turn the South into another Haiti helped fuel sectional conflict throughout the decade. In the aftermath of the Compromise of 1850, the proslavery movement made two major attempts to expand slavery, believing that its very existence was at stake. The first was to pass the Kansas‐Nebraska Act, which opened the door for the establishment of slavery—through popular sovereignty—in territory north of the Missouri Compromise line, causing uproar in the North and widespread physical violence in what became known as "Bleeding Kansas." The proslavery movement had adopted Calhoun's call for the legalization of slavery everywhere, and many northern politicians who supported the Kansas‐Nebraska Act would pay a steep price for their “yes” votes in Congress, losing their congressional seats to candidates who endorsed free soil.42  
Secondly, the proslavery movement actively worked to add more territory to the United States. Instead of focusing exclusively on the West, they turned their attention to   the Caribbean and Central America, centering on Cuba as the ideal addition to slake the lust of slaveholders who maintained that their institution of 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labor needed to expand in order to survive in an era of emancipation. Employing privately funded military outfits known as filibusters to spark revolution or conquer territory, the most ardent proslavery forces hoped to wrestle away colonies from European metropoles. The most publicized example of these proslavery missions of conquest involved Cuba. Shortly after the introduction of the Wilmot Proviso, some southerners began to view Cuba as a possible additional slave state that could enter the Union without much controversy. They believed that if a prohibition of slavery had been favored in the West because slavery had long been banned there, slavery would be protected in Cuba because of its long history on the island. These southerners saw Cuba's annexation as another state to be a way to balance the admission of California. The proslavery movement saw that the South could no longer control the House of Representatives; they became determined to maintain power in the Senate.43  
Southern politicians from 1848 to 1854 encouraged four different presidents—James K. Polk, Zachary Taylor, Millard Fillmore, and Franklin Pierce—to buy Cuba from Spain. Others in the proslavery movement worked to spark a revolution in the island by promoting a private Cuban junta, hoping an independent Cuba could be annexed in the same fashion as Texas.  A revolution, they believed, would allow President Franklin Pierce, a Democrat sympathetic to slaveholders, to 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University of North Carolina Press, 1980): 26. Southerners would continue to press for a slaveholding 
empire throughout the Caribbean throughout the 1850s and through secession when the Confederate States 
of America was established and during the Civil War. See Robert E. May, The Southern Dream of 
Caribbean Empire, 1854-1861 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973) and Matthew Pratt 
Guterl, American Mediterranean: Southern Slaveholders in the Age of Emancipation (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2008).  
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make a bid for the island. Pierce was a member of the Young America Movement, whose goal of rapid U.S. expansion easily encompassed the addition of Cuba. In 1853 the president refused to accept a treaty between Spain, France, Great Britain, and the United States that made illegal attacks on the island by private citizens hoping to spark revolution. At the same time, as the president stalled on a treaty regarding filibusters, supporters of annexing Cuba to the United States who planned an invasion of the island in order to detach it from Spain.44  
The impetus for proslavery action in the Caribbean became greater, however, when Spain, due to pressure from both Great Britain and France, and America’s permissive indifference towards filibustering, considered emancipation in Cuba and the arming of black troops to ward off invaders. The Louisiana legislature petitioned Congress, declaring the possibility of abolition coming to Cuba to be "a most pernicious influence upon the institutions and interests, social, commercial, and political of the United States" and stating that the effect of emancipation would be "the sacrifice of the white race, with its arts, commerce and civilization, to a barbarous and inferior race." The Louisianans argued that it was the duty of the federal government to "adopt the most decisive and energetic measures to thwart and defeat a policy conceived in hatred to this republic, and calculated to retard her progress and prosperity."45 The sudden threat of a large free black population, less                                                         
44 Yonatan Eyal, The Young America Movement and the Transformation of the Democratic Party, 1828-
1861 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007): 135-139; Brown, Agents of Manifest Destiny, 109-
123. 
45 House Miscellaneous Documents, 33 Cong., 1 sess, no. 79; C. Stanley Urban, "The Africanization of 
Cuba Scare, 1853-1855," The Hispanic American Historical Review 37 (Feb., 1957): 29-45; Brown, Agents 
of Manifest Destiny, 89-123. 
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than one hundred miles off of the coast of the slaveholding South, made Cuban annexation an immediate necessity for members of the planter class and their dwindling northern allies. 
This quandary resulted in the final major attempt by the proslavery movement to add to the United States more territory where slavery already existed. As northerners began to protest the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act and civil war 
loomed in Kansas between slaveholders and free soilers, the American ministers to 
France (John Y. Mason), Spain (Pierre Soulé), and England (James Buchanan) devised a plan to annex Cuba during a meeting in the coastal town of Ostend, Belgium, at the suggestion of Secretary of State William Marcy, the former governor of New York. As they drew up the Ostend Manifesto, the three ministers explained why they believed the United States could and should acquire the island of Cuba. Spain, due to its "wretched financial condition," would accept an offer from the Pierce administration for 130 million dollars. However, if Spain refused, the United States could "afford to disregard the censures of the world" in the name of "self‐preservation."46   
The American ministers concluded by stating they believed America now found itself in a perilous situation, one in which "self‐preservation" would justify an assault on the island. Just as they had in the 1830s, the proslavery movement justified action by the federal government to protect slavery by connecting it to national security—only this time they added an expansionist twist. The three                                                         
46  Document XVI, The Ostend Manifesto in Willis Fletcher Johnson, America's Foreign Relations, volume 
II (New York: The Century Co,. 1921): 439-441; Brown, Agents of Manifest Destiny, 140-141; Brown, 
Agents of Manifest Destiny, 140-141. 
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ministers maintained, "We should, however, be recreant to our duty, be unworthy of our gallant forefathers, and commit base treason against our posterity, should we permit Cuba to be Africanized and become a second St. Domingo, with all its attendant horrors to the white race, and suffer the flames to extend to our own neighboring shores, seriously to endanger or actually to consume the fair fabric of our Union."47 A second "St. Domingo" would also mean a second Toussaint, the perceived slayer of the planter class in the nightmares of the planter class. The same fear that occurred during the Haitian Revolution in the 1790s occurred again in the proslavery movement, this time in the form of the "Africanization" of Cuba inciting the South's black population to rebellion and racial warfare. 
The method proslavery forces had used for decades to get their way in a national debate, however, found little success this time around. Wilmot had changed things. Northern politicians no longer genuflected toward political leaders who supported slavery and decried an imminent threat to the Union. The Ostend Manifesto, along with the Kansas‐Nebraska Act, received a harsh and negative rebuke by those who lived in the free states. Democratic leaders in the North like Lewis Cass denounced the Ostend Manifesto. In the mid‐term election of 1854, President Franklin Pierce and his fellow Democrats would pay a heavy price for supporting the Slave Power, losing seventy‐three seats in the House of 
                                                        
47 Document XVI, The Ostend Manifesto in Willis Fletcher Johnson, America's Foreign Relations, volume 
II, 441. 
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Representatives.48  
The Whigs, however, collapsed entirely. No longer able to create a national coalition because of the stark differences of opinion between northern and southern party members over slavery, southern Whigs joined southern Democrats while northerners left for two new parties that appeared in the North, both of which were viewed as antislavery coalitions—the American Party, which became known as the Know Nothings, and the Republican Party, which had adopted the old free soiler mantra "Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men."  The proslavery movement could no longer control the federal government by connecting national defense and the sanctification of the Union to the protection and expansion of slavery. After the harsh rebuke to the expansion of slavery in 1854, the United States would not add and organize another major piece of territory until the 1890s, when Congress finally organized Alaska, purchased in 1867.49 
One of the final confirmations for the proslavery movement that the Abolitionist Power now controlled of the federal government came in the form of 
                                                        
48 Leonard, The Slave Power, 190-195; Potter, The Impending Crisis, 192. 
49 Tyler Anbinder, Nativism and Slavery: The Northern Know Nothings and the Politics of the 1850s (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2002): 75-102; William W. Freehling, The Road to Disunion, vol. 2, 85-
108. For the explanation of the rise of the Republican Party see Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free 
Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1995) and William E. Gienapp, The Origins of the Republican Party, 1852-1856 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988).  Curiously, while the battle, both with words and swords, raged over Kansas-
Nebraska Act and the Ostend Manifesto, the Pierce administration without much dispute did add nearly 
30,000 square miles of land on the southern border of New Mexico and Arizona in what became known as 
the Gadsden Purchase, named after James Gadsden who was an ardent member of the proslavery 
movement who had tried and failed desperately to separate California into two states, one free the other 
slave, who helped negotiate the purchase of the land from Mexico. Alaska would be bought from Russia in 
the 1860s, but the area would not be organized into a territory until the 1890s.  
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the failed presidency of one of its fiercest northern allies, James Buchanan. In the 1856 presidential election, Democrats took advantage of the demise of the Whig Party, winning the presidency by nominating the last ardently proslavery northerner and gaining the unanimous support in the Electoral College from the slave states—something that had not occurred since the "Era of Good Feelings" and the electoral landslide that granted James Monroe his second term. Buchanan was able to garner enough support in the North against his two rivals from the Republican and Know Nothing parties to win a solid majority of the Electoral College with only 45 percent of the popular vote.50 
 A Keystone State politician who encouraged the expansion of slavery to Cuba and Texas and had supported the censorship of antislavery tracts while serving in the Senate during the 1830s abolitionist mail controversy, Buchanan supported two proslavery measures during his presidency that would doom the Democratic Party in 
the North. He also experienced a third crisis that would make the South question its 
loyalty to the Union. The first came in the form of the Supreme Court decision Dred 
Scott v. Sanford, in which the court discussed whether or not carrying an enslaved person 
into free territory automatically freed the slave. Hoping that a proslavery verdict that 
allowed slaves to be taken into any territory in the United States without changing their 
status would solve the problems caused by the Wilmot Proviso, Buchanan—as president-
elect—corresponded with Supreme Court justices in hopes of influencing the outcome in 
his favor. In his inaugural address Buchanan specifically identified the question of 
                                                        
50 Potter, The Impending Crisis, 225-266; William W. Freehling, The Road to Disunion, vol. 2, 109-122. 
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slavery as belonging  "to the Supreme Court of the United States, before whom it is now 
pending, and will, it is understood, be speedily and finally settled." Two days later—in a 
six to three decision in which only one northerner sided with the majority—the Court 
issued a broad ruling that in essence legalized slavery everywhere, proclaiming that black 
people were not protected as people under the Constitution and that free blacks were not 
to be considered citizens of the United States of America. The Missouri Compromise, the 
court declared, had been unconstitutional—slavery was a national institution.51 
Antislavery northerners immediately attacked the Court's ruling, declaring that a 
conspiracy had been developed by the Slave Power to enshrine slavery in the United 
States without the full consent of the people. The Supreme Court, the critics stated, could 
not dictate an issue that should be decided in the legislature. The Scott v. Sanford 
decision, which became popularly known as the Dred Scott decision, heightened 
northerners’ acute sense that the Democrats preferred pandering to southern interests to 
protecting the nation as a whole. No longer could defenders of slavery attract northern 
sentiment by placing their concerns within a national context. Democrats, especially in 
the Midwest, became viewed by many northerners as simply tools of the Slave Power 
who conspired to make the United States a completely slaveholding country.52 
Buchanan would cement this view for many northerners by his own actions 
following the Dred Scott decision. During the years that immediately followed the 
                                                        
51 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, 34 Cong., 3 sess., 271-272; Austin Allen, Origins of the Dred 
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Kansas-Nebraska Act, the territory of Kansas had been the rhetorical and physical 
battlefield between the proslavery and antislavery movements as each side tried 
desperately to make the territory into either a slave or free state. In an attempt to quell the 
confrontation over slavery and settle the question once and for all, President Buchanan 
searched for a territorial governor who would offer a strong hand in guiding Kansas. He 
finally settled on long-time friend Robert Walker, who had convincingly swayed 
northerners to accept Texas annexation as a way to draw enslaved blacks away from the 
North and towards Mexico.53 
In Robert Walker's inaugural address as territorial governor of Kansas, he told the 
residents that the people, not Congress, would decide whether Kansas would enter the 
Union as a free or slave state. He declared that any constitution that would be submitted 
to Congress would have to first be ratified by "actual bona fide resident settlers of 
Kansas" after being drafted by a constitutional convention. Little time passed before his 
proslavery friends attacked his idea. The Charleston Mercury declared, "General Walker 
is a native of Pennsylvania. He emigrated to Mississippi, and represented that State in the 
Senate of the United States. He is now a Pennsylvanian again. Neither the Constitution of 
his native State, Pennsylvania, nor that of his temporarily adopted State, Mississippi, was 
ever submitted to the people for ratification after being adopted in Convention."54 
According to the paper, southerners could no longer trust their former allies from the                                                         
53 Potter, The Impeding Crisis, 298-310; Freehling, The Road to Disunion, volume II, 130-132; Etcheson, 
Bleeding Kansas, 143-144. 
54 Inaugural Address of R. J. Walker, Governor of Kansas Territory, delivered in Lecompton, K. T. May 27, 
1857 (Lecompton, KS: 1857): 5; Charleston Mercury, June 9, 1857. Walker also maintained his view that 
slavery would eventually erode away from the Upper South and into Mexico. See Freehling, The Road to 
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North, even the ones who had served as leaders of the proslavery movement just years 
before. Rhett's words from a few years before seemed to be prescient for many planters: 
the South itself would have to protect a secure system of slavery. 
The vote to create a constitution, however, would not constitute the fair 
representation of settlers envisioned by Walker. Despite slaveholders’ financing of the 
immigration of yeoman southerners to the Great Plains, the 1857 population of the state 
was estimated at 17,000 antislavery settlers and only 7,000 proslavery migrants. Any true 
vote, as Walker promised, should indicate the majority’s favor of making Kansas a free 
state. In 1855, before the massive immigration of free soilers to the West, proslavery 
citizens from Missouri had ventured to Kansas to declare themselves citizens for one 
day—Election Day. These one-day residents voted in favor of a heavily proslavery 
legislature to serve for two years. As Walker was becoming governor and Buchanan 
hoped to end the bitter fighting between Americans over slavery in the territory, 
proslavery advocates saw their elected terms coming to an end. Soon, they feared, the 
new legislature, which would be dominated by those who were antislavery, would vote to 
make Kansas another free state. If the proslavery leaders wanted to add another slave 
state in the political climate created by the Wilmot Proviso, they would need to do so 
soon before they lost control of the territorial legislature.55 
Proslavery forces in Kansas acted fast. The expiring legislature declared that a 
state constitutional convention would convene before the 1857 elections. Because of the 
previous election fraud by southerners, Kansas citizens in favor of free soil shunned  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official government elections, including the proslavery-called convention that planned to 
meet in Lecompton. Free soilers also boycotted the election held to send delegates to 
Lecompton, resulting in a dominant proslavery contingent at the convention. Predictably, 
the convention drafted a constitution that allowed slavery in Kansas. The convention 
delegates also created a maneuver around the electorate that would reject their 
constitution outright while technically staying within the framework of Walker's 
ultimatum that the proposed state government would need to be ratified by the people. 
The convention decided to only put the part of the constitution that allowed the future 
importation of slaves to a vote: those already held in bondage in the Great Plains would 
remain in their shackles.56  
The national response to the Lecompton convention was predictable. Proslavery 
southerners pointed to the Northwest Ordinance—as Wilmot had done in his attempt to 
prohibit slavery in the West—and claimed that it had only banned the importation of 
slaves into the territories instead of freeing those already held in slavery. Antislavery 
northerners derided the Lecompton constitution as simply a proslavery document. 
Slaveholders would simply ignore a ban on the importation of new slaves, they insisted. 
In response to what they viewed as a sham constitution, antislavery Kansans boycotted 
the ratification vote of Article Seven of the Lecompton Constitution and held their own 
separate election that took measure of the entire constitution, resulting in the "official" 
election ratifying the Lecompton constitution's allowance of future slavery in the territory 
while the unofficial vote overwhelmingly rejected the entirety of proslavery                                                         
56 The entire saga over the Lecompton constitution is best described in Etcheson, Bleeding Kansas, 139-
167. 
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constitution.57 
President Buchanan blundered by playing politics and supporting the anti-
democratic Lecompton constitution during a time that called for national leadership. He 
understood that the base of his party came from the South and believed that supporting 
slavery would help Democrats remain in power. In protest, Robert Walker resigned while 
Stephen A. Douglas, outraged at how the president accepted such an abrogation of local 
democracy, worked to rally northern Democrats against admitting Kansas under the 
proslavery constitution. When Congress took up the issue, a stark sectional divide 
appeared—both nationally between the slave states and the free states, and politically 
between northern Democrats who supported the measure and Republicans and Know 
Nothings who opposed it. The Senate accepted admitting Kansas into the Union as a 
slave state by a vote of 33-25; however, the House of Representatives demurred, voting 
120-112. In both cases a majority of the North and a handful of southerners in the Upper 
South voted against the proslavery position. Kansas would not become a slave state.58 
Despite controlling the presidency and Supreme Court and maintaining a balance 
in the Senate, the proslavery movement perceived the protection of slavery by the federal 
government and their northern allies as waning. The Charleston Mercury summed up 
these feelings in its reaction to the rejection of the Lecompton constitution by the House 
of Representatives. In an article titled "No More Slave States," the leading newspaper of 
the proslavery movement declared, “The South has suffered a defeat on a vital principle, 
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involving her destiny in the Union." The author said that the claims of fraud had been 
trumped up by "Black Republicans" and used as a "stratagem" to "divert attention from 
the occupation of an advanced position towards securing Southern subjection and 
Northern rule. Under the way of an increasing and overshadowing Northern majority, 
agitation is to go on." Without expansion, the Mercury told its readers, "the cordon of 
hostile sentiment" would slowly strangle slavery to death, "perhaps after a desperate and 
bloody struggle."59 The exceptional nature of the government that had made the 
American Constitution different from Parliament seemed to have fallen away. Many of 
their northern allies had abandoned the proslavery movement; the rest, they feared, could 
no longer resist the antislavery consensus building in the North. As Robert Turnbull had 
stated in his prophecy nearly three decades before, the newspaper inferred that majority 
rule would stamp out slavery in the United States just as it had in England, either through 
a slow strangling death or through violent agitation. 
In October 1859 a man deemed the most fanatical of the fanatics carried the 
battles in Kansas eastward. In an event that stunned the nation, John Brown and his 
followers, inspired by the Haitian Revolution, planned to spark an enslaved insurrection 
of their own by unleashing the very spirit of Toussaint in the American South. In the 
aftermath of the attempted revolt, John Brown's son told the New York Times  "It is, then, 
only the body of Toussaint L'Ouverture which sleeps in the tombs; his soul visits the 
cabins of the slaves of the South when night is spread over the face of nature....the 
despots of America shall yet know the strength of the toiler's arm, and that he who would 
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be free must himself strike the first blow." He would attack the oldest slave state in the 
Union, Virginia, hoping to stab at the heart of the slaveholding ethos. Following in the 
steps of Gabriel Prosser, Denmark Vesey, and Nat Turner, John Brown came to Virginia 
with the hope of sparking a revolution.60 
In the years that had followed the Wilmot Proviso, John Brown had become 
convinced that violence was the only way for slavery to meet its final end in the United 
States. While slaveholders worried about slavery’s possible prohibition in California, 
Brown focused on Dred Scott and the Fugitive Slave Act as evidence that the federal 
government still favored the planter class of the South. He chose to make his first major 
attack against slavery in the South at Harpers Ferry, Virginia. Eighteen other men, all of 
whom had written farewell letters to their families in expectation of death, joined him. 
Five members of Brown's band of raiders were black, including one whose wife and 
children still fell under the heavy yoke of bondage. Brown planned to attack the federal 
arsenal in the town and use its weapons, along with the hundreds of hand-made pikes that 
he and his troops brought with them, to arm the enslaved around the area. A student of 
the Haitian Revolution, Brown carefully chose Harpers Ferry because of its proximity to 
the Appalachian Mountains, just as Toussaint had utilized the Cahos Mountains to 
conduct a successful guerilla warfare campaign against the French.61 
Brown planned to ignite a revolution. His "Declaration of Liberty," written before 
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his planned rebellion, proclaimed, "in the course of Human events, it becomes necessary 
for an Oppressed People to Rise, and assert their Natural Rights." The rest of his 
declaration resembled that of David Walker's Appeal, laying out a history of human 
outrage and calling for unity against the slaveholding class of the South. American 
planters had broken the law of God that "requires All Men Shall be" free, Brown stated.62 
He planned to punish slaveholders for their crimes against humanity. On the night of 
October 16 that punishment was to begin. As Brown's men approached the armory, the 
raiders yelled to the night watchman to open the gate that guarded the weapons that had 
been made for the American military. When he refused, Brown's band used a crowbar to 
get in, taking captive the lonely guard. Brown looked at his hostage and coldly stated, "I 
came here from Kansas, and this is a slave State; I want to free all the negroes in this 
State; I have possession now of the United States Armory, and if the citizens interfere 
with me, I must only burn the town and have blood."63 The second Haitian Revolution, 
Brown believed, had begun. 
John Brown's raid did not ultimately turn out as he had hoped. There would be no 
massive insurrection that sparked a revolution. Upon news of Brown's raid, President 
Buchanan dispatched a detachment of Marines, led by Colonel Robert E. Lee, to Virginia 
to secure the town. After thirty-six hours of skirmishing that led to a handful of deaths on 
each side, the federal forces attacked Brown's encampment, in a small brick engine house 
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at the train station. After a short standoff, the Marines, led by J. E. B. Stuart, rushed the 
building. As the American troops approached Brown fired one last shot, killing a Marine. 
Lt. Israel Greene, the first to encounter John Brown, smashed the cold blade of Greene's 
military saber against Brown's head, not killing him, but injuring him badly. During the 
skirmish of Brown's final stand, four of his men were killed while two Marines died in 
the action. The wounded Brown and the rest of the survivors were taken prisoner. Though 
the Haitian Revolution would never come to Virginia, Brown's raid had lasting impact in 
the United States.64 
A few weeks after being captured, Brown went to court. Despite having attacked 
a federal armory, the state of Virginia tried the insurrectionist instead of the federal 
government. Though his defense lawyers had tried to paint their client as insane in order 
to gain leniency, Brown would have none of it, challenging them in front of the 
courtroom. He wanted the world to understand that he had acted thoughtfully, striking 
against the institution of slavery that he hated and hoped to overturn through violence. 
The insurrectionist prayed that others—both in the antislavery movement of the North 
and those held in slavery in the South—would adopt his approach. After a five-day trial, 
Brown was declared guilty. His sentence was death by hanging, scheduled for one month 
later.65 
Northerners evinced very little pity in their initial reactions to Brown's failed raid. 
Outside of antislavery periodicals, newspapers lambasted his efforts. One Connecticut 
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native, for instance, wrote, "We pity the weakness that has made him a fanatic."66 Many 
of his ardent supporters deserted him as he awaited his death. Members of the Secret 
Six—a group of prominent northerners who supported Brown's expedition—either fled 
the country or enrolled themselves into an asylum in order to flee scrutiny.  Pro-southern 
newspapers in the North claimed success in putting down the rebellion, in the belief that 
Brown had indeed intended to spark a revolution in the mountains of Virginia. The New 
York Herald wrote, "Old John Brown made a foray on Harper's Ferry; but he is not likely 
to repeat the experiment....The enemy's camp is broken up; their leader is in a Virginian 
prison; their arms and munitions of war have fallen into the hand of the victors; and three 
or four survivors of the provisional government have fled promiscuously, with prices set 
upon their heads." The fanatic abolitionists were still the enemy in a war over slavery. 
Harpers Ferry, for the proslavery movement, appeared to be a victory.67   
 At the beginning of Brown's trial, proslavery newspapers connected the raid on 
Harpers Ferry to the Haitian Revolution, hoping to show how dangerous someone like 
Brown could be to the South. The Charleston Mercury republished an article from the 
Baltimore Sun that stated, "Brown wanted the citizens of Virginia calmly to fold their 
arms and let him usurp the government, manumit our slaves, confiscate the property of 
slaveholders, and without drawing a trigger or shedding blood permit him to take 
possession of the Commonwealth and make it another Hayti."68 
 Other proslavery newspapers chastised the Republicans as well as Brown. "If our  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Northern Browns shoot 'freedom' into the South, and make slaves masters of their 
masters, as was done in Hayti, then the South will turn out to be as productive as Jamaica 
or Hayti.” The newspaper continued: "If we are not countrymen," the Washington, D.C. 
Constitution told its readers, "New Yorkers, Marylanders, and Virginians—we are 
neighbors. Our farms are near together....Is it right to be scattering firebrands into 
neighbors' houses, to preach principles in neighbors' households that certainly lead to 
servile if not civil war?"69 Newspapers throughout the South characterized Brown as a 
religious fanatic. The New Orleans Crescent described his actions as part of a larger 
Abolitionist Power conspiracy led by powerful northerners in the free state mainstream, 
and said his failed raid portended "vast and powerful ramifications through many 
states."70 Southern planters called for their former northern allies to temper the 
abolitionist movement before they created a dire state of violence in the slave states that 
the proslavery movement anticipated.  
 As John Brown waited one month for the hangman's noose, southerners worried 
about possible attempts to save Brown. The Virginia governor, Henry Wise, effectively 
declared marshal law throughout much of his state in the aftermath of the raid on Harpers 
Ferry. Claiming that he had received credible sources about another impending attack, 
Wise wrote President Buchanan informing him that he planned to seal the border of his 
state and formally notified the governors of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Ohio: 
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"Necessity may compel us to pursue invaders of our jurisdiction into yours." Wise told 
his fellow governors that his state expected "the confederate duty to be observed, of 
guarding your territory from becoming dangerous to our peace and safety, by affording 
places of depot and rendezvous to lawless desperadoes who may seek to war upon our 
people."71 Northern allies, many in the proslavery movement feared, could no longer be 
trusted to defend the South against slave insurrection. The governor, believing he was 
ensuring his state's safety against a hostile North, posted militia troops near his state's 
border, watching for a possible insurgency. As with other insurrection scares, the 
slaveholding South was on high alert. 
 Governor Wise was warned by fellow slaveholders not to make John Brown a 
martyr by hanging him. Rather, they argued, he should just spend the rest of his life in a 
Virginia cell. The governor, however, wanted revenge. There would be no pardon, and 
Brown hung from the gallows on December 2, 1859. Proslavery southerners' fears, 
however, did not fall to the ground with his lifeless body. Instead, they interpreted 
northern responses to Brown’s hanging as indications that the North was moving towards 
abolitionism. On the day of Brown's execution, vigils were held throughout the free 
states. Americans across the North observed the insurrectionist's death by tolling church 
bells, attending prayer meetings, delivering glowing oratories, and even offering 
hundred-gun salutes. Northern newspapers ran full-page stories on the day's events. 
Throughout the month of his captivity by Virginian authorities, Brown had written letters 
to supporters and curiosity seekers who contacted him. He knew his role and played his 
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part perfectly. Northern responses of anger and veneration only grew when readers saw 
reports of Brown's calm demeanor as he walked to the gallows. One New York 
newspaper reported that Brown kissed a black baby held up to him by its mother as he 
left his jail cell.72 White southerners viewed the championing by many in the North of the 
Brown ethos as a sign that they had little problem with his ultimate goal of creating 
another Haitian Revolution in the United State South. Their once trusted allies appeared 
to be embracing the greatest fear of slaveholders. The proslavery movement began to 
anticipate doom for the South if they lost control of the White House and the American 
military that had prevented Brown's planned insurrection from escalating.  
 The entire country seemed to feel as though John Brown's raid, capture, and 
eventual execution changed things. The election of 1860 would prove that sentiment 
right. The first sign of the collapse of American politics falling into pure sectionalism 
came in the form of the Democratic National Convention held in Charleston, South 
Carolina. In the wake of John Brown’s raid, the proslavery movement demanded more 
guarantees from the federal government to protect slavery in the territories. At the 
opening of Congress in 1859 Senator Jefferson Davis had issued a demand, which the 
Senate Democratic caucus adopted, that called for a congressional slave code fulfilling 
the Dred Scott ruling. As Democrats met in Charleston in 1860 for the Democratic 
national convention, Alabama delegates remembered their instructions to walk out of the 
convention if the Davis resolutions were not specifically included in the party's platform. 
The delegations of the South likewise vowed to block the nomination of the frontrunner,  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Stephen Douglas—the man who had helped pass the Compromise of 1850—if he failed 
to include a firm protection of slavery in the party's platform. Sectionalism reigned 
triumphant.73 
 The convention lasted ten days, and by its conclusion, the Democratic Party still 
had no nominee. When they reconvened in Baltimore, sectionalism still predominated, 
but this time the supporters of Douglas forced through his nomination. In protest, the 
proslavery southern delegations held their own, smaller convention, nominating Vice-
President John C. Breckinridge. The Democratic Party, like the Whigs less than a decade 
before, had collapsed under the weight of sectional tension. The United States of America 
no longer had a unified political party that could transcend sectional lines.74 
 For much of the early part of 1860 southern fire-eaters focused most of their 
political attacks on William H. Seward, the former senator and governor of New York 
who many presumed to be the frontrunner for the Republican nomination. For example, 
Edmund Ruffin, who would fire the first shot at Fort Sumter, published a book titled 
Anticipations of the Future that depicted a Seward presidency causing civil war and slave 
insurrection. An antislavery advocate, Seward had become infamous in the South for 
delivering a speech in which he deemed the conflict between freedom and slavery 
"irrepressible." For many in the proslavery movement, John Brown's attack was the 
logical outcome of prohibiting slavery in the West and in the nation's capital. Though 
Seward and other Republicans condemned Brown's Harpers Ferry raid, the notion 
prevailed in the North that he was too much of an antislavery radical to win. In May,  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when the party met in Chicago, the Republicans chose someone else—Abraham 
Lincoln—because he was considered a moderate who had argued against slavery from 
the legacy of the Founding Fathers, whom he believed had overwhelmingly been opposed 
the extension of slavery. In response, Ruffin simply replaced the name of Seward with 
Lincoln—the ardent proslavery advocates saw no difference.75 
 Though he spoke as though he did not want to influence slavery where it already 
existed, both Abraham Lincoln and his proslavery critics understood that his goal was to 
end slavery in the United States. Historian Jonathan Earle has written, "A key to 
Southerners believing that Republican victory would mean a certain end to their 'peculiar 
institution' was because so many Republicans made this very point, repeatedly and 
unceasingly." In the speech that had made him famous and likely gave him the 
nomination, Lincoln stated that the right to own slaves was not directly protected in the 
Constitution. Years earlier, Massachusetts Senator Harry Wilson had explained the plan 
of the Republicans if they assumed control of the federal government: "We shall blot out 
slavery from the national capital. We shall surround the slave states with a cordon of free 
states. We shall then appeal to the hearts of men and consciences of men and in a few 
years we shall give liberty to millions in bondage."76 If not as immediate as Wilson 
declared, Lincoln planned to do the same. For decades southerners had linked the 
expansion of slavery with its existence in the slave states; antislavery northerners had 
finally done the same. 
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   In 1860, the perfect storm finally arose. Given the sectional division of the 
Democrats, the Republican Party, with its platform of preventing the expansion of slavery 
into the West, won the presidency and control of the House of Representatives. The election of Abraham Lincoln—the first Wilmot Proviso supporter to become president—directly caused the secession crisis led by South Carolina, the state most fearful of a large slave revolt.  Unlike during the Nullification Crisis or the Nashville Convention, other southern states had felt such a growing fear of the restriction of slavery in the West that they followed the Palmetto State out of the Union.   The roots of the proslavery reaction to Abraham Lincoln's election stretched all the way back to the southern response to the Haitian Revolution and the fear of slave insurrection that had initially gripped the South in the 1790s. South Carolina's declaration of causes that addressed why they had seceded specifically invoked the fear of slave rebellion as a major reason for their separation from the Union. The secessionists wrote, "We affirm that these ends for which this Government was instituted have been defeated, and the Government itself has been made destructive of them by the nonslaveholding states....They have encouraged and assisted thousands of our slaves to leave their homes; and those who remain, have been incited by emissaries, books, and pictures to servile insurrection."77 With a Republican in control of the White House, proslavery southerners believed that instigation of the slave population, led by "fanatics" who wished to see the South punished for its sin of slavery, would become more prevalent. 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 South Carolinians argued that without the support of slavery in the federal government, their entire society would collapse into violent racial warfare, as had been discussed since the beginning of the century. They charged that Republicans gaining control over the machinery of national government had in effect declared "that the South shall be excluded from the common Territory; that Judicial Tribunals shall be made sectional, and that a war must be waged against slavery until it shall cease throughout the United States." For decades proslavery politicians had argued that without expansion, slavery would end in the bloodshed of race war. Without the commitment of northerners to protect their southern brethren from a growing slave population hemmed in by free soil, the secessionists believed "the slaveholding States will no longer have the power of self‐government, or self‐protection, and the Federal Government will have become their enemy."78  Slaveholders believed that with Lincoln in charge, the South would slowly become more like Jamaica, a mere colony to the North that no longer had a say in its own affairs, dependent on a president who did not support their slave society to protect them in times of danger.79 
 For proslavery southerners, it did not matter if Lincoln was a moderate or a 
"fanatic." What mattered was their belief that the new president would not prosecute 
abolitionists who threatened the South or help the South if "outside agitators" did indeed 
spark an insurrection. This belief would stay with the slaveholding South up until the 
Civil War. One secessionist commissioner from North Carolina, sent to other slave states  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in order to help unify the South in secession, claimed in the early days of secession that 
"to impair the value of slave property in the States by unfriendly legislation" would 
"render the institution itself dangerous to us, as slaves increase, to abandon it, or be 
doomed to servile war."80 Another secessionist made this point clear at the Virginia 
convention gathered to debate whether or not the Old Dominion should remain in the 
Union. He stated, "Expansion with us, [however], is a question of existence. The races 
cannot be amalgamated; they cannot be severed, their diffusion, under such 
circumstances, over an area which will prevent a dangerous superiority, in any section, or 
at any point, of the black race, is a necessity of our position, and essential to the 
preservation of our civilization itself."81   Without trustworthy allies in the North on the issue of slavery, many southerners feared the physical destruction of their society.  The Union that so many southerners in the 1830s saw as exceptional now looked, in 1860, to be no different from the English Parliament that had banned slavery in the Caribbean. For decades proslavery theorists had warned that any attempt to regulate slavery at the federal level would eventually result in the ending of slavery. Now, the antislavery majority ruled the day. Republicans believed that federal authority over the western territories would allow them to slowly destroy slavery by strangling it to death. That attack on slavery, secessionists believed, undermined the Constitution and everything that had made the American form of government different from the rest                                                         
80 Charles B. Dew, Apostles of Disunion: Southern Secession Commissioners and the Causes of the Civil 
War (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2001): 34-35. 
81 Showdown in Virginia: The 1861 Convention and the Fate of the Union, eds. William W. Freehling and 
Craig M. Simpson (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2010): 64-65. 
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of the world. They also anticipated that in the death throes of slavery the slave states would become engulfed in racial warfare, as had happened in the Haitian Revolution, while whites in the North, who "fanatically" supported the destruction of the South's peculiar institution, sat idly by, doing nothing to help.   Radical proslavery supporters expressed exasperation about radical abolitionists gaining control of the mechanisms of the national government and hindering federal protection of southern slavery. Southerners were well aware of the dangers of holding millions of people in slavery and feared a Haitian-style revolution 
in North America. Being surrounded by free soil, with a Commander-in-Chief who they 
believed would not assist them during an insurrection, became too much to bear for the 
fervent supporters of the proslavery movement. By telling all white southerners that 
Republicans threatened not just slavery but their homes by promoting insurrection, they 
were able to gain favor in the South. During the debate over secession in Virginia, for 
example, one delegate claimed, "It is no longer safe for a slave State to remain under that 
government."  Safety was the top priority. This Virginia radical stated, "Take the history 
of the abolitionized Governments and it is a history of abolitionized people.  Look at 
England, France, Denmark, and at their magnificent Colonies; the pearls of the Antilles, 
sacrificed without remorse." Numerous secessionists referenced Jamaica and Haiti in 
comparison to American slavery in the slave states.82 Haiti had never left the 
consciousness of the South from the late eighteenth century onward.  
 The Constitution deemed so exceptional in the 1830s because it granted power to                                                         
82 Ibid., 29 See also Jon, L. Wakelyn, ed., Southern Pamphlets On Secession: November 1860-April 1861 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996): 186. 
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slaveholders in America, making them different than their Caribbean counterparts, had 
now fallen aside, they believed. Southern planters weighed the likelihood of civil war 
with the North against the uncertainty of staying in a Union controlled by an antislavery 
political party. Honestly or not, secessionists offered a choice to the southern people that 
built on decades of history and fear: risk war with the North and its growing antislavery 
movement by leaving the Union, or prepare to face the uprising of their own enslaved 
population as the federal government came under control of "fanatics" who hoped to end 
slavery by any means necessary. In April 1861, sparked by the desperate decision of a 
fearful proslavery movement, the cannons would be fired at Fort Sumter. The long-
prophesied war finally came to the United States of America. 
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